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ABSTRACT 
 
While scholarship on the modern Civil Rights Movement has emphasized the centrality of the 
Black church, popular and scholarly accounts of Black Power portray a movement marked by a 
profound de-Christianization. Soul Power upends this prevailing narrative, arguing that the Black 
church played a sustained and pivotal role in the Black Power Movement at its central flashpoint, 
Cairo, Illinois, a city identified by contemporaries as the site of the nation’s “longest protracted 
struggle” for racial justice. This dissertation explores how activists working within Cairo’s 
leading Black Power organization, the United Front, reworked the religious discourses and 
institutions that had anchored earlier civil rights struggles and provided access to the Black 
church’s tremendous organizational resources. Seizing upon emergent trends in Black Theology, 
the United Front developed a distinctive spiritual philosophy that legitimized the organization’s 
political program and unified movement participants. In turn, prominent Black clergy assisted 
the United Front in leveraging much needed resources from mainline denominations and 
ecumenical organizations operating at the state and national level. As support for traditional civil 
rights organizations waned and faith in the War on Poverty dwindled, this dissertation shows that 
churches became a significant, albeit overlooked, source of coalitional support for the Black 
Power Movement. However, as conservative political agendas established their dominance in the 
early 1970s, this heavy reliance upon church revenues, particularly that of predominantly white 
denominations, left Black Power organizations acutely vulnerable to state repression and shifting 
sentiments within the church itself.
 iii 
 
 
 
To friends and allies. 
 
 
iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
Writing this dissertation has been a solitary endeavor, but one in which I have incurred many 
debts. Financial support came from a number of sources, including the University of Illinois 
Graduate College, the History Department, the Department of African American Studies, the 
Doris G. Quinn Foundation, the Illinois Historic Preservation Agency, and the Illinois State 
Historical Society. Staff at the History Department, including Tom Bedwell, Jan Langendorf, and 
Elaine Sampson, also provided invaluable administrative support.   
My research also benefited significantly from the guidance of librarians and archivists at 
the African American Research Center and the Illinois History and Lincoln Collections at the 
University of Illinois, the Special Collections Research Center at Southern Illinois University, 
the Cairo Public Library, the Vivian G. Harsh Research Collection of Afro-American History 
and Literature at the Chicago Public Library, the Chicago Historical Society, the Abraham 
Lincoln Presidential Library, the Illinois State Archives, the General Commission on Archives 
and History of the United Methodist Church, the Schomburg Center for Research in Black 
Culture, the National Archives, and the Library of Congress. Special thanks are due to the staff at 
Cairo City Hall who graciously allowed me to use their facilities during numerous research trips 
to the city. 
 For the privilege of engaging in intellectual labor I am indebted to many excellent 
teachers. During the early years, Max Keen inspired a passion for learning and history while 
Sarah O’Flynn instilled self-confidence and hope. At King’s College London, I had the honor of 
working under the supervision of John Howard whose excellence in teaching and scholarship set 
a high bar to which I continue to aspire. Since arriving at the University of Illinois in 2005, I 
v 
have also benefited from the patience and guidance of my dissertation committee: Clarence 
Lang, Mark Leff, James R. Barrett, Sundiata Keita Cha-Jua, Angela Dillard, and David 
Roediger. During my first semesters, Dr. Barrett imparted a deep appreciation for the value and 
power of “bottom-up” social histories that continues to guide my work. It was Dr. Cha-Jua that 
pointed me toward the Cairo case study and in his introductory Black Studies course that I began 
to explore the scholarship on the relationship between Black Theology and Black Power for the 
first time. Having spent periods of their own lives in Cairo, Dr. Cha Jua and Dr. Roediger 
provided helpful insights into the community and local organizing traditions. During the research 
phase, Dr. Dillard encouraged my exploration of Black Power’s church-based donors, directing 
me to the IFCO records as a potentially fruitful resource. Drafts of chapters were also presented 
to the History Department’s dissertation writing workshop, including Sally Heinzel, Ryan Jones, 
Bruce Levine, Megan McLaughlin, Joel Miyasaki, Martin Smith, and Troy Smith.  
I am especially beholden to my co-advisors – Clarence Lang and Mark Leff - whose 
intellectual rigor and breadth of knowledge continues to both inspire and challenge me. Dr. Leff 
brought me into the history profession, encouraging me to apply for graduate school and serving 
as my mentor and friend for almost a decade. Dr. Lang’s courses solidified African American 
Studies as my intellectual home and grounded me in the scholarships that inform this 
dissertation. Both spent countless hours reading over drafts and providing regular and extensive 
feedback. Equally as important, both avidly supported my own participation in local struggles for 
racial and social justice viewing the relationship between scholarship and activism as a 
generative one.  
 As I labored over this dissertation, I gained support and guidance from many other 
excellent friends, allies, and colleagues who are similarly committed to putting their intellectual 
vi 
labor into dynamic conversation with contemporary struggles. Back home in London, I am 
particularly indebted to a cohort of dynamic and like-minded women, including Jo Burgin, 
Sophia Khan, Clare McLeish, Althea Legal-Miller, Adeola Sheehy-Adekale, and Claudine Vega. 
At Illinois I was fortunate to be welcomed into a number of different intellectual and activist 
communities that helped mentor and sustain me over the long haul. Early on, Ken Salo served as 
a bridge between campus and community offering important lessons on the responsibility of 
activist scholars. It was in Dr. Salo’s class that I was introduced to members of the Champaign-
Urbana Citizens for Peace and Justice who provided me with a second education on building 
movements for racial change. Particular thanks are owed to Carol and Aaron Ammons, Deacon 
Clayborne, Brian Dolinar, Belden Fields, and Martel Miller. An invaluable component of this 
second education came from my brothers and sisters in the local labor movement. There are too 
many folks here to list, but special mention is due to Treva Ellison, John Gergely, and Natalie 
Havlin for bringing me into the struggle and grounding me in a radical tradition of democratic 
grassroots unionism. I am extraordinarily blessed in that my closest intellectual peers were also 
my strongest political allies. My cohort in African American History at the University of Illinois 
is a dynamic, radical, and loving community that I leave with great sadness. We have shared the 
wonderful experience of studying and building social movements together. Much love and 
appreciation to you David Bates, Heidi Dodson, Ashley Howard, Anna Kurhajec, Stephanie 
Seawell, and Alonzo Ward.  
 Lastly, I would like to thank my family. Writing a dissertation is a transformative 
experience, but not always in positive ways. While I grew in some areas, I regressed in many 
others. Behind the scenes, I wasn’t always interesting, funny, or attractive. In fact, most of the 
time I was positively a pain to live with. Yet, I am blessed with a family that completely 
vii 
understands and supports me all the same. Thank you to my parents – Kevin and Ann Pimblott – 
for encouraging me to walk my own path, ask difficult questions, and be “obnoxious,” as 
someone once put it. Finally, thank you to Raymond Mitchell who has been my best friend and 
tireless partner throughout this process. Writing this dissertation has truly been a team effort. 
Over the past year, Ray has been forced to listen to me read entire chapters out loud ad nauseam. 
He always follows up with a series of irritating (pertinent) questions and an onslaught of savage 
criticism from which this dissertation has greatly benefited. When things got really bad, Ray 
locked me in my affectionately titled, “isolation chamber” for hours at a time refusing to let me 
leave until “the chapter is finished!” I am happy to say that it is now officially “finished” and we 
can finally talk about something else for a change.
viii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………...……………………………...1 
 
CHAPTER 1: ON JORDAN’S BANKS: THE ORIGINS OF COMMUNITY, FAITH AND 
STRUGGLE IN CAIRO, ILLINOIS………………….……………………………...………….29 
 
CHAPTER 2: REDEMPTIVE LOVE, VIGILANTE TERROR AND REBELLION: 
CAIRO IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS CAULDRON……………………………..………………….76 
 
CHAPTER 3: FROM THE SEMINARY TO THE STREETS: GRASSROOTS BLACK 
THEOLOGY AND THE FORGING OF A UNITED FRONT………………………………...141 
 
CHAPTER 4: STRAIGHT FROM THE OFFERING PLATE: CHURCH FUNDING AND 
THE CAIRO BLACK POWER MOVEMENT………………………………………………...206 
 
CHAPTER 5: “THE RECESSION OF NATIONAL SPIRIT”: THE DECLINE OF THE  
CAIRO BLACK POWER MOVEMENT…………………………..………………….............262 
 
CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………………....325 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………………335 
 
APPENDIX……………………………………………………………………………………..358 
 
  1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On March 13, 1971, the United Front (UF) – a nationally renowned Black Power organization 
based in Cairo, Illinois – published an article written by 16 year-old Oklahoman Karen Rice in 
its weekly paper the United Front News. In the article, entitled “The Movement, God and Me,” 
Rice testified to her political “awakening” while attending a Lutheran conference in Chicago. 
During the conference, attendees were encouraged to “get together with others of [their] own 
race and discover themselves as a group of people.” African American students joined together 
in forming a Black caucus called Black Youth Unlimited and, according to Rice, were 
“completely de-brainwashed” and “blackenized” by the experience. However, upon returning 
home to Tulsa, Rice struggled to find practical outlets for her heightened sense of racial 
consciousness. She joined a gospel troupe called the Ghetto Choir and began performing for 
embattled communities across the country but continued to have doubts about her role in the 
movement and, increasingly, doubts about the relevance of her Christian faith to the Black 
liberation struggle. “I knew that the choir was working through the hands of Jesus Christ,” she 
explained, “but I just was not sure if this was my role in the movement.” In particular, Rice 
struggled to reconcile her emergent sense of Black consciousness with popular conceptions of 
Christianity as the “white man’s religion.” “How can we believe in something that was taught to 
us by the white man?” Rice asked. “It seemed [as] though our oppressor had given us this 
religion called Christianity so that he could control us.” This, Rice explained, is probably “why 
black people have been a non-violent people for so long.”  
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However, in November 1970 Rice travelled with the Ghetto Choir to Cairo, Illinois, 
where her understanding of the relationship between African American Christianity and the 
Black Power Movement would be radically transformed. In Cairo, Rice experienced firsthand 
local Black Power activists proclaiming a reconstructed and relevant Black theology centered on 
the Black experience and committed to Black liberation. “After we visited this city,” Rice wrote, 
“I finally had found the answer that I have been looking for for over a year.” Far from 
abandoning the faith, Rice explained, local activists demonstrated “that the way to win this battle 
was by living the gospel preached in the Holy Bible.”1  
Penned at the height of the Black Power Movement (BPM), Karen Rice’s articulation of 
one African American girl’s personal struggle to reconcile her faith with the cause of Black 
liberation resonates with a set of broader concerns that emerged in movement circles during the 
course of the 1960s. Frustrated with the pace of change and critical of the notion that love, 
nonviolence, and redemptive suffering were viable strategies in the liberation of Black people, a 
new generation of Black Power activists questioned the Christian political philosophy that had 
underpinned the modern Civil Rights Movement, bringing to light longstanding fissures just 
beneath the surface of the fragile civil rights coalition.  
While major civil rights organizations like the Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
(SCLC) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) linked immediate 
demands for integration to longer-term spiritual visions of a “Beloved Community,” many 
activists who worked within or alongside these organizations had a more pragmatic interest in 
integration and grew increasingly skeptical of the reconciliationist rhetoric deployed by civil 
rights leaders. As SNCC leader Stokely Carmichael (a.k.a. Kwame Ture) put it, “I never saw my 
responsibility to be the moral and spiritual reclamation of some racist thug. I would settle for                                                         
1 Karen Rice, "The Movement, God and Me," United Front News, March 13, 1971. 
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changing his behavior period.”2 SNCC worker Cleveland Sellers agreed: “[W]e did not believe 
that we were fighting to create a morally straight America. We were essentially concerned with 
power. Integration was never seen as anything more than a means to an end.”3 For those who 
initially embraced reconciliationist thought, the steady specter of racial violence and the absence 
of state protection eventually came to undermine the Beloved Community’s realization and 
brought into question the utility of nonviolent strategies that had presumed the existence of a 
moral conscience to which the sins of white America could be appealed.4 In the wake of the 1963 
bombing of the 16th Street Baptist Church in Birmingham, Anne Moody, who had participated in 
the sit-ins, recalled vowing to God that she would “never be beaten by a white man again.” 
“Nonviolence is out,” Moody said, and if God heard from Martin Luther King any time soon he 
could go ahead and “tell him that nonviolence has served its purpose.”5  
While civil rights workers in the Deep South were losing the faith, poet and activist 
Amiri Baraka (a.k.a., LeRoi Jones) gave voice to Black youth growing up in the nation’s urban 
ghettoes, a world in which civil rights’ emphasis on the power of nonviolence and moral suasion 
simply did not register. “[W]e younger Blacks,” Baraka explained, “out of school or the service 
or in the factories and warehouses and docks knew being ‘righteous’ or ‘good’ had never 
worked, except if you could fight.” Thus, he argued, “the Christian essence of ‘the movement’ 
was lost to us.”6 During the late 1960s, youthful activists across the nation often echoed these 
frustrations, casting aside the Christian underpinnings of earlier civil rights struggles in favor of                                                         
2 Wesley C. Hogan, Many Minds, One Heart: SNCC’s Dream for a New America (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina, 2007), 36.  
3 Cleveland Sellers and Robert L. Terrell, The River of No Return: The Autobiography of a Black Militant and the 
Life and Death of SNCC (New York: Morrow, 1973), 147.  
4 Scholars of the Civil Rights Movement have long acknowledged that nonviolent strategies could operate both 
through appeals to the conscience and through the application of social or economic pressure in the form of 
boycotts. I am emphasizing the moral appeal here not to obscure the diversity of positions held by civil rights 
activists but rather to reflect how critics of nonviolence often flattened these debates during the mid-1960s. 
5 Anne Moody, Coming of Age in Mississippi (New York: Laurel Press, 1968), 317-318. 
6 Amiri Baraka, “From Parks to Marxism: A Political Evolution,” Crisis 105, no. 6 (Dec., 1998), 21.  
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greater tactical flexibility and what Black Panther Party (BPP) leader Huey P. Newton called “a 
more concrete understanding of social conditions,” rooted less in the Bible than in the works of 
political radicals like Karl Marx, Mao Tse-Tung, Frantz Fanon, and Malcolm X.7  
As movement participants questioned whether strategies rooted in Christian discourses 
could facilitate Black liberation, others audaciously contended that Christianity was in fact the 
primary instrument of African Americans oppression. Strident critiques of Christianity came 
from the Nation of Islam (NOI), an organization that had garnered considerable support among 
working-class African Americans in northern cities. The organization’s leader, Elijah 
Muhammad, a former Baptist minister, spoke directly to African Americans like Rice, who had 
come of age in the Black church.8 Christianity, according to Muhammad, was a religion 
“organized and backed by the devils [white people] for the purpose of making slaves of black 
mankind.” Muhammad explained how Christianity enslaved Blacks by offering an 
“otherworldly” faith that promoted love for the enemy over love and protection of self and 
community.9   
In the early 1960s, Elijah Muhammad’s teachings on Christianity were translated to a 
national audience by his best-known student, Malcolm X (a.k.a, El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz). In a 
1963 interview Malcolm spoke to the sea change in consciousness he saw taking place in many 
urban communities: “The black masses that are waking up don’t believe in Christianity anymore. 
All it’s done for black men is help to keep them slaves.” “Intelligent black men today,” Malcolm 
asserted, “are interested in a religious doctrine that offers a solution to their problems right now, 
                                                        
7 Huey P. Newton, Revolutionary Suicide (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), 71. 
8 The term “Black Church” can be deployed in several different ways. In this dissertation, I use the term to reference 
Black Christians and predominantly black congregations whether they belong to a historically Black or 
predominantly white denomination.  
9 Mark L. Chapman, Christianity on Trial: African American Religious Thought before and after Black Power 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1996), 42.  
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right here on this earth, while they are alive.”10 Although only a relative handful of African 
Americans would follow Malcolm X into the NOI, theologian Gayraud Wilmore contends that 
many “believed he spoke the truth about Christianity being a religion for White people” and 
turned their backs on the Black church.11  
This broader historical context has led Black Freedom Studies scholars such as historian 
Judson L. Jeffries to claim that Christianity simply “did not figure as prominently in the Black 
Power Movement as it did in the Civil Rights Movement.” While local Black Power activists 
may have been churchgoers, Jeffries insists that “[n]one of the commonly known leaders of the 
movement manifested a positive view of Christianity.”12 Indeed, while scholarship on the 
modern Civil Rights Movement’s “heroic phase” has emphasized the centrality of African-
American religious institutions and beliefs to effective movement mobilization,13 popular and 
scholarly accounts of Black Power often portray a movement marked by a profound de-
Christianization.14  As the dominant ideologies, strategies, and tactics of Black liberation 
struggles shifted from integration to Black nationalism, interracial cooperation to self-                                                        
10 Malcolm X, interview by Alex Haley, Playboy, May 1963, reprinted in David Gallen, Malcolm X: As They Knew 
Him (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995), 109-130. 
11 Wilmore quote taken from, Chapman, Christianity on Trial, 70. 
12 J. L. Jeffries, Black Power in the Belly of the Beast (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006), 8. 
13 Two landmark works on the Black church in the modern Civil Rights Movement are Aldon D. Morris, The 
Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change (New York: Free Press, 1984) 
and Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1982). Both Morris and McAdam focus on the invaluable organization resources that the Black church 
provided to civil rights struggles, including: charismatic leadership, financial resources, pre-existing membership-
base, communication networks, meeting spaces, and, administrative facilities. More recently, scholars have also 
explored the transformative effect of religious worldviews on the ideologies and activism of specific organizations 
and grassroots activists. Such works include Charles Marsh, The Beloved Community: How Faith Shapes Social 
Justice, from the Civil Rights Movement to Today (New York: Basic Books, 2005); Johnny E. Williams, African 
American Religion and the Civil Rights Movement in Arkansas (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2003); and 
Johnny E. Williams, “Linking Beliefs to Collective Action: Politicized Religious Beliefs and the Civil Rights 
Movement,” Sociological Forum 17, no. 2 (Jun., 2002): 203-222. 
14 Religious Studies scholar Gayraud Wilmore coined the term “de-Christianization” in Black Religion and Black 
Radicalism: An Interpretation of the Religious History of Afro-American People, 2nd ed., (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 
Books, 1983). For accounts that characterize the shift from Civil Rights to Black Power as the de-Christianization of 
the movement see, Gayraud S. Wilmore, ed., African American Religious Studies: An Interdisciplinary Anthology, 
4th ed., (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2000), 182; Charles Marsh, God’s Long Summer: Stories of Faith 
and Civil Rights (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); Charles Marsh, The Beloved Community. 
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determination, and nonviolence to armed self-defense, scholars contend that the legitimacy of 
Christian discourses and the organizational significance of the Black church was undermined, 
particularly among the young, working-class populations whose frustrations reverberated in a 
series of urban rebellions that swept the country between 1963 and 1968. Some have gone so far 
as to suggest that Black Power’s abandonment of its spiritual moorings contributed to the 
movement’s declension by “jettisoning… the moral and social anchors that had helped regulate 
relationships among activists” and alienating important coalitional allies.15  
 
Black Power, the Black Church, and African American Christianity 
 
Karen Rice’s story – like those of many lesser-known Black Power activists – raises 
important questions about Black Power’s de-Christianization and bolsters recent calls from 
scholars in the emergent subfield of Black Power Studies to probe more deeply the relationship 
between the Black church, African American Christianity, and the Black Power Movement.16 
While studies of Black Power struggles in cities like Baltimore and Detroit have tended to note 
the continued participation of Black churches, clergy, and laypersons, there has been little 
sustained analysis of the character, extent, or significance of the Black church’s involvement or 
the broader influence, if any, of African American Christian discourses to movement 
mobilization.17  
                                                        
15 Charles M. Payne, I’ve Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom 
Struggle (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 366. 
16 See, Peniel E. Joseph, “The Black Power Movement: A State of the Field,” The Journal of American History 96, 
no. 3 (Dec., 2009): 751-776, and “Perspectives on the New Black Power Scholarship,” (paper presented at the 93rd 
Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of African American Life and History, Birmingham, Ala., October 
2008). 
17 Rhonda Williams and Angela Dillard have underscored the role of Black clergy in the Black Power Movement in 
Baltimore and Detroit respectively. See Rhonda Y. Williams, “Black Women, Urban Politics, and Engendering 
Black Power,” in The Black Power Movement: Rethinking the Civil Rights-Black Power Era, ed. Peniel E. Joseph 
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 This neglect is particularly surprising considering that scholars in the field of African 
American Religious Studies have consistently acknowledged the transformative effects of Black 
Power on the Black church and African American theological traditions.18 While many in church 
circles disavowed Black Power as a betrayal of the Christian principles that had underpinned 
earlier civil rights struggles, others saw the movement’s call for racial unity, cooperation, and the 
establishment of autonomous institutions as offering valuable lessons that demanded the 
attention of urban ministers and Black theologians alike. The widespread interest of African 
American clergy in Black power was manifest in the explosion of Black caucuses established 
within predominantly white denominations during this period. Through caucuses, African 
American ministers were able to secure a more significant role in denominational decision-
making as well as gain control of committees devoted to addressing issues of race and poverty.19  
In 1966, efforts to solidify Black clergy’s power culminated in the formation of the National 
Conference of Black Churchmen (NCBC), an ecumenical body that, according to theologian 
Gayraud Wilmore, was committed to mobilizing “the increasing number of radical black 
ministers in the northern cities as a more strategic and aggressive leadership for the next phase of 
the struggle.”20 The following year, the Interreligious Foundation for Community Organizations 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
(New York: Routledge, 2006): 79-104; Angela D. Dillard, Faith in the City: Preaching Radical Social Change in 
Detroit (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2007). A more general examination of Black Theology and 
the Black Power Movement is provided by William L. Van Deburg, New Day in Babylon: The Black Power 
Movement and American Culture, 1965-1975 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
18 I am going to reserve my discussion here to the immediate impact of the Black Power Movement on the Black 
Church during the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, the longer-term impact of the Black Power Movement on 
the Black Church has been assessed in C. Eric Lincoln and Lawrence H. Mamiya, The Black Church in the African 
American Experience (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990). 
19 For more on Black caucuses see, Peter C. Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 1930-1975 (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 2004), 201; Gayraud S. Wilmore, Pragmatic Spirituality: The Christian Faith through 
an Africentric Lens (NY: New York University, 2004), 191-192; Mary R. Sawyer, Black Ecumenism: Implementing 
the Demands of Justice (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1994). 
20 Quote taken from Wilmore, Pragmatic Spirituality, 188-189. For more on the National Conference of Black 
Churchmen (NCBC), see Sawyer, Black Ecumenism, 66-87; Anthony B. Pinn, The Black Church in the Post-Civil 
Rights Era (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 2002), 15; Robert S. Lecky and Elliott Wright, Black Manifesto: 
Religion, Racism, and Reparations (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), 7; Lincoln and Mamiya, The Black Church 
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(IFCO), an ecumenical funding agency, was established to extend financial aid to social 
movement organizations working to address poverty and racism in communities across the 
country.21 Through these bodies, African American clergy and laypeople endeavored to render 
the church relevant to the struggles of Black communities by leveraging the tremendous 
organizational resources of their denominations and developing a systematic Black theology 
centered on the Black experience and committed to Black liberation. The latter would be the 
Black church movement’s most prominent legacy of the 1960s and early 1970s.22 
While a number of studies have demonstrated the transformative effect of Black Power 
on the Black church and African American theological traditions, what is less clear is the impact 
these emergent Black caucuses, ecumenical bodies, and theologies had upon local Black Power 
struggles. Religious studies scholars have generally downplayed the influence of these new 
developments in the Black church, arguing that Black caucuses and ecumenical bodies lacked the 
necessary coordination and support to sustain Black Power struggles in the manner that SCLC 
had during the Civil Rights Movement.23 Furthermore, scholars contend that despite its radical 
potential, Black Theology’s influence was largely confined to seminaries and universities.24 
“Ironically,” Gayraud Wilmore explains, “the first Black Church movement that was able to 
sponsor and propagate an authentic black theology was unable to concretize and activate that 
theology in the places where it would have made a palpable difference.” However, the legitimacy 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
in the African American Experience, 192-193; Dwight N. Hopkins, “A Transatlantic Comparison of a Black 
Theology of Liberation,” in Freedom’s Distant Shores: American Protestants and Postcolonial Alliances with 
Africa, ed. R. Drew Smith (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2006), 85-85. 
21 For more on the Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization (IFCO), see Lecky and Wright, Black 
Manifesto, 7-11; Wilmore, Pragmatic Spirituality, 195, 296; Sawyer, Black Ecumenism, 84-86. 
22 For early works in Black Theology, see Albert B. Cleage, Black Christian Nationalism: New Directions for the 
Black Church (New York: W. Morrow, 1972); Albert B. Cleage, The Black Messiah (New York: Sheed and Ward, 
1968); James H. Cone, Black Theology and Black Power (New York: Seabury Press, 1969). 
23 Wilmore, Pragmatic Spirituality, 193-194. 
24 Dale P. Andrews, Practical Theology for Black Churches: Bridging Black Theology and African American Folk 
Religion (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2002), 23. 
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of such claims is undercut by the paucity of studies addressing the impact of these emergent 
Black caucuses, ecumenical bodies, and theologies at the local level during the Black Power 
Movement.25   
Accordingly, in Soul Power, I combine the approaches of Black Power Studies with the 
findings of African American Religious Studies to probe the changing role and relationship of 
African American Christian institutions, beliefs, and rituals to the Black Freedom Movement in 
Cairo, Illinois. Central to this study are four research questions: (1) How and why was the 
dominant Civil Rights discourse of racial reconciliation and nonviolence in Cairo affected by the 
urban rebellions and shift to Black Power approaches during the late 1960s? (2) How did local 
Black Power activists in the city transform existing theologies to meet the changing social and 
political realities of their historical moment? (3) What role did this transformed vision of the 
Black church and African American Christianity play in the local Black Power Movement? (4) 
How did local Cairo activists translate the new Black Theology into an ideology to guide their 
movement? 
In the process of addressing these questions, Soul Power makes several claims about the 
relationship between Black Power, the Black Church, and African American Christianity. At the 
broadest level, Soul Power troubles dominant conceptions of Black Power’s de-Christianization 
by demonstrating the sustained and pivotal role played by the Black church and African 
American Christian discourses to movement mobilization in Cairo. While the changing political 
and economic realities of the Black Power era were disruptive to the dominant Civil Rights 
ideology and coalition, Soul Power demonstrates that Black religious discourses and institutions 
continued to provide the basis for a coherent movement culture, unifying ideology, and renewed 
access to the Black church’s tremendous organizational resources.                                                          
25 Wilmore, Pragmatic Spirituality, 194. 
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 More specifically, Soul Power shows that in their efforts to construct a viable Black 
Power Movement, activists in the Cairo United Front forged important connections with 
nationally prominent Black theologians, urban ministers, and their affiliated organizations.  
Taking advantage of the political opportunity provided by the urban rebellions, the United Front 
partnered with Black church executives in exerting pressure on predominantly white 
denominations to render the church relevant to Black liberation by extending their tremendous 
organizational resources to local Black power organizations. Between 1969 and 1974, these 
efforts were remarkably successful, resulting in the transfer of more than $500,000 in grants to 
the United Front as well as extensive lobbying, consultancy, and legal support. Grant awarding 
bodies, including the Interreligious Foundation for Community Organizations (IFCO), the 
Episcopal Church’s General Convention Special Program, and the Presbyterian Church’s 
National Committee on the Self-Development of People, extended critical resources that 
sustained the United Front’s daily operations and political programming. In contrast to federal or 
corporate support, church-based grants were malleable and extended with relatively few strings, 
making them particularly attractive to Black Power activists. As a result, churches made critical 
contributions to those components of the United Front’s operations that a governmental or 
corporate agency would not support, including, staff salaries, office space, travel expenses, and 
bail bond. Further, church-based organizations extended seed-money for the initiation of the 
United Front’s community development programs, increasing the likelihood that such initiatives 
would eventually receive state and federal governmental awards. As financial support for major 
civil rights organizations declined during the 1960s, these new resources proved invaluable and 
ensured that churches would be the United Front’s primary source of funding.  
  11 
In a period of conservative re-ascendancy, however, this heavy reliance upon 
predominantly white denominations left the United Front acutely vulnerable to shifting political 
sentiments. An upsurge of opposition among white lay people; the emergence of an organized 
conservative opposition within denominational hierarchies; and the growing popularity of 
evangelical and fundamentalist alternatives, all contributed to a significant decline in mainline 
denominational support for the United Front after 1972. Internal opposition to Black clergy’s 
social justice activities was compounded by pressure from state actors including, most 
significantly, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the FBI, which quickly mobilized to cut off 
funding for Black Power struggles. Thus, Soul Power demonstrates the overlooked role that 
churches played in both the rise and decline of Black Power struggles. 
In the transition from Civil Rights to Black Power, local activists called upon the Black 
church movement not only to provide important organizational resources, but also to help  
rework the movement’s dominant ideologies, strategies and tactics. Far from being disconnected 
from the emergent Black Theology, United Front leaders engaged the latest theological literature, 
invited Black theologians to speak at their weekly rallies, and sent potential local leaders for 
training in Black Theology at seminaries and universities across the country. From this dynamic 
interaction with a national movement, local activists in Cairo were able to develop a distinctive 
grassroots Black theology, that served to legitimate their conception of white America as a 
hopelessly corrupt and immoral society that valued capitalist accumulation over Black lives. 
Popularly referred to as “Soulism” or “Soul Power,”26 this grassroots theology solidified support                                                         
26 Reverend Charles Koen utilized the term “Soul,” “Soulism,” and “Soul Power“ to distinguish between the United 
Front’s spiritual philosophy of mutuality and cooperation and its negative counterpart in American individualism, 
materialism, and militarism. United Front members would often shout “Soul” or “Soul Power” in chorus. For 
example, see “How Long Must We Wait?” United Front News, September 12, 1970; “Blacks Vote Boycott On,” 
United Front News, September 26, 1970; “New Cairo March a Tense Standoff,” United Front News, December 19, 
1970; J. Anthony Lukas, “Bad Day At Cairo, Ill.” New York Times Magazine, February 21, 1971. The chant “Soul 
Power” was first used by Operation Breadbasket’s leader Jesse Jackson during the Poor People’s Campaign in 1968 
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for the United Front’s strategic and tactical focus on armed self-defense and the development of 
autonomous parallel institutions grounded in an alternative Black value system of cooperation 
and collectivity. The dynamic relationship between Black Theology and the United Front’s 
political programming was far from unique and challenges scholars’ assumption that Black 
Theology was primarily an academic pursuit that failed to influence local Black churches and 
communities.  For a brief period at the end of the 1960s and the start of the 1970s, the interaction 
of local struggles with Black Theology produced a plurality of popular grassroots theologies that 
facilitated and legitimized church involvement in the Black Power Movement while providing 
the ideational framework for movement mobilization. In this manner, Black Theology in the 
United States may have had more in common with its Latin American counterpart, Liberation 
Theology, than has been previously assumed.  
 Implicit in these claims is Soul Power’s contention that the involvement of the Black 
church and African American Christian discourses in movement mobilization was neither 
inevitable nor complete, but rather was contingent upon the discursive labor and organizational 
pressures applied by activists with feet in both the church and social movement organizations. In 
staking this claim, Soul Power challenges traditional portrayals of the Black church as an 
“otherworldly” distraction or a liberatory organic source of social protest by situating the Black 
church as a complex and heterogeneous institution capable of sustaining multiple and divergent 
ideological traditions simultaneously.27  As historian Charles Payne argues, “there is nothing 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
as a spiritual alternative to “Black Power” that was flexible enough to incorporate poor people irrespective of race 
and ethnicity. See “Poor People Vow Last Peaceful March in Plea for Aid From Congress,” Jet, July 4, 1968. The 
term was later immortalized by James Brown on his live album Revolution of the Mind: Recorded Live at the 
Apollo, Polydor, 1971. 27 The quietist tendencies of Black religion are emphasized in most of the early scholarship on Black religion 
performed by African American sociologists and historians. See Carter G. Woodson, The History of the Negro 
Church (Washington D.C., Associated Publishers, 1945), 224-233; E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro Church in 
America, (New York: Schocken Books, 1974), 51, 56; Joseph R. Washington, The Politics of God (Boston: Beacon 
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inherently conservative about the Church… its message can as easily be packaged in order-
threatening as in order-serving ways.”28 Accordingly, securing the participation of Black 
churches in movement mobilization required that activists work within the parameters of these 
existing traditions, re-packaging dominant ideologies or recovering subjugated ones. 
Acknowledging this important but often obscured labor is particularly important in light of the 
tendency to both exaggerate and romanticize the involvement of the Black church in popular and 
scholarly accounts of the Civil Rights Movement.29 The assumption that connections between 
the Black church and the modern Civil Rights Movement were obvious and essential has been 
challenged by studies showing that the majority of African American clergy failed to participate 
and, in fact, often opposed the idea of Black church involvement in social protest.30 Historian 
Allison Calhoun-Brown offers an important corrective when she states that “the movement did 
not rise from the church” but that “the resources and ministers of the church had to be actively 
recruited into the movement.”31  
At root, therefore, Soul Power is concerned with how grassroots activists recruited and 
sustained Black church, clerical, and lay support for Black power struggles at the local, state, and 
national levels. In my examination of this labor, I rely heavily upon approaches developed by 
scholars of social movement theory. Social movement theorists have demonstrated that while 
grievances are ever-present they do not automatically lead to collective action. Thus, they have                                                                                                                                                                                   
Cross, 1967); Gunnar Myrdal in An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, 2nd ed., (New 
York: Harper & Brothers, 1944). 
28 Payne, I’ve Got the Light of Freedom, 274. 
29 For criticism of the tendency to romanticize and exaggerate church and clergy participation in the Civil Rights 
Movement, see Ronny E. Turner, “The Black Minister: Uncle Tom or Abolitionist?” Phylon 34, no. 1 (1973): 86-95; 
Adolph Reed, The Jesse Jackson Phenomenon: The Crisis of Purpose in Afro-American Politics (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1986). 
30 See Adam Fairclough, “The Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the Second Reconstruction, 1957-
1973,” South Atlantic Quarterly 80 (1981), 183; William Brink and Louis Harris, Black and White: A Study of U.S. 
Racial Attitudes Today (New York: Simon Schuster, 1967); Payne, I’ve Got the Light of Freedom, 191.  
31Allison Calhoun-Brown, “Upon This Rock: The Black Church, Nonviolence, and the Civil Rights Movement,” 
PS: Political Science and Politics 33, no.2 (Jun., 2000), 172. 
  14 
pointed to the importance of political opportunities and organizational resources in facilitating 
movement mobilization.32 However, while expanded political opportunities and organizational 
strength provide the structural potential for a movement, they do not in themselves make a 
movement. As political scientist Doug McAdam argues, “Mediating between opportunity and 
action are people and the subjective meanings they attach to their situations.”33 Therefore, 
Calhoun-Brown argues, “much of the work done by a social movement organization involves, 
literally, making meanings and communicating the appropriate mobilizing messages to its 
constituents.”34 In sociological literature, this process of “making meaning” is called framing and 
it is one of the most important jobs performed by activists working within social movement 
organizations. Framing, more precisely defined, is the process by which a social movement 
organization links individual and group grievances to a broader interpretative framework that 
helps potential participants understand their experience, recognize that it is unjust, and envision 
specific ways in which they remedy it collectively.35 Scholars have indicated that the success of 
such movements often hinges on the ability of organizations to deploy frames that resonate with 
potential participants and coalitional bodies.36 
During the emergent stages of the modern Civil Rights Movement, developing frames 
that resonated with potential participants required engaging with widely held religious beliefs                                                         
32 See, McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency; Morris, The Origins of the Civil 
Rights Movement. 
33 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 48. 
34 Calhoun-Brown, "Upon This Rock: The Black Church, Nonviolence, and the Civil Rights Movement," 171. 
35 For key works on Frame Theory, see Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of 
Experience (New York: Harper and Row, 1974); David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, Robert 
D. Benford, “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” American Sociological 
Review 51, no. 4 (Aug., 1986): 464-481; Robert D. Benford and David Snow, “Framing Processes and Social 
Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000): 611-639; William A. Gamson 
and David S. Meyer, “The Framing of Political Opportunity,” in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements ed. 
Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 275-290; 
Doug McAdam, “The Framing Function of Movement Tactics: Strategic Dramaturgy in the American Civil Rights 
Movement,” in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, 223-55. 
36 Snow, Rochford, et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” 464-481. 
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and the centrality of the Black church to African American communities. According to 
McAdam, as expanded political opportunities and “indigenous” organizational strength 
converged during the postwar era they brought into question dominant “otherworldly” theologies 
that had served to inhibit political engagement. “It was a religion of containment,” sociologist 
Aldon Morris contends, “the opiate of the masses, a religion that soothed the pains of economic, 
political and social exploitation.”37 The transformation of this dominant religious ideology – a 
process McAdam has called “cognitive liberation,” was vital to the emergence of the modern 
Civil Rights Movement. According to Morris, a new generation of “militant” ministers including 
Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., played pivotal roles in “refocusing the cultural content” of 
churches towards a Social Gospel tradition, thus rendering congregants ready for activism.38 In 
turn, major civil rights organizations like the SCLC and the SNCC capitalized on cognitive 
liberation by developing ideologies, strategies, and tactics that resonated with church people and 
had the capability of facilitating mass-mobilization. Civil rights organizations achieved this by 
linking liberal integrationist ideologies and direct-action strategies and tactics to Christian 
discourses of racial reconciliation and nonviolence.39  This discursive frame would prove 
remarkably successful in establishing a unifying movement culture and solidifying coalitional 
links with northern white liberals.  
However, as the dominant ideologies, strategies, and tactics of the Black Freedom 
Movement shifted during the mid-1960s this civil rights frame lost resonance, jeopardizing 
church-based support and access to the organizational resources that had underpinned earlier 
civil rights struggles.  In this context, Soul Power explores how grassroots activists looked to a 
changing Black church and Black Theology for help in refashioning dominant theological                                                         
37 Morris, The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement, 97. 
38 Ibid., 97 
39 Calhoun-Brown, "Upon This Rock: The Black Church, Nonviolence, and the Civil Rights Movement." 
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worldviews. Activists then used them to frame the ideological, strategic, and tactical agendas of 
new social movement organizations during the Black Power era. Though these efforts were cut 
short by narrowing political opportunities and state repression, their existence offers important 
lessons for future struggles and reminds us that the Black church’s involvement in social 
movement activity will not come without the ardent and creative labors of activists at the local 
level. 
 
Black Freedom Struggles in the Borderland 
 
Soul Power’s focus on Cairo is timely in that it converges with a growing body of 
scholarship in the field of Black Freedom Studies that has challenged dominant spatial 
conceptions of the modern Civil Rights Movement as a distinctly southern struggle. By 
conducting studies that are attentive to the local dynamics of struggles in northern cities, a new 
generation of scholars has argued for a parallel northern movement that “inspired southern 
activists as much as they were inspired by them.”40 Within this broader spatial reconfiguration of 
the field, a smaller group of scholars has also begun to grapple with the unique patterns of racial 
oppression and resistance that characterize borderland communities occupying tenuous spatial                                                         
40 Quote taken from Jeanne F. Theoharis and Komozi Woodard, ed., Freedom North: Black Freedom Struggles 
Outside the South, 1940-1980 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 5. For studies of northern Black freedom 
struggles, see Thomas J. Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the North (New 
York: Random House, 2008); Robert O. Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland, 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003); Matthew Countryman, Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power 
in Philadelphia (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006); Martha Biondi, To Stand and Fight: The 
Struggle for Civil Rights in Postwar New York City (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); Yohuru 
Williams, Black Politics/White Power: Civil Rights, Black Power, and the Black Panthers in New Haven (St. James, 
NY: Brandywine Press, 2000); Thomas J. Sugrue, “Northern Lights: The Black Freedom Struggle Outside the 
South,” OAH Magazine of History 26, no. 1 (Jan., 2012), pp. 9-15; Patrick D. Jones, “Coming of Age in Cleveland,” 
OAH Magazine of History 26, no. 1 (Jan., 2012), pp. 7-8; Patrick D. Jones, “‘Selma of the North’: The Fight for 
Open Housing in Milwaukee,” OAH Magazine of History 26, no. 1 (Jan., 2012), pp. 17-22; Lisa Levenstein, 
“African American Women and the Politics of Poverty in Postwar Philadelphia,” OAH Magazine of History 26, no. 
1 (Jan., 2012), pp.31-35; Jeanne Theoharis, “‘The northern promised land that wasn’t’: Rosa Parks and the Black 
Freedom Struggle in Detroit,” OAH Magazine of History 26, no. 1 (Jan., 2012), pp. 23-27. 
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locations at the intersection of North and South. Studies of Black freedom struggles in 
communities like St. Louis, Missouri; Cambridge, Maryland; and Louisville, Kentucky situate 
the borderland as an interstitial region in which North and South converge, producing a 
seemingly contradictory amalgamation of racial practices and customs.  Chief among borderland 
communities’ unique characteristics, scholars contend, were the ability of African Americans to 
vote and hold political office; the presence of a fluid system of social segregation governed by a 
combination of custom and law; and, the comparative infrequency and social unacceptability of 
racial violence. According to scholars, these important regional distinctions in patterns of racial 
oppression allowed white civic leaders to draw points of contrast with their Deep South 
counterparts by situating borderland communities as “beacons of civility” and racial progress, a 
discourse that African American activists would regularly utilize to their own advantage. 
However, while the politics of civility ensured that borderland leaders would adopt, at least in 
public, less confrontational approaches to Black freedom struggles, scholars also contend that 
these discourses justified a gradualist approach to social change that for African American 
activists carried the risk of cooptation and incorporation. Thus, far from collapsing traditional 
boundaries between North and South, studies of the borderland demonstrate that regional 
distinctions mattered, because they powerfully shaped Black opportunities and freedom 
struggles.41  
In focusing on Cairo, Illinois, Soul Power both contributes to and complicates our 
understanding of Black freedom struggles in the borderland. While the emergent scholarship 
                                                        
41 For studies of Black freedom struggles in border cities, see Peter B. Levy, Civil War on Race Street: The Civil 
Rights Movement in Cambridge, Maryland (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003); Tracy E. K’Meyer, 
Civil Rights in the Gateway to the South: Louisville, Kentucky, 1945-1980 (Lexington, KY: University Press of 
Kentucky, 2009); Clarence Lang, Grassroots at the Gateway: Class Politics and Black Freedom Struggle in St. 
Louis, 1936-75 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2009); Kenneth S. Jolly, Black Liberation in the 
Midwest: The Struggle in St. Louis, Missouri, 1964-1970 (New York: Routledge, 2006). 
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focuses on urban places in the five traditional Civil War border states (Delaware, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Missouri, and West Virginia), I adopt urban historian Henry Louis Taylor, Jr.’s more 
expansive conception of the borderland as encompassing states and cities positioned both 
immediately north and south of the Mason-Dixon Line. In Taylor’s analysis, the five traditional 
border states are defined as “southern borderland states,” while Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, 
Illinois, and New Jersey are incorporated as “northern borderland states.” In this context, Taylor 
distinguishes borderland cities as those “lying on both sides of the borderline separating the 
North and South” meaning that “Cincinnati and Cairo, Illinois would be borderland cities but not 
Cleveland and Chicago.”42 Taylor’s expanded definition of the borderland is particularly useful 
because it allows scholars to elucidate important but often overlooked regional distinctions that 
exist within states conventionally designated as northern and between those regions and their 
southern borderland counterparts. In Soul Power, therefore, I utilize the borderland concept to 
delineate Cairo’s regional particularity in Southern Illinois as well as to draw important lines of 
comparison and distinction between Cairo as a northern borderland city and its nearby southern 
counterparts.  
This study also has relevance to trends in the field of Black Urban History. While earlier 
accounts focused on the Midwest and Northeast, Soul Power reflects the relatively recent growth 
of Black community studies rooted in the South, the West and at the intersection of each. 
According to urban historian George C. Wright, in order to attain a “full understanding of how 
white America dealt with its Negro problem it is extremely important to discuss the 
circumstances of blacks in border cities.”43 Located at the confluence of the Ohio and 
                                                        
42 Henry Louis Taylor, Race and the City: Work, Community, and Protest in Cincinnati, 1820-1970 (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1993), xviii. 
43 George C. Wright, Life Behind a Veil: Blacks in Louisville, Kentucky, 1865-1930 (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1985), 9. 
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Mississippi rivers, Cairo was a frontier river city founded at the peak of westward expansion and 
the market revolution. With access to two of the nation’s largest river systems, Cairo appeared 
peculiarly situated to capitalize on the growing commercial and industrial opportunities of the 
early nineteenth century. As the Ohio Valley region emerged as a national center of commerce 
and industry in the 1830s and 1840s, Cairo took its place as an important transshipping hub, 
moving goods by steamboat East and West, North and South, and internationally via the 
Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico. Like other Ohio Valley river cities, Cairo’s labor 
force expanded during this period, incorporating skilled German mechanics and unskilled Irish 
laborers into its ranks. After a brief period of economic stagnation, the city’s position was 
solidified in 1851 when the Illinois State Legislature selected it as the southern terminal for the 
Illinois Central Railroad – a decision that further tied Cairo with Deep South communities all the 
way down to Mobile, Alabama. In 1859 alone, six million pounds of cotton and wool, seven 
thousand barrels of molasses, and fifteen thousand hogsheads of sugar were shipped through the 
city. Thus, Cairo, like other northern borderland cities, faced south - making its profits in light 
manufacturing and as a key transportation center for the southern slave economy. However, 
Cairo’s expansion, like that of most Ohio Valley river communities, was quickly outmatched by 
the growth of the great industrial cities to the north. Struggling to expand its manufacturing base 
and experiencing a precipitous decline in river and rail traffic, Cairo experienced the ravages of 
corporate relocation, unemployment, and population decline decades before they occurred in 
larger Ohio River Valley metropolises like Pittsburgh and Cincinnati, foreshadowing changes 
that would eventually take place across the Rust Belt.44  
                                                        
44 Joanne Wheeler, “Together in Egypt: A Pattern of Race Relations in Cairo, Illinois, 1865-1915,” in Toward a New 
South? Studies in Post-Civil War Southern Communities, ed. Orville Vernon Burton and Robert C. McMath 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982); Christopher K. Hays, “Way Down in Egypt Land: Conflict and 
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Sitting ninety latitudinal miles south of Richmond, Virginia, Cairo’s southern ties 
solidified the community’s identity as “the Deep South city of the North.”45 The city’s white 
native-born stock traced roots back to the Upland South states of Virginia, Kentucky, and 
Tennessee,46 a fact that distinguished white Cairoites from their counterparts in upstate Illinois 
and profoundly shaped the cultural and political context of the region.47 Like other parts of the 
northern borderland, southern Illinois’s allegiances were complicated by its recent history of 
bound labor. While the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 banned slavery in the territory, 
slaveholders in the southernmost parts of Illinois, referred to locally as “Little Egypt,” had been 
permitted to retain their slaves as indentured servants until the practice was finally outlawed in 
1848. In fact, Cairo’s first African American residents had come as bonded laborers in 1818 
when William Bird, a Missouri slaveholder, moved to the area and constructed the community’s 
first commercial properties. Therefore, a reliance on slave labor, though not widespread, was not 
uncommon in Southern Illinois during the early nineteenth century, with several hundred African 
Americans working in domestic, agricultural and industrial capacities mirroring practices across 
the northern borderland. Although not all native-born whites owned slaves or supported the                                                                                                                                                                                   
Hays, “The African American Struggle for Equality and Justice in Cairo, Illinois, 1865-1900,” Illinois Historical 
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Darrel E. Bigham, We Ask Only a Fair Trial: A History of the Black Community of Evansville, Indiana, 
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1970. 
46 For further discussion of early European-American migratory patterns in Southern Illinois, see Frederick M. Wirt, 
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practice, white Cairoites exhibited little sympathy for African Americans who crossed the Ohio 
River from the slave-rich Purchase region in search of a Promised Land. They exuberantly 
upheld the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 and vigorously enforced the state’s Black Codes and, after 
1853, its Black exclusion law. Accordingly, as sectional animosities increased during the 1850s 
and 1860s, tensions over slavery, Black migration, and southern roots were exacerbated, making 
decisions about Civil War allegiances in Cairo and across the northern borderland especially 
fraught. Fears that the fiercely Democratic partisans of Southern Illinois would defect to the 
Confederacy ran rampant farther north, and in April 1861 Union leaders moved to secure the 
area by establishing a military stronghold in Cairo that would serve as a key base in the western 
theater. However, Copperhead sentiment persisted and the region remained remarkably southern 
in its outlook.48 
Until the Civil War, native born-whites’ vigorous enforcement of the Black codes and 
exclusion laws ensured that the African American population in Southern Illinois and across the 
northern borderland would remain extremely small. In 1860, the total Black population of 
Illinois sat at 7,600 with only 8 towns – all located outside of Southern Illinois – having 100 or 
more Black residents. Cairo was home to only 23 free Blacks in 1860, most of them consigned to 
marginal domestic and service labor. During the war, however, African Americans fled to 
northern borderland cities in droves, resulting in a demographic revolution as Black-white 
population ratios shifted to mirror those of the southern borderland. Cairo, with its Union 
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military base and growing “contraband” camp, experienced the largest proportional increase as 
the Black population grew by 3,834 percent during the 1860s. Restricted by vehement anti-Black 
sentiment in nearby rural counties, many of the new Black migrants, largely from Kentucky and 
Tennessee, opted to stay in Cairo, building new lives and communities together. However, as in 
other northern borderland communities, their efforts would be restricted by a distinctive pattern 
of racial oppression.49  
Cairo’s identity as a southern-city-in-a-northern-state produced patterns of racial 
oppression that were distinct both from upstate Illinois and neighboring communities in the 
southern borderland. While segregation in southern borderland cities like Louisville and St. 
Louis was characterized by a fluidity and unevenness in comparison to the Deep South, the 
separation of Blacks from whites in Cairo was almost complete by the turn-of-the-century. 
African Americans were excluded from the use of certain public facilities, including the Cairo 
Public Library and the city’s swimming pool, and faced segregation in others, including water 
fountains, bus stations, and restrooms.  The city’s hospital, St. Mary’s Infirmary, maintained 
separate wards for Black patients. Black children, irrespective of residence, attended separate 
and inferior schools at the elementary and senior levels. In the private sector, white-owned lunch 
counters, movie theaters, and bars either refused to serve Blacks or provided separate and 
inferior facilities. Thus, in many ways, life for Cairo’s Black residents was comparable to that of                                                         
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the Deep South. Importantly, however, state laws prohibiting racial discrimination ensured that 
Cairo’s system of social segregation would hinge on custom as opposed to law so struggles to 
dismantle Jim Crow in the Land of Lincoln took an entirely different shape from the Deep South 
or the borderland South – a shape that both afforded and necessitated distinctive strategies and 
tactics. These unique political realities ensured that Cairo would become an important testing 
ground for the NAACP’s legal and direct action strategies in the years preceding the Brown 
decision as well as the site of SNCC’s first integration campaign north of the Ohio River in 
1962.50  
Black Cairoites’ experience of racial segregation and exclusion was compounded by the 
extraordinarily marginalized position of the city’s Black working class and the attendant 
underdevelopment of a Black middle-class that in other borderland cities provided access to 
separate Black institutions. While African Americans across the borderland were largely 
confined to the lowest paid and unskilled positions in domestic and service work, the economic 
plight of Black Cairoites was particularly precarious. As river trade declined during the late 
nineteenth century, Cairo was unable to secure the large industrial and manufacturing contracts 
that ensured the survival of other larger river cities and, as a result, the city’s Black workers were 
forced into the most marginal day labor, seasonal, and service work. Historian Darrel Bigham 
identifies similar trends in his study of Evansville, Indiana, and contends that the absence of 
significant industrial opportunities in smaller Ohio River Valley communities prevented the 
proletarianization of Black workers and severely undercut the development of the Black middle-
class. In Cairo, as in Evansville, a small Black professional class and an even smaller Black                                                         
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American Struggle for Equality and Justice in Cairo, Illinois, 1865-1900,” 279-81; Hays, “Way Down in Egypt 
Land,” 238-246, 449-450. 
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business class endeavored to provide key services and facilities to Black Cairoites, but were 
never able to achieve the stability of their big-city counterparts. Therefore, Black Cairoites were 
increasingly subject to the practice of racial exclusion as opposed to racial segregation, lending a 
sense of urgency to struggles over discrimination in public accommodations and hiring practices. 
Furthermore, the absence of a well-established Black middle class also ensured that when those 
struggles did occur, Black workers would play a leading role and, in comparison to many of their 
borderland neighbors, would be relatively unimpeded by intraracial class struggles over goals 
and approaches. In this sense, Cairo provides a unique opportunity to explore Black worker 
struggles for freedom and empowerment.51  
In their efforts to address segregation and other racially discriminatory practices, Black 
Cairoites, like African Americans across the borderland, were able to exercise their political 
rights by voting and running candidates who best represented their collective agendas. Scholars 
have shown that the distinctive demographic and political realities of borderland communities 
often afforded African Americans a significant role in local politics. In the wake of the Civil 
War, Cairo represented one of the most extreme examples of this, as its disproportionately large 
Black community held the balance between the Democratic and Republican parties. After 1870, 
Black Cairoites formed Republican clubs and forged a fragile alliance with local white 
Republicans, securing the Party’s first county majority after years of Democratic domination. For 
the next four decades, Black Cairoites exerted significant influence over the local Republican 
Party and secured access to government reforms, appointments and municipal jobs. However, 
sensing the threat posed by a Black electorate, white “progressives” passed a series of measures 
between 1909 and 1913 that undercut Black political power until the 1980s. These reforms                                                         
51 Frazier, The Negro in the United States, 252; Bigham, We Ask Only a Fair Trial, 65, 129, 172; Hays, “Way Down 
in Egypt Land,” 298-300. 
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included tighter voter registration laws, poll taxes, and the replacement of the aldermanic form of 
municipal governance with a city commission model, overturning the ward-based political 
system that had afforded Black voters so much power. Cumulatively, these reforms began to 
exclude African Americans from local government and forestalled the politics of patronage and 
interracial negotiation that characterized other borderland cities. Although this limited the risk of 
cooptation and incorporation, it also effectively eliminated lines of communication between the 
city’s white civic leadership and the Black community, making political reform remarkably 
difficult without the support of the state and federal governments.52   
For their part, Cairo’s white civic leadership emphatically rejected the discourse of racial 
civility that underpinned struggles across the southern borderland. While southern borderland 
cities cast themselves as “beacons of civility” and racial progress compared to the Deep South, 
Cairo’s white elite was largely uninterested in drawing such distinctions. In fact, as Black 
Cairoites launched concerted campaigns against segregation and discriminatory practices 
between 1949 and 1974, Cairo’s white civic leadership increasingly aligned itself with the 
militant segregationist stance of the Deep South, forging alliances with white supremacist 
organizations like the Ku Klux Klan, American Nazi Party and the White Citizens Council. Such 
tendencies were exacerbated by Cairo’s fragile economic base and the concomitant absence of 
northern corporate influences that many scholars have perceived as having a liberalizing effect 
on race relations in southern borderland communities.53 Facing economic collapse and mounting 
pressure for racial equality, Cairo’s Black and white communities were completely polarized by 
the late 1960s as the city’s white leadership sought to mobilize the full weight of the state to 
preserve the status quo.                                                         
52 Hays, “Way Down in Egypt Land,” 380. 
53 K’Meyer, Civil Rights in the Gateway to the South, 7. 
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The religious culture of white Cairoites also distinguished them from their northern 
counterparts and solidified the city’s place within the borderland. A 1957 study of church 
membership in one hundred religious bodies and denominations performed by the National 
Council of Churches illuminates important regional distinctions in the religious beliefs and 
practices of Illinoisans. In 1957, church membership in Illinois sat at 53.6 percent of the state’s 
total population. Of that total, Roman Catholics held a slim majority at 50.1 percent, Protestants 
followed with 42.1 per cent, and 7.8 per cent identified as Jewish. This religious diversity, fueled 
in no small part by Chicago’s role as an industrial powerhouse and home to some of the nation’s 
largest immigrant communities, ran even deeper in some neighborhoods. In Cook County, for 
example, Protestants comprised only 22 per cent of all church members while Catholics and 
Jews constituted 64.9 and 13.1 per cent respectively. Furthermore, Cook County’s Protestant 
population was remarkably heterogeneous with over 59 different denominations represented.  
In comparison, the sixteen southernmost counties of Illinois known as “Little Egypt” 
were overwhelmingly Protestant, representing 86 per cent of all church attenders. Moreover, the 
Protestant population in Southern Illinois exhibited much less heterogeneity with a total of 
twenty-six denominations operating in the sixteen counties and only thirteen with more than a 
thousand members. Fundamentalist and conservative religious traditions predominated. While 
the Methodist Church was the state’s largest denomination, in Southern Illinois it ranked second 
behind the Southern Baptist Convention, which constituted a staggering 47.3 per cent of all 
Protestant church members polled. Close to half of Illinois’ Southern Baptists resided in Little 
Egypt.  In contrast, the influence of liberal mainline denominations was comparatively small.54 
                                                        
54 The data in this section comes from the National Council of Churches, Churches and Church Membership in the 
United States: An Enumeration and Analysis by Counties, States, and Regions, Series C, No. 14 - 15 (New York, 
1957). Unfortunately, this study did not include data on churches or church membership from historically Black 
denominations including the “two large Negro Baptist bodies nor the three Negro Methodist bodies.”  
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The prominence of a comparatively homogenous conservative Protestant theological tradition 
ensured that Little Egypt’s religious culture was closer to that of the U.S. South than the Land of 
Lincoln. The ratio of Protestants to Roman Catholics in Southern Illinois was comparable with 
border states like Kentucky and West Virginia, where Protestants constituted 79.7 and 83.8 per 
cent respectively of total church membership. Moreover, the size of the Southern Baptist 
Church’s influence was entirely consistent with trends in the state’s bordering it to the South and 
West. The Southern Baptists were the largest denomination in Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, 
and all of the Deep South states. This conservative religious culture provided the backdrop for 
Black Cairoites’ engagement in Black Liberation Theology.55  
The exclusion of Black Cairoites from conventional political structures combined with 
the limited range of separate Black institutions, afforded the Black Church a particularly 
prominent role in Cairo’s African American community. Typical of Ohio River Valley 
communities, Methodist and Baptist churches predominated and became key institutions for 
leadership development, education, and the provision of much needed social services. In the 
absence of Black political officials and a significant Black business class, Black clergy also 
continued to operate as important community representatives and leaders alongside the small 
number of Black professionals. Furthermore, churches played an important political role, 
functioning, as urban historian Joe Trotter states, “as springboards for the formation of political 
clubs and civil rights organizations.”56 Black political ideologies were, thus, intimately 
connected to the ideational world of the Black church and struggles for Black freedom hinged 
intrinsically on the ability of local activists to mobilize them.  
                                                        
55 The report defined the U.S. South as including Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, West 
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, 
Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas. 
56 Trotter, River Jordan, 82. 
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 I explore the changing relationship of the Black church and African American 
Christianity to Cairo Black freedom struggles over five chapters. Chapter One provides an 
historical account of Black community formation in the borderland city, with a particular 
emphasis on the foundation of Cairo’s Black churches and their contribution to earlier Black 
freedom struggles. Chapter Two traces the mobilization of Black churches and African American 
Christian discourses by local activists during the Civil Rights Movement. Through an 
examination of postwar struggles to desegregate public schools and accommodations, I 
demonstrate how the dominant civil rights discourses of racial reconciliation and nonviolence 
facilitated mass participation and access to the resources of local Black churches. However, the 
urban rebellions of the mid-1960s powerfully symbolized the alienation of a new generation of 
working-class youth from this dominant reconciliationist and nonviolent framework.  
Accordingly, Chapter Three explores how Black Power activists constructed a “relevant” 
Christianity by re-working the dominant civil rights discourse through a critical engagement with 
formal Black Theology and grassroots religious traditions, while Chapter Three tracks Black 
Power activists’ mobilization of this new discourse to secure important organizational resources 
and coalitional support from local, state, and national Black church organizations. Finally, 
Chapter Four examines the closing stages of the Cairo Black Power struggle, situating state 
repression of activist church agencies and the revival of conservative political agendas within 
congregations as fundamental but overlooked causes of the movement’s demise. 
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CHAPTER 1 
ON JORDAN’S BANKS:  
THE ORIGINS OF COMMUNITY, FAITH AND STRUGGLE IN CAIRO, ILLINOIS 
 
The Black church has historically served as a key staging ground for Black freedom struggles in 
Cairo, Illinois. At crucial junctures throughout the city’s history, social movement organizations 
have relied upon Black churches for their extensive organizational and ideational resources. In 
turn, local congregations opened their doors and extended their hands in support of struggles for 
rights, respect, and empowerment.  By the late 1960s, the city’s Black churches had a strong 
legacy of protest and occupied a position of social and cultural preeminence that grassroots 
activists were forced to navigate in their attempts to build effective movements for racial change 
and social justice. However, the Black church’s centrality to local protest traditions was neither 
inevitable nor complete but rather contingent upon three interrelated factors: the distinctive 
social and political conditions of Black life in the northern borderland; the relative homogeneity 
of Black religious traditions; and the agency and skill of activists responsible for recruiting 
congregations into the movement.  
In this chapter, I trace the broad contours of Black life and community in Cairo, Illinois, 
over four overlapping historical periods showing how the city’s economic instability and 
distinctive blend of northern and southern racial practices combined to ensure the Black church’s 
emergence as the central institution in Black community building and protest traditions. More 
specifically, I argue that the consignment of Black Cairoites to the lowest rungs of the river 
city’s declining economy hindered the development of a proletarianized Black working-class and 
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attendant Black middle-class capable of sustaining autonomous institutions that might have 
rivaled the church’s role in the Black community. Further, political reforms passed during the 
early twentieth century undercut the ward-based electoral power of Black voters, putting an end 
to an era of Black office holding and patronage. Pushed to the margins of formal political 
institutions, Black Cairoites increasingly looked to the church as a site of political protest and 
social movement activity. In turn, I demonstrate that the rise of Cairo’s Black churches to a 
position of political and cultural preeminence was also facilitated by the specific quality of the 
religious tradition they harbored. In contrast to many larger cosmopolitan Midwestern cities, 
Cairo was bypassed by the new waves of migration and industrial expansion that elsewhere 
contributed to a diversification of faith traditions as well secularization among segments of the 
Black population during the first half of the twentieth century. In contrast, Cairo, like other 
borderland cities, maintained a comparatively strong and homogenous religious culture rooted 
firmly in the evangelical Methodist and Baptist traditions. This unifying religious culture 
provided an important institutional basis for racial solidarity and ecumenical organizing upon 
which local activists would capitalize in their efforts to build viable Black freedom struggles.1 
 
Black Life and Community in Antebellum Cairo (1818-1860) 
 
African American life in Cairo had its beginnings in the antebellum settlement of the 
cypress filled swampland that many contemporaries believed presented unparalleled 
geographical and commercial opportunities. Located at the confluence of the nation’s two largest 
                                                        
1 My work here is influenced by political scientist Adolph Reed’s insistence that links between the Black church and 
political protest not be essentialized but rather grounded in a systematic study of their specific “developmental 
context” and “the trajectory of actions and choices dictated by this context.” See Reed, The Jesse Jackson 
Phenomenon, 46.  
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river systems in the Ohio and the Mississippi, Cairo captured the interest of westward 
expeditionary forces and eventually eastern capitalists seeking to profit from the river traffic that 
was central to the growing market economy of the early nineteenth century. Profiteers were 
aided in their endeavors by the encroachment of Euro-American migrants from the upland South 
as well as treaties signed with the five tribes of the Illinois confederacy in 1803 and 1818, which 
resulted in the ceding of the tribes’ remaining land rights in southern Illinois. However, efforts to 
capitalize on the site’s position at the confluence were punctuated by a series of failures. In 1818, 
Baltimore merchant John Comegy made the first of several attempts to develop the area for 
commercial purposes, forming the City and Bank Company of Cairo and petitioning European 
financiers for sponsorship. However, within a few short months the project collapsed and the site 
remained little more than a lumber depot for passing ships. The task of erecting Cairo’s first 
physical structures fell to enslaved African Americans who, at the direction of Missouri planters 
John and Thompson Bird, built a tavern and a store on the Ohio waterfront in 1828 but it would 
take another decade and the rise of the railroads to reignite the interest of investors in the site. In 
1837 Boston merchant Darius Holbrook secured a charter to establish a port and a railroad and 
under his leadership the Cairo City and Canal Company oversaw the construction of levees and 
the clearing of land. However, Holbrook’s Company failed during the depression of the late 
1830s and workers abandoned the town once again. When British writer Charles Dickens visited 
the site upon which Cairo now stands in 1842 during a journey down the Mississippi he 
described it as little more than “a dismal swamp,” “a detestable morass,” and “an ugly 
sepulcher… uncheered by any gleam of promise.” However, desperate to recoup their losses, 
investors formed the Cairo Property Trust and in 1852 secured Cairo’s bid to become the 
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southern terminal for the Illinois Central Railroad (ICR), marking a key juncture in the 
community’s development.2   
  In the decade that followed, Cairo would emerge as Southern Illinois’s largest city and 
an important Midwestern transshipment hub focused on the storage, processing, and 
transportation of commodities such as flour, timber and cotton. In 1854, the number of boats 
landing in Cairo totaled 3,798 surpassing nearby St. Louis, which received 3,006 vessels that 
same year. After the completion of the ICR in 1854, cargo could be loaded by dockworkers 
directly from large riverboats onto railroad cars to be sent north to St. Louis and Chicago. In 
1859, Cairo received 6,902 barrels of molasses, 15,152 hogsheads of sugar, and more than 6 
million pounds of wool and cotton. In addition to the burgeoning river and rail trade, antebellum 
Cairo maintained a number of small industries including lumber, iron works, brick making, and 
flourmills. The city’s commercial expansion also resulted in renewed migration, growing the 
population from 242 in 1850 to 2,188 just ten years later. Initially populated by rural white 
migrants from the upland South, Cairo began to attract northeastern artisanal families as well as 
significant numbers of German and Irish immigrants. By 1860, Cairo had greater ethnic diversity 
than the surrounding rural communities, with Irish immigrants representing 24 per cent of the 
city’s population and German immigrants 10 per cent. Recent immigrants transformed the social 
and cultural landscape, establishing their own institutions at the forefront of which was the 
Roman Catholic Church. Initially, the city’s Catholic population attended St. Patrick’s Church,                                                         
2 Charles Dickens, American Notes and Pictures from Italy (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1900), 203, 222. 
On the early settlement of Cairo, see Lansden, A History of the City of Cairo, Illinois; H.C. Bradsby, “History of 
Cairo,” in History of Alexander, Union and Pulaski Counties, Illinois, ed. William Henry Perrin (Chicago: O. L. 
Baskin & Co., 1883); Larry Heid, River City: A Home-Town Remembrance of Cairo, Illinois (New York: Exposition 
Press, 1966); Arthur Clinton Boggess, The Settlement of Illinois, 1778-1830 (Chicago: Chicago Historical Society, 
1908); Federal Writers’ Project (Illinois), Cairo Guide (Cairo: Cairo Public Library, 1938); Lantz, A Community in 
Search of Itself, 7-20; Hays, “Way Down in Egypt Land,”; Terri K. Wright, “The Upper Circle: The History, Society 
and Architecture of Nineteenth-Century Cairo, Illinois,” (Ph.D. Thesis, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, 
1995); Beadles, A History of Southernmost Illinois; Louise P. Ogg and Monica L. Smith, Alexander County, Illinois: 
History & Families, 1819-1989, Vol. 1 (Paducah, KY: Turner Publishers, 1989). 
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which was founded in 1838. However, in 1872 the construction of St. Joseph’s Church afforded 
German immigrants their own edifice. Parochial schooling was also established along ethnic 
lines with Irish immigrants attending St. Patrick’s parochial school and German immigrants St. 
Joseph’s.3  
In contrast, the African American population in Cairo remained comparatively small, 
primarily because of the state’s Black exclusion law of 1853 and rigorous enforcement of the 
Fugitive Slave Act. As Table 1 shows, only forty-seven African Americans lived in Cairo in 
1860 constituting 2 per cent of the city’s population. While the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 
banned slavery in the territory, Black indentured servitude persisted in southern Illinois until it 
was outlawed in 1848. In addition, the state government permitted a limited number of slaves to 
be imported to work in the region’s salt refineries at Valmeyer, Brownsville, and Equality. As a 
result, many Black Cairoites were from Illinois while others were former slaves from the upland 
South states of Missouri, Kentucky, and Tennessee. The opposition of white Southern Illinoisans 
to Black migration made the small free Black population vulnerable to acts of racial violence as 
well as capture and sale into slavery prompting most to move to urban areas for protection. Black 
Cairoites lived in close proximity to each other in several large augmented households reflective 
of what historian Sundiata Cha-Jua describes as the “adaptive extended kinship networks” of 
Black Illinoisans during this period. Augmented households reflected the distinctive cultural 
heritage of Black Cairoites, but they also served important economic purposes for men and 
women who found themselves consigned to the lowest rungs of the city’s job market as unskilled                                                         
3 U.S. Census Office, Eighth Census of the U.S.: 1860 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1864); Hays, 
“Way Down in Egypt Land,” 42-117; Wright, “The Upper Circle,” 29-66; Charles C. Colby, Pilot Study of Southern 
Illinois (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1956), 13; Executive Committee on Southern Illinois, 
Southern Illinois: Resources and Potentials of the Sixteen Southernmost Counties (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1949), 146; Beadles, A History of Southernmost Illinois, 23-25; Kionka, Key Command, 15-26; Robert 
Newton Barger, Ethnicity in the Cairo Catholic Schools: An Historical Investigation (Illinois Historical Survey, 
1975), 12, 20; Lansden, A History of the City of Cairo, Illinois, 138-139, 143, 152. 
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laborers, porters, and domestic servants. As a result, Black Cairoites possessed little real or 
personal property and by 1860 the city’s wealthiest Black households were those headed by 
William Freeman and James Renfrow, who amassed fortunes totaling only two hundred dollars.4  
Black Cairoites also found themselves excluded from civic life through a combination of 
custom and law. The Illinois black codes barred Black residents from voting, assembling in large 
numbers, and serving on the state militia, while local customs excluded them from the city’s 
schools and the Catholic parishes.  With the limited resources they possessed, Black Cairoites 
strove to develop their own institutions including a small private school charging a fee of $1 per 
month to the city’s wealthier Black families.5 However, broader efforts in community and 
institution building were limited by the small size of Cairo’s Black population compared to their 
counterparts in other parts of the Ohio River Valley. As early as 1850, the Black communities of 
larger river cities such as Pittsburgh and Cincinnati eclipsed Cairo totaling 1,959 and 3,237 
respectively. Having a larger population as well as higher levels of personal and real property 
ownership allowed African Americans in these river communities to develop a much broader 
range of institutions during the antebellum period including schools, businesses, fraternal orders, 
and churches. In Cairo, these endeavors in community and institution building would await the 
Civil War and the vast migration of African American men, women, and children across the 
Ohio River.6   
                                                        
4 Sundiata Keita Cha-Jua, America’s First Black Town: Brooklyn, Illinois, 1830-1915 (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2000), 63. “Arrest of runaway slaves, Thebes, Illinois, 1856,” Illinois Writers Project: ‘Negro in Illinois’ 
Papers (IWP), box 4, folder 12, Vivian Harsh Research Collection of Afro-American History and Literature, 
Chicago Public Library; “Runaway slaves,”, box 4, folder 22; Voegeli, Free but Not Equal, 2, 8-9; U.S. Census 
Office, Eighth Census of the U.S.: 1860. Population; Alexander County, Illinois, 1850 Census (Thomson, Ill.: 
Heritage House, n.d.); Wright, “The Upper Circle,” 79; Hays, “Way Down in Egypt Land,” 48, 58-61, 93-95, 172-
73; Bigham, On Jordan’s Banks, 35-54; Executive Committee on Southern Illinois, Southern Illinois: Resources and 
Potentials of the Sixteen Southernmost Counties, 12-13. 
5 Lloyd W. Owens, “The Beginning, 1853-1900,” IWP, box 14, folder 5. 
6 On the formation of Black communities in the Ohio River Valley, see Joe William Trotter, River Jordan; Bigham, 
We Ask Only a Fair Trial; Bigham, On Jordan’s Banks. 
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Table 1 :  Population of Cairo by Race, 1850-1970 
Year White Black  Other Total 
 (N) (%) (N) (%) (N) (%) (N) 
1850 - - - - - - 242 
1860 2,141  0.98 47 0.02 N/A - 2,188 
1870 4,418 0.70 1,849 0.30 N/A - 6,267 
1880 5,661 0.63 3,349 0.37 1 0.0001 9,011 
1890 6,622 0.64 3,689 0.36 13 0.0013 10,324 
1900 7,563 0.60 5,000 0.40 3 0.0002 12,566 
1910 9,108 0.63 5,434 0.37 6 0.0038 14,548 
1920 10,190 0.67 5,000 0.33 13 0.0009 15,203 
1930 9,448 0.70 4,575 0.30 - - 13,532 
1940 8,907 0.62 5,494 0.38 6 0.0004 14,407 
1950 7,722 0.64 _ 0.36 4,401  12,123 
1960 5,821 0.62 3,511 0.38 16 0.0017 9,348 
1970 3,905 0.62 2351 0.37 21 0.0033 6,277 
 
Source: U.S. Census Office, Ninth Census, Population of the U.S., vol. 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1872), p.108; U.S. Census Office, Tenth Census of the U.S., vol. 1, Population (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1883), p. 417; U.S. Census Office, Eleventh Census: 1890, vol. 1: Population of the U.S., pt. 1 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1895), p. 454; U.S. Census Bureau, Twelfth Census of the U.S., vol. 1, Population, pt. 
1, 1900 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901), p. 613; Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census of the 
U.S., vol.2: Population, 1910 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913), p. 506; Bureau of the Census, 
Fourteenth Census of the U.S., vol. 3: Population, 1920 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922), p.262; 
Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census of the U.S.: 1930, vol. 3, Population, pt. 1 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1932), p. 628; Bureau of the Census, Sixteenth Census of the U.S.: 1940, vol. 2, Populations, pt. 1 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 613; Bureau of the Census, Seventeenth Decennial Census of 
the U.S., vol. 2: Population, pt. 13, 1950 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 79; Bureau of the 
Census, U.S. Census of Population: 1960, vol. 1, Characteristics of the Population, pt. 15 (Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 116; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1970, vol. 1, 
Characteristics of the Population, pt. 15 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 214. 
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Civil War, Migration, and Proletarianization in Cairo (1861-1890) 
 
 The arrival of the Civil War transformed Cairo irrevocably. Cairo’s strong cultural and 
economic ties to the South ensured that support for the Union would be muted and in certain 
quarters greeted by outright opposition. “Little Egypt,” as Southern Illinois was popularly 
known, was a beachhead of Democratic Party politics where white residents had vigorously 
opposed Lincoln’s bid for the presidency by a margin of four to one. Democratic politicians from 
Southern Illinois had also sponsored a series of anti-Black legislative measures including 
proposals to legalize slavery in 1827 and restrict Black migration in the 1840s and 1850s. 
Populated by white migrants from the upland South as well as Irish immigrants who often 
viewed African Americans as a direct threat to their own racial and economic status, Cairo’s 
ethnically diverse white citizenry was united by anti-Black sentiment and a shared opposition to 
abolition, Black migration, and racial equality. During the war, the majority of white Cairoites 
fought for the Union or adopted a position of neutrality consistent with that of other parts of the 
borderland. However, a few hundred men from across Southern Illinois, did join Confederate 
units in Tennessee, one-third of them from the Cairo area. By May 1861, rumors of disunion 
combined with Cairo’s strategic location at the confluence prompted Illinois Governor Richard 
Yates to order the state militia to occupy the town and Union forces to establish Fort Defiance as 
a key army and naval post on the western front.7 
                                                        
7 My estimate of Cairo volunteers that fought for the confederacy is taken from Gleeson’s, Illinois Rebels, 1. On the 
divided loyalties of Southern Illinois during the civil war, see T. K. Kionka, Key Command: Ulysses S. Grant’s 
District of Cairo (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2006), esp. 27-42; James Pickett Jones, Black Jack: John 
A. Logan and Southern Illinois in the Civil War Era (Tallahassee: Florida State University, 1967); Etcheson, The 
Emerging Midwest, esp. 118-119, 137-138; Hays, “Way Down in Egypt Land,” 118-195; Delores Archaimbault and 
Terry A. Barnhart, “Illinois Copperheads and the American Civil War,” Illinois History Teacher 3, no. 1 (1996), 15-
30; Lansden, A History of the City of Cairo, Illinois, 128-137;  Perrin, History of Alexander, Union and Pulaski 
Counties, Illinois, 55; Wirt, “The Changing Social Bases of Regionalism,” 34.  
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 During the war, Cairo underwent a demographic revolution as more than forty thousand 
refugees from the south descended upon the city in search of aid and protection. As Table 1 
shows, those who opted to stay once the war had ended contributed to the city’s exponential 
growth from 2,188 in 1860 to 6,267 in 1870. The refugee population included a large number of 
poor whites who had been dispossessed by the conflict. However, as the site of the nation’s only 
“contraband camp” north of the Mason-Dixon line, it was Cairo’s Black community that 
witnessed the largest gains as the population grew from 47 in 1860 to 1,849 in 1870, an increase 
of nearly 4,000 per cent. The wartime influx of Black migrants also transformed the city’s racial 
demography as African Americans expanded from 2 per cent of the city’s population in 1860 to 
30 per cent in 1870. Most of the newcomers had absconded from plantations and households in 
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi though significant numbers also came from Virginia, 
Maryland, Missouri, Arkansas, and Louisiana. Upon arrival they were housed at an abandoned 
army barracks in the southwestern corner of the city on Cedar Street and fed at the Freedmen’s 
Mess House on Commercial Avenue near the Ohio River (See, Figure 1). After the camp reached 
capacity, hundreds more were forced to take shelter in abandoned buildings or in makeshift lean-
tos scattered on the periphery and in the woods nearby.8 
 
                                                        
8 Bureau of the Census, Eighth Census of the U.S.: 1860; U.S. Census Office, Ninth Census, Population of the U.S., 
vol. 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1872); Noyes, “The Contraband Camp at Cairo, Illinois,” 203-217; 
U.S.S.C., The U.S. Sanitary Commission in the Valley of the Mississippi, 518; Eaton and Osgood Mason, Grant, 
Lincoln, and the Freedmen; Reminiscences of the Civil War, 37-38; Hays, “Way Down in Egypt Land,” 147-148, 
178, 180, 188; Bigham, On Jordan’s Banks, 84-93. 
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Figure 1: Map of Military Installations of the Federal Forces in Cairo, Illinois (1861-1865). 
Courtesy of John Willis Allen Papers, Special Collections Research Center, Morris Library, 
Southern Illinois University Carbondale.  
Governmental efforts to relieve the burden by relocating African American refugees to 
work in other parts of the state were stymied by a rising tide of white opposition. In the fall of 
1862, shortly after Secretary of War Edwin Stanton ordered the dispersal of the refugees, white 
citizens across Illinois held mass meetings denouncing the move as a violation of the 
constitutional ban on Black migration and a threat to white labor. During a rally at Breadwell in 
Logan County in October, white citizens demanded that the constitution be “enforced to the very 
letter, - peaceably if possible, forcibly if necessary.” Similar threats were made at Pittsfield in 
Pike County where members of the crowd promised to uphold the Black laws “at the point of the 
bayonet.” Over the coming months, white vigilantes would make good on those threats ushering 
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in a wave of anti-Black terrorism in communities across the state. In turn, white Cairoites 
registered their opposition to Black migration at the polls as the Democrats swept Alexander 
County in the elections of 1862 running on a virulently racist platform. Under mounting 
pressure, officials abandoned the relocation plan making Cairo the final port of call for African 
Americans entering Illinois from the south. By April 1863, a total of 1,530 people occupied the 
temporary barracks, mostly women and children. Having survived the dangerous journey out of 
slavery, they now struggled to survive in filthy, overcrowded, and disease-ridden 
accommodations that the renowned Quaker and abolitionist Levi Coffin described as having 
“none of the comforts and few of the necessities of life.” In the aftermath, many would leave 
Cairo following the ICR northward, forming communities across the state. However, many 
others would stay and lay the foundations of Black community life in Cairo.9 
 
Industrial and Commercial Expansion after the Civil War 
 Cairo emerged from the civil war a larger and more robust city. The next twenty-five 
years were boom years as the city underwent a period of commercial and industrial growth 
paralleling that of other Ohio River Valley communities. As Table I shows, the city’s economic 
growth also spurred a precipitous increase in population that would not be stemmed until WWI. 
The heart of Cairo’s economy continued to be its expanding transshipment business and the wide 
range of related industries that sprang from it. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, 
seven railroads terminated in Cairo, including the Illinois Central; Cairo and Vincennes; Cairo 
and St. Louis; New Orleans, Jackson and Great Northern; Mobile and Ohio; and the Cairo,                                                         
9 Voegeli, Free But Not Equal, 60;  Coffin, Reminiscences of Levi Coffin, 619-620; “100 Years Ago,” Chicago 
Tribune, February 19, 1963; Haviland, A Woman’s Life-Work, 246; Noyes, “The Contraband Camp at Cairo, 
Illinois,” 205-210; James W. Loewen, Sundown Towns: A Hidden Dimension of American Racism (New York: 
Touchstone, 2006), 28, 139-140; Leslie A. Schwalm, ““Overrun with Free Negroes,” 145-174; Bigham, On 
Jordan’s Banks, 93. 
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Arkansas, and Texas. River traffic also thrived with Cairo functioning as an important transfer 
point for cargo from packet lines conducting regular services between Paducah, Memphis, and 
ports further south. As Figure 2 illustrates, the Ohio River waterfront bustled with activity as 
longshoremen loaded goods from river to rail and back again.  
Manufacturing also grew, with the lumber industry taking center stage. By the 1890s, 
Cairo was one of the largest hardwood centers in the West with a total of thirty-two 
manufacturing establishments and a workforce of more than a thousand. Next to lumber, iron 
was the largest industry, followed by grain with commercial interests operated by local titans, the 
Halliday Bros’ Egyptian Mills and Bennett’s and Albert Galigher’s Corn Meal Mills. Cairo also 
attracted larger national corporations like the Singer Manufacturing Company, which selected 
Cairo as the site for its sewing machine cabinet factory in 1882. Located on the edge of the Ohio 
River, the Singer plant utilized modern machinery and management techniques to turn out 
hundreds of cabinets a day. As capitalists invested in new technologies and production methods 
they radically transformed the labor process, undercutting the autonomy and specialized skill of 
artisans and deepening the division of labor giving rise to proletarianization and increased class 
stratification. By the 1880s, Cairo’s new elite had solidified its political and economic influence 
and developed a distinctive cultural world separate from that of the growing working-class 
constituted by native-born whites, Irish and German immigrants, and African Americans. The 
city’s workers increasingly lacked control over the means of production and survived by selling 
their labor power to the highest bidder.10 
                                                        
10 Lantz, A Community in Search of Itself, 20-50; Federal Writers’ Project, Cairo Guide, 42-43; Shirley J. Portwood, 
“African American Politics and Community in Cairo and Vicinity, 1863-1900,” Illinois History Teacher 3 (1996): 
13-21 (13); Wright, “The Upper Circle,” 111-138; The Attractions of Cairo, Illinois (Cairo, Ill.: The People Print, 
1890); Hays, “Way Down in Egypt Land,” 223, 293-294. 
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Figure 2: Perspective Map of the City of Cairo, Ill. (1888) 
  
Race, Class, and Labor after the Civil War 
 For the growing numbers of African Americans migrating to Cairo during the late 
nineteenth century, wage-work offered a degree of economic and social independence denied by 
slavery and its offshoot, the sharecropping system. However, Black Cairoites continued to be 
subjected to a racialized division of labor that consigned them to the lowest paid, unskilled jobs. 
In 1880, more than three-quarters of all Black household heads in the workforce (75.2%) held 
unskilled positions in domestic and personal services or as common laborers. The first group 
included a substantial number of Black women who were employed as “housemaids” or 
“laundresses” by white families earning between $2 and $3 per week. Black men often held the 
most dangerous and backbreaking laboring positions on the docks and the railroads, and in the 
city’s growing number of factories.  At the Singer plant, for example, African Americans worked 
exclusively as janitors or on the loading docks moving freight and lumber. Black workers on the 
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waterfront did the heavy lifting as stevedores and roustabouts. Occupational mobility was 
restricted and the few men obtaining work in the skilled trades achieved this by catering to a 
Black clientele, providing services in masonry, painting, plastering, shoemaking, and tailoring. 
In 1866, Black craftsmen were introduced into the workforce at the Cairo Dry Docks and local 
lumber mills but were quickly driven out by white workers who responded with violence and 
industrial action. Accordingly, white workers and employers both contributed to the construction 
of a racially segmented labor force that locked African Americans out of entire sections of the 
city’s growing industrial and commercial economy.11  
Despite the limited occupational opportunities available to Black workers in the late 
nineteenth century, a large number of low-paid menial jobs did exist, distinguishing this period 
from those that followed. Indeed, if Black proletarianization ever took place in Cairo, it was 
during the final decades of the nineteenth century as a growing number of Black migrants moved 
out of agricultural and domestic work and into wage-earning jobs. As a river city, Cairo’s 
experience of Black proletarianization differed from that of larger Midwestern cities, with its 
most potent effects taking place earlier and in nonindustrial forms of employment. With an 
economy centered on the transshipment business as opposed to large-scale industry, Cairo did 
not witness the emergence of a large Black industrial proletariat that typified cities like 
Milwaukee, Chicago, and Detroit.12 Nonetheless, African Americans arriving in Cairo during the 
                                                        
11 Ancestry.com and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 1880 United States Federal Census [database 
on-line] (Provo, UT: Ancestry.com Operations Inc., 2010); Portwood, “African American Politics and Community 
in Cairo and Vicinity, 1863-1900,” 13-15; Hays, “Way Down in Egypt Land,” 216-217, 224-225, 298-301; Hays, 
“The African American Struggle for Equality and Justice in Cairo, Illinois, 1865-1900,” 267, 270-71; Bigham, On 
Jordan’s Banks, 221. 
12 My analysis of Black proletarianization in Cairo builds upon the seminal work of urban historian Joe William 
Trotter, Jr., Black Milwaukee: The Making of an Industrial Proletariat, 1915-45, 2nd ed., (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 2007). Trotter situates proletarianization as a hallmark of the Black urban experience and central to 
the development of Black urban communities during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. According to 
Trotter, it was the rise of a Black industrial proletariat that facilitated the formation of a new Black middle-class and 
community institutions after WWI. Further, by examining proletarianization through the lens of the Black working-
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late nineteenth century transitioned from agrarian labor to wage-work, producing a substantial 
and politically active Black working class. In turn, Cairo’s Black working class provided the 
demographic and financial basis for the formation of a small Black middle class, predominantly 
small business owners and professionals. Between 1865 and 1890, a growing number of African 
American entrepreneurs established saloons, restaurants, hotels, dance halls, grocery stores, 
laundries, theaters, and an opera house catering almost exclusively to a Black clientele. In 
addition, Black schoolteachers, lawyers, dentists, newspaper editors and ministers catered to the 
physical, intellectual, and spiritual needs of the growing populace.13 
 
African American Community Building after the Civil War 
The expansion of Cairo’s Black working and middle classes underpinned a new wave of 
community and institution building spurred on by widespread practices of racial discrimination. 
During the late nineteenth century, African Americans were barred from Cairo’s public schools, 
public library, and poor house, as well as subjected to an uneven system of racial segregation in 
railroad cars, hospitals, street cars, steamboats, parks, churches, white-owned businesses.14 In 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
class, Trotter contributes to a reinterpretation of its effects. While labor historians traditionally viewed 
proletarianization as a downward shift for workers who had previously owned their own skill and labor, Trotter 
showed that for many African Americans wage-work represented a step up from peonage. My application of the 
proletarianization thesis to a river city complicates Trotter’s periodization and narrow focus on industrial workers.  
13 Hays, “Way Down in Egypt Land,” 299-300; Hays, “The African American Struggle for Equality and Justice in 
Cairo, Illinois, 1865-1900,” 267-268; Wheeler, “Together in Egypt: A Pattern of Race Relations in Cairo, Illinois, 
1865-1915,” 110-111; “Housing for Negroes in Alexander County,” IWP, box 37, folder 29; “Notes on Cairo, 
Illinois,” IWP, box 26, folder 22 and 23; “The Beginning and the Ending of the Colored Newspaper in Alexander 
County,” IWP, box 42, folder 17; Bigham, On Jordan’s Banks, 221. 
14 Scholars have not yet reached a consensus as to the nature of race relations in Cairo during the late nineteenth 
century.  Historian Joanne Wheeler contends that Cairo was “a racially integrated society” after the Civil War and 
that practices of racial segregation only solidified during the second decade of the twentieth century. Wheeler 
explains this high degree of integration as a product of the city’s unpreparedness for the influx of black residents. 
Unlike other communities, Cairo did not have a longstanding Black community or well-established practices of race 
relations according to Wheeler.  See Wheeler, “Together in Egypt: A Pattern of Race Relations in Cairo, Illinois, 
1865-1915,” 104, 110.  In contrast, historians Shirley Portwood and Christopher Hays argue that Jim Crow practices 
and patterns of racial discrimination were clearly visible in public and private accommodations during the late 
nineteenth century. See Portwood, “African American Politics and Community in Cairo and Vicinity, 1863-1900,” 
  44 
response, African Americans mounted a vigorous campaign for full citizenship and civil rights 
while simultaneously creating independent institutions capable of meeting the needs of a 
growing populace. By the end of the nineteenth century, Black Cairoites had established a wide-
range of institutions including churches, labor organizations, and fraternal orders. The absence of 
a well-established Black community prior to the Civil War meant that African Americans in 
Cairo would have to build these institutions virtually from scratch. The Black church stood at the 
forefront of these efforts, functioning as a springboard for the formation of other Black 
institutions including schools, benevolent groups, and political organizations.15  
Churches were among the first institutions established by African Americans in Cairo.  
During the Civil War, occupants of the contraband camp organized religious services while 
better-situated Black Cairoites initiated the first wave of church planting from their homes. 
Patterns of denominational affiliation were relatively homogenous and mirrored those of other 
communities in the Ohio River Valley with the Baptist and African Methodist Episcopal (AME) 
denominations predominating. By 1890, Cairo had seven Black churches, including six Baptist 
and one AME congregation. The city’s first Black congregation was Ward Chapel AME Church, 
formed in 1863 in the home of Cairo resident Maria Renfrow. After beginning with only eight 
members, Ward Chapel quickly outgrew Renfrow’s home as wartime migrants joined the church 
seeking forms of worship independent from white control. In the following decades, Ward 
Chapel became one of the city’s largest Black congregations and the institutional hub of 
Methodist activities in the city.  The hierarchical structure of the AME Church and its insistence 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
14-15; Hays, “Way Down in Egypt Land,” 238-243; and, Hays, “The African American Struggle for Equality and 
Justice in Cairo, Illinois, 1865-1900,” 280-281. 
15 The reference to the church as a “springboard” for Black institution building initiatives is taken from Trotter’s, 
River Jordan, 78. Portwood, “African American Politics and Community in Cairo and Vicinity, 1863-1900,” 16; 
Hays, “Way Down in Egypt Land,” 333-336; Illinois Woman’s Exposition Board, Illinois Women’s Work 
(Springfield, IL: State Register Print, 1893), 7. 
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on an educated ministry provided Ward Chapel with institutional and financial stability. 
However, the denomination’s strict enforcement of the itinerancy system of pastoral leadership 
meant that the church’s clergy often lacked the deep community ties of their Baptist 
counterparts. In contrast, Cairo’s Baptist churches exhibited greater local autonomy, allowing 
congregations to multiply and charismatic preachers to lead for generations. Immediately after 
the war, Black Cairoites founded three Baptist congregations – New Hope Free Baptist Church 
(1867), First Missionary Baptist Church (1867), and Antioch Baptist Church (1860s). A second 
wave of church planting occurred during the last two decades of the nineteenth century as 
African Americans fled white terrorism and economic exploitation in the post-Reconstruction 
South. During this period, three additional Baptist congregations were established – Mt. Moriah 
Missionary Baptist Church (1881), Mt. Carmel Missionary Baptist Church (1880s), and 
Morningstar Free Will Baptist Church (1898). By the end of the century, Black Cairoites had 
successfully built their own houses of worship and solidified a religious culture rooted in both 
the evangelical Baptist and Methodist traditions.16  
In addition to meeting the spiritual needs of Black Cairoites, Black churches also 
provided an extensive array of social services for their members in the context of broader 
practices racial exclusion. Outside of the family, churches were African Americans’ most 
powerful social network during this period, allowing members to quickly identify needs and 
organize collectively around them. Prior to the formation of segregated Black public schools 
during the 1870s, churches played a key role in meeting the educational needs of their 
                                                        
16 Trotter’s, River Jordan, 78, 80; Trotter, Coal, Class, and Color: Blacks in Southern West Virginia, 1915-32 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990), 43; Bigham, On Jordan’s Banks, 247- 249; Hays, “Way Down in Egypt 
Land,” 326; “Notes on Morning Star Free Will Baptist and Ward Chapel A.M.E. Churches in Cairo, Illinois,” IWP, 
box, 17, folder 2; “Notes on New Hope Free Baptist Church in Cairo,” IWP, box 17, folder 6; “Notes of Mt. Moriah 
Missionary Baptist Church in Cairo,” IWP, box 17, folder 5; “Notes on Mt. Carmel Missionary Baptist Church in 
Cairo,” IWP, box 17, folder 8.  
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congregants, operating their own daily schools that taught reading, writing, and arithmetic. In 
September 1867, Reverend Thomas J. Shores, pastor of the First Missionary Baptist Church, 
established the Union Free School, which served approximately three hundred students, relying 
on a combination of offerings from Black congregants and donations from white patrons. Since 
African Americans were also barred from using many of the city’s existing benevolent and 
welfare institutions, Black churches also played a vital role in raising funds for the sick and 
needy by hosting pot lucks, organizing clothing drives, and taking special offerings. Beyond 
these practical functions, churches were also the central social institution of many Black 
Cairoites’ lives, providing them with relationships, entertainment, and support. In this way, 
churches fostered a culture of mutuality that bound community members’ together lending value 
and meaning to their lives in the midst of racial oppression.17   
 Despite these shared traditions, Black congregations also reflected Cairo’s deep 
intraracial fissures rooted in social class, color and region. The absence of a well-established 
Black community prior to the Civil War meant that divisions between older and newer residents 
were not as potent in Cairo as in other Black urban communities during this period. However, in 
a city constituted almost entirely by recent migrants, origins mattered and African Americans 
tended to join churches reflecting their own regional and cultural backgrounds.18  Members of 
Ward Chapel AME, for example, were almost exclusively from the Midwest and Upper South 
states of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia. The Methodists’ promotion of an educated                                                         
17 Hays, “Way Down in Egypt Land,” 244, 327-328, 353; Hays, “The African American Struggle for Equality and 
Justice in Cairo, Illinois, 1865-1900,” 278; “The Beginning, 1853-1900,” IWP, box 14, folder 5; “Notes on 
education in Cairo, Illinois, 1867-92,” IWP, box 14, folder 4; Bigham, On Jordan’s Banks, 296. On the mutual-aid 
and educational services provided by Black churches during the post-Civil War era, see Frazier, The Negro Church 
in America, 40-47; Woodson, The History of the Negro Church, 243-249. 
18 The importance of class and color in congregational affiliation in the post-Civil War era has been explored by a 
number of scholars. See Frazier, The Negro Church in America, 36-37. On African American migrants and their 
selection of churches based on kinship and origins, see Kimberley L. Phillips, AlabamaNorth: African-American 
Migrants, Community, and Working-Class Activism in Cleveland, 1915-45 (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1999), 
142.    
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ministry, more subdued forms of worship, and a theology that advocated personal frugality, 
temperance and industry as keys to racial advancement provided Ward Chapel with an air of 
urbane respectability that attracted disproportionate numbers of Black middle class professionals, 
business owners, and skilled craftsmen. In contrast, rural migrants from the Deep South tended 
to join the city’s Baptist churches. Alabamians built New Hope Free Baptist Church while 
families from the Louisiana and Mississippi Delta built Mt. Moriah Missionary Baptist Church 
after fleeing what they described as “the reign of the Ku Klux Klan” during the 1870s and 1880s. 
In these congregations, migrants maintained the ecstatic forms of religious expression that had 
prevailed in the rural south, drawing criticism from segments of Cairo’s Black middle class. 
These tensions quickly extended into the political realm as Baptist ministers representing 
working class southern migrant congregations blurred the boundaries between sacred and secular 
by running for public office, campaigning for civil rights, and leading citywide direct action 
protests much to the chagrin of many of their middle class counterparts.19  
 
The Black Church at the Zenith of Black Political Power 
  The late nineteenth century marked the zenith of Black political power in Cairo, as the 
city experienced its own “social and political reconstruction.” The ratification of the Fifteenth 
Amendment in 1870 combined with the passage of other state and federal civil rights legislation 
situated African Americans as citizens who legally possessed all of the rights previously held by                                                         
19 Bigham, On Jordan’s Banks, 249, 297; Notes of Mt. Moriah Missionary Baptist Church in Cairo,” IWP, box 17, 
folder 5; “Notes on Morning Star Free Will Baptist and Ward Chapel A.M.E. Churches in Cairo, Illinois,” IWP, box, 
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box 21, folder 15; Hays, “Way Down in Egypt Land,” 327-329; Ancestry.com and The Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints, 1860-1900 United States Federal Census [database on-line] (Provo, UT: Ancestry.com 
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York: Oxford University Press, 1995).  
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whites. Black Cairoites swiftly put those rights into action, fostering a dynamic political culture 
centered on Black Republican clubs, voting in local elections, and running candidates for office. 
Prior to the Civil War, contemporaries described Cairo’s electorate as “diabolically Democratic.” 
However, between 1870 and 1890, African Americans facilitated a political realignment that 
secured Republican Party dominance in local elections into the early twentieth century. 
Representing approximately a third of the city’s electorate, Black voters held the balance of 
power, forcing the Democrats to forgo past virulently racist platforms and ensuring that white 
Republicans incorporated African Americans into party leadership as well as adopted more 
progressive positions on civil rights. From this tactical alliance emerged a generation of Black 
Republican office holders who utilized their positions within municipal and county government 
to advocate racial equality and the integration of public accommodations.20  
The Black church was an integral part of this vibrant political culture, functioning as a 
key space for political education and mobilization. Many Black congregations opened their doors 
to Black Republican clubs, allowing them to hold their meetings in church buildings and involve 
laity in debates about public policy. Several Baptist ministers, including Reverend Thomas 
Shores, Reverend Thomas Strother, and Reverend Nelson Ricks, were key leaders in the club 
movement and its efforts to enforce civil rights legislation in the city. Viewing the struggle for 
racial justice as inseparable from Christian mission, these ministers used their pulpits to 
encourage Black political participation and educate parishioners on local and national political 
affairs.  Baptist ministers were peculiarly situated to take up leadership roles during this period. 
In contrast to their Methodist counterparts, they often served lengthy tenures, allowing them to 
                                                        
20 Hays, “Way Down in Egypt Land,” 348-350; Bradsby, “History of Cairo,” 55; Hays, “The African American 
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put down roots and establish strong community ties. In turn, Baptist ministers were expected to 
be charismatic leaders who gave voice to the spiritual and physical yearnings of their followers.  
Those who aligned themselves with the radical wing of the Republican Party tended to be pastors 
of predominantly rural south migrant congregations. While their members were far from 
wealthy, working class churches were able to sustain autonomous institutions through regular 
tithes and offerings, providing radical ministers with a degree of insulation from white control. 
This “economic autonomy,” historian Shirley Portwood argues, enabled Cairo’s Black political 
elites to “pursue their own political goals and to engage in political advocacy for blacks with 
little fear of… economic retaliation.”21   
While pastors of Black working class congregations often led the way, middle class 
churches constituted by migrants from the upper south and Midwest tended to adopt a more 
accomodationist stance. For example, Reverend Henry Brown, pastor of Ward Chapel from 1871 
to 1873, maintained a position of strict political neutrality during his tenure. While some 
speculated that the Methodist minister had been influenced by recent donations made by 
prominent white benefactors toward the church edifice, Brown’s refusal to associate with the 
political protest of the Black working class also reflected deep-seated tensions within the 
Methodist Church over the appropriate means of achieving equality. In the Reconstruction South, 
the A.M.E. Church functioned as a vital staging ground for political mobilization, its ministers 
and lay leaders often running for political office. However, northern church leaders were critical 
of this approach viewing frugality, temperance, and industry as the keys to racial advancement. 
Opposition to the involvement of clergy in political affairs was so strong at the 1872 General                                                         
21 Portwood, “African American Politics and Community in Cairo and Vicinity, 1863-1900,” 14; “Notes on African-
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Convention that Bishop David Payne supported a motion that, if successful, would have barred 
ministers from holding elected office entirely. However, despite Brown’s neutrality and 
occasional criticism of radical clergymen, active participation in Republican politics included 
Ward Chapel members, including John Gadney who served as Cairo’s first Black elected police 
constable and John J. Bird who became the city’s first Black police magistrate in 1877. Reverend 
Jacob Bradley of Antioch Baptist Church was an even more vocal critic of the movement’s 
radical wing, particularly Shores whom he considered a “phoney” and criticized for trying to 
“excite the colored people” by convincing them that “the good people of Cairo were unwashed 
rebels.” Bradley’s political conservatism reflected that of many of his congregants who were 
middle class migrants from the Midwest and upper south, underscoring the important political 
differences among Black Cairoites of different class and regional backgrounds.22  
Despite these obstacles to racial and ecumenical solidarity, Black Cairoites continued to 
build upon their growing demographic, economic, and institutional strength, achieving a number 
of political victories by the end of the nineteenth century. Black Cairoites came to serve in a 
number of elected and appointed positions including as assemblymen, county coroner, 
postmaster, jailor, and police constables. Moreover, by forging a tactical alliance with white 
Republicans, Black political elites were able to broker access to patronage and municipal jobs for 
African Americans, expanding the ranks of the middle class and upper working class. It appeared 
that Black political power would only continue to expand, particularly in ward-based elections 
where Black majorities could ensure the election of African American candidates. However, this 
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optimism proved to be short lived as the city’s declining economic opportunities fueled white 
animosity, leading to racial violence, Black disenfranchisement, and economic exclusion.23 
 
African Americans during the Nadir in Cairo (1890-1928) 
 
The 1890s represented a watershed for Cairo, as the city struggled under the effects of a 
global financial crisis and its hopes of becoming a great industrial and commercial metropolis 
were dashed. The depression of 1893-97 hit the river city particularly hard, resulting in business 
failures, a decline in river and rail traffic, escalating unemployment, and eroding expectations. In 
many economic sectors the effects lingered, causing disillusionment among the city’s elite and 
prompting capital flight. However, while the depression escalated the pace of decline, the city’s 
economic problems were also tied to broader transformations within the national economy. 
Cairo’s heavy reliance upon the transshipment business made it extremely vulnerable to the 
precipitous decline of river traffic caused by the surge in rail transportation. Trade on the 
Mississippi River plummeted during this period from 1,244,175 tons in 1896 to 365,920 tons in 
1908. This collapse in river trade also had a devastating impact on the small industries that had 
grown up around the transshipment business. As Cairo’s bustling waterfronts quieted, efforts to 
enlarge the city’s portion of rail trade were hampered by the late development of railroad bridges 
crossing the Mississippi River (1888) and the Ohio River (1938). Even when the Illinois Central 
Bridge was finally opened, rail traffic tended to travel straight through, bringing little 
commercial advantage to the city. The biggest obstacle to economic restructuring, however, was 
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Cairo’s failure to attract large-scale industry. While river cities like Pittsburgh and Cincinnati 
became hubs for heavy industries in steel, meatpacking, textiles, and chemicals, Cairo was 
unable to expand upon its limited industrial base. Lumber and cottonseed oil remained the 
primary industries and despite the best efforts of the city boosters, most corporations bypassed 
Cairo in favor of larger urban centers. The only perceptible signs of growth were in the 
underground economy of liquor and vice which, according to one scholar, became “the most 
stable and predictable source of revenue in Cairo.”24 
Financial crises recurred throughout the first decade of the twentieth century, cementing 
perceptions that Cairo’s economic woes might be permanent. As hopes of recovery faltered, 
social fractures intensified giving rise to class and racial conflict. Organizing drives were 
initiated in some of the city’s largest factories as workers struggled to defend themselves against 
layoffs, dangerous working conditions, and wage cuts. In October 1901, the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) organized the Singer factory, and workers the following year engaged 
in a sympathy strike with the company’s plant in South Bend, Indiana. In 1907, employers 
slashed wages in response to another financial downturn prompting a strike wave that affected 
the city’s key industries. Economic insecurities also fueled underlying racial tensions. Often the 
last hired and first fired, Black workers bore the brunt of the city’s financial crises but were 
viewed by their white counterparts as competitors instead of allies in a period of dwindling 
opportunities. White civic leaders reinforced these fears by casting African Americans as 
scapegoats for Cairo’s declining prospects, alleging that rampant immorality and criminal 
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behavior had deterred investment and prosperity. Progressive era reformers pointed to the growth 
of Black-owned taverns, brothels, and gambling houses such as the “Bucket of Blood” located at 
13th and Poplar and “The Nation” on 32nd and Commercial as having attracted a criminal element 
to the city that fostered a culture of corruption and depravity. Black politicians were singled out 
for colluding with vice bosses and contributing to the industry’s stranglehold on the city. In 
reality, the vice industry had been a visible and influential presence in the city since the Civil 
War with considerable support from white proprietors and politicians. However, between 1890 
and 1920 – a period historian Rayford Logan has described as “the nadir of American race 
relations” – white residents would utilize these anxieties about crime and immorality as a thinly-
veiled justification for reasserting their control over the city’s social and political institutions and 
stripping African Americans of many of their post-Civil War gains.25  
 
The Rise of Jim Crow Segregation during the Nadir 
As anti-Black sentiment increased, practices of racial segregation and exclusion were 
further entrenched, solidifying Cairo’s identity as a southern town in a northern state.  
Segregation persisted in the school system and was extended into other public accommodations 
such as bus stations, restrooms, water fountains, cemeteries, and hospital wards. The new leisure 
and mass entertainment venues of the early twentieth century also imposed color bars. White 
owned movie theaters consigned African Americans to the balcony; the city’s parks designated 
separate areas for the races; lunch counters served Black patrons through a hatch or a back door; 
and the Rotary Club swimming pool and municipal sports leagues excluded Blacks entirely. The 
                                                        
25 Hays, “Way Down in Egypt Land,” 398; Rayford Logan, The Betrayal of the Negro (New York: MacMillan, 1970 
[1954]); “Illegitimate Businesses,” IWP, box 35, folder 26. For an excellent examination of interracial vice districts 
during the nadir, see Kevin J. Mumford, Interzones: Black/White Sex Districts in Chicago and New York in the 
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city’s two Catholic parishes – St. Joseph’s and St. Patrick’s – also reinforced their strict color 
line. In 1889, the Sisters of Loretto provided began offering segregated classes to African 
American boys in St. Patrick’s Parish. Two years later, however, even these separate and unequal 
services had been abandoned and the city’s Catholic community returned to excluding Black 
Cairoites from parochial schooling.  
Residential patterns mirrored the shift toward a rigidly segregated community. As late as 
1880, African Americans had been relatively evenly distributed across all five wards in the city 
(See Figure 3). However, as housing development gradually caught up with population growth, 
residential segregation hardened, with wealthier whites purchasing homes in more desirable 
communities “up town” while African Americans were left to occupy neighborhoods close to 
vice districts or low lying, flood-prone areas. One such community was Future City, a large 
unincorporated Black enclave located in the flood plains just north of the city. Here, African 
Americans lived without access to municipal services such as running water, emergency 
services, and power. In the city proper, residential segregation also intensified, with only one in 
ten white households living next door to a Black household in 1915 compared to one in three in 
1880. Efforts to maintain residential segregation were aided by local government, which 
mandated that Black households in the Cairo city directory be clearly marked with an asterisk. 
Like other border cities, Cairo’s system of racial segregation continued to be upheld by custom 
as opposed to law. For all intents and purposes, however, Cairo increasingly resembled the 
rigidity of the Deep South as opposed to the flexibility and unevenness of other border cities.26   
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Figure 3: Ward Based Map of Cairo (1876) 
 
The Resurgence of Racial V iolence during the Nadir 
 The emergence of a rigid system of social segregation in Cairo was accompanied by an 
upsurge of racial violence. In the absence of legal mechanisms, terror and mob violence 
functioned as key tools in the preservation of racial boundaries. During the nadir, anxieties about 
racial order received added fuel from the growth of white supremacist organizations, including 
the Ku Klux Klan, as well as middle class reform movements aimed at moral and civic 
improvement. White Cairoites increasingly connected isolated allegations of Black lawlessness 
and disorder with the city’s deteriorating conditions, resulting in outrage and clamor for action.                                                                                                                                                                                   
169; Barger, Ethnicity in Cairo Catholic Schools, 20, 37; Herbert A. Eastman, “Speaking Truth to Power: The 
Language of Civil Rights Litigators,” The Yale Law Journal 104, no. 4 (Jan., 1995): 869-872. 
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On at least three occasions between 1904 and 1910, white vigilantes employed a combination of 
terror and violence to intimidate Black Cairoites and punish suspected lawbreakers. In July 1904, 
violence was narrowly averted after Black community members assembled at the city jail to 
protect A. S. Mason, a forty-year-old Black resident of Future City, from local vigilantes. 
However, full-scale mob violence broke out in October 1909 when Black laborer William 
“Froggy” James was accused of the murder of a local shop clerk. A lynch mob constituted by 
whites from across southern Illinois and neighboring parts of Kentucky and Missouri seized 
James from police custody and took him to the center of town where he was hung, shot, 
mutilated, and set on fire before an audience of more than ten thousand people. Following 
James’ murder, the crowd headed to the jail where Henry Saltzner, a white Cairoite accused of 
killing his wife, was dragged from his cell and hung from a nearby tree. The following year, mob 
violence erupted again when armed vigilantes led a failed attempt to lynch John Pratt and 
Lincoln Wilson for stealing a woman’s purse. In the aftermath, local vigilantes threatened to 
“make a good job of our next holiday and lynch enough to scare the rest of the negroes out of 
town.” Writing that same year, Cairo politician and historian John McMurray Landsen reflected 
the views of many white Cairoites when he rationalized the periodic outbreaks of violence as a 
product of the “large number of worthless and debased negroes in our population” insisting that 
few white citizens had “regretted the mob’s disposition of James.”27  
The upsurge of racial violence in Cairo during the first decade of the twentieth century 
was strongly correlated to the gains of Black Cairoites, particularly in the political sphere.                                                         
27 “Cairo Cowers in Fear of Mob Rule,” Indianapolis Star, February 21, 1910; “Race War is Plot,” Los Angeles 
Times, February 23, 1910; “In Cairo, Ill.” Crisis 1 (December 1910); Hays, “Way Down in Egypt Land,” 373, 405-
409; Paula J. Giddings, IDA: A Sword Among Lions (New York: Harper Collins, 2008), 481-484; Lansden, A 
History of the City of Cairo, Illinois, 147, 278; Lantz, A Community in Search of Itself, 76-78; Interview with John 
Clarke and C.W. Halliday performed by Matt Conroy, June 22, 1976, Shawnee Community College Oral History 
Program (SCC-OHP), Shawnee Community College Library, 4; Interview with Edna Conroy performed by Matt 
Conroy, July 3, 1976, SCC-OHP, 6-9.  
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During the 1890s, African Americans had made some of their most significant strides in local 
politics, securing the election of four Black aldermen to the fourteen-member city council in 
1895 and gaining nine additional county and city positions over the next two years. Critically, 
many of these victories were acquired democratically and not through party patronage, 
demonstrating that the Black electorate was now sizable and consolidated enough to exert 
independent influence upon the Republican Party. As Black Cairoites rose to positions of 
influence within municipal and county government, white anxieties about the willingness of 
local officials to protect their own property, power, and privilege intensified. Increasingly, 
citizens of all social classes looked to extralegal methods to reinforce white supremacy because 
they felt they were losing control over the existing legal and political mechanisms. In turn, the 
decline of racial violence during the following decade coincided neatly with a series of 
Republican-backed political reforms carefully designed to undercut the power of the Black 
electorate and return the city council and local law enforcement into white hands.28  
 
The Destruction of Formal Black Political Power 
 The tactical alliance between Black and white Republicans was always a fragile one. 
Black Republicans frequently questioned the commitment of their white counterparts to racial 
equality and willingness to appoint Black candidates to key positions of party leadership. In turn, 
many white Republicans resented outspoken Black political leaders and their increasing demands 
on the party machine. These tensions escalated during the 1890s as heightened residential 
segregation led to the consolidation of Black voting power, particularly in Ward’s III and V, 
expanding the influence of Black political elites. After witnessing Black politicians secure a                                                         
28 Portwood, “African American Politics and Community in Cairo and Vicinity, 1863-1900,” 14-15; Hays, “The 
African American Struggle for Equality and Justice in Cairo, Illinois, 1865-1900,” 275; Wheeler, “Together in 
Egypt: A Pattern of Race Relations in Cairo, Illinois, 1865-1915,” 126-127; Bigham, On Jordan’s Banks, 191, 310. 
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series of landmark victories in the 1895 and 1897 elections, white Republicans refused to support 
African American candidates for county office in 1898. In response, Black politicians 
encouraged voters to protest by supporting the Democrats or the Negro Protective Party 
producing a defeat for the Republicans and marking the end of a longstanding political alliance. 
Over the next decade, white Republicans led by Mayor John Lansden worked to shift the balance 
of power in the city by building support for a series of progressive era reforms under the banner 
of eliminating corruption and cleaning up government. The election reforms included a new 
voter registration act passed in 1909 that required extensive proof of length and place of 
residency and the substitution in 1913 of an at-large city commission form of government for the 
ward-based system that had afforded Black politicians their recent victories. The enactment of 
the latter coincided with the Illinois State Legislature’s passage of women’s suffrage in 1913, a 
decision that transformed Cairo’s electorate incorporating thousands of new Black women 
voters. Taken collectively, these reforms undercut Black women’s new political power, 
disenfranchised several hundred Black voters in the unincorporated suburb of Future City, 
actively discouraged Black voting within the city proper, and practically eliminated the 
possibility of Black candidates securing election in at-large city commission races. Between 
1885 and 1901, the city had always had at least one Black city councilmember. After 1913, 
however, no Blacks were elected to city office for almost seventy years. Furthermore, Black 
Cairoites were cut off from channels of party patronage that had previously afforded them access 
to municipal jobs.29  
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African American Community Building During the Nadir 
On the eve of WWI, Black Cairoites found themselves in a declining river city that was 
increasingly hostile to their presence. The cumulative effect of diminishing economic 
opportunities, social segregation, racial violence, and political marginalization proved 
devastating, and between 1910 and 1920 the Black population plummeted by 8 per cent while the 
white population increased by 12 per cent. Among those leaving the city were a number of 
prominent community leaders, including the pastors of the two largest Black Baptist 
congregations – Reverend Nelson Ricks of the New Hope Free Baptist Church and Reverend 
J.R. Bennett of the First Missionary Baptist Church. Having served their congregations for 
several decades, both men decided to leave the city immediately after the lynching of William 
James in 1909.  In 1912 and 1913, Black Cairoites faced new challenges as floodwaters 
inundated Future City and almost breached the city’s levees forcing the closure of the Sycamore 
Street floodgates. Despite narrowly averting catastrophe, the flooding put five railroads out of 
business and resulted in the closure of several industrial plants. With the outbreak of WWI, the 
exodus continued as hundreds of Black and white workers relocated to larger urban communities 
in search of better paying jobs in wartime industries. Meanwhile, Cairo’s economy continued to 
stagnate as civic leaders failed to attract federal war contracts and several large businesses closed 
in rapid succession including the Singer Factory in 1916.30 
 In the context of declining opportunities, Black Cairoites struggled to build upon the 
limited economic gains they had made during the late nineteenth century. The vast majority 
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continued to occupy a small number of increasingly tenuous positions in domestic and personal 
service or as unskilled laborers on the railroads, waterfront, and in the city’s workshops and 
factories. Cairo’s Black middle class, constituted primarily by professionals and business 
owners, remained comparatively small and fragile. However, the consolidation of Jim Crow 
segregation did contribute to a small expansion in the city’s Black-owned businesses. African 
American entrepreneurs responded to discrimination by establishing the first Black-owned 
undertaking parlor (1901), movie theater (1905), drug store (1909), shoe store, and baseball 
team. African Americans also maintained a number of grocery stores during this period and 
Black barbers and beauty shops continued to proliferate. However, the growing instability of 
Cairo’s Black working class ensured that most Black-owned businesses relied heavily on credit 
sales and were vulnerable to bankruptcy and closure, a problem that would have devastating 
effects during the Great Depression of the thirties.31  
 Black Cairoites responded to worsening economic and social conditions by deepening 
their community building activities. At the forefront of these efforts were the city’s Black 
churches, which continued to play a central role in the civic and political life of Black Cairoites. 
Renewed migration during the nadir spurred the formation of several new congregations. Baptist 
churches continued to predominate with the founding of St. Paul Missionary Baptist Church in 
1915 as well as the Everdale Missionary Baptist Church and First Central Baptist Church in 
1919. However, Cairo, like many Ohio River Valley communities during this period, also 
witnessed a growth in Pentecostal traditions marked by the formation of the Cairo Church of 
God in Christ (C.O.G.I.C.) in 1912. These new Baptist and Pentecostal congregations were 
populated predominantly by Black laborers from the Deep South and played a critical role in 
meeting the needs of a migrant population. First Central Baptist, for example, was founded by                                                         
31 “Notes on Cairo, Illinois,” IWP, box 26, folder 23; Hays, “Way Down in Egypt Land,” 450.  
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migrants from Mississippi and over the coming years became a hub for seasonal workers that 
traveled to Cairo every autumn to pick cotton in the farming areas surrounding the city. In the 
absence of effective municipal social services, congregations like First Central Baptist connected 
migrant workers and extended much needed resources.32  
The growth in Black migration also attracted the attention of the Roman Catholic Church. 
In 1928, the Belleville Diocese and the Society of African Missions joined in founding St. 
Columba’s Catholic mission to cater to the spiritual and material needs of Black Cairoites. Since 
the city’s existing parishes – St. Patrick’s and St. Joseph’s – were rigidly segregated, the diocese 
purchased a disused church and a two-story school building and began offering pastoral services 
to African American residents. The parish also operated a grade school that provided free classes 
to an average of eighty Black students that were excluded from the city’s other parochial schools. 
Graduates were expected to enter the city’s public high schools upon completion of the eighth 
grade. Within four years of St. Columba’s formation, the local Black Catholic population grew 
from six in 1928 to over one hundred in 1932. Annual reports show that many of St. Columba’s 
students also worked in the cotton fields just north of the city and, as a result, they would start 
classes late in September and finish early in May to correspond with harvest season. When the 
school opened in 1928 none of the students were identified as Catholics. Ten years later, 
however, approximately seventy five per cent of St. Columba’s pupils had converted to the faith. 
The school mandated that all pupils attend Sunday Mass at St. Columba’s as well as take 
religious studies classes. Thus, efforts to meet the spiritual and material needs of migrants during 
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the nadir contributed to a diversification of Black faith traditions illustrated by the rise of 
Pentecostalism and Catholicism.33 
 Despite the emergence of new religious traditions, the influence of Cairo’s leading 
Baptist and Methodist congregations remained unmatched. By 1925, Ward Chapel A.M.E. 
boasted a membership of four hundred and the church’s imposing new edifice on 17th Street 
continued to welcome leading members of the city’s professional and business classes. Rivaling 
Ward Chapel in size and influence was the First Missionary Baptist Church and Mt. Moriah 
Baptist Church, both of which attracted members of the city’s small Black middle-class as well 
as skilled and unskilled workers. The preeminence of the city’s Black Baptist and Methodist 
churches continued unchallenged during the decades of migration that followed. While the 
processes of industrialization and urbanization in larger northern cities resulted in an exponential 
growth in storefront Holiness and Spiritualist congregations as well as other non-Christian 
traditions, religious affiliations in Cairo would remain relatively static. A 1957 study of the city’s 
religious patterns identified more than three-quarters of Black respondents as church members 
and of those indicating a denominational preference 70.4 per cent identified as Baptist and 13.5 
per cent as Methodist.34  
During the nadir, Cairo’s large Baptist and Methodist congregations became important 
hubs of denominational activity as local clergy took up leadership positions in national church                                                         
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conventions and publishing ventures. The formation of the National Baptist Convention of the 
United States of America in 1895 and the Baptist General State Convention of Illinois in 1902 
provided the institutional context for the work of Cairo’s Black Baptists. In 1919, the annual 
conference of the Illinois Baptist Convention was held in Cairo at the First Missionary Baptist 
Church and four years later the church’s minister, Rev. J. J. Olive, was elected as the 
organization’s president. Rev. Olive forged strong ties with other local Baptist ministers, 
particularly Rev. Hockenhull and Rev. J. T. Brown of Mt. Moriah Missionary Baptist Church 
with whom he co-managed the Baptist publication, Illinois Messenger, from 1925 to 1933. Rev. 
J. T. Brown also served as editor-in-chief of the publishing house of the National Baptist 
Convention, U.S.A, located in Nashville, Tennessee. In total, Cairo was home to three major 
Black church publications during this period – The Baptist Truth (1899-1926); the Illinois 
Messenger (1925-1933); and, the International Evangelical Herald (1919-1934), the official 
organ of the International Evangelical Bureau.35  
 
The Black Church in the Aftermath of Political Reform 
 In addition to building denominational power and influence, Cairo’s Black churches also 
stepped into the vacuum of political leadership created by the electoral reforms of 1909 and 
1913. Locked out of formal political channels, Black Cairoites increasingly looked to Black 
churches as an alternative site for the development of Black political leadership and authority.                                                         
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While churches could refocus political activities inward to the building of denominational and 
congregational power, they also had the capacity to extend outward providing the leadership and 
resources necessary to sustain campaigns for civil rights and racial uplift. During the nadir, Black 
middle-class church members working in both secular and religious organizations were critical in 
mobilizing this support.36  
During the nadir, Black middle-class congregations became beacons of racial uplift and 
advancement. Black churchwomen including Florence Sprague Fields and Alice Titus Beatty 
were particularly prominent, blurring the boundary between secular and sacred work through 
their active participation in the national club movement and formation of the Yates Woman’s 
Club, an affiliate of the Cairo City Federation of Colored Women’s Clubs, in 1905. The 
fundraising efforts of clubwomen culminated in December 1916 with the opening of Yates 
Memorial Hospital, the city’s first Black-owned and operated hospital targeted at meeting the 
medical needs of Black Cairoites. In 1920, Fields and Beatty joined other middle- and working-
class Black residents in founding the Cairo branch of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Under the leadership of Rev. C. C. Wilson, pastor of 
the First Missionary Baptist Church and publisher of The Baptist Truth, the NAACP mounted an 
unsuccessful legal campaign aimed at integrating the Cairo Public Library as well as fought for 
better educational and employment opportunities.  
NAACP members were drawn from the ranks of the city’s leading Black congregations, 
particularly Ward Chapel (17th and Washington), Mt. Moriah Baptist Church (26th and Poplar),                                                         
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and the First Missionary Baptist Church. During the twenties, ministers from these congregations 
became active members in the NAACP, often propagating the organization’s message of liberal 
integrationism from the pulpit. At Ward Chapel, Rev. Henry Jamison frequently “gave lessons in 
race relations” and preached a message of racial reconciliation. Hattie Kendrick, an African 
American schoolteacher who relocated to Cairo from Mississippi in 1924, recalled Jamison 
hosting a number of revivals that were so “electric” that they attracted a number of local whites. 
Concerned about the blurring of the color line, a white minister contacted Jamison asking if he 
would be willing to reserve a section of the church for his congregants, a query to which the 
pastor responded “Hell no,” according to Kendrick. Jamison also met with members of Cairo’s 
segregated ministerial alliance and rebuked them for failing to incorporate Black members.37 
 
African Americans in a Declining River City (1929-1945) 
 
Cairo was already experiencing a period of prolonged economic decline when the stock 
market crashed in the autumn of 1929. Just two years prior, rising river levels had threatened the 
city once again and seep water encroached, prompting renewed outward migration.  Between 
1920 and 1930, the population plummeted by 11 per cent from 15,203 to 13,532. In this context, 
the Great Depression was the last in a series of ongoing crises for the city, forcing many already 
struggling businesses to close, banks to fail, and large numbers of workers into unemployment. 
The city’s longstanding economic problems ensured that the effects of the Depression would be                                                         
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more potent and enduring in Cairo than elsewhere in the state. As late as May 1934, the Chicago 
Tribune reported that 50.4 per cent of Alexander County’s residents were still on the relief rolls 
compared to 14 per cent statewide. In this context, public emergency work programs sponsored 
by President Roosevelt’s New Deal administrations were essential to the city’s survival 
providing jobs and facilitating extensive municipal projects. In 1940, almost a quarter of Cairo’s 
workforce (21.6 per cent) held temporary jobs on federal public works projects, while another 
8.4 per cent were unemployed, figures that vastly exceeded state averages. Per capita incomes in 
the sixteen southernmost counties also lagged behind the rest of the state averaging $324 in 1939 
compared to $678 for Illinois as a whole. Entrenched practices of employment discrimination 
ensured that Black workers were disproportionately impacted by the effects of the long 
depression. In 1940, 37.8 per cent of the Black workforce was hired on public work programs 
while an additional 12.2 per cent were unemployed.38  
Despite Cairo’s ongoing economic troubles, Black migration to the city surged during the 
depression as landlords throughout the Mississippi Delta pushed sharecroppers off their farms 
and floodwaters returned again in 1937 to devastate the region. Between 1930 and 1940, Cairo’s 
Black population grew by 20 per cent while the white population dropped by 5.8 per cent. Lewis 
Jones and his family arrived in Cairo in 1938 by way of Mississippi and Missouri where they had 
worked as sharecroppers and day laborers in the cotton fields. Jones recalled few job prospects in 
the city, though he eventually found low-paid work as a handyman at the Cairo Hotel. Poor 
                                                        
38 “G.O.P. Chief Hails Tuesday Vote as New Deal Blow,” Chicago Daily Tribune, November 7, 1935; Lantz, A 
Community in Search of Itself, 53-54, 114; Wright, “The Upper Circle,” 193; Federal Writers’ Project, Illinois; a 
descriptive and historical guide (1939), 169; Draft manuscript by Kathryn Ward, Kendrick-Brooks Family Papers, 
LOC, box 22, folder 2; Executive Committee on Southern Illinois, Southern Illinois: Resources and Potentials of the 
Sixteen Southernmost Counties, 42-44, 177; Cairo City Council Minutes, January 9, 1939; Cairo City Council 
Minutes, November 6, 1969; Cairo City Council Minutes, October 29, 1940, City Hall, Cairo, Illinois; Illinois Inter-
Racial Commission, First Annual Report of the Illinois Inter-Racial Commission (1944), 62; Bureau of the Census, 
Sixteenth Census of the United States, vol. 2: Characteristics of the Population, 1940 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1943). 
  67 
employment opportunities and ongoing racial discrimination in all areas of community life 
ensured that for many newcomers Cairo would serve as only a temporary stop on their journey 
north. Cairo native Anne Winters recalled “a pretty good exodus leaving Cairo” during the 
thirties. “They would come here and get a toe hold and get enough to go to St. Louis or Chicago 
and then go on. They didn’t stay.” Jazz singer Bessie Smith captured Cairo’s transitional identity 
for a new generation of seemingly rootless wanderers in her celebrated rendition of W. C. 
Handy’s classic number, St. Louis Blues, singing, “Help me to Cairo, make St. Louis by myself.” 
Indeed, for many of those who stayed behind, Cairo would come to epitomize the spirit of the 
blues – a dying city that offered little in the way of hope or opportunity. During the thirties and 
forties, a vast network of blues performers including Cairo native Henry Townsend, Lonnie 
Johnson, Pinetop Perkins, and Earl Hooker, and songs like Cannon Jug Stomper’s “Cairo Rag” 
(1928) and Henry Spaulding’s “Cairo Blues” (1929) solidified Cairo’s identity as a hard but 
entertaining river town that understood what it meant to be both Black and blue.39 
 
Race, Class, and Labor during the Long Depression 
After the Great Depression, Cairo’s economy never recovered, and demand for Black 
labor declined transforming the city’s Black working class into a permanently expendable 
surplus labor force. The river, rail, and factory jobs that had laid the foundation for Black 
proletarianization during the late nineteenth continued to leave the city, forcing a large segment 
of the Black population into unstable forms of day labor, seasonal work, and unemployment. 
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Illinois Press, 1999); Sebastian Danchin, Earl Hooker, Blues Master (University Press of Mississippi, 1999); Draft 
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Blues, Columbia Records, 1925; Hays, “Way Down in Egypt Land,” 457-58; Lantz, A Community in Search of 
Itself, 55; “Housing for Negroes in Alexander County,” IWP, box 37, folder 29; Federal Writer’s Project, Illinois; a 
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Black workers fought back, organizing unions in key industries and initiating a series of strikes 
and protests at the Federal Barge Lines in 1933, on the docks and at the Alexander County Relief 
Office in 1937, and at the Valley Steel Company, Roberts Cotton Oil Company and Cairo Meal 
and Cake Company in 1939. However, in a pattern that would become all too familiar over the 
coming decades, city leaders repressed Black protests, calling in the National Guard and 
deputizing local white citizens. WWII brought little relief, as city officials were once again 
unable to secure federal defense contracts. Capital flight continued apace resulting in a series of 
plant closures including the Federal Barge Lines in 1940, the Big Four Railroad in 1941, and the 
Mississippi Valley Barge Line in 1947, all of which had been major employers of Black workers. 
Most of these jobs did not return after the war and when combined with the end of federal job 
creation programs the impact was devastating upon the Black working class. During a period of 
so-called national prosperity, Cairo witnessed its Black unemployment rate skyrocket from 12.2 
per cent in 1940 to 22.7 per cent by 1950. That same year, only 15.1 per cent of Cairo’s 
workforce held positions in manufacturing jobs compared to 32 per cent in the rest of the state, 
reflecting the migration of capital to northern cities and, increasingly, the south and west. A 
study performed in 1952 showed that Cairo now maintained only three establishments hiring 
more than a hundred workers and none exceeding two hundred. Thus, Cairo experienced the 
ravages of corporate relocation, deindustrialization, and deproletarianization decades before their 
full effects were felt in larger Midwestern and Rust Belt cities.40 
                                                        
40 My discussion of Cairo’s place within broader periodizations of U.S. political economy and the specific 
experience of Black workers is informed by Sundiata Cha-Jua’s theory of Black Racial Formation and 
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April 10, 1937; “Illinois Troops Oust Relief Sit-Downers,” New York Times, April 11, 1937; “Strikers are Back at 
Work,” The Pittsburgh Courier, November 11, 1933; “Cairo Appeals for Troops in Strike Slaying,” Chicago Daily 
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Everyone in the city felt the effect of economic restructuring, but because of ongoing 
practices of discrimination in both public and private sector employment Black workers were 
disproportionately impacted. A 1948 study performed by the newly established Illinois 
Interracial Commission found that Black Cairoites employed in the private sector were now 
almost universally consigned to “unskilled and service jobs with low wage scales” and their 
prospects for advancement were “blocked pretty effectively by the discriminatory practices of 
employing concerns.” The report failed to mention the contributions of local trade unions, which 
almost universally excluded Black workers from membership. Conditions in the public sector 
were even worse according to the Commission, which found widespread discrimination in both 
municipal and federal employment.  African Americans went unrepresented on all city 
commissions, councils, and boards. They were excluded from the ranks of the fire and police 
departments, with the exception of a single Black police officer charged with patrolling African 
American neighborhoods. Black doctors and nurses were barred from serving in St. Mary’s 
Hospital and the T.B. sanitarium, even in the segregated wards and annexes. While some of these 
discriminatory employment practices had been implemented during the nadir, others were more 
recent. The post office, for example, had hired a number of African Americans as mail carriers 
throughout the early twentieth century. However, as job prospects declined in the private sector, 
mail carrier jobs were increasingly reserved for whites while African Americans were relegated 
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to janitorial positions. Fearing competition for jobs, white Cairoites closed ranks further, 
delimiting Black employment opportunities.41  
The instability of Black working-class employment had a corollary effect upon Cairo’s 
small Black middle class. Reliant almost exclusively upon a Black clientele, African American 
business owners were particularly vulnerable to the effect that de-proletarianization had on 
consumer spending. During the city’s long depression, a large number of Black-owned 
businesses failed, particularly those that had relied heavily on credit based sales. By the 1950s, 
businesses that provided anything but the most essential and personal services, such as funeral 
parlors and barbershops, simply could not survive in Cairo. The age of Black movie theaters, 
grocery stores, and opera houses had passed and Black proprietors numbered no more than 
twenty by the decade’s end. Tightening restrictions in public and private employment also 
prevented African Americans from securing jobs in the clerical sector. By 1960, only 1.3 per 
cent of Black workers in Alexander County held clerical jobs, a number that compared poorly 
with other Illinois counties with large Black urban populations such as Champaign County (7.6 
per cent) and Cook County (12.9 per cent). Black professionals were the largest group within the 
Black middle class, constituting 8 per cent of the city’s Black workers by 1960. The devastating 
impact of deproletarianization upon Black owned-businesses prompted large numbers of middle 
class African Americans to leave the city during the long depression along with many of the 
political and economic institutions they had forged, including the NAACP, which fell into 
inactivity during the thirties. This out migration of the Black middle-class was further                                                         
41 Illinois Interracial Commission, Special Report on Employment Opportunities in Illinois (Chicago, 1948), 8-9. 
Extensive discrimination in federal post office jobs was also identified by members of the Illinois State Advisory 
Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights during a public hearing in Cairo in 1966. See, Illinois 
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Program in Southern Illinois,” (1966); box 40, Illinois State Advisory Committee; Records Relating to Special 
Projects, 1960-70; Office of the Staff Director; USCCR, Record Group 453; National Archives Building, 
Washington D.C. 
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compounded by the tendency of Black high school students to leave the city upon graduation. In 
the decade following WWII, close to ninety percent of Black high school graduates left Cairo in 
search of jobs elsewhere.42 
 
Black Churches and “Union Spirit” during the Long Depression 
  The impact of the Long Depression was also felt by the city’s Black churches, which 
were charged with the unenviable task of meeting both the spiritual and material needs of their 
congregants in a time of financial drought. While a number of Black-owned businesses and 
community organizations failed during the thirties, Black churches remained vital hubs of Black 
political and social activity. A number of congregations maintained large memberships during 
the depression despite facing enormous financial challenges. At the peak of the crisis, First 
Central Baptist Church had over three hundred members and 250 regular attendees, many of 
them migrant workers. By the early 1940s, First Missionary Baptist Church maintained a 
membership of 650 and a regular attendance of nearly three hundred. Mirroring the union spirit 
that pervaded Black working-class politics during this period, Cairo’s Black congregations 
insisted that the best way to survive the effects of the depression was to collectively organize. 
Rather than continue their work separately, church leaders fostered “a city wide union spirit” by 
encouraging church choirs, boards, and clubs to consolidate their resources and energies. 
According to investigators employed by the Works Progress Administration (WPA), “the Usher 
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boards of the city were first to unionize, then followed the gospel Choruses, the Pastors Aids, 
and Missionary [Society], which meets once per month from church to church.” Congregations 
also worked together to plan “union revivals” featuring outside speakers and choirs.43  
On one level, the ecumenical activities of the long depression were motivated by practical 
necessity. Pooling limited resources allowed struggling churches to ensure that their basic 
administrative and institutional functions continued unimpeded and that the needs of Black 
community members were met. However, the strengthening of ecumenical bonds also 
transformed church cultures and, ultimately served to further harmonize Black religious 
traditions in the city. The push for unionized boards and committees, for example, encouraged 
more congregations to adopt the kind of administrative structures supported by larger middle-
class churches. By the 1940s, even the smallest congregations maintained a variety of clubs and 
societies, allowing for greater lay participation and institutional uniformity. Moreover, the rise of  
“union revivals” fostered a blending of worship styles and rituals that served to erode 
longstanding differences rooted in denominational affiliation and social class. This 
homogenization of worship styles was most apparent in the broad appeal of Gospel music – a  
tradition that blended secular and sacred traditions including the Blues sound that was sweeping 
the city’s bars and taverns. Initially performed by working class Pentecostal and Baptist 
congregations, gospel music in larger cities was often vehemently opposed by Black middle class 
congregations who preferred a more conventional liturgical model that incorporated European 
hymns and spirituals. In Cairo, however, Black congregations universally embraced the new 
musical style during the thirties, forming their own Gospel choirs and choruses. Increasingly,                                                         
43 “Notes on Morning Star Free Will Baptist and Ward Chapel A.M.E. Churches in Cairo, Illinois,” IWP, box, 17, 
folder 2; “Notes on New Hope Free Baptist Church in Cairo,” IWP, box 17, folder 6; “First Central Baptist Church 
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Cairo’s Black churches irrespective of denomination, class, or migratory origins embraced a 
shared religious culture that centered on gospel music, call-and-response oratory, communal 
prayer, and charismatic sermonizing.44   
The emergence of a popular Black religious culture in Cairo during this period also 
reflected the declining status and influence of the Black middle class. As large segments of the 
Black bourgeoisie left the city in search of opportunities elsewhere, the Methodist and Baptist 
congregations that had traditionally served as bastions of middle class respectability were forced 
to become more inclusive of working class participation and cultural practices. According to 
Hattie Kendrick, services at Ward Chapel underwent a significant transformation during the long 
depression, moving from “very formal” liturgies that featured classical recitals, hymns, and 
spirituals to the formation of a gospel choir and Junior Gospel chorus by the decade’s end. The 
changing demographics of Ward Chapel also produced frustration with ministers like Reverend 
A. Attaway whose Oxford-training and scholarly manner alienated him from the majority of 
church members who forced him to resign after a single year of service in 1933. In contrast, 
Reverend John A. Randolph who joined the congregation the following year was widely praised 
for his inclusive and down-to-earth approach to ministry. “Whatever else can be said of Rev. 
Randolph, he pastored,” Kendrick recalled. “The affluent, the poor, the young, the old, the 
influential, the unknown, the sick, the well were all sheep of his folk and he was loved.” While 
Ward Chapel remained a hub for middle class Methodists like Kendrick, these changes in                                                         
44 On gospel music’s incorporation into urban congregations during this period, see Clarence Taylor, The Black 
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ministerial and worship style reflected the growing influence of the Black working class during 
the depression years.45 
 
 
Figure 4: Street Map of Cairo (n.d.). Courtesy of John Willis Allen Papers, Special Collections 
Research Center, Morris Library, Southern Illinois University Carbondale.  
 
After WWII, the shared religious culture and ecumenical networks between Cairo’s black 
congregations would function as both the backdrop and glue for the initiation of broad based 
civil rights struggles. During the thirties, Black workers had fought their own battles to improve                                                         
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conditions through labor unions and unemployed worker’s associations. However, as factories 
closed and companies relocated to new sites across the country, the workplace moved with them 
breaking the power of local unions and stripping Black workers of the conventional tools for 
addressing injustice and inequality. Beyond the shop floor, Black Cairoites continued to face Jim 
Crow practices in all areas of community life, provoking many soldiers to ask why they were 
fighting for freedom abroad if they could not achieve it at home. This paradox was cast into 
further relief in 1943 when the city began moving working class residents from private slums 
into two federally funded public housing projects – Elmwood Courts for whites and Pyramid 
Courts for Blacks. As Figure 4 indicates, while the brick homes of Elmwood Courts were located 
in the more prosperous “up town” district, the wood-frame dwellings of the Pyramid Courts were 
located on the same low lying spot on which the Civil War contraband camp had been 
constructed eighty years prior. While Jim Crow was being established in public housing, the 
mass exodus of Black proprietors and professionals ensured that the experience of racial 
segregation was being supplanted by one of outright exclusion. “There was no place that… 
blacks could get accommodations,” Reverend John Cobb, minister of the nearby Pulaski COGIC 
congregation explained. “[N]aturally coming out of Texas, where we had our own restaurants, 
motels, hotels, hospitals, that was segregated too but ours was open to us. We had black 
doctors… and dentists that had their own practice, and I was used to all of that, but when we 
came here we didn’t have a lot of that.” The escalation of racial segregation and exclusion in the 
midst of the war against fascism fueled Black political protests, and while the war itself failed to 
reverse Cairo’s declining fortunes, Black veterans returned home determined to make lasting 
changes to the city’s racial order.46                                                          
46 Draft manuscript by Kathryn Ward, Kendrick-Brooks Family Papers, LOC, box 22, folder 2; Michael P. Seng, 
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CHAPTER 2 
REDEMPTIVE LOVE, VIGILANTE TERROR AND REBELLION:  
CAIRO IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS CAULDRON  
 
By the mid-twentieth century, the social and cultural power of Black churches in Cairo 
was unrivaled. Sacred edifices served both religious and worldly purposes functioning as 
primary sites of Black worship, welfare, community, and protest. However, the Black church had 
arrived at this lofty position by default, its power gained as a paradoxical consequence of a 
broader decline in Black economic and political opportunities that hindered the development and 
survival of alternative institutions. Filling the vacuum that remained was an unenviable task that 
some argued detracted from the church’s primary mission of ministering to the spiritual needs of 
congregants. Despite these obstacles, churches emerged as a primary locus for Black freedom 
struggles during and immediately following WWII. Emboldened by the contradiction presented 
by a global war against fascism and racial discrimination at home, leading Black church 
members reinvigorated the local NAACP and mounted a series of punctuated battles aimed at 
overturning Jim Crow.  
This chapter traces the contours of Cairo’s early Civil Rights struggles with a focus on 
the contested but invaluable contributions of Black churches. Beginning with the NAACP’s 
postwar campaign to eliminate school segregation, I demonstrate the centrality of Black churches 
and activist church leaders to mass direct action and the role of white violence in its derailment. 
In a preview of the “massive resistance” that would follow the Brown decision, white opposition 
forced the NAACP underground, frightening away supporters, and compelling activists to shift 
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to legal gradualism and accommodationism, largely as a matter of survival. In this context, 
tensions over the Black church’s involvement in protest activities resurfaced contributing to a 
decline in church support and the marginalization of activist clergy. The eventual resurgence of 
mass direct action during the early 1960s coincided with the southern movement’s “heroic 
phase” and the decision of higher authorities in the Illinois Conference of the African Methodist 
Episcopal Church to appoint a young militant clergyman, Reverend Blaine Ramsey, Jr., to serve 
in Cairo. Ramsey’s tenure at Ward Chapel provided the backdrop for the rise of a new generation 
of Black student activists to join with the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) 
in mounting the organization’s first integration campaign north of the Ohio River. Under the 
influence of SNCC activists from Nashville, student activists in Cairo adopted a distinctly 
religious conception of civil rights rooted in Black Christian discourses of racial reconciliation 
and a Ghandhian philosophy of nonviolence. By mobilizing this religious tradition, Black youth 
were able to recruit intergenerational and cross-class support through the city’s Black 
congregations ultimately succeeding in toppling segregation in public accommodations. 
However, in the concluding section, I show how this religiously motivated alliance fractured in 
1967 as persistent barriers to economic advancement and allegations of police brutality 
combined to produce a potent urban rebellion. 
 
Postwar Church Alliances and the Reinvigoration of the NAACP 
 
With the onset of WWII, Cairo witnessed an upsurge in political activity emanating from 
the city’s Black churches. Ministers empowered by the ecumenical networks they had 
established during the long depression increasingly injected themselves into local politics under 
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the auspices of the Interdenominational Ministers’ Alliance, an organization representing African 
American pastors from across the city. According to the Chicago Defender, the Ministers’ 
Alliance, under the “progressive and aggressive” leadership of Reverend F. K. Jefferson of Mt. 
Moriah Baptist Church, “vigilantly guarded the rights of Negroes in Cairo.” Representatives of 
the organization frequently attended city council meetings to speak out against police brutality, 
inequality in public services, and the ongoing practice of racial segregation. Ministers and their 
families also championed the cause of educational equality forming their own organizations and 
calling for the integration of the city’s existing Parent Teacher Associations. In 1941, Reverend 
Jefferson became the first African American in more than a generation to run for an elected 
position on the Alexander County school board. That same year, an ecumenical group of church 
members led by local business owner Henry Dyson and schoolteacher Omitress Sparks sought to 
revitalize the Cairo branch of the NAACP.1 
In January 1942, Hattie Kendrick found herself heading to Ward Chapel at the prompting 
of her mother Charlotte Swan Kendrick to attend a mass meeting aimed at reactivating the local 
branch of the NAACP. By the time Kendrick reached the church it was already packed. The 
brutal lynching of Cleo Wright that had taken place across the river in Sikeston, Missouri, a few 
days prior prompted outrage among Black Cairoites and spurred on the organizational efforts of 
local activists. As the meeting got underway, George Cross – a real estate agent and leading 
member of Graham Chapel AME Church in nearby Mounds, Illinois – called for a renewed 
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campaign for racial justice drawing parallels between tyranny and violence at home and abroad. 
“No, we shall not forget Pearl Harbor. Nor shall we forget Sikeston, Missouri,” he shouted to 
rapturous applause. After the meeting, Dyson and Sparks moved through the crowd signing up 
enough new members to the NAACP’s rolls to secure the organization’s charter. Over the next 
year, Kendrick reported that the NAACP grew significantly as Sparks and Dyson worked “with 
the lower strata of the Negro populace.” While many of the organization’s leaders were members 
of the city’s small Black middle class, Kendrick emphasized their own working class heritage 
and ties. Kendrick described branch President Dyson as “an uneducated auto mechanic” and 
Secretary Sparks as “the daughter of [a] poor wash woman” who had “not rubbed elbows with 
the upper tens white or black.” According to Kendrick, “Prof. [John C.] Lewis was the only 
upper class negro who belonged to the NAACP because,” as she sardonically explained, “no 
self-respecting member of the black constituency would done belong to that ‘mess’ with all those 
common niggers.” With members of Cairo’s Black working and middle-class at the forefront, the 
NAACP began holding regular meetings, corresponding with the national office, and hosting 
educational events featuring outside speakers.2  
In 1943, branch leaders began planning their first campaign – the equalization of 
teachers’ salaries. Wage discrimination was a central feature of the separate-and-unequal 
educational system in Cairo as it was in many other border and southern communities. By the 
mid-1940s, Cairo maintained seven elementary schools, two junior high schools, and two high 
schools for approximately twelve thousand residents. The total number of schools in Cairo was 
more than double the average maintained by towns of comparable size across the state of Illinois. 
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African American students attended elementary school at either Washington, Bruce or Garrison 
elementary and then graduated on to Washington Junior High School and Sumner High School. 
White students attended Lincoln, Safford, Douglas, and Elmwood elementary and then graduated 
on to Cairo Junior High and Cairo High School. African American teenagers from smaller rural 
communities in Alexander County were bussed into Cairo to attend Sumner High as opposed to 
attending all-white high schools in their own communities. In this context, paying Black 
educators on average 61 percent of a white teachers salary allowed administrators to reduce the 
financial cost associated with operating a dual school system. During the late 1930s, however, 
the NAACP targeted wage discrimination as an indirect method for achieving its broader goal of 
toppling segregated schools. According to historians August Meier and John T. Bracey, “The 
rationale for this indirect approach was to make segregated public schooling so expensive that 
the choice would be desegregation or economic ruin.” By the early 1940s, the NAACP had 
achieved a number of landmark legal victories including Mills v. Board of Education (1939) and 
Alston v. School Board of Norfolk (1940), prompting branch leaders in Cairo to consider a 
salary equalization suit as the first step in their own campaign to overturn Jim Crow.3  
During the second week of February 1944, the NAACP hosted another mass meeting at 
Ward Chapel and invited newly elected Black state legislator Corneal Davis to speak. The ties 
between Davis and the Cairo struggle were both political and religious. Affectionately known to 
his colleagues as “deacon,” Davis was the assistant pastor of Quinn Chapel AME Church in 
Chicago. Upon his arrival, Davis began asking Kendrick about the racial conditions in Cairo and 
her experiences as a schoolteacher. “Is it true,” he inquired, “that they do not pay equalized 
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salaries to black and white teachers?” Kendrick responded by explaining that Black teachers like 
herself were paid less because they were “not as qualified” as their white counterparts, to which 
Davis asked whether Kendrick had her teaching certificate. “Oh yes,” Kendrick replied. “Then 
you are qualified,” he answered, “and Cairo cannot disqualify you. However, I will see you after 
the meeting.” At Ward Chapel later that evening Davis gave his typical election stump speech 
and followed up with a large group of teachers in attendance. Upon learning that many were 
earning as little as $86 per month compared to $200 for their white counterparts, Davis 
rescheduled his plans and committed to remain in Cairo overnight in order to discuss the 
situation with the county superintendent of schools, Leo Schultz, the following day.4 
The following morning, Davis, Kendrick, and Dyson walked over to Schultz’s office at 
the all-white Cairo High School. Schultz, who had been notified about the mass meeting at Ward 
Chapel the previous evening, was waiting outside the high school for the group to arrive. Before 
Davis could introduce himself Schultz bellowed at the senator, “Oh, I know who you are… You 
that nigger that came down here and got these people all stirred up?” A stunned Davis retorted, 
“I don’t know what you’re talking about. I didn’t stir up anybody. I came down to make a speech 
for the NAACP….” “Oh yes you did,” Schultz fired back. “You came down here about all these 
niggers.” Somewhat surprised by the tenor of the conversation, Davis maintained his formal tone 
explaining that he had come to the county superintendent’s office to locate copies of the schedule 
of the salaries for teachers in Alexander County. Schultz refused the request and proceeded to 
berate the esteemed senator. “If you know what’s good for you,” he threatened, “you’ll get on 
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back up there to Chicago… These niggers down here are all satisfied. They get along fine.” 
Angered by his encounter with Schultz, Davis made a commitment to Kendrick and the rest of 
the teachers that he would fight obtain the records and pursue the case on their behalf. Upon 
returning to his office at the state capitol in Springfield, Davis reached out to rising star 
Thurgood Marshall at the NAACP headquarters in New York who encouraged him to 
collaborate with Z. Alexander Looby who was fighting a similar case in Nashville. Over the 
coming months, the two exchanged information and Davis began building the case that would 
champion equal pay for the city’s Black teachers.5  
  As Davis’s work became public knowledge white Cairoites responded angrily sending 
the senator hate mail filled with racial epithets. “I never got so many unsigned threatening letters 
in all my life,” Davis recalled. “One time they sent me a coffin right here in Springfield.” 
Undeterred, Davis returned to Cairo later in the year to file the legal suit at the courthouse. Upon 
his arrival, Davis learned from community members that more threats had been made on his life. 
“Hell has broke loose down here,” one man warned. “These white folks say they going to kill 
you down here. They going to lynch you!” Kendrick also recalled the fear that enveloped the 
community as “the usual claims” were made by members of “the master race” that “blood will 
run down the street like water.” Davis insisted that he would file the suit but suggested that local 
people not go with him for fear that their identities would be exposed. With that, Davis headed to 
courthouse where he was confronted by a mob of white men. “Boy,” one of them drawled with 
contempt, “where are you going?” Davis explained that he was in town to file a case with the 
federal courthouse. “Didn’t we tell you not to come down here?” one of the men retorted. At this 
point, the mob began to demand that Davis leave town. When he refused, one man asked Davis 
to turn around and look at the bridge that ran across the Ohio River and into Kentucky. “You                                                         
5 Davis et al., Corneal A. Davis, 43-45 
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know where that goes?” the man asked. Davis replied that he didn’t know. “Kentucky,” the man 
responded. “We’re going to take you across that bridge and we’re going to teach you that when a 
white man tells you something, dammit, you’ll respect him.” Fearful but emboldened, Davis 
tried to appeal to reason. “Gentlemen,” he declared “I don’t have anything to protect me or to 
stop you from taking me over there. All I have here is your laws… I’m trying to try this case 
under your laws, not under the Russian law or the Communist laws.” He pulled off his overcoat 
to show the men that he carried no weapons. “See, I don’t have anything. Your laws protect me,” 
Davis shouted. “If this don’t protect me then, dammit take me over there. I’m tired of this stuff!” 
When the men failed to respond, Davis pushed his way through the crowd and into the 
courthouse whereupon he filed the suit.6 
 The filing of the lawsuit was met by a media blackout in Cairo prompting local NAACP 
leaders to purchase an advertisement in the Cairo Evening Citizen explaining the grounds for the 
complaint which charged the Cairo school board with paying Black teachers lower wages than 
their white counterparts in direct violation of the federal and state law. “This is not only 
undemocratic but un-Christian,” the NAACP stated. “Negroes are dying on foreign fronts for 
democracy, why not give them a chance to live for and with democracy at home.” In April 1945, 
Negro City Teachers Association of Cairo vs. Vernon L. Nickell, Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, et al., was finally heard before the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of 
Illinois with Thurgood Marshall, special counsel for the NAACP, representing the teachers 
alongside attorney’s William H. Temple, Senator Charles C. Wimbush of Chicago, and David 
Lansden chairman of the branch’s Legal Redress Committee. The latter was the grandson of 
former Cairo Mayor John Lansden whose administration had overseen the passage of a series of                                                         
6 Davis et al., Corneal A. Davis, 46-47; “Hattie Kendrick handwritten note, n.d., Kendrick-Brooks Family Papers, 
LOC, box 22, folder 4;  
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restrictive electoral reforms. States Attorney Peyton Berbling and local Attorney D. B. Reed 
were present on behalf of the city. Marshall successfully petitioned the court to release local 
records revealing the full extent of the city’s discriminatory pay scale and forcing Judge Wham 
of Centralia to find on behalf of the plaintiffs. In a landmark victory, the judge ordered a consent 
decree imposed on the city mandating equal pay for Black teachers. Inspired by the victory, 
members of the Interdenominational Ministers’ Alliance and the NAACP began to shift the 
battle to a direct assault on Jim Crow.7 
 
The NAACP and the Battle for Integrated Schools (1952) 
 
 Shortly after winning the Cairo salary equalization suit, the NAACP’s legal director 
Thurgood Marshall announced that his office was embarking on a new campaign to overturn 
school segregation in the north. In the southernmost parts of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, racial practices tended to mirror those of the Deep South. 
However, as Marshall noted, important legal differences distinguished the regions from each 
other. Most importantly, while Deep South states tended to codify segregation through law, local 
segregationist practices in Southern Illinois were in direct violation of state legislation that 
banned segregation during the late nineteenth century. This unique context afforded NAACP 
strategists some valuable weapons in the battle for racial equality and ensured that the northern                                                         
7 “Cairo Teachers Salary Hearing Set for April,” New York Amsterdam News, April 7, 1945; Papers of the NAACP, 
Part 3: The Campaign for Educational Equality, Series C: Legal Department and Central Office Records, Reel 23, 
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1951-1955, Reel 23, 00800; Christopher C. Wimbush to Thurgood Marshall, March 9, 1945, Papers of the NAACP, 
Part 3, The Campaign for Educational Equality, Series C, Legal Department and Central Office Records, 1951-1955, 
Reel 23, 00801. 
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borderland would be an important testing ground for national civil rights organizations in the 
postwar era. Prior to the Brown decision of 1954, it was often northern border communities – 
where local customs ran up against state legislation – that provided the best targets for the 
NAACP to test the kinds of legal and direct-action strategies that would become so effective 
during the modern Civil Rights Movement. Therefore, struggles for desegregation often occurred 
earlier in the northern borderland and, accordingly, provided an important indicator for events to 
come.8  
 During the 1940s, longstanding practices of school segregation in Illinois came under 
growing fire from African American activists and their political allies. The twelve southernmost 
counties, popularly referred to as “Little Egypt,” were singled out for particular criticism. While 
African American children in many parts of the state attended majority or all-Black schools as a 
result of residential segregation, Little Egypt maintained a dual-system in which race was used as 
the sole basis for pupil assignments. Postwar studies performed by the Illinois Interracial 
Commission demonstrated that African American students in Cairo were confined to the poorest 
facilities with the most limited resources and that teacher-student ratios were disproportionately 
high. Investigators from the Commission visited Cairo in 1949 to discuss their concerns with 
local school authorities including Superintendent of Schools Leo Schultz. During their visits, 
members of the committee found little support for integration. In fact, some school leaders 
suggested that existing legislation prohibiting school segregation should be repealed. However, 
despite their findings the Illinois Interracial Commission adopted a gradualist approach placing 
the integration of Cairo schools on its “long-range program.” At the same time, Black legislators                                                         
8 Thurgood Marshall quote taken from Davison M. Douglas, Jim Crow Moves North: The Battle over Northern 
School Segregation, 1865-1954 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 238. On the NAACP’s campaign to 
end northern school segregation during the 1940s, see Douglas, Jim Crow Moves North; Sugrue, Sweet Land of 
Liberty, 169-170; and Gilbert Jonas, Freedom’s Sword: The NAACP and the Struggle against Racism in America, 
1909-1969 (New York: Routledge, 2005). 
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in the Illinois General Assembly spoke out on the persistence of school segregation in the state 
and pushed a number of legislative initiatives aimed at overturning the practice. The first 
occurred in 1945 when earlier anti-segregation laws were amended to provide that “[n]o pupil 
shall be excluded from or segregated in any such school on account of his color, race, or 
nationality.” However, since the policy lacked any enforcement provision it had virtually no 
impact. During the 66th General Assembly of the Illinois legislature in 1949, Charles Jenkins of 
Chicago introduced an amendment to House Bill No.1066, the Distributive Fund Appropriation 
Bill, which would allow for the withholding of state-aid funds from school districts that practiced 
racial exclusion or segregation in public school facilities. “Let’s wipe out Jim Crowism in 
Illinois schools,” Jenkins declared, adding that while some downstate school districts might 
continue “their un-American philosophies” they shouldn’t be permitted to “do it at state 
expense.” The Jenkins Amendment passed adding another weapon to the activist arsenal.9  
 After the passage of the Jenkins Amendment, NAACP leaders encouraged grassroots 
activists across Southern Illinois to test the law by organizing local students to seek enrollment in 
white schools. Campaigns were organized in a number of downstate communities but were 
greeted by intransigence from school authorities prompting the NAACP to file legal suits forcing 
desegregation in East St. Louis, Alton, and Edwardsville in 1950 and Harrisburg in 1951. 
However, the campaign in Cairo and other communities in the southernmost parts of the state 
were much slower prompting legislators to strengthen the Jenkins Amendment in 1951 requiring 
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that each District Superintendent of Schools requesting state funds provide a statement under 
oath that the district was in compliance with the bill’s non-segregation policy. The House also 
passed a resolution establishing a special legislative committee to investigate compliance in 
down state communities where school segregation was still practiced. The special committee, led 
by Corneal Davis and Charles Jenkins, visited Cairo. It confirmed once again the discriminatory 
nature of school facilities and the principled opposition of local school authorities to integration. 
In the committee’s final report, members concluded that Leo Schultz, Superintendent of Schools 
of Cairo, remained “the main obstacle to the elimination of school segregation in Alexander 
County,” and that Black parents “feared bodily violence for their children seeking to attend the 
school nearest their residence.” Emboldened by the support of their allies in the state legislature, 
NAACP leaders in Cairo requested support from the national office for an organizing drive 
focused on desegregating the city’s schools. In January 1952, Thurgood Marshall sent field 
workers June Shagaloff and Lester P. Bailey to Cairo to meet with city officials and aid parents 
in registering their children for transfer into white schools.10  
The city’s Black churches became ground zero for the NAACP’s organizing drive. Mass 
meetings educating parents about the benefit of integrated schools and encouraging them to 
submit applications for transfer requests were held at Mt. Moriah Baptist Church and Ward 
Chapel. The use of these particular churches as meeting spaces was due in part to their size and 
independence from white control. However, the NAACP’s ability to access these specific 
churches also hinged on the support of their members, particularly clergy and lay leaders. Since                                                         
10 Report of Special Committee Appointed Pursuant to House Resolution No. 34, 1951, Superintendent of Public 
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the success of the salary equalization suit, a number of Ward Chapel’s leading congregants had 
joined Hattie Kendrick at the NAACP. Two of the church’s trustees – Dr. W. A. Fingal and Dr. 
James Carroll Wallace, Jr., took up leadership positions in the organization, the former serving as 
the branch president and the latter as the chairman of both the Press and Publicity Committee and 
the Finance Committee. At the height of the desegregation campaign, Ward Chapel’s itinerant 
pastor Reverend Arthur Jelks replaced Fingal as president and played an active role in the 
integration campaign. The high profile role played by church leaders in the desegregation 
campaign was far from uncontroversial however. As Kendrick recalled, “A part of the church 
congregation was proud of the firm stand which was being made in civil rights, the other part 
seemed humiliated.” As the spiritual home of many of the city’s most prominent citizens, Ward 
Chapel’s use for civil rights meetings was also a source of debate. According to Kendrick, some 
congregants opposed the church’s use feeling that it was “too dangerous,” while others “felt if 
we could not have Civil Rights meetings in our own churches then our Civil Rights was a farce 
and needed strengthening.” Despite these underlying tensions, the support of Ward Chapel’s 
leaders ensured that it would play an integral part in the desegregation campaign and by the start 
of the spring semester the organization had recruited an unprecedented 200 new members and 
filed eighty-four transfer requests with the local school board.11 
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  As word spread that Black parents were planning to transfer their children on the first 
day of classes, white citizens engaged in an organized campaign of violence and intimidation. 
Parents that had signed transfer requests received menacing letters from anonymous senders; 
white drivers issued threats to young children playing in the streets; and, on the night before the 
first day of the semester, three crosses burned in Black neighborhoods across town. Field 
secretary June Shagaloff, who was subjected to near continual harassment, secured the services 
of two bodyguards and began carrying a weapon. Seeking to dispel parents’ fears, Shagaloff also 
had to address the opposition of leading members of Cairo’s Black middle-class, particularly 
schoolteachers who justifiably feared that desegregation would cost them their jobs. Before 
classes started principal Willie Mathews of Sumner High School visited every student who had 
applied for a transfer individually and falsely informed them that all of the other applicants had 
withdrawn their requests and that they would be the only one enrolling on the first day of classes. 
Others were visited by Reverend Mitchell Fisher of the Cairo COGIC congregation who warned 
parents that they would lose welfare payments and bank credit privileges if they pursued 
integration. Accordingly, some parents withdrew their transfer requests out of fear of reprisals. 
However, a larger group of undeterred parents prepared to enroll their children on the first day of 
classes.12 
  On January 28, 1952, Black parents – with children in tow – walked to the city’s 
historically white schools past large numbers of white men who were patrolling the area in cars 
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and on foot. Upon their arrival, school officials determined to halt the integration drive informed 
the parents that their transfer requests had not been processed. Shortly after, violence broke out 
across the city. Armed vigilantes fired multiple shotgun blasts into the home of Dr. J. C. 
Wallace; unexploded dynamite was discovered at the tire shop owned by NAACP Vice President 
Henry Dyson; and Dr. W. A. Fingal received threats warning him to leave the city or “suffer the 
consequences.” Not all of those targeted were prominent civil rights activists. Dr. Urbane Bass, a 
local doctor who admitted that he had refused to participate in the transfer plan, narrowly averted 
death when vigilantes threw dynamite onto his property in the middle of the night, destroying 
part of his back porch. When local police failed to act quickly to halt the violence, Black war 
veterans distributed weapons and established barricades to protect their communities. While 
other southern Illinois communities had desegregated relatively peaceably, Cairo witnessed yet 
another upsurge in racial violence, prompting the deployment of the National Guard and 
foreshadowing events that would take place in the Deep South just a few years later.13   
 The response of city officials to the NAACP’s desegregation campaign also distinguished 
Cairo from other southern Illinois communities. In East St. Louis, for example, key civic leaders 
from the Board of Education, Chamber of Commerce, law enforcement, and the local press 
engaged in behind-the-scenes negotiations with activists in an effort to resolve the desegregation 
battle peaceably. Civic leaders in Cairo, however, had little interest in dialogue. The NAACP’s 
offer to collaborate with city council members on developing a desegregation plan was met with 
“stony silence.” School authorities, led by arch-segregationist Leo Schultz and a school board                                                         
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that included representation from some of the city’s largest financial and industrial interests, 
opposed desegregation and in direct violation of state law continued to obstruct efforts to transfer 
Black students into white schools. Moreover, NAACP leaders alleged that Schultz was 
personally responsible for leaking the names and addresses of transfer applicants to known 
vigilantes. Schultz did little to deter such claims, insisting in a confidential memo to the State 
Superintendent of Schools that white citizens should be commended for “their recent action” 
which he contended had “called [the NAACP’s] hand.” “It is hoped,” Schultz stated bluntly, 
“that many of [the NAACP’s] tactics will be halted as a result of this action – not only checked 
in Cairo, but throughout the Nation.” The use of vigilante violence was also tacitly endorsed by 
local law enforcement agencies, which NAACP leaders accused of much foot dragging prior to 
the arrival of state and federal agents. All of this took place unchecked by the last watchdog of 
democratic governance as the editorial board at the Cairo Evening Citizen maintained a media 
blackout on the school desegregation campaign and refused to publish any NAACP press 
releases which might have dispelled rumors and lessened tensions in the city. As NAACP field 
secretaries June Shagaloff and Lester Bailey surmised, “It was the official white reaction to 
[desegregation]… that put Cairo in the hall of infamy.” Taken collectively, the actions of city 
officials presented a solid wall of opposition that distinguished Cairo from other northern 
communities facing desegregation campaigns during this period.14 
 Despite local opposition, NAACP leaders were aided by the arrival of state and federal 
investigators in February which resulted in the arrest of over twenty white citizens in relation to 
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the bombings, shootings, and cross burnings. While some had initially attributed the violence to 
a “small minority group of hoodlums,” the arrests revealed that those most likely to be accused 
of vigilantism were well-established local business owners. Among those arrested were auto 
dealer Robert Hogan; Jack and Earl Bauer of the Bauer Bros. Oil Company; Elmer Cummings of 
the Cairo City Coal Company; and Kenneth Sullivan of Sullivan Electric Company. Angered by 
the arrests, fellow merchants William Lebo and Clifford Jones filed charges of disorderly 
conduct and endangering the life of a child against eight NAACP activists. Cairo police officers 
proceeded to Ward Chapel where they arrested David Lansden, Reverend Jelks, Dr. Fingal, Dr. 
Wallace, Dr. S. W. Madison, June Shagaloff and Lester Bailey. In a refrain popular with local 
segregationists, the plaintiffs claimed that NAACP leaders had jeopardized the safety of Black 
students by forcing them to enroll in all-white schools. Eager to appease white citizens, State’s 
Attorney Michael O’Shea upheld the charges and moved the case forward for prosecution. When 
the grand jury returned in February they found no grounds for indictment against NAACP 
activists, but in a lengthy statement foreman John Clarke chastised the organization for 
disrupting the “safety and moral conditions” of local schoolchildren and acting with an 
“arrogance, abusiveness and utter lack of cooperation, which could have very easily led to 
violence and upheaval.” Shortly after, in a move that outraged not only from activists but state 
officials, the grand jury also threw out the charges against the men accused of participating in the 
bombing of Dr. Bass’s home.15 
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By early March, twenty-one Black students had been successfully enrolled in the city’s 
formerly all-white schools. However, continued obstructionism prompted NAACP leaders to 
conclude that local authorities were permitting token enrollment to deflect criticism and avoid 
complete desegregation. Accordingly, local activists filed suit against the school district and 
began working with allies in the state legislature to cut off funding in accordance with the 
Jenkins Amendment. Under intense pressure Lucy Twente McPherson, the County 
Superintendent of Schools for Alexander County, withheld state funds for several months during 
the spring semester and by the fall the total number of Black students enrolled in formerly all-
white schools had increased to sixty-two. The impact of the desegregation battle was also felt in 
the city’s parochial schools. Administrators at St. Joseph’s parochial high school reported in the 
spring of 1952 that the NAACP’s “unfortunate agitation” had prompted a flood of inquiries from 
white citizens as to whether Black children would be admitted and if the school would consider 
enrolling white Protestants if they “did not care to sit in the classroom with the Negroes in the 
public schools.” Fearing the consequences of a desegregation campaign at St. Joseph’s High 
School, administrators decided to permanently close the school during the summer of 1952 
publicly citing financial difficulties as the cause.16  
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Encouraged by these strides, the NAACP reassigned Shagaloff and Bailey to more 
troublesome areas and journalists began to tout Cairo as a promising sign that even the most 
violent communities could be redeemed. “Jim Crow education is on its way out,” jubilant editors 
at the Chicago Defender stated in September. Local realities, however, offered little ground for 
optimism and complete integration would not be achieved until the Princeton Plan was 
implemented in 1967 resulting in the ultimate consolidation of the city’s schools just two years 
later. Until then, a “freedom of choice” model was followed by which a small number of African 
Americans elected to fill a small number of available spots in the city’s formerly all-white public 
schools while the majority continued to attend all-Black schools with no white students. The 
teaching staff remained rigidly segregated. Efforts to integrate the city’s parochial schools also 
continued at a slow pace. In 1954, Flora Chambliss, the wife of a local Black physician, applied 
to have her children transferred from St. Columba’s to St. Joseph’s Grade School but was 
encouraged to wait until a desegregation plan could be implemented by the diocese.17  
In September 1953, W. A. Fingal, president of the Cairo branch of the NAACP, wrote a 
desperate plea to Thurgood Marshall asking for field secretary June Shagaloff to be immediately                                                                                                                                                                                   
Archives; Lucy Twente McPherson to Vernon L. Nickell, April 16, 1952, Superintendent of Public Instruction, 
Legal Department Correspondence, Segregation File, Record Group 106.014, Illinois State Archives; Davis, et al., v. 
Schultz, Superintendent of Schools, School District No.1, Alexander County, et al., No. C-3360, Circuit Court of 
Alexander County, State of Illinois, March 5, 1952, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Legal Department 
Correspondence, Segregation File (1952), Record Group 106.014, Illinois State Archives; Lucy Twente McPherson 
to Vernon L. Nickell, May 14, 1952, Superintendent of Public Instruction, General Correspondence, Legal File 
(1952), Record Group 106.007, Illinois State Archives; Vernon L. Nickell to Harry A. Polster, April 15, 1952, 
Superintendent of Public Instruction, General Correspondence, Segregation File (1952), 106.007, Illinois State 
Archives; “Negroes Enter White Cairo Schools without Incident,” Jet, September 18, 1952. 
17 “School Doors Opening,” The Chicago Defender, September 13, 1952; Barger, Ethnicity in Cairo Catholic 
Schools, 45-46; June Shagaloff and Lester P. Bailey, “Cairo – Illinois Southern Exposure,” Crisis 59 (April 1952); 
Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty, 458; June Shagaloff, “Progress Report on Northern Desegregation,” Equity & 
Excellence in Education, vol. 4 (1966); Samuel J. Simmons to Walter Lewis, August 22, 1966, box 40, Illinois State 
Advisory Committee; Records Relating to Special Projects, 1960-70; Office of the Staff Director; USCCR, Record 
Group 453; National Archives Building, Washington D.C; Illinois Commission on Human Relations, “The 
Integration of Public Schools in Illinois,” (January 1959); Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, Illinois 
School Directory, 1966-67 (Springfield, Ill.: Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, 1967); Office of the 
Superintendent of Public Instruction, Illinois School Directory, 1967-68 (Springfield, Ill.: Office of the 
Superintendent of Public Instruction, 1968). 
  95 
reassigned to Cairo. The Cairo branch, Fingal explained, was caught in the middle of “a life and 
death struggle.” The year following the desegregation campaign had witnessed an upsurge in 
organized white supremacist activity that effectively forced the Cairo branch underground. In 
June 1952, white Cairoites, led by a group of small-business owners, formed the Cairo Citizens 
Association, a forerunner to the White Citizen’s Councils that would spring up across the South 
in the wake of the Brown decision. Headed by local car dealers Walter Warden and Lee Stenzel 
and with William Lebo serving as its secretary, the Cairo Citizens Association worked to 
undermine the efforts of local civil rights activists through a combination of economic 
harassment and physical intimidation. The NAACP’s only white member, attorney David 
Lansden, became the target of considerable ire for his role in the pending legal suit against local 
school authorities. Garbage was strewn across Lansden’s property, his front steps were smeared 
with oil, and rocks were thrown through his windows. The prominent attorney also had the 
misfortune of living next door to a member of the Cairo Citizens Association, Connell Smith, a 
local leader in the Cairo branch of the American Federation of Labor’s Hod Carriers, Building 
and Common Laborers Union who erected what author Langston Hughes would describe as a 
four-foot “red arrow of bigotry” on his garage pointing toward his neighbor’s property. When 
asked by reporters from Life magazine to explain the purpose of the sign, Smith stated bluntly, 
“so I can see where the dynamite is going off.” City officials also engaged in economic reprisals 
against Black activists denying the Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance’s requests for 
parade permits and preventing Black entrepreneurs from securing the appropriate licenses. As 
one of the few Black schoolteachers to support the desegregation campaign, Hattie Kendrick was 
particularly vulnerable to harassment and shortly after the protests she was dismissed her from 
her position at Washington Junior High by the school board.18                                                          
18 W. A. Fingal to Thurgood Marshall, September 10, 1953, Papers of the NAACP, Part 3: The Campaign for 
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In his letter to NAACP executives, Dr. Fingal stressed the chilling effect this unchecked 
campaign of terror had had upon the branch’s efforts to organize Black Cairoites. “Negroes are 
99.9 percent scared at all times of the white folks and NAACPers,” Fingal explained. “Any local 
Negro who dares defy the boundaries imposed by the white brethren is in danger of hell’s fire 
and damnation administered by his Negro fellowman.” In the face of strident opposition and 
pressure to accommodate, the NAACP’s membership plummeted and branch leaders were forced 
to alter their strategies. “The NAACP at that time,” former member Reverend J. I. Cobb 
explained, “was working what they call underground, because of the pressure, the intimidation 
and all types of violence that was directed toward the members of NAACP.” Branch leaders held 
“secret meetings” in their homes and encouraged concerned citizens to meet with them face-to-
face due to fears that the organization’s mail was being tampered with. “We had to be very, very 
careful about what we were doing for our protection,” Rev. Cobb explained. Accordingly, the 
organization’s focus shifted away from high-profile acts of direct-action that required mass 
support to the filing of individual legal suits targeted at integrating the city’s movie theaters and 
protecting its members from economic reprisals.19                                                                                                                                                                                    
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As the branch struggled under the effects of repression, many of the Black professional 
men that had served as the organization’s formal leaders left the city. Among the most visible 
community leaders, Black ministers, doctors and business owners were the primary targets of 
racial violence making their presence in the city particularly perilous. Some chose to use their 
limited mobility to relocate elsewhere. Others were compelled by economic or physical 
harassment. Even those, like Dr. J. C. Wallace, who insisted that they had “no intentions of 
leaving Cairo,” faced obstacles. In January 1953, Wallace found himself called to active duty 
from the army reserves and was deployed to Germany. In their absence, Black women 
increasingly accepted positions of formal leadership within the NAACP. The number of elected 
officer positions held by Black women increased from one in 1952 to a majority of eight in 1954. 
Black women officers included Carrie Dunn Jones (Secretary); Carmel Fowler (Membership 
Committee); Hattie Kendrick (Entertainment Committee and Press and Publicity Committee); 
Juanita Gholson (Education Committee), and Josephine Brown (Junior Work Committee). In an 
ironic twist, the escalation of repression during the mid-1950s had decimated the branch’s 
leadership and, in the process, opened up space for Black women’s elevation to officer positions. 
 In this context, Black women played a critical role in sustaining the organization during the 
harshest of times.20 
Concern about the declining involvement of the city’s Black churches was also prominent 
in Fingal’s report. As fear of reprisals escalated, longstanding disagreements regarding the 
appropriate role of Black churches and church leaders in the civil rights struggle reemerged at 
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Ward Chapel threatening to divide the congregation in the summer of 1952. According to 
Kendrick, “Rev. Jelks, our pastor, called on trustee Dr. W. A. Fingal and asked him to go to the 
Bishop Baber and asked him to replace him at the end of the conference year.” Shortly after, 
Rev. Jelks was relocated to East St. Louis and replaced by Reverend R. S. Everett (1952-1954) 
and subsequently Reverend W. C. Coleman (1954-1959). Kendrick described the years 
immediately following Rev. Jelk’s departure as “a time of problems and stagnation for the 
church,” during which a majority of the membership refocused their energies inwards. As Fingal 
crafted his letter to NAACP executives in September 1953 a sense of fear gripped the city’s 
Black congregations, promoting a culture of widespread accommodation.  
[Eighty] percent of the Negroes dare not attend an NAACP meeting or 
any other meeting setting forth their rights as citizens. They are taught 
through the pulpits and schools that this is just stirring up something… 
Only two churches, of nearly twenty, are available for mass assemblage. 
Ministers are afraid to come out to such meetings. Even when placed on 
program to pray they are afraid to come out and deny that they were 
asked. 
 
Not all ministers opposed the NAACP’s work, but their involvement was often constrained by 
the sentiments of their congregants in ways that have been overlooked by scholars.21 According 
to Fingal, activist ministers risked alienating their own members who in some cases threatened to 
halt financial contributions if they disagreed with the church’s activities. Baptist and Pentecostal 
ministers were particularly vulnerable to forms of economic pressure as they lacked the financial 
independence that the Methodist’s hierarchical structure offered. However, as Rev. Jelk’s 
resignation illustrates, economic opposition was not the only obstacle ministers faced to activist                                                         
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ministries. In turn, the efforts of activist congregants to draw explicit connections between their 
church work and involvement in civil rights struggles was also constrained by the sentiments of 
their pastors and fellow church members. According to Kendrick, it was for this reason that 
activist lay leaders including herself were jubilant when the Bishop of the Illinois conference 
took what many “older and more conservative churchmen considered a long chance” by sending 
a youthful Blaine Ramsey, Jr. to serve as Ward Chapel’s pastor in 1959.22  
 
SNCC and the Integration of Public Accommodations (1962) 
 
Ramsey’s youth and inexperience made him a surprising choice for the pastorate of Ward 
Chapel. The young minister had led just one church and served in the Illinois AME Conference 
for only five years, a resume that hardly prepared him to lead an established congregation that 
had been plagued by internal conflict and financial difficulties. However, with the civil rights 
movement in full swing and a new generation of militant ministers taking the lead in cities across 
the South, leaders in the Illinois AME Conference opted to appoint Ramsey who had extensive 
training in the latest social outreach approaches as well as theology. In the highly centralized 
AME Church, this denominational support afforded Ramsey a strong mandate and the 
independence to act even in the face of local opposition. However, Ramsey’s quick intellect and 
passion for an engaged ministry quickly inspired the support of many of his congregants and set 
the stage for Ward Chapel’s reemergence at the forefront of civil rights struggles.23                                                          
22 W. A. Fingal to Thurgood Marshall, September 10, 1953, Papers of the NAACP, Part 3: The Campaign for 
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Though Ramsey concentrated exclusively on the needs of Ward Chapel - performing 
repairs, establishing a financial plan, and ministering to the membership – he gradually refocused 
his congregation outwards to conditions beyond the church’s walls. Ramsey demonstrated an 
uncanny ability to fuse religious thought and action. Like other so-called militant ministers of his 
generation, he embraced a prophetic theological tradition that emphasized Christ’s ministry of 
love and reconciliation and its contemporary import for the poor and oppressed. In his sermons, 
Ramsey seamlessly integrated scripture and protest carving space for civil rights activity at the 
heart of understandings of Christian mission. This philosophy of spiritual praxis allowed him to 
bridge the very real theological divides among congregants at Ward Chapel. As Kendrick 
explained, “In Blaine Ramsey’s church there were two [schools of thought] on community 
involvement. Number one, preach Christ in him crucified – that will settle everything. The other 
school cried preach us a practical gospel.” Ramsey’s skill, Kendrick argued, was in his ability to 
mobilize scripture to challenge this bifurcation of the sacred and the secular, thought and action, 
and “this-worldly” and “otherworldly” theologies. 
Blain [sic] Ramsey heard both of them and understood what they were 
saying better than they themselves. Did not they say with him every 
Sunday morning, [thou] shall love the Lord they God with all they heart 
and they neighbor as thyself. Blain looked around. He saw his people. 
God’s Black children, sick of poverty and deprivation; hungry for 
knowledge; thirsty for opportunity; imprisoned within walls of 
segregation and discrimination. Blain Ramsey heard their cry and like 
Elijah, answered, here I am Lord, send me, send me. 
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By grounding the call for civil rights in a gospel of love and reconciliation Ramsey legitimized 
the church’s involvement in civil rights work and encouraged his congregants to participate as 
part of their Christian duty.24  
Ramsey’s distinctive approach resonated with Ward Chapel’s activist lay leaders, 
particularly Kendrick who was widely recognized for her own commitment to an engaged social 
ministry that fused religion and racial uplift. Studies by historians Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham 
and Bettye Collier-Thomas situate the Black church as a foundational space for Black women’s 
activism as well as a key vehicle and contested site in their struggles against racial and gender 
discrimination. Through missionary societies, women’s auxiliaries, and secular organizations, 
Black churchwomen became leaders in social service and racial self-help.25 Kendrick was a part 
of this longstanding Black feminist tradition and, like Ramsey, she saw her activism as an 
extension of her deep religious convictions. In addition to her work at the NAACP, Kendrick 
served as Chair of the Social Action Commission of the Fourth Episcopal District’s Women’s 
Missionary Society, taking Matthew 25:35-36 as her mandate: “For I was hungered, and ye gave 
me meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave me drink: I was a stranger, and ye took me in: Naked, and ye 
clothed me: I was sick, and ye visited me: I was in prison, and ye came unto me.” (King James 
Version) This mandate, Kendrick believed, would not be achieved “merely by sermons from the 
pulpit” but rather through the active contributions of Black churchwomen to local communities. 
In a set of guidelines distributed to local women’s missionary societies, Kendrick proposed that 
Black churchwomen actively engage their communities by tutoring school children, coordinating                                                         
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meals and snacks, pooling clothing for community-wide distribution, and providing basic 
medical care in places where facilities were not provided. At Ward Chapel, Kendrick diligently 
worked to institutionalize this vision through her service as a Sunday school teacher, member of 
the Steward Board, and founder and president of the Charles A. Bolar Lyceum. Through the 
latter, Kendrick educated congregants – young and old - on Black history and culture as well as 
the responsibilities of Christian mission, service, and racial uplift.26 
Recognizing the parallels in their work, Ramsey collaborated with Kendrick in his efforts 
to promulgate a philosophy of spiritual praxis among congregants and fellow clergymen. 
Ramsey joined Kendrick on the executive board of the Cairo NAACP and began reaching out to 
the city’s Black ministers in an effort to reenergize the ecumenical relationships that had 
underpinned earlier struggles. He quickly gained the confidence of his peers in the 
Interdenominational Ministers’ Alliance, forming strong ties with Rev. E.G. Mayes of the First 
Missionary Baptist Church and Rev. J. I. Cobb of the Cairo COGIC congregation who were also 
members of the NAACP. Ramsey also partnered with Kendrick in 1960 in establishing the Ward 
Chapel Social Action Commission, a body charged with “coordinating activities in the areas of 
social, race, and economic relations as well as community cooperation.” Through the Social 
Action Commission, Ramsey and Kendrick were able to recruit and train a new generation of 
church-based activists that helped reignite the civil rights struggle in Cairo. Foremost among this 
group was sixteen-year old Charles Koen, a student at Sumner High who lived with his mother in                                                         
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the Pyramid Courts. Koen’s extended family had deep ties to Ward Chapel. His great-
grandfather, George Bondurant, had helped build the 17th Street edifice; his grandmother, 
Christine Bondurant, served as the church organist for more than twenty years; and several of his 
aunties and uncles were singers in the choir. Despite this lineage, Koen explains that his own 
involvement had been limited during the late 1950s because he felt “the church wasn’t doing 
enough to help the poor and the struggling people.” However, after Koen was sentenced to 
reformatory school for breaking a storefront window, his mother sent him to Rev. Ramsey who 
met with the judge and arranged to cover the fine and cost of repairs on Koen’s behalf. In return, 
Koen worked for the pastor, sparking a close relationship between the two.27    
Growing up in the Pyramid Courts, Koen was acutely aware of the interlocking realities 
of racial and class oppression. His autobiography portrays a childhood beset by poverty and 
shaped by the heroism of his mother, Naomi Bondurant, who struggled to raise her children 
under the most trying of circumstances. Patent distinctions in the material worlds of Cairo’s 
Black and white residents, combined with the painful experience of racial exclusion, fostered 
feelings of intense anxiety, shame, and resentment during Koen’s boyhood. He describes the 
“dehumanizing” feeling of waiting in the commodity line with other Black families as white men 
unloaded “sacks full of dry foods, canned goods and potatoes” from trucks and his “longing” to 
enter local restaurants and “enjoy what the whites were enjoying – all the fine food, fine music, 
with the comfort of air-conditioning on hot nights.” For Koen, these tangible differences in rights 
and privileges seemed to extend into all areas of life in Cairo. “[I]t was the same with their nice 
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homes and fine cars,” he explained. “[Y]ou see blacks living in shacks while whites relax in their 
two-story homes surrounded by rose bushes.” Koen’s frustration was compounded by a gendered 
sense of responsibility as the eldest son to be “the father of the house” and provide for his 
mother.28  
While Koen felt the sting of racial and class oppression from a young age he struggled to 
comprehend its cause. “I grew up recognizing the symptoms of racism in Cairo and yet not fully 
understanding what the sickness was all about,” he explains. However, at the age of sixteen – 
shortly before meeting Ramsey – Koen describes an “awakening period” in which his vision of 
racial and class inequalities was intensified. “I still didn’t really know what was going on, but 
from my observation I deduced that the oppression and racism we experience as blacks in Cairo 
controlled us psychologically.” To a teenage Koen, this psychological control appeared most 
visible in Black Cairoites’ accommodation to practices of racial exclusion. 
For instance, if you check it out; whites were going to the Gem theatre 
and we had to go to the Lincoln, and the Gem structurally was a better 
theatre and then you check the whites swimming in a pool right in the 
center of town as well stroll past it on our way to the river to swim there. 
Or not having a skating rink and consequently not going skating. The 
only way they could get away with stuff like that was because they 
controlled our minds.  
 
Perceiving the role that fear and accommodation played in upholding the status quo, Koen 
describes feeling even “more ashamed” and “depressed.” But after his arrest, Koen recalls, “Rev. 
Ramsey was very instrumental in putting me on the proper track and giving me guidance which 
was very helpful for me on one hand and keeping me out of reform school and trouble on the 
other…. Meeting him was probably the best thing that happened to me at that point of my life.” 
Ramsey “recruited and mentored” Koen, taking him “under his wing” and teaching him “how to 
do church work.” Koen’s relationships with Ramsey and other activist lay leaders at Ward                                                         
28 Koen, The Cairo Story, 50-51.  
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Chapel were transformative in that they legitimized previously unarticulated feelings of shame 
and frustration and provided an organizational context through which these sentiments could be 
directed into constructive forms of collective protest. “Around about then,” Koen states, “I 
started voicing my opinions on many injustices I saw.” Ramsey also became a spiritual mentor 
whose model of an activist ministry was an “inspiration” to Koen preparing him for his own 
“calling into the ministry” and helping him “to recognize the depth of the spirit.”29  
 By the time Ramsey and Koen met in 1961, the young pastor was already testing racial 
barriers and contemplating a broader campaign to overturn Jim Crow in the city. In January, 
Ramsey met with city council members and proposed the formation of a Human Relations 
Council composed of Black and white residents in order to address ongoing practices of racial 
discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations. Councilmembers 
acknowledged Rev. Ramsey’s request but failed to act upon it. He received a similar response 
from members of the city’s exclusively white Ministerial Alliance whom, according to Kendrick, 
“[he] chided… for allowing racial segregation to exist in the Christian family.” When petitions 
failed Ramsey and other local activists, inspired by recent integration campaigns led by students 
working for the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee (SNCC), began to consider the use of nonviolent direct-action as an alternative tool 
to challenge Jim Crow. That same year, CORE had mounted campaigns in a number of 
borderland cities including nearby East St. Louis and St. Louis aimed at integrating recreational 
facilities such as swimming pools and bowling allies. Nearby in Nashville, SNCC activists 
responsible for leading sit-ins at downtown restaurants and stores the year prior were preparing 
to embark on the Freedom Rides in an effort to test laws banning segregation on interstate travel.                                                         
29 Koen, The Cairo Story, 46-47; Maryadi, “The Roles of Black Churches in the Cairo Civil Rights Movement 
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In the spring of 1962, Ramsey reached out to SNCC organizers on behalf of the Cairo NAACP 
and invited them to come to Cairo to aid in a citywide campaign against segregation in the city. 
SNCC leaders agreed, making “Little Egypt” the site of the organizations’ first integration 
campaign north of the Ohio River.30  
 Prior to SNCC’s arrival, the Cairo branch of the NAACP worked hard to generate mass 
support and an organizational structure capable of sustaining the upcoming campaign. 
Organizing the city’s youth was a vital component of this plan. Rev. Ramsey and Rev. Cobb 
approached Koen to ask him to take the lead in mobilizing students from Cairo and Sumner High 
Schools in preparation for possible direct-action campaigns. Koen embraced the role, organizing 
Black youth, particularly those from the Pyramid Courts, and forming the Cairo Nonviolent 
Freedom Committee (CNVFC), an organization modeled after SNCC. Ramsey encouraged the 
organization to use Ward Chapel as their headquarters. When SNCC fieldworkers John Lewis, 
Mary McCollum, James Peake, and Joy Reagon arrived from Nashville in June, they 
encountered approximately seventy-five high school children organized by Koen and additional 
support from student activists who had recently formed a SNCC chapter at Southern Illinois 
University in Carbondale. The fieldworkers quickly accepted the role of advisors, helping local 
students plan the campaign and providing training in nonviolent direct-action.31                                                          
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 Many of the SNCC fieldworkers from Nashville had trained under Reverend James 
Lawson and subscribed to a Tolstoyan or Gandhian philosophy of nonviolence that resonated 
with Cairo’s church-based organizing traditions, becoming the ideological foundation of the 
local movement.32 The CNVFC’s newsletter invoked SNCC’s 1960 “Statement of Purpose,” 
which affirmed the redemptive quality of nonviolence to transform hate through love and to 
produce a reconciled community. The CNVFC’s publications and private correspondence show 
that this ideology was internalized by many of the organization’s members, becoming “a 
personal philosophy” as opposed to a pragmatic strategy or abstract “set of principles.” In 
contrast to the NAACP, which focused on legal suits to force integration, the CNVFC believed 
that segregation was a symptom of a deeper “moral sickness” that needed to be “confronted” at 
the individual level with redemptive love. “Through the demonstration,” activists argued, “we 
confront each man – the restaurant owner, hotel owner and the people in the street who support 
the businessman – with his responsibility.” CNVFC leaders claimed that the “creative 
interchange” that emerged from these confrontations would reinforce “the dignity of both 
groups,” and leave the door open for true racial reconciliation. Thus, while integration was the 
practical goal of CNVFC activists, many members also embraced a broader vision of nonviolent 
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direct action, producing a Beloved Community where brotherhood could be realized. “We shall 
continue,” local activists declared, “until love takes the place of hatred, until right drives out 
wrong, until freedom and equality replace slavery and injustice in our land.”33 
  On June 17, CNVFC members with the support of SNCC activists began testing a small 
number of restaurants and hotels in the community. After initially being refused access to the 
Mark Twain Restaurant and the Cairo Hotel, an interracial group successfully obtained service at 
both locations later that week. On June 27, a group of Black patrons also obtained service 
without incident at Glenn’s Restaurant located a few miles north of Cairo. However, at Mack’s 
Barbecue on Sycamore a group of Black high school students refused to leave after they were 
grossly overcharged and served food that was inedible. Angered by their behavior, the 
restaurant’s owner, James Cox, assaulted one of the students and had to be restrained by other 
patrons. The group returned later that afternoon but the waitresses quickly locked the doors and 
continued serving white patrons inside. Shortly after, Cox appeared with a hose and began 
spraying water at the group as they waited outside. As word of the protest spread, a group of 
more than sixty white citizens assembled outside the restaurant. During the melee that followed, 
an unidentified white man pulled out a knife, slashing Mary McCollum. McCollum refused to 
press charges, stating that the group’s purpose was to change people’s attitudes and that they 
were “willing to suffer for that change.” Koen agreed: “No matter what they do or say, we will 
be able to accept it and forgive them for their cruelness. After they treat us cruel for so long, 
maybe it will get on their conscience and they’ll finally realize what they’re doing. I feel sorry 
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for them in a way.” Over the coming days, Cox continued to refuse service to Black patrons 
prompting protestors to perform sit-ins and pickets in shifts.34 
 Over the next two months, protests spread as the CNVFC launched “Operation Open 
City,” a citywide campaign aimed at overturning segregation in all areas of civic life. Also 
included in the Operation’s 11-point plan were other goals including the creation of a Human 
Relations Council, “de facto” integration of the city’s schools, decent housing for all, fair 
treatment by the police and other city officials, and fair employment opportunities and wages. In 
a press release, members of the CNVFC vowed to “continue their battle for human justice until 
all these aims have been achieved and brotherhood is a reality in this town.”35 Despite the wide-
ranging nature of the CNVFC’s demands, the majority of the group’s direct-action activities 
focused on the integration of public accommodations. Protests were staged at local recreational 
facilities including the swimming pool,36 the Roller Bowl,37 and the Oriac Youth Center (aka.,                                                         
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Teen Town),38 as well as at barbershops39 and churches.40 While students staged sit-ins, older 
members of the Interdenominational Ministers’ Alliance and the NAACP often worked behind 
the scenes to negotiate settlements with proprietors and city officials.41  
The responses of business owners varied, though few elected to integrate voluntarily. 
Typical methods of obstructionism included overcharging patrons, providing poor service, or 
closing temporarily. However, as the protests continued white citizens increasingly turned to the 
police and extralegal violence to halt the drive for integration. By the end of the second week of 
protests more than forty demonstrators had been arrested on charges ranging from trespassing to 
breach of the peace and mob action. Among those detained were CNVFC President Charles 
Koen, Vice President Frank Hollis, and SNCC fieldworker John Lewis, who along with the 
majority of the protestors refused bail. Inside the segregated jail, protestors held Bible studies, 
sang freedom songs, and staged a spontaneous hunger strike designed, according to Koen, “to 
purify our souls.” On July 20, twenty-one guilty verdicts were handed down to the student 
protesters as more than two hundred protesters rallied outside singing “The Truth Will Set Us 
Free,” “God Is On Our Side,” and “Black and White Together.” Speaking before the crowd, Rev. 
Ramsey declared, “We are fighting against an evil system, and we shall continue until that 
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system is defeated.” Shortly after, the CNVFC received a telegram from Reverend Martin Luther 
King, Jr., who was leading the campaign in Albany, Georgia extending prayers and support from 
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.42 
 The use of arrests and criminal prosecutions to quell protestors, many of whom were the 
children of Black residents, sparked outrage and served as a catalyst for the mobilization of 
broader support, particularly from older community members who had chosen to stay on the 
sidelines up until that point. The density of Black communal networks in Cairo ensured that 
news of the children’s arrests traveled quickly, personally affecting a large cross-section of the 
community. Churches became the central hubs for the mobilization of this new support and sites 
for the development of important intergenerational alliances that would hold the movement 
together in the weeks that followed. Regular mass meetings were held at Ward Chapel and the 
First Missionary Baptist Church featuring speakers from the Interdenominational Ministers’ 
Alliance, the NAACP, SNCC, and the CNVFC. Student leaders used these meetings to appeal to 
older residents for solidarity and support. In early July, these efforts gave rise to the Adult 
Coordinating Committee, a group of five ministers and four laymen that would provide advice                                                         
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and “counsel” to youth involved in the sit-ins. Mass meetings also strengthened these bonds 
between organizations, providing a central forum for the discussion of the movement’s tactics 
and goals. The students’ reliance upon Christian discourses of racial reconciliation and 
nonviolence provided a unifying basis for these dialogues capable of generating broader support 
for tactics that might otherwise have been opposed as too militant. Indeed, many older residents 
were provoked by the youth’s commitment to nonviolence in the face of threats and violence. 
Moreover, appeals to religious discourses also served as the foundation for limited interracial 
cooperation. However, with the exception of Reverend P. J. Fitzsimons of St. Columba’s parish, 
white support continued to come almost exclusively from the organization’s out-of-town allies.43   
  By August, students had successfully integrated all of the city’s restaurants, making 
recreational facilities the movement’s primary focus. Established by the Rotary Club during the 
twenties, the local swimming pool was now under the ownership of the Cairo Natatorium and 
Recreation Club whose management appealed to the organization’s status as a private members-
only club in denying Black patrons admission. When sit-ins resulted in further arrests, some 
CNVFC activists, recognizing that moral suasion was not working, filed suit claiming that the 
swimming pool’s owners had refused to admit African Americans in defiance of state and federal 
law. A similar suit was filed against William Thistlewood, owner of the Roller Bowl, for denying 
Black patrons admission to the skating rink. Illinois Attorney General William Clark addressed 
the charges, issuing a legal opinion that both facilities were public places of accommodation or 
amusement and therefore subject to Section 13-1 of the Civil Rights Act. Empowered by the 
decision, Koen led a group of thirty-eight students to the Roller Bowl on August 17 to test the                                                         
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ruling. Upon their arrival, the group was viciously attacked by a mob of white men carrying 
baseball bats, chains, black jacks and lead pipes. Men of all ages participated in the beating of 
protesters across the head, face, and arms while police stood passively by. Some tried to flee to a 
nearby parking lot for protection but were confronted by a man pursuing them with a bicycle 
chain. Twelve-year old Deborah Flowers was struck about the legs and fell to the ground. Others 
were chased by passing vehicles and threatened at gunpoint before they were able to return to 
Ward Chapel for safety. Koen and several other activists were hospitalized.44  
  In the aftermath of the violence, civil rights leaders from across the state demanded that 
Governor Otto Kerner act to restore law and order in the embattled downstate community. 
Leaders from the Illinois NAACP spearheaded a demonstration in Springfield calling upon state 
officials to deploy the National Guard to Cairo, appoint a special attorney general to investigate 
all criminal cases pertaining to the recent violence, and prosecute any proprietors that continued 
to discriminate against Black patrons. Shocked and embarrassed by the violence, Governor Otto 
Kerner agreed, assigning two special attorney generals to investigate the charges and committed 
to prosecute any cases of unlawful segregation in the city. The Governor’s decision angered 
Cairo city councilmembers who refused to form a Human Relations Commission and rather 
shifted their attention to the passage of a new parade ordinance designed to allow local police to 
crack down on Black protesters.45 
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Despite the city council’s efforts, the violence and subsequent outcry signaled a turning 
point in the CNVFC’s campaign.  Facing legal suits and mounting pressure from state officials, 
Cairo’s proprietors, including the owner of the Cairo Hotel and the Roller Bowl, finally relented 
admitting Black patrons for the first time in September 1962. The pressure of the combined 
protests also prompted the Belleville Diocese to launch a preemptive desegregation campaign of 
the city’s parochial schools. In September 1962, eleven African American students began 
attending St Joseph’s parochial grade school and the following year the school and church at St. 
Columba’s were closed. Shortly after, the sitting city council was replaced by a new slate of 
councilmembers committed to restoring calm to the city. Under Mayor Thomas Beadle’s 
leadership, the city council revoked the repressive parade ordinance and encouraged businesses 
to comply with state and federal law on racial integration.46  
Rev. Ramsey’s efforts to break down racial barriers among the city’s clergy also began to 
bear fruit. In the fall of 1962, two white Methodist ministers – Rev. Boyd Wagner of the First 
Methodist Church and Rev. William Fester of Tigert Memorial Methodist Church – resigned 
from the Cairo Ministerial Association after the organization’s members refused to admit Black 
clergymen. Inspired by the recent integration campaign, particularly “kneel ins” held by CNVFC 
activists at Cairo’s white congregations, the two ministers joined a small but growing number of 
Methodist clergy in pointing to the contradiction between racial segregation and Christ’s 
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message of reconciliation and love. Over the coming months, the two ministers organized an 
interracial Ministerial Association under a new constitution and celebrated its founding at a 
service attended by both Black and white congregants at the First Methodist Church on Good 
Friday in 1964. The two ministers also worked behind-the-scenes to pressure recently elected 
city council members to form a Human Relations Commission in June 1963. In this context of 
conciliation and reform, local protests subsided and several key leaders left the city, including 
Rev. Ramsey who was reassigned to Bethel A.M.E. in Champaign in the fall of 1963 and Koen 
who began his ministerial training at McKendree College that same year.47   
Despite promising signs, these progressive efforts received little broader or lasting 
support from white Cairoites. By the end of 1964, both the Human Relations Commission and 
the interracial Ministerial Association were inactive. Liberal clergymen increasingly found 
themselves ostracized by hostile congregants and opted to relocate elsewhere. Popular resistance 
to integration in Cairo continued, simply taking on new forms. When the Cairo Natatorium and 
Recreation Club reopened on an integrated basis during the summer of 1963 the majority of 
white members refused to use the facility, forcing the club to close for the season. Determined to 
see the pool in operation, the Beadle administration leased it from the club the following summer 
but chose to close the pool permanently after just two weeks in the face of ongoing opposition. 
Shortly after, the property was sold to a third party who filled the pool with cement.48   
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In addition to these setbacks, many local activists reflected on the limits of Operation 
Open City, particularly its failure to mount a meaningful campaign against employment 
discrimination. “Once we integrated all over town… everything ended right there,” Koen 
recalled. “When it came to employment, everything just dropped. It was like the struggle swept 
in like a cyclone, picked up the door and windows but left the house intact. And this happened 
not only in Cairo but in other struggling towns during the whole Civil Rights era. When it came 
to finding jobs for blacks, the struggle ended and though we could eat, swim and skate with 
whites, we didn’t enjoy the luxury. With no job, we were back where we started. Poor.” While 
Operation Open City had identified eliminating job discrimination as part of its 11-point plan, 
local activists had struggled to shift tactics midstream. “It was ironic but nobody wanted to move 
on employment; for them it was a horse of a different color,” Koen explained.49  
 
The Hearing of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in Cairo (1966)  
 
In the summer of 1966, the Illinois State Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on 
Civil Rights met in Cairo to investigate allegations of ongoing civil rights violations in the city. 
The investigation was performed at the request of the Cairo NAACP’s newly elected President 
Hattie Kendrick and legal counsel Robert Lansden (brother of David Lansden). Speaking before 
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the committee, eighty-four year old African American Rosie Bryant described how the recent 
passage of federal civil rights legislation had impacted race relations in the city. 
Listen. I don’t see a bit of difference now than I did way back in ’51 or 
’52 in the civil rights. It hasn’t reached us. It ain’t got to us – not the civil 
rights. I reckon it’s on its way but it ain’t got here yet. 
 
While Bryant’s comments downplayed some of the important gains local activists had made over 
the preceding decades, her words powerfully evoked what most Black Cairoites agreed was “the 
changing same” of race relations in the embattled border city. 50   
During the investigation, committee members found much to substantiate Bryant’s 
statements including ongoing segregation in the city’s schools and public housing as well as 
widespread discrimination in federal contracts, employment, and social programs. Local unions 
and employers were found to have maintained a solid wall of resistance to Black economic 
mobility confining African American workers to the lowest paid unskilled positions or forcing 
them into unemployment. Indeed, some of the committee’s most damning findings pertained to 
the treatment of African American welfare recipients by white social workers. In an act that one 
committee member described as tantamount to “racial peonage,” local residents testified to being 
routinely thrown off welfare rolls during harvest season when low-paying agricultural work was 
available in the fields of Southern Illinois, Kentucky, and Missouri. Local growers were accused 
of conspiring with the Illinois Public Aid Commission and the Illinois State Employment service 
to ensure continued access to a cheap and dependent surplus labor force at the cost of 50 cents 
per hour. City officials allegedly made similar arrangements for periodic flood control and road 
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construction projects. From the report emerged an image of a city seemingly unchanged by the 
momentous events of the preceding decade.51  
In the aftermath of the hearing, pressure increased on state and federal authorities to 
address the desperate plight of Cairo’s Black working class, particularly those seasonal workers 
who had fallen victim to economic exploitation at the hands of the government and corporate 
interests. The Illinois Advisory Committee was particularly critical of federal programs 
associated with Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on Poverty, finding widespread discrimination in 
Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) projects administered locally through the Shawnee 
Development Corporation. One organization that took a particular interest was the Illinois 
Migrant Council (IMC), a not-for-profit corporation founded by some of the state’s leading 
religious agencies on March 31, 1966 to address the economic, health, housing, and educational 
needs of migrant and seasonal workers. Shortly after its formation, the Illinois Migrant Council 
secured federal funding under the auspices of Title III-B of the Economic Opportunity Act for 
the purpose of establishing schools that would provide adult-education classes to migrant and 
seasonal farm workers as well as training for those wishing to pass the Eighth Grade or High 
School Equivalency exam as well as federal and state civil service examinations for typist, clerk, 
and postal service positions.52                                                         
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In December 1966, Charles Krop, Assistant Project Director of the Illinois Migrant 
Council, visited Cairo to discuss the development of a local chapter of the organization with 
community members. Upon his arrival at the Morris Hotel, Krop quickly became aware of local 
opposition to his visit and the broader work of the Illinois Migrant Council. The proprietor of the 
Morris Hotel tapped Krop’s phone and other guests were closely monitoring his conversations. 
Krop left the hotel and met with Charles Koen, who had recently graduated from seminary at 
McKendree becoming an ordained Baptist minister. Koen was now working as a youth counselor 
for the Job Corps program with his wife Clydia Koen. The two men met at the Mark Twain 
restaurant where they were followed by the Chief of Police and a patrolman. That night, Krop 
was scheduled to speak at Ward Chapel. However, before he could reach the building, a car 
pulled up beside him and two white men jumped out. “Are you the man from the Migrant 
Council,” they asked. Krop replied affirmatively. The men struck Krop in the face, knocked him 
to the ground, and kicked him repeatedly. After the men left, Krop tried to gather himself and 
locate help. He entered the Cairo Public Library where two police officers conducted a brusque 
interview before dropping Krop off at Ward Chapel. “I made quite a sight when I entered the 
Negro church,” Krop recalled. “My face was swollen, my suit, shirt, and tie had been practically 
torn off my person.” Krop conducted the meeting and returned to his hotel only to be awoken by 
the sound of a brick smashing through his window. Too afraid to contact local law enforcement, 
Krop requested protection from the state police, only to be informed that the case was outside 
their jurisdiction. Krop called the local police who were “very negative,” but after a number 
threats, provided Krop with security for the rest of the night. Several nights later, four shots were 
also fired into Koen’s home.53                                                         
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Despite ongoing harassment, the Illinois Migrant Council proceeded with its plans to 
establish a school in Cairo, asking Koen to serve as the organization’s Area Coordinator. Koen 
agreed and on January 2, 1967, Illinois Migrant School #8 opened, providing classes to more 
than one hundred and fifty seasonal farm workers, most of whom were African American. To 
enable low-income students to attend classes, the IMC extended a stipend of $40 per week for 
individuals and an additional $5 per week for each dependent. In turn, students were expected to 
complete six hundred hours of classes in three main areas of study: basic literacy, pre-vocational 
training, and “community living,” a component of the course curriculum designed to orient 
students to American history and society.54  
Under Koen’s leadership and with the support of the school’s principal, Earnest Brooks, 
the migrant school quickly became much more than a vocational training center. Students took a 
strong sense of ownership, cultivating their own organizations, customs and traditions. 
Administrators also encouraged them to “make democracy work” by developing a student 
council and electing leaders from amongst their peers. These types of activities were designed to 
empower students and familiarize them with democratic practices essential to civic and political 
engagement. Civic responsibility was also strongly emphasized in the curriculum, which 
encouraged students to engage in community service and outreach. These democratic and social 
responsibilities were undergirded by a broader religious ethos that stressed the interracial 
cooperation and reconciliation. The school code, which was popularly referred to as the Ten 
Commandments, described the ministry as “a training school in the love of God and Humanity”                                                                                                                                                                                   
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and called on students to use their newfound knowledge to “bind more closely together… the 
people of Southern Illinois.” Students were called upon to make the school “a center of Love” 
and to keep “companionship and growth with Christ at the center of its life.” This ethic reflected 
the liberal theological traditions of the Illinois Migrant School’s sponsors as well as the 
reconciliationist ideology of local civil rights activists. However, the hostility of local whites to 
the school, combined with the overwhelmingly African American student population, exposed 
important contradictions between religious ideals and local realities. While reconciliationist aims 
continued to undergird the school’s philosophy, they were often supplanted by the goals of Black 
pride and empowerment in the context of ongoing racial oppression and economic exploitation.55 
This empowerment mission was readily apparent in Hattie Kendrick’s classroom. At the 
age of seventy-two, Kendrick was invited to join the staff to teach a course as part of the school’s 
community living program. After being barred from the city’s public schools for more than a 
decade, Kendrick was nervous at the prospect of returning to the classroom, particularly since 
most of the other instructors were much younger and, as she put it, considered her “a 
Methuselah.” However, in contrast to her younger peers, Kendrick had an extensive knowledge 
of Black history and culture that she was determined to incorporate into the school curriculum. 
School administrators supported Kendrick’s idea, asserting that one of the primary goals of 
migrant schools was to instill confidence and pride in their students. Accordingly, Kendrick 
developed a survey course in African American history that traced the Black experience from its 
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African roots through the contemporary moment. The course was divided into three parts – part 
one focused on the common origins of all humanity in Africa and the intellectual and cultural 
contributions of early African societies to civilization; part two explored Africans in America 
focusing particularly on their agency, resistance, and community building efforts; and the final 
section focused on the contemporary plight of African Americans and their continued economic, 
cultural, and social oppression. In letters to her family, Kendrick took great pride in the impact 
her class was having on her students. “It really does my heart good to see their eyes glow as I 
have incidentally brought in facts about the Negro,” she wrote. “Friday night in two classes no 
one knew that Ralph Bunche was a Negro… As the period closed one woman caught my hand 
and said, ‘Miss Kendrick, I hate to see you leave us all the time. You tell us so much about our 
people that I never knew.’ I left the room hurriedly. What kind of teacher would I be letting my 
students see me cry?”56  
Kendrick and the other instructors also challenged their students to bring their newfound 
knowledge to bear on local problems, prompting a growing assertiveness among students. As 
part of their mandatory prevocational training, students were expected to survey the types of jobs 
available in their community and to make visits to local agencies, factories, and industries to gain 
first-hand job experience. These requirements forced students to confront the reality of 
discriminatory hiring practices head-on and succeeded in elevating the issue to a position of 
prominence among local activists for the first time. Throughout the spring of 1967, members of 
the Interdenominational Ministers’ Alliance approached the city council demanding the creation 
of permanent employment for Black workers and an end to discriminatory hiring practices. 
When these efforts fell on deaf ears, Koen and local NAACP member Preston Ewing launched                                                         
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unsuccessful bids for city commissioner in an election clouded by allegations of voter fraud. 
Ewing was a rising star in the local NAACP who had become involved just prior to the 1966 
hearing of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. After his defeat in the election, Ewing began 
urging the NAACP to stage a boycott of local stores that refused to hire Black workers, a 
strategy that was increasingly being adopted by civil rights organizations across the country. 
Ewing quickly secured the support of Koen and Brooks at the migrant council as well as 
members of the Interdenominational Ministers’ Alliance frustrated by the city’s inactivity. 
Shortly after, the group began planning a trip to Tougaloo College to meet with NAACP field 
secretary Charles Evers who had recently reached a settlement in a ten-month long boycott in 
Port Gibson, Mississippi, which had resulted in the appointment of a Black police officer, the 
integration of public accommodations, and the hiring of fifteen black store clerks. Before the 
boycott could get underway, however, violence broke out.57  
 
The Cairo Urban Rebellion (1967) 
 
 At around 2 a.m., on the morning of July 16, Preston Ewing awoke to the sound of his 
phone ringing. On the other end of the line was a Black physician who informed Ewing that he 
had been called out by local law enforcement to examine the body of Robert Hunt, Jr., a nineteen 
year-old African American soldier from Urbana, Illinois who had been found dead in his cell at 
the Cairo police station. Hunt, who was in Cairo to visit his aunt, had been arrested on charges of                                                         
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disorderly conduct after a routine traffic stop. Less than an hour after entering police custody, 
officers alleged that Hunt had committed suicide, hanging himself from the ceiling of his cell 
with his own t-shirt. Ewing proceeded to the jail where he observed a number of inconsistencies 
that appeared to challenge the police’s story. Upon examining Hunt’s body, Ewing noticed 
several bruises that implied a struggle had taken place. The NAACP leader also saw that the 
ceiling of the cell was constructed out of a flimsy wire mesh incapable of sustaining Hunt’s body 
weight. As rumors trickled out regarding the suspicious circumstances surrounding Hunt’s death, 
many Black Cairoites concluded that local officers had in fact killed the young soldier. Within a 
matter of hours, an uprising had begun as Black working class teens and young adults took to the 
streets in anger.58   
 As urban rebellions raged in larger cities across the country in the summer of 1967, Cairo 
also erupted on the evening of July 16 as groups of young rebels from the Pyramid Courts pelted 
buildings with homemade gasoline and kerosene bombs. Despite efforts by city leaders to 
characterize the rebellion as an act of unrestrained and indiscriminate violence, insurgents 
focused the majority of their activities narrowly on the property of the city’s small commercial 
and industrial elite, signifying that while Hunt’s death had clearly sparked the rebellion, Black 
youth were striking back at what they viewed as a broader pattern of racial oppression and 
economic exploitation in the city. On the first night of the uprising, Molotov cocktails were 
thrown into several white-owned businesses adjacent to the Pyramid Courts including Rink’s 
grocery store at 22nd and Pine, the Elias Dollar warehouse at 16th and Walnut, and Boalbey’s 
Market at 14th and Walnut. Rebels coordinated the assaults using citizen band radios and shot out 
streetlights in the Pyramid Courts to protect against any subsequent police or vigilante                                                         
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incursions. The following night rebels targeted the White-Coleman Lumber Company near the 
Mississippi River levee on 10th Street as well as the home of the company’s white foreman John 
Riggs. Shortly after, the insurgents made their first encroachments “uptown,” smashing windows 
at the Hanna Grocery at 32nd and Poplar. When local and state police proved unable to stem the 
tide, the National Guard was deployed and the Pyramid Court was quickly cordoned off by a 
perimeter of soldiers armed with fixed bayonet rifles. A curfew was imposed and residents 
wishing to leave the housing project were required to obtain a pass from the county sheriff.59   
 In the wake of the uprising, Black working class youth insisted on the political nature of 
their acts, identifying discriminatory hiring practices as their primary grievance. Speaking with 
reporters from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, John Brantley, a thirty year-old unemployed laborer, 
explained, “We are fighting this discrimination – this economic thing.” Twenty-seven year-old 
Willie Bingham agreed, “We need jobs, we got a right to live, same as you people.” When asked 
by reporters how many jobs they were demanding, Brantley replied: “No less than half of what 
we rightly deserve. If you’ve got 20 people working in a department store, we want 10 to be 
Negro and 10 something else… We goin’ to keep fighting until we get something around here.” 
While Brantley and Bingham refused to address whether they had been actively involved in the 
recent disturbances, their statements indicated clear support for the use of property damage as a 
legitimate strategy in the effort to secure more jobs for Black workers. For Brantley, who had 
participated in the CNVFC’s earlier direct-action campaigns, white intransigence had 
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consistently undermined nonviolent attempts to create a just and reconciled community. In his 
conversation with reporters, Brantley represented the rebellion not as a radical break with earlier 
civil rights struggles, but as simply a new and potent weapon in the ongoing battle for racial 
equality and integration. This articulation of the uprising as continuous with earlier civil rights 
struggles was symbolically reinforced to reporters by a large group of teenagers who gathered 
around and “began to chant freedom songs” as Bingham and Brantley were interviewed. 
Revealingly, when asked by a reporter if he was an advocate of Black Power, Brantley replied, 
“This is not Black Power but Negro strategy.” Far from rejecting the liberal integrationist aims of 
earlier struggles, Brantley and many of the other youth that joined the rebellion viewed force as 
the only means capable of challenging a conscienceless people who maintained their position 
through threats and violence.60   
 In addition to repudiating the nonviolent approach of earlier struggles, the rebels had 
acted independent of the city’s established civil rights leadership and shifted the movement’s 
organizational center from the unique cross-class and intergenerational milieu of the Black 
church to the exclusively working class setting of the Pyramid Court housing project. In the 
midst of the hostilities, civil rights leaders held clandestine meetings with youth at the Pyramid 
Courts in an effort to calm tempers and channel their energy back into conventional forms of 
political protest. NAACP President Preston Ewing pleaded with the militants to stay off the 
streets and refrain from further acts of arson and vandalism. However, speaking with reporters 
from the Post-Dispatch, Ewing confessed that he had been unable to control the men, whom he 
described as mostly unemployed “school drop-outs with nothing to do.” Ewing’s inability to                                                         
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secure the confidence and support of the rebels hinted at the gulf that had opened up between 
established civil rights leaders and the Black working class youth who bore the brunt of the city’s 
economic hardships. In an attempt to convey the situation to local officials, Ewing explained, 
“I’m a radical to you, but I’m an Uncle Tom to these youths.” In many ways, the barrier between 
the two had more to do with class and ideology than generation. At thirty-four years of age, 
Ewing was close in age to some of the rebels but his middle-class parentage and college 
education set him apart. In turn, Ewing’s commitment to the NAACP’s time honored strategy of 
legal gradualism and nonviolent direct-action inspired little hope among the residents of the 
Pyramid Court.61 
In contrast, twenty-two year-old Charles Koen had grown up in the Pyramid Courts and 
knew many of the current residents from his youth and more recent work as area coordinator of 
the Illinois Migrant Council. Having led the sit-ins five years prior, Koen empathized with 
concerns about the utility of nonviolent direct action in light of the ongoing intractability of city 
officials. “My feeling about the whole thing was [that] the youth were tired and non-violent 
demonstrations had passed away in 1962. They sought to change the system peacefully back 
then; it didn’t work.” Once the National Guard had been deployed, Koen quickly emerged as a 
spokesperson for the youth, encouraging them to call a truce and make formal demands to city 
leaders. On July 20, Koen joined Ewing and other community leaders in a meeting with city 
officials at the Pyramid Courts. During the meeting, Koen presented a list of demands that had 
been developed by Black working class youth. At the top of the list was the hiring of Black 
workers by all public and private employers. Further demands included the complete 
desegregation of the city’s schools, the reopening of the swimming pool, the appointment of a                                                         
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Black co-chief of police, and the formation of a city youth commission composed of three whites 
and three Blacks to determine the validity of the charges against those that were arrested during 
the uprising. Brantley warned that if the demands were not met within 72 hours, “Cairo will look 
like Rome burning down.” Another Black youth, James Whitfield, also insisted that if no 
effective action was taken in three days not even the presence of the National Guard could stop 
the violence. “We want to get across that we are human beings – nothing else,” Brantley 
explained, “we have been treated as mules.” Koen agreed insisting that the leaders were seeking 
“harmony in the community,” but if city officials refused to meet the demands “violence will 
explode.” After facing decades of obstructionism and violent resistance to their appeals for rights 
and protection, Black youth determined that their demands would be met by any means 
necessary.62 
 Outraged by the ultimatum, city officials responded with threats of their own, causing 
negotiations to temporarily break down. “You haven’t got 10 per cent of your own people who 
will back you,” Alexander County Sheriff Chesley Willis accused. “If these demands are not met 
in 72 hours, you’ll find out how many are backing us,” local youth Willie Hollis retorted. “If that 
happens,” Sheriff Chesley Willis warned, “ you’ll find out how many white extremists there are 
here.” When Ewing tried to steer the conversation toward the more straightforward task of 
integrating the city’s baseball diamonds, Commissioner Bill Ryan threatened to close down the 
ballpark altogether. However, Mayor Lee Stenzel responded with greater restraint. Stenzel – a 
former leader of the all-white Cairo Citizens Association – had shown a surprising degree of 
balance in his assessment of the rebellion. In a statement to the St. Louis Post Dispatch just two                                                         
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days prior the mayor had angered many white citizens by conceding that the rebellion had been 
prompted by ongoing segregation and a lack of job opportunities for Black workers. “This thing 
is a bombshell that has been simmering for 20 years,” Stenzel argued. “It was brought on by the 
politicians. All we have to do is the right thing.” At the meeting, Stenzel maintained this 
position, insisting that he was working behind the scenes to create more jobs, but cautioned that 
city officials “cannot solve these problems within 72 hours.” Black leaders, skeptical of Stenzel’s 
intent, were less that reassured. As the meeting drew to a close, a frustrated Rev. Marshall Smith, 
pastor of Ward Chapel, pleaded for interracial cooperation. “Where is the white clergy?” he 
asked. “This is a very serious meeting, not a joke. White and Negro must work together; housing 
and jobs must be made available. I can tell from the expression on the faces of the officials here 
that they are not going to do a damn thing [and] if they don’t they are going to create chaos and 
hell unless this meeting is taken seriously.”63  
 Over the next three-days, Mayor Stenzel negotiated a number of concessions in an effort 
to avert further violence. The city council agreed to hire one African American to both the fire 
department and police department as well as appoint a Black officer to the position of Special 
Assistant to the Chief of Police. In addition, the council agreed to train a member of the police 
department in the field of human relations. Efforts to secure a firm commitment regarding the 
hiring of Black workers from the Chamber of Commerce and the Retail Merchant’s Association 
were less successful producing little more than verbal assurances. Despite these limitations, 
Koen commended city officials for taking “positive steps in the right direction.” In turn, Black 
youth accepted the concessions as “a token of good faith,” ordering a continuation of the truce.                                                         
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The rebels’ actions had helped to secure some tangible gains for the city’s Black residents and 
increased pressure on employers to begin hiring Black workers. According to Kendrick, “Some 
gains were made. A black girl works in a local bank – professionally so. One supermarket has a 
butcher. Some down town stores are using black clerks… Burkhart – a textile plant is hiring 
more negroes. Snower, a sewing plant is hiring on nondiscriminatory basis. A small wood 
production plant has an almost all Negro working force… The workers are made up of what 
Cairo has termed – the untouchable, unemployable, the unreliables.”  Additional jobs would 
come from the public sector with the Department of Labor and the Illinois State Employment 
Service announcing a number of job openings for welders and nurses and the Department of 
Public Works hiring Black workers on road construction projects.64 
 Despite the rebels’ success, the uprising and subsequent negotiations had inflamed 
underlying tensions within both the white and Black communities. The majority of white 
Cairoites rejected Mayor Stenzel’s assertion that the rebellion stemmed from longstanding 
problems of segregation and unemployment. Rather, they tended to view the disturbances as the 
baseless and opportunistic acts of violent thugs and extremists who threatened to undermine the 
morality and prosperity of the community at large. In this context, the demands of Black youth 
were viewed as “criminal extortion” and any concessions a sign of capitulation. As in the past, 
local merchants and small business owners took the lead in organizing these latent sentiments 
into action. On July 21, more than four hundred white citizens led by Tom Madra, owner of 
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Cairo Meal & Coke Milling Company, and Carl Helt, owner of a downtown music store, 
assembled at St. Mary’s Park to call upon city leaders to strictly uphold law and order. While 
many in attendance denied any racial motivation, handbills circulated prior to the event clearly 
described it as “an organizational meeting” of the “White Citizens Committee,” and invited 
white Cairoites to come and “protect your life and property.” In the days immediately following 
the rally, large groups of white citizens began attending city council meetings to demand the 
apprehension and prosecution of those responsible for the disturbances as well as the passage of 
new city ordinances to deal with so-called “agitators of violence”. The city council agreed to 
consider the proposal and posted a $1,000 reward for information leading to the arrest and 
conviction of the rebels. However, when news of the Council’s concessions broke, white citizens 
were enraged and berated Mayor Stenzel and councilmembers for yielding to the demands of 
radicals and extremists.65 
 Recognizing that the city council was not going to champion a strict law and order policy, 
white citizens took action into their own hands, forming the Committee of Ten Million. 
Inspiration for the organization came from an article written by former President Dwight 
Eisenhower in the August issue of The Reader’s Digest. In the essay, entitled “We Should Be 
Ashamed,” Eisenhower expressed concern for what he characterized as “a growing disrespect for 
law and order in this country,” exemplified by the “riots” that had swept the nation in recent 
years. In identifying the root causes of the rebellions, the former president, like many white 
Cairoites, pointed not to entrenched social and economic problems but to a breakdown in 
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morality, discipline, and respect. In turn, he advocated a strong and conservative response 
whereby “culprits” would be “dealt with as any other criminals, regardless of their race or their 
grievances against society.” To better aid law enforcement in these duties, Eisenhower extended 
his support for the proposals of the 1967 Crime Commission, including the expansion of police 
forces and the reform of court procedures to allow for easier prosecution and conviction. 
However, the former president also called upon local people to join the battle by becoming “a 
Committee of Ten Million citizens dedicated to law and order in this country.”66  
 How Eisenhower envisioned the specific operations of the Committee of Ten Million at 
the local level is unclear. In Cairo, however, white citizens interpreted the former president’s 
essay as a call for the formation of armed civilian units capable of deploying force to quell future 
disturbances. Led by former Alexander County State’s Attorney Peyton Berbling and car 
salesman Tony Levill, the Committee of Ten Million quickly recruited members particularly 
from the city’s business classes and began staging paramilitary drills, patrolling the streets, and 
openly brandishing weapons. Distinguished by the white helmets members wore, the Committee 
was known popularly as the “White Hats,” a term that conjured images of the white hoods of the 
Ku Klux Klan that had terrorized Cairo’s Black residents for generations. Despite the 
Committee’s exclusively white membership, leaders denied that it was either a vigilante or anti-
Black organization. Rather, Berbling and Levill described the White Hats as a civil defense 
organization capable of supporting local law enforcement in moments of crisis. The organization 
actively lobbied for an expansion in the police department’s resources and, at Berbling’s 
suggestion, proposed that members be formally deputized. By the spring of 1969, the 
organization boasted 600 members “from all walks of life,” ready to be deputized by the county                                                         
66 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “We Should Be Ashamed!” Reader’s Digest, (August 1967); “Chapter of Committee of 
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coroner and sheriff. These ties lent the White Hats considerable legitimacy and over the coming 
months members maintained a visible presence across the city aiding police in their ongoing 
harassment of Black youth in the Pyramid Courts and at the migrant school.67   
 In the context of this growing and increasingly organized white opposition, some 
members of the Black community also began to speak out against the actions of the rebels and 
their spokespeople. Pressure on established civil rights and community leaders to condemn the 
violence and distance themselves from so-called militants was very strong and on July 24 fifteen 
Black community members representing several of the city’s religious and community 
organizations met with city officials to express their vehement condemnation of the violence and 
property damage performed by Black youth. Led by former Cairo police officer, J. R. Stokes, the 
group chastised Black youth for engaging in acts that had “endangered the lives of innocent 
citizens and placed them in deadly fear of their lives.” While the leaders insisted that segregation 
and job discrimination were realities that needed to be addressed, they strenuously objected to 
the use of arson and vandalism as methods for achieving these goals.  
The participation of Stokes, a former police officer, and Ed Wade, a county probation 
officer, was not entirely surprising. The NAACP had filed complaints against Stokes for his 
rough treatment of Black citizens while on the force. However, the participation of respected 
civil rights leaders such as Rev. J. I. Cobb, was troubling and illustrated the profound divisions 
that the rebellion had provoked within the Black community. An active member of the NAACP 
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and pastor of a predominantly working class congregation, Cobb was one of the city’s strongest 
advocates for the expansion of job opportunities for Black workers having served as the county 
director of the Green Finger Project (aka Operation Mainstream), a job-training program 
sponsored by the Office of Economic Opportunity. As a Pentecostal minister, however, Cobb’s 
theology centered on his principled opposition to “all violence, either physical or psychological,” 
and his commitment to interracial cooperation as not just a strategy but a goal of the civil rights 
struggle. While not all Black Cairoites shared in Cobb’s pacifism or his prioritization of racial 
reconciliation over Black advancement, many shared in his moral condemnation of the uprising, 
provoking important intraracial fissures rooted in class, generation, and theology.68  
 
From Rebellion to Black Power Politics 
 
Nevertheless, the urban rebellion represented a watershed in the Cairo Black freedom 
struggle, marking a key transition in the movement’s leadership, aims and approaches. In one fell 
swoop, a new generation of Black working class youth had shifted the terrain of struggle, 
injecting a much-needed sense of urgency and elevating their interests to the forefront. In the 
months that followed, Koen and Ewing renewed their efforts to reach out to Black working class 
youth and plug them into existing institutions and organizations. The NAACP continued its legal 
campaign for full integration and the elimination of discriminatory practices, filing complaints 
against governmental agencies, and private employers. However, Ewing increasingly refocused 
the organization toward the plight of the Black working class holding the organization’s 
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meetings in the Pyramid Courts and mobilizing around issues such as discrimination in blue-
collar employment, public housing, welfare, and the criminal justice system. Ewing also actively 
recruited Black youth into the organization and in December his brother, Van Ewing, established 
the NAACP Youth Council aimed at channeling “the unused creative energies of youth into 
constructive… behavior.” At the migrant school, Koen also redoubled his efforts to involve 
unemployed young adults in the organization’s programming, recruiting Willie Bingham and 
James Whitfield to take up leadership roles. However, the initiatives Black working class youth 
would develop through the NAACP’s Youth Council and the migrant school represented a 
significant departure from the strategies and tactics adopted during the movement’s earlier 
waves.69 
 In the months following the rebellion, Black working class youth increasingly shifted the 
movement’s primary focus from integrating existing institutions to developing autonomous 
economic, educational, and recreational institutions of their own. Rather than petitioning for 
admission to the all-white Oriac Center (aka Teen Town), teenagers working with the NAACP’s 
Youth Council began raising funds to purchase and renovate a building that could be used as a                                                         
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recreational center for Black youth. Students at the migrant school also adopted a self-help 
approach, forming the Southern Illinois Cooperative Association (SICA) in the fall of 1967. 
Through SICA, students established a cooperative buying program and market that allowed 
Black workers to avoid white merchants, create new jobs, and redirect profits back into the Black 
community. Members also began developing plans for a cooperative day care center, a record 
store, a newspaper, a radio station, a housing construction program, a thrift store, and a credit 
union that would lend at a lower interest rate than local banks.70 
 Underpinning this strategy of Black self-help and institution building was a broader 
transformation in the outlook of Black working class youth. Mirroring similar ideological shifts 
taking place within liberal civil rights organizations such as SNCC and CORE during the late 
1960s, Black youth would increasingly abandon calls for liberal integration and reform of 
American society in favor of a Black Power politics rooted in Black Nationalism. The city’s 
Black working class in particular began to view racial oppression as a fixed and immutable 
reality that necessitated racial solidarity, self-reliance, and collective action.  Members of the 
NAACP Youth Council, for example, cautioned their peers against the futile hope that white 
Cairoites might voluntarily cede to demands for meaningful change. “The past decade has shown 
that the Negro in Cairo cannot wait for the white man to solve his problems for him,” members 
declared. In delineating a specific plan of action, Youth Council members advocated greater                                                         
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racial solidarity among Black Cairoites and a dual strategy of economic nationalism and Black 
electoral power.  “The Negro… is going to have to take it first in expanding his black 
consciousness and unifying his effort. He is going to have to take it by using his vote where it 
will do him the most good just as other ethnic groups have done before him. He is going to have 
to do it by spending his money where possible in ways that will help businesses which give him 
a fair shake and will help black businesses flourish.” Students and administrators at the migrant 
school supported this vision viewing racial solidarity and the development of autonomous 
institutions as the only effective solution to the city’s ongoing practices of economic 
discrimination.71  
 In August 1968, these efforts received support from a somewhat unlikely source: the 
Roman Catholic Church. The urban rebellions of the past year had fostered support among 
progressive clergy both nationally and within the Belleville diocese for a new strategy to address 
the slow pace of integration in local parishes and the plight of Black urban communities. 
Pressure from student protestors in 1962 had prompted the diocese to close St. Columba’s, 
Cairo’s segregated mission to African American parishioners. The decision to close the parish 
had coincided with the Second Vatican Council in Rome at which Pope John XXIII called for 
greater involvement on the part of the Church in the life of the community and particularly to the 
poor and oppressed. While Vatican II may have also contributed to the decision of diocesan 
leaders to close the segregated parish, integration of the city’s white churches was ineffective, 
leaving many Black parishioners without a place to worship. In turn, white priests at St. Joseph’s 
and St. Patrick’s had stood on the sidelines during the Civil Rights battles of the 1950s and 1960s                                                         
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often serving as obstacles and not advocates of racial change. By the late 1960s, however, a 
small number of progressive clergy in Southern Illinois from both Catholic and mainline 
Protestant churches were working with established civil rights leaders as well as younger Black 
Nationalist organizations. 72 
It was in this broader context that Bishop Albert Zuroweste assigned Father Gerald 
Montroy to Cairo in August, 1968. Montroy was charged with establishing meaningful programs 
for the city’s poor and Black residents as well as aiding in the integration of Cairo’s Catholic 
churches. Having entered seminary in the wake of the Vatican II decisions, Montroy’s faith 
emphasized the importance of an engaged social ministry. “We were taught that religion was 
helping people who were hungry, helping people who were disadvantaged. Helping people like 
that, and we figure that… you were blessed by doing that.” By the end of the year, Montroy had 
established a tutoring program for local youth and forged strong ties with local activists that 
shared his concern about the poor and oppressed. Soon after, he offered to lease offices in the 
former parish to the NAACP, SICA, and the migrant school, bringing the city’s leading Black 
political organizations all under the same roof. For his work, Montroy quickly earned a 
reputation among local whites as “the Father Groppi of Southern Illinois,” referring to Father 
James Groppi the white priest who gained national visibility and attention for his role in the 
Milwaukee Black freedom struggle during the same period. Groppi and Montroy would 
eventually meet during a rally in nearby Sikeston, Missouri, in the spring of 1969. Black activists 
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had gained a new and important ally in their battle to eliminate racial discrimination and 
economic exploitation.73   
At the same time as tentative links were being forged between white Catholic leaders and 
emergent Black Power organizations, Cairo’s Black congregations were beginning to 
contemplate their own place in this new phase of the struggle. After holding a prominent position 
in earlier civil rights campaigns, Black congregations and activist church leaders now found 
themselves on the periphery of an emergent Black Power struggle in which unifying Christian 
discourses of philosophical nonviolence and racial reconciliation no longer played a central role.  
Black activists of all ideological stripes, however, recognized the importance of Black church 
support to local protest traditions and the need to recruit activist clergy and lay leaders back into 
the struggle. These efforts began in earnest the year following the rebellion with Black Power 
leaders staging a series of dialogues with congregations about the true meaning of scriptural 
conceptions of racial reconciliation and  “Christian Brotherhood.” In March 1968, local activists 
also invited Reverend Metz J. Rollins, executive director of the recently formed National 
Committee of Black Churchmen, to speak on the religious implications of Black Power. In a 
speech delivered at Ward Chapel, Rollins encouraged Christians not to fear Black Power arguing 
that that it “only means violence when violence is forced upon Black people.” In a more 
fundamental sense, Rollins argued that Black Power represented the same concept of “black 
unity [that] was used to build black churches” in the face of white exclusion and violence. While 
he acknowledged integration as a “godly way to live” founded on the Christian vision of “a                                                         
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single human race,” Rollins argued that it was “necessary at this time for all black people to 
continue to identify [strongly with each other] until freedom from white inflicted injustices is a 
reality for all black brothers and sisters.” Over the coming years, Black Power activists would 
build upon this foundation, forging strong ties between Black Power and Black religious 
traditions facilitating the Black church’s reemergence at the center of the Cairo Black freedom 
struggle.74  
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CHAPTER 3 
FROM THE SEMINARY TO THE STREETS: 
GRASSROOTS BLACK THEOLOGY AND THE FORGING OF A UNITED FRONT 
 
In September 1970, Rev. Charles Koen, leader of the Cairo United Front,1 joined 
delegates from across the African diaspora in Atlanta, Georgia, for the founding conference of 
the Congress of African Peoples (CAP). Organized by Newark-based activist Amiri Baraka, the 
CAP conference took place at a watershed moment in the Black Power Movement. Coming on 
the heels of a period marked by intense sectarianism and internecine battles epitomized by the 
West Coast US-BPP conflict, CAP represented an ambitious attempt to heal old wounds and 
bring together the disparate ideological wings of the movement into a single united front.  
The concept of a national Black united front, popularized by Malcolm X’s (later El-Hajj 
Malik El-Shabazz) Organization of Afro-American Unity (OAAU) and subsequently employed 
by others including Stokely Carmichael (later Kwame Ture) and Amiri Baraka, was 
reinvigorated at the CAP conference, becoming both a key hallmark and aspiration of what 
historian Peniel Joseph has called the “second wave” of the Black Power Movement.2 During the 
early 1970s, advocates of a united front strategy sought to mobilize Black political leaders and 
activists of all ideological stripes behind a shared organizational structure and common political 
agenda. Nationally, these efforts were best represented by the work of Baraka and CAP, 
responsible for organizing a series of Black political conventions, culminating in the landmark                                                         
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National Black Political Convention in Gary, Indiana in 1972. However, these broader initiatives 
grew out of and were informed by the struggles of grassroots activists committed to building 
united front organizations in communities across the country.3  
Forging lasting alliances between cultural and revolutionary nationalists, not to mention 
mainstream civil rights organizations and Black Power radicals, was no easy feat. For this 
reason, conference attendees greatly anticipated hearing from Rev. Koen who, like Baraka, was a 
well-known practitioner of the united front approach. Between 1969 and 1974, Koen’s 
organization distinguished itself as one of the nation’s leading united front movements 
responsible for mounting the longest economic boycott in U.S. history and maintaining 
unprecedented levels of support within the Black community. In a speech entitled, “How Long 
Must We Wait?” Koen emphasized the urgent need for Black Power organizations to move 
beyond symbolic forms of racial solidarity and toward the formation of tangible alliances 
capable of sustaining a national liberation movement. “We must hook up,” he beseeched his 
audience, “from Cairo, Ill., to Atlanta and back to Chicago and Newark.” “Don’t think for a 
minute it is going to be an easy struggle,” Koen cautioned. “We must make a decision… 
Everybody is Black, everybody is yelling ‘nation time,’ everybody has a natural, an afro and a 
beard,” he joked playfully. “You should know now who you really are… The point is: are you 
ready?” The crowd responded affirmatively. “Are we going to move together now or wait a little 
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longer?” The crowd responded again. “If we can hook ourselves together,” he explained, “if we 
can unite under a banner of redefined, relevant Christianity, then we will have an over-all 
struggle.” These final words, spoken before an audience of Black leaders from across the 
diaspora, reflected the distinctive contribution of Koen and the Cairo United Front to Black 
Power politics. During a period when the Black church’s role in the Black freedom struggle was 
increasingly questioned by movement participants, Koen insisted on the continued relevance of 
Black Christian traditions and the pivotal role they might play in forging a national Black united 
front.4  
Koen’s belief in the ability of a “redefined, relevant Christianity” to unify the disparate 
wings of the Black Power Movement stemmed from his practical efforts to build a grassroots 
united front movement in Cairo. In this chapter, I explore the formation of the Cairo United 
Front, an organization that brought together Black Cairoites from across organizational, class, 
generational, and ideological lines in support of a broad-based and inclusive movement for racial 
change and social justice. I explore the origins and contours of the united front strategy, focusing 
on the critical role played by Black Power radicals in both its conceptualization and day-to-day 
operations. In contrast to other forms of coalitional and alliance-based organizing, the united 
front strategy had its roots in both Black Nationalist and radical intellectual traditions, and 
reflected the specific political aspirations of Black Power’s militant wing in the context of 
narrowing political opportunities and brutal repression. A united front approach afforded Cairo’s 
Black radicals a degree of insulation from external pressure and a broader platform from which 
to organize. However, as national Black Power leaders would quickly learn, maintaining a united 
front was remarkably difficult because it tied radical activists to multiple competing 
constituencies that frequently differed in their interpretations of the movement’s goals and                                                         
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tactics. It was in navigating these potential pitfalls that the Cairo United Front was most 
successful. By building on the shared religious culture of Black Cairoites as well as emergent 
trends in Black Theology, United Front leaders constructed a grassroots Black Power theology 
and movement culture capable of bridging intraracial divisions and sustaining the movement 
over the long haul. 
 
The Genesis of a Strategy 
 
If the politics of civil rights liberalism took clearest shape in the crucible of the postwar 
Jim Crow South and the new nationalism in the more cosmopolitan urban north of the Sixties, 
the united front strategy which strove to fuse these two strains into a single struggle was perhaps 
best articulated at the border in Cairo, Illinois. For Black Cairoites, adopting a united front 
strategy was in some ways a logical and necessary response to local conditions. Organizing in 
“the Deep South city of the North” carried the perpetual risk of persecution and racial violence. 
During the mid-1950s, cross burnings and bombings forced the local NAACP chapter 
underground, effectively stalling civil rights protest. When the movement regained steam during 
the early 1960s, teenage protestors were savagely beaten in the streets. Cut off from the rest of 
the state and trapped behind the city’s fortress-like walls, Black freedom fighters faced the 
prospect of a dangerous and isolating struggle. Accordingly, activists emphasized the need to 
reach outwards building broad-based movements and strategic alliances that would draw national 
attention to the embattled city. While Black professionals historically held leadership roles in 
civil rights organizations, the rigidity of Cairo’s color line and the consignment of the majority of 
African Americans to the lowest rungs of the city’s social and economic hierarchy solidified 
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conceptions of “linked fate” between the Black working and middle class. While the two groups 
often diverged in their understanding of the appropriate strategies and tactics, they were united 
by a sense of the fragility of their struggle and the need for solidarity in the face of opposition.5 
 During the late 1960s, calls for a renewed community-wide campaign for racial change 
gained increasing support in response to ongoing practices of racial discrimination and 
segregation as well as escalating poverty, police harassment, and political marginalization. The 
civil rights battles of the 1950s and early 1960s resulted in the gradual integration of schools, 
medical facilities, and some public accommodations. However, Jim Crow and racially 
exclusionary practices persisted in many areas of community life, including the city’s segregated 
public housing projects, all-white civic and religious organizations, and the labor force where 
strict color bars locked Black workers out of city jobs and confined them to the lowest rungs of 
private sector employment. The Chicago-based Alliance to End Repression reported in 1971 that 
Cairo had the highest levels of poverty, unemployment, and substandard housing in Illinois and 
that Black Cairoites bore the brunt of these hardships.6  
Since the urban rebellion of 1967, local activists had engaged in a number of smaller 
punctuated protests, coordinated largely by the local branch of the NAACP aimed at overturning 
the remnants of the city’s segregated landscape. Led by the organization’s young and determined 
president, Preston Ewing, Jr., these efforts relied upon the NAACP’s conventional legal strategy. 
However, Ewing recognized that while segregationists held key city leadership positions, 
achieving even the smallest victories would be a long and arduous process that demanded 
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alternative approaches as well as broad-based alliances. As early as February 1968, the NAACP 
called upon Black residents to boycott local merchants who refused to hire Black workers, but 
the branch struggled to shift organizational focus and resources toward mass mobilization and 
direct action.7 
 At the same time, a growing number of Black Cairoites – frustrated by the slow pace of 
change and the limited gains of earlier civil rights campaigns – embraced a politics of Black 
Nationalism and self-determination, throwing their weight behind the development of 
autonomous institutions focused on addressing the economic needs of Black residents. As the 
previous chapter showed, these efforts centered on the Illinois Migrant Council’s (IMC) school 
and its offshoot, the Southern Illinois Cooperative Association (SICA). Under the auspices of 
these agencies, Black Cairoites developed a cooperative buying program and store that enabled 
residents to avoid discriminatory merchants and redirect profits back into the Black community. 
Relationships between the NAACP and these nascent Black Power initiatives were positive and, 
as in many small communities, considerable cross-pollination existed. Leaders from each of the 
respective groups worked closely together, viewing their efforts as complementary and not 
adversarial. All three organizations shared office space at St. Columba’s, the formerly segregated 
parish, which Fr. Gerald Montroy had reopened in August 1968 to serve the city’s poor and 
Black residents.8  
The close relationship between Black Nationalist organizations and the NAACP also 
contributed to a broadening of the latter’s political agenda beyond traditional integrationist aims. 
In February 1968, the NAACP released a “30-Point Program” outlining its goals for the coming 
year. A number of the points listed were clearly inspired by SICA’s Black Nationalist agenda,                                                         
7 “Cairo NAACP Adopts 30-Point Program for 1968,” Monitor, February 1, 1968.  
8 Ewing and Roddy, Let My People Go, 14.
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including the call to establish “a black economic program controlled and executed by black 
people” as well as “a housing program that will provide good housing for black people.” 
According to Ewing, the sheer scope of the problems facing Black Cairoites during the late 
1960s, as well as the persistence of discriminatory practices supposedly outlawed by the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, solidified strong bonds between the different Black activist groups in the 
city. Increasingly, the NAACP called for the groups to formalize these alliances through the 
creation of “a council” that would include “representation from all black organizations in the 
county” for the purpose of initiating a unified, community-wide struggle against all forms of 
discrimination and exploitation. While the organizational structure was slow in taking shape, 
strong ties of solidarity between local civil rights and Black Nationalist organizations set the 
stage for the emergence of the Cairo United Front in the spring of 1969.9 
While local imperatives justified broad-based and inclusive organizational approaches, 
the decision to adopt a distinctive brand of united front politics hinged on the intellectual and 
organizational labor of skilled radical activists during the Black Power era. Mass mobilization 
and operational unity could have been achieved in any number of ways. During earlier struggles, 
the NAACP recruited Black working-class people and youth into the organization while 
maintaining a largely professional middle-class leadership. Later, militant youth created their 
own independent organizations responsible for spearheading direct action campaigns while 
working in close alliances with existing civil rights and religious organizations. More recently, 
Ewing called for the creation of a countywide council in which all Black organizations would 
participate sharing in resources and coordinating programs and actions. On the surface, Ewing’s 
proposal, like other forms of coalitional or alliance-based activism, shared some important 
commonalities with united front approaches and, indeed, many local activists would continue to                                                         
9 “Cairo NAACP Adopts 30-Point Program for 1968,” Monitor, February 1, 1968. 
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conflate the two. However, for Koen and many of the radical activists who would eventually take 
up leadership positions in the local movement, the united front strategy reflected their own brand 
of radical pedagogy and praxis geared toward revolutionary change.   
United front politics was a product of the radical political milieu of the Black Power era. 
Advanced initially by communist intellectuals after WWI, front-style tactics were designed to 
bring together Communist and non-Communist workers and, in some cases, progressive 
bourgeois allies in common cause against fascism. During the interwar years, Black leftists in the 
United States adapted the strategy to build mass movements around police brutality, jobs, and 
housing, forging alliances with Black Nationalist and liberal reform organizations. These efforts 
culminated in the formation of the National Negro Congress in 1936.10 United Front 
organizations were later developed by revolutionary anti-colonial struggles in Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America. Black Power radicals often came to learn of the strategy by way of these earlier 
Black organizing traditions or through Mao’s writings on the Chinese Revolution and Ghanaian 
revolutionary Kwame Nkrumah’s expositions on pan-African struggle.11  
After his visit with the leaders of national liberation movements in Africa in 1964, 
Malcolm X promoted a united front strategy for the Black liberation movement in the United 
States. This approach promised to bring together the movement’s disparate ideological wings                                                         
10 On the united front politics of Black leftists in the United States during the interwar years, see Mark Naison, 
Communists in Harlem during the Depression (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1983), esp. 126-159; Mark 
Solomon, The Cry Was Unity: Communists and African Americans, 1917-1936 (Jackson: University of Mississippi 
Press, 1998); Gerald Horne, Black Liberation/Red Scare: Ben Davis and the Communist Party (Cranbury, N.J.: 
Associated University Presses, 1994); George M. Fredrickson, Black Liberation: A Comparative History of Black 
Ideologies (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), esp. 202-224; Erik S. McDuffie, Sojourning for Freedom: 
Black Women, American Communism, and the Making of Black Left Feminism (Raleigh, N.C.: Duke University 
Press, 2011); Minkah Makalani, In the Cause of Freedom: Radical Black Internationalism from Harlem to London, 
1917-1939 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011); Erik S. Gellman, Death Blow to Jim Crow: The 
National Negro Congress and the Rise of Militant Civil Rights (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2012). 
11 The work of anti-colonial activists from Africa, Asia, and Latin America influenced proponents of a united front 
strategy in the United States. For key works, see Kwame Nkrumah, Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare: A Guide 
to the Armed Phase of the African Revolution (New York: International Publishers, 1969); Mao Tse-Tung, Selected 
Works of Mao Tse-Tung (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1969). 
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under a single umbrella. All parties would work together to forge a common agenda while 
simultaneously respecting the autonomy of each constitutive group. In this manner, Malcolm X 
hoped that Black radicals and Black Nationalists could form a strategic front with more 
traditional civil rights organizations without compromising either group’s unique tactical 
approach. However, in contrast to more traditional political alliances, Malcolm X’s articulation 
of a Black united front strategy carried a radical connotation in which revolutionary nationalists 
were positioned as key agents in the eventual reorientation of constituent groups toward a pan-
African and leftist critique. Consistent with these aims, Malcolm X founded the Organization of 
Afro-American Unity (OAAU) in 1964. “Its purpose,” he wrote, was ‘to unite Afro-Americans 
and their organizations around a non-religious and non-sectarian constructive program for 
Human Rights.” While the realization of a united front eluded Malcolm X in his lifetime, the 
concept continued to resonate with Black Power radicals who followed him, most prominently 
the Los Angeles-based Black Congress formed in 1967 and the Washington D.C.-based Black 
United Front formed by former SNCC leader Stokely Carmichael in 1968. Like Malcolm X, 
Carmichael hoped these efforts would provide the organizational philosophy and framework for 
a broader front with civil rights leaders at the national level.12 
It was in this context that Charles Koen learned of the united front strategy and became 
its key advocate in Cairo. In many ways, Koen’s political development mirrored that of 
                                                        
12 On the united front politics of Malcolm X and Stokely Carmichael, see William W. Sales, Jr., From Civil Rights 
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Carmichael’s. In 1962, at the age of sixteen, Koen had collaborated with experienced SNCC 
organizers in mounting a nonviolent direct-action campaign against Jim Crow accommodations 
in Cairo. He remained in SNCC’s orbit while attending seminary at McKendree University in 
Lebanon, Illinois during the mid-1960s, eventually joining the organization in 1966 during 
Carmichael’s tenure as chairman.13 Koen’s membership coincided with the organization’s 
dramatic turn toward Black Power struggles in northern cities and brief alliance with the Black 
Panther Party (BPP). Scholars have tended to view this period of SNCC’s history as one marked 
by militant rhetoric and internal conflict at the expense of a workable program for northern cities. 
While there is much truth in this claim, SNCC also provided a new generation of grassroots 
activists with new ideological and strategic resources at a key turning point in the Black Freedom 
Movement. Struggling to address rapidly changing social and political realities, SNCC members 
engaged a wide range of conceptual frameworks including Black liberalism, Black Nationalism, 
Pan-Africanism, Black Marxist, and Third World internationalism. In this moment of political 
and intellectual experimentation, SNCC members often vacillated between approaches, their 
public statements reflecting a fundamental ambivalence that contributed to Black Power’s 
increasingly amorphous character. However, the stark ideological divisions that would 
eventually come to characterize the movement had not yet hardened and as a participatory 
democratic organization, SNCC became a key discursive space for activists hoping to give 
meaning to Black Power.14 
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For Koen, who had come of age in a struggle rooted in discourses of racial reconciliation 
and nonviolence, SNCC offered alternative frameworks that were formative to his own political 
development. In turn, SNCC’s expansive intellectual and organizational networks encouraged 
Koen – a working-class activist from a comparatively remote part of the United States – to view 
local struggles as part of broader pan-African and internationalist struggles. In the spring of 
1968, Koen left Cairo and his job as regional director of the Illinois Migrant Council to organize 
African Americans in the region’s larger cities. He moved to Carbondale and then East St. Louis 
where he became the spokesperson for the Black Economic Union (BEU), an alliance of local 
antipoverty, youth and cultural organizations. It was here that Koen solidified his understanding 
of the ghetto as an internal colony that could be liberated only through the promotion of Black 
ownership and control of local institutions. Like many SNCC leaders, Koen also developed an 
anti-capitalist critique that challenged the simple transfer of white colonial rule to a new Black 
middle-class administration. Building upon his early work with the IMC and SICA, Koen 
advocated Black working-class leadership and the development of cooperative economic 
institutions that would distribute wealth and power more equitably within the Black community. 
During his short tenure in East St. Louis, his support for a united front strategy was also 
apparent. With Koen at the helm, the BEU brought together a broad cross-section of the Black 
community with a strategic front around a common agenda of self-determination and community 
control.15 
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Koen’s work in East St. Louis raised his profile and at SNCC’s staff meeting in June 
1968 he was elected to serve as one of the organization’s national deputy chairmen. At that 
meeting, Newark-based organizer Philip Hutchings was appointed as SNCC’s program secretary. 
Under Hutchings’s leadership, SNCC increasingly embraced electoral politics, encouraging local 
organizers to create Black political fronts with the goal of solidifying a national Black political 
party. SNCC’s adoption of an electoral strategy converged with the organization’s fragile 
alliance with the BPP, which was also making incursions into the political realm under the 
auspices of the Peace and Freedom Party. Inspired by SNCC’s approach and alliance with the 
BPP, Koen relocated to St. Louis in June to expand regional networks among radicals and Black 
Nationalist organizations under the auspices of the BEU. Koen initially joined the Zulu 1200’s, 
the youth “action arm” of an established umbrella organization, the Mid-City Community 
Congress. However, frustrated by what he perceived as the Zulus’ exclusive focus on Black 
cultural politics, Koen resigned in August to found the Black Liberators – an organization that, 
much like the Panthers, would focus more directly on the political and economic concerns of 
Black working-class youth.16  
Setting up shop in the heart of North St. Louis, the Liberators recruited from the ranks of 
the hardcore unemployed and underemployed who lived in the surrounding community. They 
embraced revolutionary nationalism, immersing themselves in the works of Karl Marx, Mao 
Zedong, and Frantz Fanon and railing against racial and class exploitation. Like the BPP, Koen 
pressed for the formation of multiracial alliances, particularly with radical student and antiwar                                                                                                                                                                                   
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organizations on the city’s college campuses. The Liberators also adopted the Panthers’ 
paramilitary organizational structure, donning uniforms, holding weekly marches and drills, and 
maintaining a strict code of discipline. While Liberators often trafficked in the rhetoric of armed 
revolution, the strategies and tactics they adopted on the city’s north side were more complex. In 
stark contrast to SNCC, Black women were excluded from formal membership and encouraged 
to set up “sister organizations” that would oversee the Liberators’ fundraising and survival 
programs, including a free breakfast program and clothing distribution service. While these 
services mirrored aspects of the BPP’s program, Koen’s training in cooperative economics led 
the Liberators to advocate a broader program aimed at establishing “an economic base for black 
people” as well as community control of all existing social and political institutions. In the 
political sphere, the Liberators embraced the recent shift among revolutionary nationalists toward 
electoral politics, backing candidates in municipal and state elections and organizing voter 
turnout. By the end of the fall, the Liberators’ work had culminated in a formal alliance with 
SNCC and the appointment to the leadership positions of several SNCC leaders including 
Hutchings, James Forman and H. Rap Brown.17 
 However, the Liberators’ organizing efforts were quickly undercut by a systematic 
campaign of police harassment. Like the Panthers, the organization’s militant vanguardist 
posture and strident support for armed self-defense provoked a severe crackdown by local, state, 
and federal law enforcement. Police set up an office directly opposite the Liberators’ 
headquarters, engaging in round-the-clock surveillance. Unmarked police cars followed                                                         
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members and repeatedly picked them up for minor ordinance and vehicular infractions. The press 
legitimized this treatment by characterizing the Liberators as “nothing more than hoodlums.” 
State agents were particularly concerned about the Liberators’ growing ties to national Black 
Power organizations, that had quickly became apparent when SNCC leaders Philip Hutchings 
and John Wilson came to the city to speak at a Liberator rally in September. Upon leaving the 
rally, they were pulled over by local police and arrested along with Koen and fellow Liberator 
Leon Dent on charges of unlawful assembly. Events reached a climax later in the month when 
the Liberators’ headquarters was mysteriously ransacked and their vehicles set ablaze. Shortly 
after, Koen and Dent were stopped by police for a broken brake light, taken to the basement of a 
local precinct, beaten brutally by officers with clubs and brass knuckles (Koen’s hands and skull 
were fractured) and indicted on charges of assault. In response, Black community leaders joined 
hands with white allies to demand justice for the Liberators. However, only six months after the 
organization’s formation, the Liberators had collapsed under mounting legal pressure. Koen 
resigned and returned to Cairo.18 
 While brief, Koen’s tenure as Prime Minister of the Liberators was formative to his 
political development, powerfully influencing the approaches he would adopt in Cairo. Koen’s                                                         
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earlier subscription to a politics of racial reconciliation and philosophical nonviolence had been 
supplanted by an emphasis on the need for Black self-determination, community control, and 
disciplined self-defense. However, the Liberators’ practical efforts to bolster Black political and 
economic power in St. Louis had been jeopardized by state repression and negative press 
coverage that focused narrowly on the organization’s militant rhetoric and stylized images of 
members brandishing weapons. As a result, many former Liberators would come to view the 
organization’s more high-profile symbolic displays of armed self-defense as a tactical error that 
served to undercut larger goals as well as alienate crucial allies. Several members pointed to the 
organization’s provision of an armed escort to Rev. Adam Clayton Powell during his August 
visit to the city as a particularly unfortunate miscalculation. Taking place within days of the 
Liberators’ formation, this act resulted in the organization’s branding as violent and dangerous. 
Whether avoiding such approaches would have allowed the Liberators to escape police 
harassment is questionable. However, such images certainly hindered relationships between the 
Liberators and other African American organizations, not to mention the broader Black 
community. “Black people,” one former Liberator argued, “was afraid to line themselves up with 
a group they thought was militant.” Once this negative image of the group had solidified, the 
Liberators found it increasingly difficult to build coalitional ties, mobilize mass support, and 
leverage much needed resources. Such obstacles were particularly frustrating to Koen, who 
clearly hoped that the organization would become the vanguard of a city-wide united front of 
civil rights and Black Power organizations as well as white student and anti-war groups.19 
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 Koen’s experiences in St. Louis solidified his belief in the need for local, regional, and 
national united fronts. By operating alongside other civil rights and Black Power organizations, 
radicals might be afforded legitimacy and greater insulation from the assaults of the state. In 
turn, a united front would allow radicals to expand their political influence and consolidate 
resources in aid of a more comprehensive economic and political program. The Liberators’ 
inability to raise the funds necessary to keep activists out of jail let alone operate a sophisticated 
network of survival programs underscored the importance of this last point. To suggest, however, 
that Koen’s embrace of a united front strategy was a product of purely pragmatic considerations 
would be a mistake. Like Carmichael and Malcolm X before him, Koen’s adoption of a united 
front approach was rooted in a Black Nationalist and radical intellectual tradition that pointed 
toward the solidarity of African peoples in a national liberation struggle.  
 
Black Radical Visions of a United Front 
 
Upon returning to Cairo in the spring of 1969, Koen found ample support for a united 
front strategy among local activists. These efforts were given added impetus by repeated 
incidents of racial violence. In January 1968, only a few months after the death of Robert Hunt, 
Jr., in police custody, local Baptist pastor Larry Potts killed Marshall Morris, a 73-year-old 
African American veteran. Potts, a leading member of the White Hats, was not arrested or 
prosecuted by law enforcement. In March 1969, local priest Fr. Gerald Montroy angered white 
residents when he informed members of the national press that the city was dominated by 
organized white supremacist activity. For over an hour, white vigilantes fired shots from the 
Mississippi River levee into the Pyramid Courts, a segregated public housing project. Others 
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drove into the housing complex and fired upon passing vehicles, including that of IMC area 
coordinator Ripley Young. In a crucial turning point, Black residents took up arms and began 
firing back in self-defense. Over the coming weeks, the violence intensified, prompting 
Governor Richard Ogilvie to deploy the National Guard to the embattled city. Seasoned activists 
recognized that the crisis provided a political opportunity to mobilize community members 
behind a sustained campaign for racial change. “By then,” Koen explained, “the black 
organizations in Cairo realized the importance of moving toward a kind of united front structure 
combining all blacks in Cairo… It was black unity or black annihilation,” he argued. “We chose 
black unity.” As an experienced and respected organizer, Koen was well situated to assist in the 
formation of an alliance and within a week of the initial outburst the Cairo United Front was 
founded as an “umbrella group” representing all of the Black organizations in the city, including 
the local branch of the NAACP, SICA, the migrant school, the Interdenominational Ministers’ 
Alliance, and Black youth organizations. Shortly after, Koen announced that the organization 
was initiating an economic boycott of all white-owned businesses that refused to hire Black 
workers.20 
While the United Front maintained strong support from all segments of the Black 
community, the organization’s mass base was firmly rooted in the Black working class. The                                                         
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Pyramid Court housing project served as a central locus of the United Front’s activities with 
residents playing prominent roles in rallies, picketing and demonstrations. In turn, Koen 
recruited a large group of Black working class youth aged between 20 and 35 to serve as the 
organization’s core activists. This group included unemployed laborers such as James Whitfield, 
Frank Hollis, and James “Switch” Wilson, all of whom lived in the Pyramid Courts and played 
active roles in post-rebellion organizing efforts through SICA and the migrant school. Others, 
like Joyce Gilkey and Mabel Hollis, had also served alongside Koen as children in the nonviolent 
direct action campaigns of 1962. Joining these homegrown activists were two other primary 
constituencies. The first was a smaller cohort of young educated Black Power organizers from 
urban communities and college campuses across the region. Among this group was Leon Page, a 
former East St. Louis CORE activist who had worked closely with Koen in the Black Economic 
Union, and Bobby Williams, a Cape Girardeau organizer who had overseen O.E.O. programs in 
the Missouri Bootheel. These more experienced and cosmopolitan organizers brought a technical 
expertise and, in Page’s case, ideological sophistication to the local struggle informing its 
activities and philosophy. The last and smallest constituency was a group of white professional 
allies that relocated to Cairo to lend the United Front their legal, technical, and moral support. 
This group included ministers like Fr. Gerald Montory and Fr. Ben Bodewes who opened up St. 
Columba’s Parish for the United Front’s use as well as attorneys working for the Lawyers’ 
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law whose operations are discussed in the following chapter. 
Consistent with earlier phases of the Cairo Black freedom struggle, local white support was 
virtually nonexistent with the notable exception of local attorneys and longtime NAACP 
members Robert and David Lansden.21                                                         
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 Local activists of all stripes viewed the adoption of a united front strategy as a pragmatic 
necessity in the face of rigorous opposition to racial change. However, for the organization’s 
more radical members, the realization of a united front strategy carried broader implications in 
that it symbolized the possibility of Black Power’s maturation beyond the bitter sectarian strife 
that had characterized the preceding years. Tensions between established civil rights 
organizations and emergent Black Power groups dogged the national movement and, more 
recently, potent divisions had arisen between West Coast cultural and revolutionary nationalists. 
For Koen, who had witnessed first hand the devastating consequences of such divisions in the 
failed SNCC-BPP alliance, the stakes were particularly high.  
The problem, Koen argued, was one of ideological dogmatism. “Black People are hung 
up on ideology,” he argued. “It is difficult for them to deal with the real enemy… we have 
different organizations, but we are yet to have a meeting of minds. When we get through fighting 
each other – fighting because someone’s a Panther; or he is in SCLC… then our minds can begin 
to come together.” Getting beyond sectarianism, Koen argued, would require that people stop 
taking “hard positions.” “We cannot at this stage, be dogmatic about our position,” he argued. 
“Sometimes we have to be flexible. Sometimes we cannot even speak the real ideas that are in 
our minds. We have to be very diplomatic about that.” The alternative, United Front leaders 
contended, was to fight for ideological purity at the expense of a movement large enough to have 
any hope of success. According to United Front activist Reggie Brown, this was a luxury 
activists could ill afford at this key juncture. “In the year 1970,” Brown asked rhetorically, “do 
we have the time or right to rule people out because they do not think like us?” The persistence                                                                                                                                                                                   
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of internal battles over “philosophical differences” was “sure disaster” for the struggle. “In all 
cases,” Brown argued, “the part must remain subordinate to the whole.” “To struggle in 
developing correct ideology is a good thing,” Brown explained, but it can “become a bad thing 
when it is done at the expense of the people.” Emphasizing the importance of mass mobilization 
over ideological purity, United Front leaders called for a broad-based movement that, as Koen 
put it, was not “hung up’ on any ‘ism’” but focused instead on the “real enemy” of racism and 
exploitation.22 
 Of course, Koen’s designation of racism and exploitation as the “real enemy” belies the 
assumption that ideology was unimportant to him and the United Front’s radical founders. 
Koen’s political ideology is best understood as a continually evolving, eclectic bricolage of 
Black Nationalist, pan-Africanist, and revolutionary nationalist traditions. The publications and 
speeches of United Front radicals demonstrate that they viewed the Cairo movement as part of a 
broader revolutionary struggle against the racial and exploitative dynamics inherent in U.S. 
capitalism. The organization’s political education materials frequently cited the works of anti-
colonial and anti-imperial revolutionaries such as Mao Tse-Tung, Frantz Fanon, Amilcar Cabral 
and Kwame Nkrumah. The impact of the last of these was most apparent in the organization’s 
efforts to establish a School of Nkrumah focused on providing political education and training to 
radicals from across the region. Nkrumah’s vision of revolutionary struggle as having three 
stages – Nationalism, Pan-Africanism, and Socialism – was formative for United Front leaders 
due to its acknowledgement of the importance of Black Nationalism and its refusal to obscure 
important class realities and fissures. United Front radicals argued that the shared experience of 
racism provided “a material base for the tactical unity of many segments of the black                                                         
22 Koen, United Front Philosophy; [untitled article], United Front News, May, 1971; “On Ideology,” United Front 
News, May 1971.  
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community” in a national liberation struggle. However, they also agreed with Nkrumah’s 
contention that the “nationalist phase” should “never be regarded as the final solution to the 
problem raised by the economic and political exploitation.” Racism and exploitation, United 
Front radicals argued, were “necessary ingredients to the maintaining of the capitalist system.” In 
the longer view, radicals envisioned a “classless society” in which these dual enemies of racism 
and exploitation would be overturned.23 
 Forming a united front was considered the most viable strategy to attain that goal. Of 
course, not all Black Power radicals were sympathetic to a united front strategy. Some viewed it 
skeptically as a pragmatic response to recent defeats that risked diluting radical influence and 
presaged an ultimate capitulation to reformist middle-class factions. In an important sense, Koen 
had reached a united front strategy by way of a litany of failures. However, United Front leaders 
defended the strategy by grounding it in a radical intellectual tradition. Here, Nkrumah’s call for 
a “united militant front” against colonial oppression was helpful. However, it was the teachings 
of Mao that were particularly instructive; United Front leaders frequently cited “The Little Red 
Book” (1966) in their speeches and publications. At root, Koen’s call for Black activists to move 
beyond their ideological differences and focus on the “real enemy” of racism and exploitation 
was inspired by Mao’s 1957 work, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the 
People, republished in Chapter IV of “The Little Red Book.” In this text, Mao underscores the 
importance of clearly identifying the primary enemy and mobilizing all other forces behind a 
unified oppositional front. While differences existed within the people’s opposition movement, 
particularly between the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry, Mao cautioned against the tendency 
to “magnify” such differences to the point that they became equivalent to or indistinguishable                                                         
23 M.R.C. Coalition, “The Warzone,” (1971); Koen, United Front Philosophy; Nkrumah, Handbook of 
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from those of the primary enemy. Rather, Maoist teachings encouraged a democratic settlement 
of these contradictions through rigorous discussion, persuasion and education. It was in this 
educational and persuasive capacity that Koen viewed the United Front’s radical wing as making 
its contribution. Rejecting coercion or exclusion as viable approaches to movement building, 
Koen called upon “the revolutionary activist” to “master the art of persuasion” and “through 
rational arguments and exemplary behavior” convince the masses “that our cause is just.” In this 
manner, Maoist teachings lent ideological legitimacy to a united front strategy and provided a 
sophisticated theorization of the role and responsibility of radicals working within it.24 
 Importantly, United Front radicals based their vision of revolutionary struggle on a 
Maoist interpretation of Marxist-Leninism that underscored the importance of adapting 
approaches based on the concrete realities of different times and places. Revolutionaries in 
China, in contrast to their Russian counterparts, would not capture state power abruptly through a 
small armed revolutionary cadre, but rather through a longer broad-based struggle during which, 
Mao argued, the collective capacity of the masses to rule was simultaneously developed.25 This 
alternative vision of revolution – not as an event but as an evolutionary process – was attractive 
to Black Power activists who were frustrated by the failures of the movement’s “first wave” and 
thoroughly disabused of the notion that rhetorics of armed revolution and guerilla warfare had 
any immediate utility in the U.S. context. Detroit-based Black Power activists James and Grace 
Lee Boggs were among the leading theorizers of this approach, characterizing revolution in their 
landmark 1974 book, Revolution and Evolution in the Twentieth Century, as “a patient and 
protracted process that transforms us and empowers us as individuals as we struggle to change 
                                                        
24 Nkrumah, Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare, 23-25; Mao Tse-Tung, Quotations From Chairman Mao Tse-
Tung, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), 45-57; [untitled article], United Front News, May, 1971; Koen, 
United Front Philosophy, 21.  
25 On Maoist conceptions of revolution, see Shaun Breslin, Mao (London: Longman, 1998), viii. 
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the world around us.” United Front radicals expressed support for this radical pedagogy, 
frequently stating: “Evolution precedes Revolution.” For such activists, Maoism – in theory if 
not in practice – offered an alternative conception of revolution and a new set of methods for its 
realization.26 
 Maoism’s central methodology, as articulated in Chapter XI of “The Little Red Book,” 
was the “mass line,” which situated the peasantry at the center of revolutionary struggle and 
privileged their practical work, ideas and leadership. Mao warned radicals not to fall into 
“dogmatism” or “commandism” but rather commit themselves to patiently serving and working 
alongside the masses to build a movement that reflected their interests and aspirations. In the 
United Front’s publications, leaders repeatedly emphasized the importance of this approach. “We 
will never master persuasion nor will we make the revolution,” Koen argued, “if we do not 
consciously adopt the mass line.” “The mass line,” he explained,” means that we have only 
people to work with and only people will make the struggle against racism and exploitation 
victorious.” “Small numbers of people,” he cautioned, “will never make a revolutionary 
struggle.” To go beyond the masses would, as Mao put it, be adventurism resulting in the 
alienation and isolation of radicals from the people capable of building an effective struggle. 
This, Koen argued, was exactly what Black Power radicals had fallen victim to during the past 
few years. Referencing Mao and possibly his own experiences in St. Louis, Koen identified 
alienation as “one of the major mistakes” made by Black Power activists. “If you become 
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isolated,” he warned, “you will [be] destroyed quicker than the person who understands the mass 
line.” While Koen acknowledged that mass line politics offered radicals some insulation, he 
cautioned against this being the primary motivation for its adoption. Instead he called upon 
radicals to be motivated by a genuine love for the people. “The revolutionary,” he explained, “is 
of the people and serves the people, and the people will judge all those who say they are 
revolutionaries.”27 
 The commitment of United Front leaders to the Maoist methodology of the mass line 
powerfully shaped their pedagogy and praxis. While the united front strategy provided 
legitimation for an alliance between radicals and their more moderate counterparts, the politics of 
the mass line underscored the need for mass mobilization and the practical involvement and 
leadership of the Black working-class in all aspects of the struggle. There was already a general 
agreement among Civil Rights and Black Power leaders in Cairo that mass mobilization would 
be needed to realize the movement’s goals at this key juncture. However, it is important to 
recognize that mass line politics imbued mass mobilization with a different set of meanings and 
purposes for radicals than for Civil Rights activists. Civil rights leaders like Preston Ewing were 
often utilitarian in their approach, viewing mass mobilization as one of many tools to exert 
pressure in aid of achieving incremental reforms. In contrast, for radicals the mass mobilization 
of the Black working class was a more integral and dynamic component of a revolutionary 
struggle, serving as both the primary source and focus of the movement’s transformative 
energies. 
 Maoist teachings on the united front and mass line also informed the organizational 
structure of the United Front, setting it apart from other forms of coalitions or alliances. Like                                                         
27 Reggie Brown, “Black People Minus Unity = Perpetual Oppression,” United Front News, September 5, 1970, 
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many Black Power organizations, the United Front’s leadership strove to balance mechanisms of 
mass participation with the efficiency and discipline required to mount a vigorous and organized 
campaign. Unwieldy consensus-based decision making models were rejected in favor of a more 
hierarchical structure that formalized leadership and streamlined program operations. Overseeing 
the United Front’s daily operations was Koen as the organization’s chairman as well as an 
elaborate staff structure that included a program coordinator, chief of staff, public relations 
officer, secretary, treasurer, and field organizers. Some of these staff positions were held by local 
Black working-class activists such as Herman Whitfield (field organizer), Frank Washington 
(field organizer), Al Farmer (treasurer), and Mabel Hollis (secretary), while Koen’s radical 
political allies from cities across the region held others, including Leon Page (program 
coordinator), Bob Williams (economic development), James Chairs (chief of staff) and Carl 
Hampton from Chicago (photographer). However, the key policy-making arm of the United 
Front was its Central Committee that included the chairman, three staff members, and 
representatives from Cairo’s Black civic, religious, and political organizations. It was through 
the Central Committee that the united front strategy was operationalized, as groups representing 
a broad cross-section of Cairo’s Black population worked collectively to determine the 
movement’s objectives and priorities as well as develop new programs. In turn, the Central 
Committee was closely monitored by an even broader group of community representatives called 
the Advisory Council that offered continual guidance and oversight. Finally, the United Front 
held weekly mass meetings every Saturday at St. Columba’s Church where rank-and-file 
participants could share their perspectives and vote on questions of strategy and tactics. United 
Front leaders utilized these meetings to identify the interests and needs of the membership, as 
well as to engage in the kind of political education they viewed as central to their broader vision 
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of revolutionary change. In turn, Black working-class people who had been marginalized from 
the city’s political institutions for generations gained new and important skills in democratic 
participation.28 
 While Maoist teachings were foundational to Black radicals’ support for a united front 
strategy in Cairo, maintaining the support of broader constituencies necessitated an alternative 
set of legitimating discourses and practices. In accordance with the mass line methodology, 
United Front leaders looked to the oppositional culture of the Black working-class, particularly 
its religious elements, as an organic ideological tradition that could inspire, motivate, and 
discipline movement participants to challenge racism and exploitation as well as bridge 
intraracial barriers of generation, class, and ideology that might serve to undercut racial 
solidarity.29 
 
A Shared Religious Tradition 
 
One tradition that Black Cairoites tended to share was a familiarity with the discourses 
and practices of the Black church. As Chapter One demonstrated, African American Christian 
traditions in Cairo exhibited greater homogeneity in comparison to larger northern cities where                                                         
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the processes of migration, urbanization, and industrialization had generated religious plurality 
as well as secularization among certain segments of the Black population. In contrast, church 
attendance and membership in Cairo remained high with the vast majority of Black residents 
coming into contact with the institution whether it was for regular Sunday worship, childhood 
Sunday school classes, or the church’s extensive social and cultural programming. Most Black 
Cairoites, like their counterparts across the Ohio River Valley, shared an evangelical Protestant 
faith, belonging largely to historically Black Baptist and Methodist denominations or one of the 
city’s three Pentecostal congregations. While important social and ecclesiastical differences 
existed between these traditions, all three shared a belief in the centrality of scripture as the 
inspired word of God, the primacy of a personal relationship with Christ, and the power of the 
divine as a present and active force in the world.  
In addition to these deep theological bonds, Black Christians in Cairo were united by a 
set of shared cultural practices rooted in the Black church, including call-and response oratory, 
communal prayer, congregational worship, and charismatic sermonizing. Shared religious 
traditions had historically functioned as an important source of ecumenicalism, binding together 
Black Cairoites of different social classes and generations. Ministers from different 
denominational backgrounds joined hands to form a citywide Black ministerial alliance; 
community choirs brought Christians together in ecumenical displays of worship; and periodic 
revivals served to unite believers around a shared evangelistic mission to reach “lost” friends and 
relatives as well as rededicate their own lives to personal holiness and righteousness. Although 
important differences did exist in denominational affiliation and worship style, Black 
Christianity in Cairo was a pervasive and comparatively homogenous tradition that, as 
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sociologist Mary Patillo-McCoy argues, “culturally and religiously [bound] together the black 
middle class and the black poor,” both young and old.30 
 Coming out of this tradition, Koen recognized the importance of securing the support of 
Black clergy and congregants to build an effective movement. Black congregations such as Ward 
Chapel A.M.E. and the First Missionary Baptist Church had functioned as important staging 
grounds for earlier civil rights struggles as well as a source of political leadership. During the 
Black Power era, many of the more established Black civic and political leaders remained 
prominent churchgoers. Most prominent among them was retired schoolteacher and former 
NAACP president, Hattie Kendrick. Kendrick was a highly respected community member and 
devout churchwoman who had been a member of Ward Chapel for almost fifty years. Kendrick, 
like many Black middle-class activists of her generation, was known for her commitment to a 
conception of Christian ministry that fused religion with a politics of racial uplift. Kendrick had 
worked through missionary societies, women’s auxiliaries and secular civil rights organizations 
to improve the quality of life of all Black Cairoites. Her extensive experience and personal 
sacrifice ensured that she was the object of almost universal respect among Black residents. 
Maintaining her support as well as that of other older community leaders such as Rev. J.I. Cobb, 
pastor of the Pulaski COGIC congregation, Rev. Sherman Jones of the First Missionary Baptist                                                         
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Church, and retired minister Rev. Levi Garrett would be important if the United Front hoped to 
gain legitimacy among the community’s elders as well as generate mass support in a close-knit 
community. 
 Koen’s interest in mobilizing Black churches into the United Front set him apart from 
many other Black Power activists. For Black radicals in particular, Christianity often conjured 
Marx’s dictum that religion was the “opiate of the masses.” Such critiques also found support 
among cultural nationalists such as Maulana Karenga, leader of the US Organization, who 
frequently referred to Christianity as a form of “spookism.” Karenga and his sometime protégé 
Amiri Baraka offered the secular humanist tradition of Kawaida as an alternative that resonated 
with many of the cultural practices of former Black Christians while rejecting what they viewed 
as Christianity’s “otherworldly” theology. Revolutionary and cultural nationalists roundly 
criticized Black clergy, including more progressive members of the National Committee of 
Black Churchmen (NCBC), which had formed in the wake of the urban rebellions as an 
expression of resurgent Black Nationalism within church circles. Speaking to NCBC members in 
St. Louis in November 1968, Karenga accused ministers of being “a liability” in the Black 
community, more concerned with ruling than with revolution, and providing “comfort not 
change.” More crudely, BPP Chief of Staff David Hilliard denounced NCBC members at an 
event in Berkeley in 1970 as “a bunch of bootlicking pimps and motherfuckers.” During the late 
1960s, the repudiation of the Black church as a harbinger of false hope and unprincipled 
leadership was a common refrain among Black Power activists.31 
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 However, many leading Black Power activists would come to reconsider their earlier 
criticisms of the Black church, if not their anticlericalism, during the movement’s “second 
wave,” as the movement’s militant wing struggled to overcome a tide of state repression and 
political isolation. Having worked on the ground in the rural South with SNCC, Stokely 
Carmichael grasped the importance of the Black church and faith to organizing traditions early 
on. “I instinctively understood that if my struggle was to be among my people then any talk of 
atheism and the rejection of God just wasn’t gonna cut it. I just knew that. My early political 
work in the rural South would confirm this. All our meetings were held in churches. They all 
began with prayer. When they approved, people would say, “Son, you doing the Lord’s work.”… 
I did not want to be alienated from my people because of Marxist atheism.” Activists working in 
the urban north where religious traditions were more diverse often took longer to reach this 
conclusion. Among the most memorable of these instances was BPP leader Huey Newton’s May 
19, 1971 speech, “On the Relevance of the Church,” at the University of California-Berkeley. 
Presented in the same location that David Hilliard had made his infamous remarks to NCBC just 
a few months prior, Newton offered what many viewed as a dramatic reversal of the BPP’s 
position on the Black church. By rejecting this key institution, Newton argued, the Panthers had 
cast themselves into “a void alienated from the whole community.” 
We said the church is only a ritual, it is irrelevant, and therefore we will have nothing to 
do with it. We said this in the context of the whole community being involved with the 
church on one level or another. That is one way of defecting from the community, and 
that is exactly what we did. Once we stepped outside of the church with that criticism, we 
stepped outside of the whole thing that the community was involved in and we said, “You 
follow our example; your reality is not true and you don’t need it.” 
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Facing marginalization, Newton explained that BPP members had reevaluated their earlier 
position and that many were now church attendees and participants.32  
While some dismissed Newton’s speech as purely strategic, it also reflected the BPP’s 
recent adoption of revolutionary intercommunalism, an ideology that, like the United Front’s, 
shifted emphasis away from small cadre politics and toward the development of a practical 
political agenda rooted within Black communities. However, the practical significance of the 
BPP’s embrace of the Black church was still unclear. While Newton’s statements lent greater 
legitimacy to the ongoing reliance of local BPP on church resources, the role that religious 
practices and beliefs would play in the movement itself was not elaborated. Moreover, Newton 
offered no indication that the organization had reneged on its interpretation of Christianity as an 
opiate, leaving listeners to infer that the Panthers were willing to tolerate such abstractions if it 
helped achieve their broader goals.33 
 While Newton struggled to find space for Black Christian institutions and traditions in 
the Black liberation struggle and others proposed their substitution with secular humanist 
alternatives, Koen was among the movement’s leading advocates for the continued relevance of 
the Black church to Black Power. Although Koen’s political ideology had altered significantly in 
the preceding years, his personal faith persisted. Koen’s small-town roots grounded him in the 
intimate yet potent social networks of the Black church, infusing his politics with a grassroots 
religious revivalism that distinguished him from many of his radical peers who had come of age 
in larger and more cosmopolitan northern cities. Koen’s emergence as a nationally renowned                                                         
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Black Power leader took place within this unique cultural milieu and, like many southern and 
border state radicals before him, he approached radical frameworks through the lens of a 
prophetic Black working-class faith. In turn, Koen’s embrace of radical frameworks played a key 
role in his effort to transform the dominant civil rights theology of racial reconciliation and 
nonviolence in order to make grassroots religious traditions amenable to the new realities of the 
Black Power era. The centrality of Koen to this process of re-working and radicalizing grassroots 
religious traditions, a process political scientist Doug McAdam terms “cognitive liberation,” 
cannot be overstated. As a Baptist minister by training, Koen possessed both the skills and 
investment in reframing religious beliefs and practices to serve radicals ends. From his position 
as chairman of the United Front, Koen situated Christian discourses at the center of the 
organization’s philosophy and infused the movement with the cultural practices of the Black 
church. In doing so, he called upon the existing religious cultures of Black Cairoites as well as 
new theological traditions emerging from the nation’s seminaries.34 
 
Spiritual Rallies and the Crafting of a Movement Culture 
 
Visitors were captivated by the religious dynamics of the Cairo struggle. Their reports 
conveyed a vivid image that jarred with popular conceptions of Black Power. Writing for the 
New Y ork Times Magazine in February 1971, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist J. Anthony 
Lukas strove to capture the unique tone and cadence of the United Front’s Saturday spiritual                                                         
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rallies. Lukas opened his article with an image of the United Front Choir “bobbing and weaving” 
to the sound of a church organ while the packed crowd at St. Columba’s clapped “to the driving, 
syncopated beat” of a familiar gospel tune. As the music ended, Koen rose to the pulpit, his 
“Afro outlined like a warriors helmet against the blue-green of the stained-glass window,” and 
began to speak. “The essence of our struggle today,” he exclaimed, “is that we got one more 
river to cross.” “We crossed the Nile. We crossed the Mississippi. We crossed the mighty Ohio. 
But the river we’re going to cross downtown today isn’t a physical river. It’s a river of the 
spirit.” “You might see some brothers fall,” he continued. “But no matter how many folks they 
kill, no matter how many armored cars they bring in, we got to have faith,” he urged. With that, 
the young minister motioned for the crowd to join him at the altar in prayer before taking to the 
streets of downtown in Cairo in protest.35 
 Lukas’s article drew national attention to the emergence of a distinctive movement 
culture in Cairo that pulled heavily from the ritualistic world of the city’s Black churches.36 The 
fascination of social commentators with these manifestations of popular religiosity reflected 
broader assumptions regarding Black Power’s secular quality in contrast to earlier civil rights 
struggles. The juxtaposition left commentators scrambling for ways to explain Cairo’s 
confounding combination of “old-time religion and revolutionary thought.” However, for local 
activists less interested in demarcating themselves from the legacy of civil rights than in building 
broad-based alliances, embracing religious rituals was a conscious and deliberate act that 
positioned the United Front favorably within a longer tradition of struggle steeped in religious 
meaning and mores. By pulling from the Black church’s cultural “toolkit” of call-and-response 
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oratory, communal prayer, and congregational worship, the United Front situated itself as 
continuous with earlier phases of the Black freedom struggle, garnering the organization 
considerable legitimacy among Black residents.37 
 Cultural continuities between the United Front and earlier civil rights struggles played an 
important role in securing the support and participation of an older generation of established 
community leaders. Spiritual rallies provided respected community elders with a familiar and 
comfortable context for participation. Local Black clergymen of all denominational stripes were 
invited to provide words of inspiration and instruction to United Front members at the weekly 
spiritual rallies. Rev. Sherman Jones, pastor of the First Missionary Baptist Church, and Rev. 
Blaine Ramsey, former pastor of Ward Chapel, were frequent speakers and would come to play 
an active role on the United Front’s advisory board. Joining them were older churchwomen such 
as Hattie Kendrick and Carmel Fowler who gave regular updates on local organizing efforts. The 
organization also maintained an ecumenical choir that performed a familiar selection of 
spirituals, hymns and gospel songs. Local church music directors and accompanists including 
Rice Whitfield, Hernean Mallory and Gradie McMillen, were invited to lead the United Front 
Choir and in the process formed close bonds with younger activists.38  
 By inviting community elders to participate, the United Front’s radical wing sought to 
build upon the unique intergenerational milieu of the Black church which had historically 
provided a valuable institutional context for the development of mentoring relationships between                                                         
37 Quote from Howard Kohn, “Civil War in Cairo, Ill.: A Dispatch from the Front,” Ramparts 9, No. 9 (April 1971). 
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38 “Blacks Vote Boycott On,”; Kohn, “Civil War in Cairo, Ill.”; “United Front Choir to Participate in Meet,” The 
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younger and older activists. Through her extensive church networks, Kendrick had forged close 
relationships with many of the younger men and women in the movement. Her enigmatic protégé 
at the NAACP, Preston Ewing, Jr., was the son of fellow Ward Chapel member Nancy Ewing 
and a former student at Washington Junior School. Koen had also been a member of Ward 
Chapel, serving with Kendrick on the church’s steward board. During the civil rights struggles of 
the early 1960s, Kendrick and Ramsey had “recruited and mentored” Koen, taking him under 
their wing and teaching him “how to do church work.” After his marriage, Koen’s wife Clydia 
joined Ward Chapel, working closely with Kendrick on church hospitality and social programs. 
Carmel Fowler, a fellow church member and NAACP leader, became godmother to the young 
couple’s children. The centrality of churches to Black life in Cairo and the intergenerational 
bonds fostered within them ensured that strong ties existed between the city’s established civil 
rights leaders and key Black Power activists.39 
 Far from rejecting these bonds, Black Power leaders further institutionalized them within 
the United Front’s structure bridging generations and casting community elders as much-needed 
advisors. Black women elders such as Kendrick and Fowler served as what sociologist Belinda 
Robnett has called “community bridge leaders,” specializing in linking social movement 
organizations to each other and to indigenous community networks. Robnett provides the 
concept of bridge leadership as a way of theorizing Black women’s key roles in social movement 
mobilization in the context of their gendered exclusion from formal leadership positions. 
However, in Cairo Black women activists like Kendrick and Fowler had held prominent                                                         
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positions within the NAACP during the campaigns of the postwar era. In this context, their 
designation as informal advisors to the United Front was a role they embraced as elders deeply 
invested in passing the torch to a new generation of leaders. While informal, the role of advisor 
was a privileged position that afforded Kendrick and Fowler a powerful voice and influence in 
the organization’s decision-making. Described by United Front leaders as “the Mother of the 
Struggle,” Kendrick’s long history as a church leader and community activist provided her with 
an excellent understanding of local people, their attitudes, and interests. In turn, her work with 
the NAACP allowed Kendrick to establish a vast network of contacts within the broader civil 
rights community that proved invaluable to younger activists. As Preston Ewing explained, “She 
knew who to contact… not only her state NAACP contacts, but she had her national contacts. So 
she knew people, who to call.” As a result, younger activists “sort of piggy-backed on [Kendrick] 
and her resources,” according to Ewing. Like Ella Baker, Kendrick used her capacity as an 
advisor to mentor and guide younger activists as well bridge different generations and 
organizations.40 
The United Front’s extension of the intergenerational milieu of the black church into the 
movement as well as its incorporation of religious practices ensured that youth involvement 
would be widely accepted and encouraged by parents. In the years following the urban rebellion, 
addressing the lack of constructive social activities for Black youth had become a central concern 
of parents and community organizations. Historically, Jim Crow practices had locked Black 
children and teenagers out of white only organizations like the Boy Scouts as well as popular 
youth hangouts like the Oriac Center (a.k.a., Teen Town), the Rollerbowl, and the swimming 
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pool. By the end of the decade, most of these recreational spaces had closed under pressure to 
integrate and dwindling financial resources. Black working-class parents, in particular, worried 
that their children were being left to roam the streets unsupervised where they could easily be 
injured or fall prey to illicit activities and police harassment. In this context, the United Front’s 
weekly rallies offered a much-needed social space for all generations within the Black family to 
participate collectively. Many of the United Front’s “strong sisters” and “strong brothers,” as 
local activist Clarence Dossie described them, came from a few core Black working-class 
families including the Garretts, the Whitfields, and the Mallorys. In each case, multiple 
generations of a single family joined the United Front, taking on active roles in the movement. 
The sight of “grandmothers with canes, middle-aged parents with children, and teenagers with 
dogs” all amassing at St. Columba’s to join in worship surprised many out-of-town visitors who 
tended to view Black Power as a predominantly Black urban youth phenomenon.41  
 While the United Front’s mass meetings built upon the cultural conventions and networks 
of the Black church, they also challenged some of the institution’s less democratic aspects. 
United Front radicals played a prominent role by bringing Maoist teachings on the mass line to 
bear on prevailing understandings of leadership and decision-making. Radicals did embrace the 
Black church’s tradition of charismatic leadership, recognizing its ability to galvanize and 
empower members. Saturday rallies were held just prior to the organization’s weekly 
demonstrations and were designed to meet the deeper emotional and spiritual needs of members, 
binding them together in preparation for the obstacles they might face downtown. In these 
moments, Koen’s pastoral voice elevated above others, taking on the quality and tone of the 
prophetic tradition so familiar to many movement participants. However, United Front radicals, 
including Koen, firmly believed that the legitimacy of their leadership hinged not on divine                                                         
41 Kohn, “Civil War in Cairo, Ill.”, Clarence Dossie interview, Cairo, Illinois, February 5, 2010. 
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calling alone but on the sanction and support of the rank-and-file. In accordance with mass line 
teachings, radicals considered the interests and aspirations of the Black working class to be 
central to matters of correct program development and decision-making. Radicals believed it was 
their responsibility to work among the people and learn from them, extracting their ideas, and 
putting then into practice. Accordingly, the United Front’s mass meetings functioned as 
democratic assemblies serving to “unite the people spiritually” as well as “inform” them and 
“allow for community expression.” Ramparts reporter Howard Kohn aptly described the 
meetings as “a combination of religious service and experiment in participatory democracy.”42 
 In implementing democratic practices at mass meetings, the United Front built upon the 
limited traditions of democratic exchange present in many Black congregations. While decision-
making in evangelical congregations tended to be hierarchical and gendered, laity exerted a 
limited degree of influence through a system of internal committees and boards. By volunteering 
to serve on church steward boards, women’s auxiliaries, and mission societies, laity played an 
active role in shaping discrete components of the church’s overall program. The United Front 
expanded upon this existing tradition by asking members to engage in Christian service by 
joining committees focused on specific areas of their political program such as housing, 
education, and cooperative economics. Interspersed between the hymns and sermons at the 
weekly spiritual rallies, leaders would report back from these committees as well as provide 
opportunities for those in attendance to ask questions, offer testimonies, and register complaints. 
In allowing this kind of democratic feedback, United Front leaders expanded upon call-and-
response traditions utilized for the purpose of affirming and uplifting. Members were encouraged 
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to offer testimonies of support and encouragement, but also disagreement and criticism. The 
latter was particularly important because it reflected the process of critical study and reflection 
essential to radicals’ understanding of the revolutionary process. In turn, major questions of 
strategy and tactics were put to a formal vote in which all members were permitted to participate 
irrespective of class, gender, or generation. Accordingly, United Front radicals deepened the 
church’s existing democratic practices, challenging conformist tendencies and opening up the 
possibility for mass participation.43 
 While radicals viewed the aspirations and interests of the rank-and-file as central, they 
did not romanticize their position. Mass meetings were imagined as a site of dynamic exchange 
in which radical intellectuals skilled in the art of persuasion played an active role. In his writings, 
Koen emphasized the importance of providing activists with “correct political training” through 
the immersion and systematic study of local conditions as well as “the science, art, and works of 
others who have been actively engaged in struggle.” This knowledge, he argued, should then be 
mobilized to persuade the people through “rational arguments” at mass meetings and in the 
United Front’s various committees. In accordance with their political training, radicals viewed 
themselves as playing an active role in raising the political consciousness of the Black working-
class and pushing them, through criticism and rational exchange, to a more advanced form of 
praxis. In reality, however, rational arguments were rivaled if not surpassed by discourses of a 
more spiritual tenor.44 
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A Handbook for the Revolution 
 
The significance of the scriptures to the United Front’s political ideology and 
programming cannot be overstated. In the organization’s publications, the King James Bible was 
referred to as a vital “tool” and “central focus” of the struggle. In political education, scriptures 
took their place alongside the words of Malcolm X, Nkrumah, and Mao. Koen referred to the 
Holy Book as a “handbook for the revolution,” insisting that he personally looked “to the Bible 
for divine guidance.” Visitors to the city noted a broader reliance upon the scriptures by rank-
and-file movement participants. John H. Britton, managing editor of Jet magazine, described 
seeing Bibles prominently displayed in the homes of United Front members during his visit to 
the city in 1970. “Typically,” he said, “it [the Bible] shows telltale signs of having been opened, 
leafed through repeatedly and closed shut many times.” United Front members, Britton argued, 
were clearly employing this “instrument of salvation” to “bargain for a few days more sanity” in 
the midst of violence and terror. While the Bible did function as an important source of 
reassurance and comfort, Britton’s statements obscured the very important way in which local 
activists called upon scriptures not only to survive Cairo, but also to transform it.45 
Christian discourses had played an important role in earlier civil rights struggles 
functioning as a source of transcendent motivation and imbuing the movement with religious 
meaning. Cairo’s liberal integration campaigns of the postwar era were underpinned by a civil 
rights theology of racial reconciliation and nonviolence that appealed to Black Cairoites across 
class and generational lines and legitimated their participation in direct-action tactics. As a 
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teenager, Koen had come of age in a movement shaped by a philosophy that emphasized the 
redemptive quality of nonviolent acts and their ability to transform hate through love. Nonviolent 
protest, he had hoped, would prompt white Cairoites to repent of their sin and join in the creation 
of a Beloved Community where Black and white community members would be reconciled. 
However, the refusal of white Cairoites to accede to the demands of peaceful protest as well as 
their continued reliance upon racial violence to maintain relationships of power and privilege 
prompted Koen and other movement participants to develop not only new strategies and tactics, 
but new scriptural referents by which Black Power could be better articulated and understood. 
 The United Front’s leadership utilized Biblical narratives to frame their practical 
organizing efforts, which represented a creative blend of the legal and nonviolent direct action 
tactics of earlier civil rights struggles with a Black Nationalist program that emphasized 
community control, institution building and armed self-defense. The tremendous diversity of 
approaches employed by Black Power activists in Cairo reflected the United Front’s broad-based 
membership and distinctive organizational structure.  Shortly after the United Front’s formation 
in the spring of 1969, members initiated an economic boycott of white-owned businesses that 
refused to hire Black workers. The boycott, which would last for almost three years, was the 
longest in the nation’s history and critical to reigniting mass protest in Cairo as well as unifying 
the movement’s ideological wings behind a shared tactical agenda. However, as a united front 
organization, constituent groups were also granted considerable autonomy to pursue their own 
tactics independently of each other. Thus, the NAACP continued its robust legal campaign 
against the city’s discriminatory practices and SICA remained committed to the development of 
separate cooperative institutions. In this context, the United Front utilized Biblical narratives of 
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exodus, exile, and nation building to provide an overarching sense of unity and purpose to the 
varied organizing efforts of Black Cairoites.46 
 The Exodus story that had been so central to earlier civil rights struggles continued to 
play a prominent role in Black Cairoites understandings of their place and purpose during the 
Black Power Movement. The story of the oppression of the Israelites at the hands of their 
Egyptian rulers and their deliverance into a Promised Land resonated with the collective 
experience of African Americans living in Little Egypt and was frequently retold by United 
Front leaders at the organization’s spiritual rallies and in its publications.   
And God said: “LET MY PEOPLE GO!” The people left Cairo, Egypt, a prosperous 
land, a fertile land, a land of security. They left for an unknown land, an unknown future, 
but they left for FREEDOM. When they left the greatness of Cairo left with them. Cairo 
gained its might through the misuse of God’s children as the Egyptians found their power 
through the enslavement of God’s people. Their economy was built around slavery. And 
then there was Little Egypt, in the United States of America, State of Illinois. Little 
Egypt, a prosperous land, a fertile land, a land of security. Its major city and capital city 
was Cairo. It too became great and prosperous and maintained its power through Slavery 
of God’s children. But throughout history God’s children kept hearing His Voice 
proclaiming “Let my People Go!” The voice grew louder, the message became clearer to 
His people. But as in Egypt, the Pharaoh’s hardened their hearts as the people heard and 
moved slowly, but surely toward Freedom’s Land. 
 
As this retelling of the Exodus story shows, Black Cairoites drew significant parallels between 
the Israelites’ plight and their own. Particular emphasis was placed on the unjust and immoral 
foundation upon which the Egyptians had built their society. United Front leaders contended that 
Cairo’s wealth and prosperity, then as now, had been established “through the enslavement of 
God’s children.” In turn, “Pharaohs” of the past and present had “hardened their hearts” to the 
cries of the people, placing them at odds with God and the inexorable drive toward freedom. 
“Just as time caught up with the Pharaohs of Egypt,” United Front leaders contended, “time                                                         
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surely has caught up with the Pharaohs of Little Egypt.” The sin and pride of the city’s white 
officials ensured their position on the wrong side of history and God’s active work within it as a 
liberating force on behalf of the oppressed.47 
However, in their retelling of the Exodus story, United Front activists drew important 
distinctions between the biblical account and their own freedom dreams. Most evidently, they 
rejected a literal interpretation of the Exodus that might have tied them to an emigrationist or 
territorial nationalist politics. While the Israelites had “sought their freedom outside of Cairo,” 
the United Front interpreted God’s proclamation of “let my people go” to mean “let my people 
find their freedom in Cairo.” Realizing this vision, United Front leaders argued, would involve 
overturning the city’s exploitative system of rule and “rebuilding” the city on a godly foundation 
of “justice,” “equality,” “brotherhood,” and “Freedom.” Echoing a longer ecclesiastical tradition 
in African American Christian thought that scholar Eddie Glaude terms the “ideology of 
chosenness,” Koen situated Black Cairoites as “a chosen people” called by God to radically 
reorder society so that “the top shall become the bottom, and the bottom shall become the top.” 
Importantly, this interpretation situated Black Cairoites at an exilic moment, the promise of 
liberation yet to be fulfilled. For this reason, many contemporaries likened Rev. Koen not to 
Moses, the prophet who led the Israelites out from under slavery, but to Joshua, the prophet 
called to lead his people through the wilderness and to the building of a new nation. Indeed, after 
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performing at one of the United Front’s spiritual rallies, jazz drummer Max Roach dedicated the 
song “Joshua” on his 1971 album, Lift Every Voice and Sing, to Koen.48  
Exodus and exilic narratives provided a powerful discursive frame for the United Front’s 
economic boycott against white merchants. While United Front leaders recognized that these 
small family-owned businesses could not address the full extent of the crisis facing the city’s 
Black workers, the boycott’s targeted moral critique proved particularly effective in mobilizing 
large numbers of Black Cairoites into the movement. Cairo’s economy, the United Front argued, 
was so “totally engulfed with exploitation” that “we can no longer support it.” New recruits 
viewed their exodus from downtown stores as a clear repudiation of the unjust and immoral 
practices of the city’s white elite. By withholding the “Black dollar,” African Americans 
expressed their unwillingness to be complicit in a system of racial discrimination and economic 
exploitation that had kept people in Little Egypt oppressed for generations. “After we pulled 
back the economic wealth,” Koen argued, “it was like the children of Israel leaving the camp 
after they pulled out the economic wealth of Egypt, Pharaoh was in serious trouble.” “We didn’t 
pull out physically,” he explained, “but we pulled out in terms of our economic support.” In this 
manner, Black Cairoites took on what religious studies scholar Cheryl Sanders calls an “exilic 
identity,” separating themselves from a sinful society until God’s restorative work had been 
performed.49  
The boycott placed moral responsibility for the city’s restoration in the hands of its rulers. 
Initially, the boycott was framed as a moral appeal to the Pharaohs’ of the day to take a public                                                         
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stance against racial discrimination in Cairo. The United Front presented city officials with a list 
of demands and expressed a willingness to “meet today or any day at whatever time and place… 
to begin meaningful discussions.” The demands were wide-ranging, calling for “public 
acknowledgement of the injustices black people live under in Cairo, fair representation of black 
people in the judicial system and equal and fair redistribution of the city’s economic and political 
power.” Once city leaders met these demands, the boycott would be called off and true 
reconciliation could begin.  
However, local merchants and city officials refused to comply, denouncing the boycott 
and ushering in a reign of terror led by members of a newly formed chapter of the White Citizens 
Council. Accordingly, United Front leaders called upon Republican Governor Richard Ogilvie to 
intervene, petitioning him to declare Cairo a disaster area, initiate job creation and training 
programs, and solicit federal support for the resolution of the city’s legal, economic and political 
problems. The United Front reinforced these demands by staging a series of sit-ins, wait-ins, and 
pray-ins at the Governor’s office in Springfield during the summer of 1969. These 
demonstrations of nonviolent direct action were designed to dramatize the moral aspect of the 
United Front’s struggle and draw out important continuities with earlier civil rights campaigns. 
During a period when many Black Power activists were actively distancing themselves from the 
legacy of the civil rights era, the United Front did exactly the opposite, describing their 
nonviolent methods as “consistent with the philosophy of the late Dr. Martin Luther King.” This 
was a strategic move on the part of radicals who recognized the privileged position King held 
among Black Cairoites and, more importantly, that, for many, King’s spiritual philosophy of 
racial reconciliation and nonviolence had not fully exhausted its utility. By deploying nonviolent 
direct-action tactics at this early stage in the movement, United Front leaders were able to 
 186 
solidify broad-based support. In addition, these approaches also appealed to liberal clergy, 
particularly members of the Illinois Council of Churches, who played an active role in the 
demonstrations at the Governor’s office.50 
However, Governor Ogilvie took an oppositional stance to the United Front, refusing to 
meet with the organization’s leaders, and greeting protestors with mass arrests. By the end of the 
summer, more than 200 people, including large numbers of nuns and ministers, had been jailed 
as a result of the demonstrations in Springfield. These actions prompted the United Front to 
brand the Governor “Pharaoh Ogilvie,” drawing explicit parallels between him and the biblical 
rulers of the Exodus story. While the United Front had previously utilized the Pharaoh moniker 
to frame their own moral appeal to political leaders as “Let My People Go,” the Governor’s 
failure to restore the city ensured that the label would be increasingly used as an expression of 
judgment that marked him as an enemy of God’s children, “more concerned about… money 
than… the poor and oppressed.” “When we distinguished him as Pharaoh,” Koen explained, “the 
whole realm of oppression became a total reality. The enemy had been defined: he was symbolic 
of the whole creation of the existence of the oppression.”  
This rhetorical shift reflected a broader loss of hope among United Front members that 
nonviolent tactics would result in any meaningful concessions from intractable white officials. 
Over the coming months, this sentiment would solidify, as local merchants who were willing to                                                         
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go out of business before hiring Black workers rendered discourses of racial reconciliation 
irrelevant. The United Front, however, refused to abandon the boycott, instead rearticulating it as 
a sign of God’s judgment and the impending destruction of Little Egypt. “Without money,” 
United Front leaders explained, “their entire program of destruction and overall exploitation is 
doomed to failure.”  Borrowing from another exilic story, Rev. Koen described the boycott as 
akin to Joshua’s battle against Jericho, predicting that the  “walls of hatred, pride, bias and 
oppression would fall in Cairo through the efforts of black residents as they struggled to be free 
from their white oppressors.” By withholding their money, United Front members now viewed 
themselves as God’s agents in an uncompromising battle against injustice that would result in the 
overthrow of Cairo’s corrupt system of rule whether local rulers repented or not.51 
The Exodus story was the most salient Biblical narrative for civil rights activists. By 
deploying it, Black Power radicals forged a discursive bridge between themselves and those who 
still subscribed to a politics of racial reconciliation and nonviolence. When Pharaoh hardened his 
heart to the plight of the oppressed, the United Front’s use of the Exodus story allowed them to 
transform what might have been construed as a sign of defeat into an act of prophetic fulfillment. 
However, the Exodus story proved much less germane to activists’ practical efforts to develop 
new and galvanizing strategies to liberate an exilic people. Accordingly, stories of exodus were 
supplemented and at times supplanted by other stories, particularly postexilic ones focused on 
the practical work of (re)-building a nation. Religious studies scholar Allen Dwight Callahan 
explores how the story of Nehemiah, in particular, has offered many African Americans “an 
alternative to a grandiose hope of freedom the deferral of which had made black folks heartsick 
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with political disappointment.” The story’s depiction of Nehemiah’s return to Jerusalem to 
rebuild the city’s walls and reform oppressive political and economic institutions in the wake of 
Babylonian captivity has historically struck a chord with both Black Nationalist and Black 
radical ministers. During the nadir, Black socialist minister Reverend George Washington 
Woodbey cast Nehemiah as a priest filled with righteous indignation for the unjust treatment of 
the poor by rulers who sought to extract usury for their own personal gain. For Woodbey, 
Nehemiah’s godly anger at the robbery of the poor echoed that of contemporary socialists who 
called for an end to the sharecropping system in the U.S. South. In their efforts to move beyond a 
nonviolent direct-action strategy, United Front leaders also looked to Nehemiah as a scriptural 
guide and legitimation for a grassroots politics that blended Black Nationalist visions of nation 
building with a radical critique of capitalism.52 
 The biblical concept of rebuilding the city was central to the United Front’s political and 
spiritual philosophy. Like Jerusalem in the age of Nehemiah, Cairo was cast as a city plagued by 
corruption and strife stemming from city administrators’ failure to adhere to godly precepts. The 
notion of the “fallen” or sinful nation pervaded Black Cairoites’ representations of the city. In a 
poem entitled “Cairo Will Die!” published in the East St. Louis Monitor in March 1968, an 
unnamed local author provides an exemplary representation of how many Black Cairoites 
viewed the city’s sin and the imminent nature of God’s wrath and judgment.      
Cairo will die because of its 
own creation of fear and hate. 
Cairo will die from its 
malignant cancer of racism, prejudice, bigotry and injustice. 
Cairo will die because of its                                                         
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Mugambi, Christian Theology and Social Reconstruction (Nairobi: Action Publishers, 2003). 
 189 
incompetent city administrators. 
Cairo will die because of its 
Russian type police force and illiterate chief. 
Cairo will die because of its 
economical and industrial starvation. 
Cairo will die because of its 
retail merchants exploitativeness. 
Cairo will die because of its 
hypocrisy in Christianity. 
Cairo will die because all men, women, and children can not  
work, live and play together. 
 
Others drew more explicit parallels between Cairo and other  “fallen” cities in the Bible whose 
imperial power had collapsed under the weight of divine judgment. In a poem, entitled, “Cairo,” 
published in the East St. Louis Monitor in February 1968, local poet and migrant school student 
Ed Riddick drew parallels between Cairo and Babylon’s spiritual sin that led to physical 
destruction: 
Shout aloud all ye people 
for old Cairo 
like ancient Babylon falls 
to rise 
no more 
and Migrants unite to arise 
and stoop no more 
and hope surfaces to 
die no more 
die no more!! 
 
However, while the Exodus narrative motivated Black Cairoites to remove all support for the 
city’s existing institutions, United Front leaders argued that Nehemiah represented their divine 
calling to return to the city and rebuild it on a more just and righteous foundation. At the 
organization’s spiritual rallies, speakers frequently drew parallels between Nehemiah’s mission 
to mend the broken walls of Jerusalem and Black Cairoites’ divine calling to rebuild a sinful city. 
Speaking at a rally in September 1970, Reverend Blaine Ramsey called upon United Front 
members to be like Nehemiah, who “returned to that rebel, that torn down community, and said, 
we are on this wall, we are going to do our work, and we can’t come down.” Through the 
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Nehemiah story, the restoration of Cairo was now rearticulated not as the prerogative of the 
Pharaohs but as the divine calling of a formerly captive people.53   
The phrase “building the wall” took on multiple meanings for Black Cairoites, but its 
most prominent usage was in reference to the development of autonomous parallel institutions. 
The failure of the economic boycott and demonstrations to secure meaningful concessions from 
political and economic leaders further encouraged the United Front’s shift toward a Black 
Nationalist politics of self-help and institution building. SICA had already pioneered efforts in 
this area, founding a cooperative store and market, and in the wake of the failed demonstrations 
of the summer of 1969 the United Front increasingly embraced these efforts, elevating 
cooperative institution building to the top of the organization’s political agenda. In the United 
Front’s end of year report, this shift in strategy was framed explicitly in the language of the 
Nehemiah story. Finding themselves “unable to move from an economic or political base,” 
United Front members had been “forced to recognize that it is the order of finite man which has 
things in its present state” and not divine will. “Therefore,” United Front leaders argued, “we 
must now begin to relate to a higher order” by “rebuilding a community that has been dying 
under the white administration.” In a direct reference to Nehemiah 4:17, the United Front called 
upon Black Cairoites to “assume the burdens of one another and the responsibilities for one 
another” by establishing “an economic base on the cooperative principal [sic].” In contrast to the 
old system, the United Front’s parallel economic institutions would be responsive not just to “the 
needs of a few but for the masses.” By adopting practices of profit sharing and cooperative 
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marketing, the United Front hoped to develop “a whole new economic order” without 
duplicating the unjust and exploitative dynamics of Cairo’s ruling elite.54  
Working closely with its constituent groups, the United Front initiated an extensive 
network of cooperative institutions designed to distribute jobs and wealth more equitably within 
the community as well as providing a much-needed alternative to the services offered by white 
business owners. Programs included a cooperative day care-center, a women’s clothing store, a 
grocery store, a taxi service, a pig farming project, and a pre-fabricated housing factory. 
Consistent with Maoist mass-line methodology, these programs emerged from dialogues with 
Black Cairoites who were expected to cooperatively own and operate them. To become a “part 
owner,” community members were required to purchase low-cost shares, which allowed them to 
vote and collect profits at a rate proportional to their investment. This emphasis on democratic 
ownership and participation gained scriptural reinforcement from the Nehemiah story, which cast 
the rebuilding of the city’s walls not as an individual act of heroic leadership, but as a 
community-wide responsibility. “The role of Nehemiah,” South African theologian J. N. K. 
Mugambi explains, “is very different from that of Moses.” While Moses was situated as the 
indispensable leader, Nehemiah “encourages the people and facilitates their work.” In this sense, 
the shift from Exodus to post-exilic scriptural referents was also indicative of Black Power’s 
embrace of a radical tradition that called for the broadening of democratic rights, powers, and 
responsibilities.55   
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While cooperative programs met many of the immediate needs of Black residents by 
creating new jobs and affordable goods and services, they also served as a powerful expression 
of the United Front’s broader political and moral critique of American capitalism. In Cairo, the 
Black radical tradition was informed by African Americans’ position as a largely superfluous 
labor force. While Black Power radicals in larger urban areas were predicting that Black labor 
would soon become “expendable” in the context of a deindustrialized national economy, Cairo’s 
position as a declining river city had already sealed Black workers’ fate as surplus labor making 
the city an important barometer for future trends. For the United Front’s radical wing, Black life 
in Cairo raised contradictions inherent in the capitalist system and the moral discourses utilized 
to bolster it. “Black people are struggling desperately to live a philosophy commonly known as 
the ‘White Protestant Ethic,’” United Front leaders argued. “This philosophy [states]: ‘Work 
long, hard and honestly and someday the great reward will be yours.” However, despite their best 
efforts most Black Cairoites were stuck “drawing Social Security” or “struggling for a dollar an 
hour or less.” In fact, United Front leaders argued, the only lesson Black Cairoites had learned 
from “white American capitalism” was that “if you can’t build yourself up, the rest of America 
will leave you on the ground – making life in America one long… death march for poor 
people.”56 
At its core, the United Front’s critique of capitalism was a moral one that characterized 
the system’s reliance upon racial and class inequalities as inconsistent with the Christian 
message. In his speeches and written works, Koen took aim at what he termed the “white value 
system” of “dollarbillism” that prioritized the individual over the collective, the material over the                                                                                                                                                                                   
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spiritual, and profits over people. White merchants were targeted for capitalizing on the shortage 
of competition by driving up prices on the poor in search of higher profits. So-called “Black 
profiteers” were also singled out for their treatment of the Black community as “an endless 
market” to be exploited for their own personal gain. “No man can serve two masters,” he 
cautioned. “Ye cannot serve God and money.” In this context, the United Front viewed 
cooperatives as an ethical alternative because they were “people orientated” and in God’s eyes,  
“men are so much more valuable than property.” (Matthew 12:12) United Front leaders did not 
oppose for-profit initiatives, only the inequitable distribution of their fruits. “Capital,” United 
Front member Reggie Brown argued, “is not inherently evil, but is made so only in the hands of 
those who want it to be.” Instead, cooperative programs were designed to operate at a smaller 
profit margin, allowing goods and services to be purchased at affordable prices and surpluses to 
be redirected back into the community. In the longer view, United Front leaders hoped that these 
new institutions would provide the foundation for a new economy as well as reinforce a new 
Black value system rooted in a culture of mutuality and cooperation or what local activists 
referred to as “Soulism.” “We must replace the white value system,” Koen argued, “with a Black 
system [based upon] the cooperative principal [sic]… When the whole essence of dollarbillism 
ceases to exist then Soulism will become the essence of the day.”57  
In many ways, Koen’s moral critique of American capitalism paralleled that of Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., who denounced the “moral and spiritual famine in Western civilization” 
brought on by a rejection of Christ’s teachings in favor of “secularism” and “materialism.” 
However, in his articulation of a new Black value system, Koen also built upon the important 
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work of cultural nationalists Maulana Karenga and Amira Baraka, for whom Kawaida 
represented an alternative “religious creed” and the doctrine of Nguzo Saba, or the “Seven 
Principles of Blackness,” a “code of common morality” for people of African descent. United 
Front radicals embraced cultural nationalists’ conception of Black liberation as both an internal 
and external struggle that necessitated the overhauling of values as much as institutions. 
However, while cultural nationalists often looked to a shared African history and culture for 
inspiration, the United Front’s understanding of Soulism or Soul Power emanated from the 
existing religious worldviews of Black Cairoites.58 
In “United Front Philosophy,” the organization described its value system as “taken 
directly from the Book of Matthew, 25th Chapter,” which “deals with the feeding of the hungry, 
clothing of the naked, and providing housing for the needy, also administering unto the sick, 
taking in strangers, and visiting those in captivity.” As the previous chapter illustrated, this 
scriptural mandate served as the bedrock of Hattie Kendrick’s earlier church-based activism as 
well as that of the Ward Chapel’s Social Action Commission out of which many of the civil 
rights leaders of the early 1960s had emerged. Koen recognized the salience of this scriptural 
mandate and its deep roots within a Black Christian politics of racial uplift and self-help. In the 
Black Power era, Jesus’s appeal to his followers to meet the needs of the poor and oppressed was 
easily refashioned to legitimate a programmatic agenda targeted at empowering Cairo’s Black 
and poor residents. This program included cooperative programs as well as “survival programs” 
aimed at meeting the immediate needs of Cairo’s poorest residents. Consistent with 
revolutionary nationalists’ call for “survival pending revolution,” the United Front organized a 
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free medical clinic, a clothing and food distribution program, and free legal aid services. 
Examined in more detail in the following chapter, these programs helped Black working-class 
people survive the daily battles of life in Cairo as well as sustain the boycott. However, survival 
programs also served as a powerful expression of Soulism’s alternative values of mutuality and 
cooperation. As United Front activist Mabel Hollis put it, people participated in these programs 
“because the Scripture of Matthew inspired them.” “They wanted to feed the hungry, to clothe 
the naked, and to provide shelter to the homeless.” By building cooperative and survival 
programs, Black Cairoites viewed themselves as fulfilling Christ’s mandate as well as 
Nehemiah’s call to “assume the burdens” and responsibilities of one another. For radicals, 
Matthew 25 also evoked Mao’s call for revolutionaries to “serve the people” – a dictum that was 
aptly printed alongside scripture in the organization’s political education materials.59  
Serving the people, United Front leaders argued, also meant being “prepared to protect 
and defend the community from all forms of evilness,” whether directed from within or without. 
Internally, the organization imposed a strict “Code of Ethics” containing fourteen principles, 
which they adapted from Nkrumah’s “Rules of Discipline” elaborated in the African leader’s 
Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare (1969). Nkrumah, in turn, took and adapted these principles 
from Mao’s “Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points of Attention” (1928).  
1. Obey orders in all your actions. 
2. Do not take a single needle or piece of thread from the people. 
3. Turn in everything captured. 
4. Speak politely. 
5. Pay fairly for what you buy. 
6. Pay for anything you damage. 
7. Do not hit or swear at people. 
8. Do not take liberties with women. 
9. No excessive drinking.                                                         
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10. No drugs, period. 
11. Keep eyes and ears open. 
12. Know the enemy within. 
13. Always guide and protect the children. 
14. Always be the servant of the people. 
 
Disciplinary codes were adopted by many radical Black Power organizations and viewed as 
important tools in maintaining internal discipline and unity. However, for the United Front, these 
codes of ethical conduct also provided a vision of the revolutionary activist that, according to 
historians Robin Kelley and Betsy Esch, “resonated with black religious traditions.” Speaking 
with a reporter from the Los Angeles Times about the “Code of Ethics,” Koen argued: “I can 
take you to the Bible and show you where it says the very same thing.”60   
The United Front supplemented the “Code of Ethics” with a document entitled, “Ten 
Positive Attributes to Discipline,” which in a more pronounced fashion demonstrated the 
religious import of disciplinary codes to the local struggle. 
1. Will… Power over-self, power over temptations that lead us away from truth and the 
struggle. 
 
2. Patience… The ability to bear pain without complaint to oneself. 
 
3. Humility… To accept a position of insignificance with the people to be humble before 
them. 
 
4. Faith… Belief and trust, confidence in the struggle, its leaders and people. 
 
5. Identity… Sameness, oneness with our people, wholeness 
 
6. Responsibility… The ability to fulfill obligations, reliable in work and struggle. 
 
7. Perseverance… To persist in spite of difficulties and hard times. 
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8. Diplomacy… The art or practice of conducting negotiations between political entities, 
organizations and agencies. 
 
9. Love… The ability to place oneself after the people in both thought and action 
 
10. Courage… The ability to conquer fear, doubt, and despair. 
 
While other proponents of ethical codes viewed them primarily as a set of tools necessary for 
disciplining soldiers in revolutionary warfare, the “Ten Attributes” demonstrate that the United 
Front’s leadership viewed them as having an intrinsic moral value essential to Black liberation. 
In a fashion consistent with both Black Nationalist and Black Christian traditions, the United 
Front promoted a politics of personal responsibility that situated discipline not merely as a means 
to an end but a movement goal in its own right. 61 
 United Front members were also expected to defend the Black community against 
external threats, the most visible coming from local law enforcement and white vigilantes who 
engaged in near nightly armed assaults on the Pyramid Courts. In response to these acts, the 
United Front established the United Front Liberators, an armed-self defense unit led by “Switch” 
Wilson, that was charged with performing regular “survival patrols” to protect the Black 
community from vigilante attack. Geneva Whitfield, a member of the Morning Star Free Will 
Baptist Church, operated a civilian band radio network out of her home in the Pyramid Court 
keeping her neighbors abreast of the latest information. The United Front also withdrew all 
support for the city’s existing law enforcement agencies. Consistent with its philosophy of 
exodus and nation building, the United Front banned local and state police from the Pyramid 
Courts, set up barricades and checkpoints at the entrance, and called upon residents to utilize the 
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organization’s new independent system of justice known as the Regional Council. “Our 
protection,” Koen declared, “will come from God and from ourselves.”62  
For the vast majority of Black Cairoites, armed self-defense was a logical and necessary 
measure that warranted little justification.  Philosophical nonviolence, while popular with 
members of SNCC and the Cairo Nonviolent Freedom Committee (CNVFC) during the sit-ins of 
1962, did not gain broad-based support among Black Cairoites. While many participated in 
organized nonviolent direct-action tactics during the movement’s “heroic” phase, Black Cairoites 
– like African Americans in other communities across the South and borderland – viewed armed 
self-defense as a legitimate response to acts of racial terror and violence. Although a small 
number of Black Cairoites, such as COGIC minister Rev. J. I. Cobb, described themselves as 
“against all violence, either physical or psychological,” most others drew ethical distinctions 
between offensive violence and armed self-defense. United Front leaders, however, were also 
cognizant of the more popular tendency to conflate acts of armed self-defense, when performed 
by African Americans, with offensive violence. Governmental officials at the local and state 
level frequently accused the United Front of engaging in an “orgy of violence” and displays of 
“outward para-military aggression.” Accordingly, Leon Page and Charles Koen worked hard to 
provide a clear conceptual framework that would legitimize armed self-defense and distinguish it 
from other uses of force.63 
Any number of legal or philosophical traditions could have been utilized by United Front 
leaders to frame armed self-defense as a legitimate tactic. In Southern Illinois, like the Deep 
South, gun ownership was for many a way of life and a fiercely held constitutional right. 
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However, the United Front did not appeal to legal or rights-based discourses, but rather scriptural 
mandates rooted in the Nehemiah story. Like the United Front, Nehemiah’s efforts to rebuild the 
walls of Jerusalem had drawn the ire of corrupt administrators who had benefited from the city’s 
rampant inequalities and unjust practices. According to the United Front, these men engaged in 
repeated attempts to deceive and even kill Nehemiah. Accordingly, in Chapter 14, Nehemiah 
establishes that his supporters built the wall under the cover of night carrying weapons to protect 
them. United Front leaders frequently cited Nehemiah 4:17-18 as evidence that armed self-
defense was morally sound and a necessary precaution for activists engaged in the god-ordained 
work of rebuilding a city. “Like Nehemiah,” Koen exclaimed, “we will carry the Bible in one 
hand and the gun to protect ourselves in the other.” 64  
Biblical justifications for armed self-defense were also visually represented through the 
organization’s symbol of “the Bible and the Gun,” shown in Figure 1, which was proudly 
displayed above the altar of St. Columba’s Church, in the organization’s mass-publications, and 
in the homes of many members. This provocative image played cleverly on popular 
understandings of Black Power as having jettisoned the spiritual moorings of earlier civil rights 
struggles by embracing “violent” tactics. Contradicting these binaries, the United Front 
represented both the Bible and the gun as essential and harmonious components of the Black 
activist’s toolkit. For local organizers the meaning of the image was apparent. “The gun,” United 
Front activist Clarence Dossie explained, “was for your protection and the Bible was for your 
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direction.” By positioning the gun on top of the Bible, the image suggests that its use has not 
been taken lightly but rather after prayerful consideration and study.65   
Through such religious imagery, United Front leaders endeavored to clearly distinguish 
between moral acts of disciplined armed self-defense performed by Black Cairoites and the 
unrestrained use of offensive violence by local whites. As the next chapter shows, drawing this 
distinction became increasingly important as the United Front came to rely upon funding from 
church-based agencies which were prohibited from extending grants to organizations that 
advocated the use of violence. However, scriptural interpretations of armed self-defense were 
also used to discipline United Front members regarding the ethical use of force. With Black 
Cairoites facing an onslaught of violence from police and white vigilantes, tensions could easily 
flare, resulting in retaliation and counter-attacks. Keeping passions in check and preventing 
uncontrolled outbursts of anger that might be used by officials to validate further acts of 
repression was critical. In this context, the ability of United Front leaders to frame the use of 
violence in explicitly moral terms played an important role in legitimizing armed self-defense 
while characterizing retaliation or offensive violence as unacceptable. “If they [law enforcement] 
are trying to intimidate us, they won’t succeed,” Koen insisted. While members would “defend 
themselves”, Koen insisted that they “[would] not attack anyone.”66 
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Figure 5: "The Bible and the Gun" taken from the cover of the United Front Choir's album, On the 
Battlefield in Cairo, Illinois.  
By “assuming the burdens” and responsibilities of one another through the extension of 
cooperative programming, survival programs, and armed self-defense, United Front members 
envisioned a new society being birthed out of the ashes of the old.  While the Biblical cities of 
Cairo, Babylon, and Jerusalem functioned as powerful symbols of the experience of captivity 
within a fallen or sinful city, “Soul Valley” came to embody the United Front’s vision of the new 
society they were building. In the organization’s communications, “Soul Valley” became 
common parlance for Cairo and its surrounding areas, serving as an almost prophetic expression 
of what could and might be. United Front leaders utilized this language to inspire others and 
encourage them to begin to imagine and build a world beyond slavery, oppression, and captivity.  
Mighty Egypt has Fallen! 
A New Creation is Being Born! 
“Little Egypt” is no more! Cairo is now in Soul Valley! 
Thank God Almighty, Free at Last --- in Soul Valley! 
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Consistent with Exodus and exilic narratives, Soul Valley was cast as “God’s promised land of 
milk and honey.” However, United Front members firmly rejected what they referred to as “pie-
in-the-sky” religion, insisting that Soul Valley’s realization hinged on the active work of God’s 
children. “We aren’t just going to walk upon Freedom,” Koen exclaimed. “We aren’t just going 
to pray upon Freedom. It is going to take blood, sweat, and determination.” Using ecclesiastical 
terms, the United Front leaders depicted Black Cairoites progression from “Little Egypt to Soul 
Valley” as “a long journey” and a “narrow way,” a language that resonated with radical 
interpretations of revolution as an ongoing evolutionary process. “Your freedom and liberation,” 
Koen insisted, “depends upon your commitment and purpose.”67 
 
A Grassroots Black Theology 
 
The United Front’s distinctive brand of Black Power radicalism quickly drew the 
attention of nationally prominent Black clergy who were engaged in their own battle to preserve 
the church’s relevance to Black urban communities and their struggles for freedom. At the heart 
of this endeavor was the National Committee of Black Churchmen (NCBC), an ecumenical 
organization of Black clergy founded in 1966 in direct response to the urban rebellions and the 
rise of Black Power. In the years immediately following the rebellions, NCBC’s members –                                                         
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many of whom were national church executives within predominantly white denominations – 
worked hard to reorient the nation’s churches toward the plight of Black urban communities. 
These efforts contributed to the birth of new denominational task forces aimed at addressing the 
urban crisis by funding grassroots community organizations. However, members of NCBC were 
also deeply invested in the broader theological implications of Black Power, a concern that 
prompted the publication of James Cone’s landmark Black Theology & Black Power (1968) as 
well as the formation of NCBC’s Theological Commission (1967) and the Black Theology 
Project (1976), aimed at the development of a systematic Black theology. In this context, the 
United Front’s radical grassroots theology was a source of inspiration that laid the foundation for 
strong alliances between NCBC and the United Front.68 
  During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Black church executives visited Cairo in droves 
to extend their support and witness firsthand the movement’s distinctive spiritual character. 
Among those attending the United Front’s events were Father Robert Chapman, executive 
director of the National Council of Churches’ (NCC) Department of Social Justice; Rev. J. Metz 
Rollins, executive director of NCBC; Leon Modeste, director of the Episcopal Church’s General 
Convention Special Program; Rev. Charles Cobb, executive director of the United Church of 
Christ’s Commission for Racial Justice; and, Rev. Albert Cleage, pastor of the Shrine of the 
Black Madonna in Detroit and author of The Black Messiah (1968). The latter was a regular and 
popular speaker whose theology of Black Christian Nationalism resonated with many United 
Front members. During the summer of 1970, Cleage’s sermons on Christ as “a Revolutionary 
Messiah” and the Black church as “a power base for the struggle” were particularly well received                                                         
68 On the National Conference of Black Churchmen (NCBC), see Sawyer, Black Ecumenism, 66-87; Pinn, The Black 
Church in the Post-Civil Rights Era, 15; Lecky and Wright, Black Manifesto, 7; Lincoln and Mamiya, The Black 
Church in the African American Experience, 192-193; Hopkins, “A Transatlantic Comparison of a Black Theology 
of Liberation,” 85-85. Important early works in Black Theology include: Cleage, Black Christian Nationalism; 
Cleage, The Black Messiah; and Cone, Black Theology and Black Power. 
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by audiences at the spiritual rallies. For those unable to attend, summaries of the sermons were 
published in the East St. Louis Monitor and the United Front News. In this sense, the United 
Front’s spiritual rallies as well as the follow-up publicity generated by them functioned as an 
important medium for the transmission and consumption of emergent Black theologies by 
grassroots Black Power activists.69 
   The leadership of the United Front embraced these new relationships with enthusiasm, 
viewing Black church executives as logical allies capable of bringing vital resources to the city. 
The next chapter explores how Black church executives did just that, using their positions within 
predominantly white denominations to leverage the church’s extensive financial and legal 
resources on behalf of the United Front. However, in contrast to many other Black Power 
organizations that relied heavily upon churches for their survival, the United Front also desired 
access to the church’s theological resources. The United Front’s radical leadership placed 
primacy on political education and the development of a disciplined and educated leadership 
cadre. The organization’s “hard core workers” were expected to receive training not only in 
revolutionary theory and praxis, but also in theological study. Recognizing this need for formal 
training, Rev. Cobb and George Bell of the UCC’s Commission on Racial Justice invited United 
Front members to participate in the Commission’s in-service training program in community 
organization and Black Theology at Columbia University in New York. The program, which was 
co-sponsored by the Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization (IFCO) and 
                                                        
69 “Rev. Cleage to Speak at Rally,” The Monitor, May 28, 1970; “Rev. Albert B. Cleage to Speak Saturday,” The 
Monitor, June 4, 1970; “Cairo Hears, ‘Suffering Part of Freedom,’” Chicago Daily Defender, June 10, 1970; “Rev. 
Cleage Charms Weekly Rally,” The Monitor, June 11, 1970; “The Church Must Be a Power Base!” United Front 
News, July 18, 1970; “Special Observance for Dr. King Set Saturday, Jan. 16,” United Front News, January 16, 
1971; United Front of Cairo Flyer, June 6, 1970, IFCO Papers, Schomburg Center of Research in Black Culture, 
New York Public Library, New York, box 46, folder 32; United Front of Cairo, “Rev. Albert B. Cleage,” [n.d.] 
IFCO Papers, box 46, folder 32; United Front News Release, May 29, 1970, IFCO Papers, box 46, folder 32; "Leon 
Modeste in Cairo July 25," United Front News, July 18, 1970. 
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Riverside Church, offered students the opportunity to receive ordination in the UCC as well as 
take classes specifically targeted toward ministry in Black urban communities. The United 
Front’s leadership agreed, viewing the program as an opportunity to develop a second tier of 
leadership. In the summer of 1970, Randy Robinson was the first Black Cairoite to participate in 
the program followed in the fall by a cohort of twelve local men including Clarence Dossie and 
Johnny Garrett.70 
 Through these programs and the regular visits of leading Black clergymen, United Front 
members became active participants in a broader dialogue about the character and role of Black 
theology. The enthusiasm with which grassroots activists engaged these theologies challenges 
not only assumptions about the secular quality of Black Power but also popular characterizations 
of Black Theology as an academic pursuit that failed to resonate with folk traditions. This is not 
to suggest that the United Front adopted these formal theologies wholesale. Rather, the United 
Front’s distinctive religious worldview, as established in this chapter, represented an eclectic 
bricolage of formal Black theologies, radical political ideologies and the organic religious 
traditions of Black Cairoites themselves. In this sense, the United Front anticipated the more 
recent work of theologians such as Dwight Hopkins who strive to connect Black Theology to its 
roots in the folk traditions of African Americans. In turn, in their blending of radical ideology 
and scripture the United Front anticipated more recent criticisms of Black Theology as failing to 
acknowledge social class as a meaningful category of identity and experience.71 
                                                        
70 Koen, United Front Philosophy; [untitled article], United Front News, May 1971; Clarence Dossie interview, 
Cairo, Illinois, February 5, 2010;  “United Church Supports Cairo,” United Front News, October 24, 1970; “Koen 
Says: Our Ship is Rolling,” United Front News, August 29, 1970; “Rev. Robinson Examines White Theology,” 
United Front News, September 5, 1970. 
71 See Cornel West, Prophesy Deliverance! An Afro-American Revolutionary Christianity (Louisville: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 1982 [2002]).  
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CHAPTER 4 
STRAIGHT FROM THE OFFERING PLATE: 
CHURCH FUNDING AND THE CAIRO BLACK POWER MOVEMENT 
 
On April 20, 1971, Black clergy and laypersons from across the country converged on St. 
Columba’s Church in Cairo for a special spring convocation of the National Conference of Black 
Churchmen (NCBC). Cairo’s nationally recognized Black Power struggle and its conscious 
incorporation of both the Black Church and Black Theology made the city an obvious site for the 
nation’s premier conference for militant Black clergy. Indeed, for many attending the 
convocation, Cairo represented a place where a relevant faith had given rise to a powerful social 
movement. Chaired by NCBC’s Executive Director Reverend J. Metz Rollins, the convocation 
constituted a veritable who’s who of the Black Church and included representation from almost 
all of the major historically Black and predominantly white denominations.  
Seeking to capitalize on this extraordinary gathering, United Front activists organized a 
separate meeting on April 22 to discuss in more detail the plight of Black Cairoites and to 
coordinate a national church strategy in support of their struggle. Rev. Blaine Ramsey Jr., former 
pastor of Cairo’s Ward Chapel A.M.E Church and, more recently, Executive Secretary of the 
Illinois Council of Churches’ Special Task Force Committee, had played a key role in bringing 
NCBC to Cairo and was now charged with chairing the special session. Ramsey immediately 
opened the floor to the United Front’s dynamic leader Rev. Charles Koen, who petitioned those 
present to “recognize the racial, economic and political strife in Cairo as being of immediate 
concern” and called upon “the interreligious communities to respond with funds and other 
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resources… to help alleviate the causes of the strife.” By the meeting’s end, those in attendance 
had committed to secure greater church resources from the nation’s largest denominations and 
asked Rev. Ramsey and the ICC’s Special Task Force Committee to function as the state-level 
liaison for “channeling these resources to the United Front.”1 
The image of national Black church leaders converging on the small borderland 
community of Cairo, Illinois, while surprising to many contemporary readers, was not 
uncommon during the late 1960s and early 1970s. As the previous chapter illustrated, the United 
Front’s skillful deployment of Black religious traditions put the organization in close relationship 
with leading Black theologians and ministers who were seeking to render the Black Church 
relevant to the Black Power Movement. However, as Rev. Koen’s statements at NCBC’s 1971 
Spring Convocation suggest, local activists expected Black clergy to contribute in ways that 
extended beyond rhetorical forms of solidarity. On the contrary, local activists urged Black 
clergy in both historically African American and predominantly white denominations to use their 
influence to open up denominational hierarchies and make the tremendous organizational 
resources of the nation’s churches available to the Black Power Movement.  
This chapter explores those efforts and demonstrates the remarkable success of the 
United Front in securing the transfer of organizational resources from state and national 
denominational structures to Black Power initiatives at the local level. Between 1969 and 1974, 
the United Front secured more than $475,000 in grants from church-based organizations as well 
as extensive lobbying, consultancy, and technical support for their political programming. As                                                         
 
1 Quote taken from Minutes of the Inter-Organization Task Force for Community Action, April 22, 1971, ICC 
Records, box 11, folder 25, “Rallies Dramatize Cairo Blacks’ Lot,” New York Amsterdam News, April 17, 1971, 
“NCBC sponsors ‘repression’ Cairo meet,” Afro-American (Baltimore), April 17, 1971, Blaine Ramsey, Jr., to 
Executives attending the April 22 Meeting in Cairo, June 9, 1971, ICC Records, box 11, folder 25, Minutes of 
Meeting with Executives of Churches in Illinois, National Church Representatives, National Committee of Black 
Churchmen and the United Front of Cairo, Ill., April 22, 1971, ICC Records, box 11, folder 25. 
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support for traditional civil rights organizations declined during the 1960s and faith in the War 
on Poverty dwindled, access to these new organizational resources proved invaluable and 
ensured that churches would become a significant, albeit overlooked, source of coalitional 
support for the Black Power Movement.  
As I will demonstrate, the extraction of church-based resources relied in large part on the 
support of progressive Black clergy. Using their newly acquired power in denominational 
caucuses, task forces, and committees, Black clergy pushed for a more active social ministry and 
refocused denominational engagement with Black freedom struggles from an emphasis on 
resolutions and lobbying to more tangible involvement through the direct extension of financial 
grants to social movement organizations working in Black communities at the local level. In 
contrast to federal or corporate support, church-based grants were extended with comparatively 
few strings, making them particularly attractive to Black Power activists. As a result, churches 
made critical contributions to those components of the United Front’s daily operations that a 
governmental or corporate agency either could not or would not support, including staff salaries, 
office space, travel expenses, and bail bond. Further, church-based organizations extended “seed 
money” for the initiation of the United Front’s economic development programs, a factor that 
increased the likelihood that such initiatives would eventually receive additional governmental 
support from state and federal agencies.  
However, church-based resources were not without their limitations and, despite their 
comparative malleability, they represented a highly unstable foundation for any organization. As 
the final chapter will demonstrate, the liberal distribution of church funds to Black Power 
organizations, when combined with a rising conservative political agenda in the early 1970s, left 
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the United Front and the nation’s largest denominations vulnerable to unique forms of state 
repression and shifting political sentiments within the churches themselves.  
 
Black Power and the Expansion of Church-Based Resource Opportunities 
 
Scholarly accounts of the mobilization of external resources by the Black Power Movement are 
still limited, and focus almost exclusively on the role played by such corporate donors as the 
Ford Foundation and federal War on Poverty programs.2 In comparison, the role of state and 
national church structures has been under-examined. On one level, this neglect reflects the 
newness of Black Power Studies emergence as a subfield whose proponents are still very much 
invested in the important work of recovering histories of forgotten struggles. However, as I have 
argued throughout this dissertation, the historical inattention to the church’s contributions can 
also be attributed to the broader acceptance of a dominant civil rights story that characterizes 
Black Power, in historian Peniel Joseph words as an “evil twin” and “negative counterpart to 
more righteous struggles for racial integration, social justice, and economic equality.” Indeed, 
scholars in the field of Black Freedom Studies have traditionally associated the peak of church-
based coalitional support with the Civil Rights Movement’s “heroic” phase, particularly with the 
National Council of Churches’ contributions to the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and 
clergy participation in the March on Washington and the Selma-to-Montgomery march of 1963 
and 1965 respectively. By contrast, Black Power is characterized as a disruptive secular force 
                                                        
2 For studies of corporate funding for Black Power see, Robert L. Allen, Black Awakening in Capitalist America: An 
Analytic History, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc.,1969); Karen Ferguson, “Organizing the Ghetto: 
The Ford Foundation, CORE, and White Power in the Black Power Era, 1967-1969,” Journal of Urban History 34 
(Nov., 2007) 67- 100. For studies of governmental funding for Black Power see, Susan Youngblood Ashmore, 
Carry It On: The War on Poverty and the Civil Rights Movement in Alabama, 1964-1972 (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 2008). 
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that “fragmented” this fragile civil rights coalition, resulting in the retraction and eventual 
dissipation of liberal external support, including church-based support.3  
However, denominational histories and contemporary accounts paint a different picture, 
suggesting that the declension of church support, particularly that of liberal predominantly white 
denominations, was not as straightforward or sudden as scholars would have us imagine. On the 
contrary, these accounts indicate that the urban rebellions of the mid-1960s prompted a major 
reevaluation of the role and responsibility of the church to poor and Black communities as well 
as a new and controversial emphasis on the need for financial contributions to be made directly 
to economic development initiatives at the local level. This new wave of activity can be seen in 
the outgrowth of various church-based funding programs during this period. Between 1966 and 
1970, several of the nation’s largest predominantly white denominations launched grant 
awarding programs focused on addressing what they termed the “urban crisis.” Liberal 
denominations like the United Methodist Church, the Episcopal Church, the United Presbyterian 
Church, and the United Church of Christ were at the forefront of these efforts. The Episcopal 
Church’s General Convention Special Program (GCSP) and the United Presbyterian Church’s 
National Committee on the Self-Development of People, founded in 1967 and 1970 respectively, 
were two of the largest such programs and were responsible for redirecting denominational 
resources to various community organizations throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 
addition, ecumenical funding initiatives like the National Council of Churches’ Crisis in the 
Nation program and the Interreligious Foundation for Community Organizations (IFCO), both 
                                                        
3 Quote taken from Peniel Joseph, “The Black Power Movement: A State of the Field,” The Journal of American 
History, 96 (Dec., 2009) p.751-2. For examples of the prevailing civil rights story on church support see, Robin W. 
Lovin, “Religion, Civil Rights, and Civic Community,” in Religion, Race, and Justice in a Changing America, eds., 
Gary Orfield and Holly J. Lebowitz (New York: Century Foundation Press, 1999) 67, Charles Marsh, “The Beloved 
Community,” in Religion, Race, and Justice in a Changing America, eds., Gary Orfield and Holly J. Lebowitz (New 
York: Century Foundation Press, 1999), 50. 
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formed in 1967, demonstrated an increased willingness on the part of both predominantly white 
and historically Black denominations to work collectively to seek solutions to the problems 
facing urban communities in this period. As one contemporary put it, these new initiatives 
constituted a “unique program of channeling large sums of church monies for people who until 
recently had no possibility whatever of getting these kinds of grants.”4  
Although denominational histories and contemporary accounts demonstrate the ongoing 
participation of the nation’s largest denominations in Black freedom struggles, they have been 
much less successful in assessing the impact these organizations had on the Black Power 
Movement itself. Though a comprehensive account of national church-based resources for Black 
Power is still needed, even the most cursory examination suggests that they were far from 
insignificant in terms of size and scope. For example, the Episcopal Church’s General 
Convention Special Program distributed $7.5 million to local projects between 1967 and 1973. 
The Interreligious Foundation for Community Organizations donated $1.5 million in 1969 alone, 
and, in its first two years, the National Committee for the Self-Development of People of the 
Presbyterian Church allocated $4.5 million. In contrast to prevailing accounts, these initiatives 
demonstrate that many of the nation’s largest denominations actually expanded their 
commitment to Black freedom struggles during the late 1960s and early 1970s.5  
   
                                                        
4 Quote taken from Will Oursler, Protestant Power and the Coming Revolution (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 
1971), 154. For contemporary accounts of the church’s responses to the urban crisis see, Lyle E. Schaller, The 
Churches’ War on Poverty, (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1967), Lecky and Wright, Black Manifesto; Arnold 
Schuchter, Reparations: the Black Manifesto and its Challenge to White America (Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, 
1970). For a good denominational history of the church’s response to the urban crisis see, Gardiner H. Shattuck, Jr., 
Episcopalians and Race: Civil War to Civil Rights, (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2000). 
5 Figures are taken from Leon Modeste, “The End of a Beginning,” Black World, (January 1974), United 
Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., Minutes of the General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., Part 
I (Philadelphia, PA, 1972) 826-32, 836, 840-2, Lucius Walker, “IFCO and the Crisis of American Society,” in Black 
Manifesto; Religion, Racism, and Reparations, (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), 123; “Self-development fund 
now exceeds $1,600,0000 says Presbyterians,” New York Amsterdam News, December 4, 1971. 
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Moreover, these findings challenge long-held assumptions about the decline of the Black 
Freedom Movement as being accelerated by the retraction of external resources by the liberal-
labor coalition. Studies of the retraction of external resources from the Black Freedom 
Movement have generally focused on the collapse in donations for three of the “Big Four” civil 
rights organizations during the mid-1960s, namely the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference (SCLC), the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and the Congress 
of Racial Equality (CORE). As these organizations increasingly adopted anti-war stances and, in 
the case of SNCC and CORE, Black Power approaches, scholars contend that external support 
decreased rapidly. According to political scientist Doug McAdam, by the end of the decade, 
many external donors had “shifted their support to the NAACP” which was now perceived “as 
virtually the only “acceptable” funding alternative” to liberal supporters.6 This shift, McAdam 
argues, “drastically diminished the insurgent capabilities of the direct-action wing of the 
movement” resulting in conservatization.7  
However, such assumptions do not take into account the possibility that external funding 
from liberal donors may have eventually shifted from nationally recognized civil rights 
organizations to a number of new local Black Power organizations in the wake of the urban 
rebellions. While the sheer multiplicity of local Black Power organizations makes a definitive 
financial assessment of external resources almost impossible, even a partial glimpse at the scope 
of denominational and ecumenical funding for such organizations demonstrates that funding for 
Black freedom struggles was instead rechanneled during the late 1960s and early 1970s. IFCO’s 
donation of $1.5 million to local community organizations in 1969 was more than the NAACP,                                                         
6 Doug McAdam, “The Decline of the Civil Rights Movement,” in Waves of Protest: Social Movements Since the 
Sixties, ed. Jo Freeman and Victoria Johnson (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 338-39; Herbert H. 
Haines, Black Radicals and the Civil Rights Mainstream, 1954-1970 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 
1988), 77-126. 
7 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 209. 
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CORE, and SCLC received combined in any given year prior to 1960. The $4.5 million in 
donations made over two years by the National Committee for the Self-Development of People 
of the Presbyterian Church totaled more than all donations made to the “Big Four” between 1958 
and 1961. Therefore, these were not insignificant donations and were, in many ways, comparable 
in size and scope to those made during the movement’s “heroic phase.”8 
The reconfiguration of church activities and resources was a direct response to the urban 
rebellions of the mid-1960s and the deeper social and economic crises affecting urban 
communities. The profundity of the urban crisis challenged and, in some cases, transformed 
clergy’s understandings of the efficacy of recent civil rights legislation to address the problems 
facing Black urban communities and highlighted the need for more sustained church 
involvement.  Indeed, a 1965 survey of clergy in six major Protestant denominations indicated 
that nearly 75 per cent of parish ministers polled felt that churches, for the most part, had been 
“woefully inadequate” in their response to the issues facing Black urban communities. Even 
more significantly, nearly 70 per cent believed that the responsibility of Christian education was 
to “bring laymen face to face with urban problems and propose solutions.” Remarkably, clergy 
across denominational lines were unified in their belief, if not practice, that issues of urban 
poverty and discrimination required the churches’ concerted attention.9  
However, equally important was the critical role played by Black clergy and Black Power 
activists in exerting pressure on religious institutions to transform their beliefs into practice by 
making good on earlier promises of support. Indeed, in the wake of the urban rebellions, 
predominantly white denominations came under intense scrutiny on two fronts. First, Black 
clergy, themselves radicalized by Black Power’s call for racial unity and empowerment,                                                         
8 For financial comparisons see “Appendix 3: Estimated Total External Income for Five Major Movement 
Organizations, 1948-70,” in Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 253. 
9 Jeffrey K. Hadden, The Gathering Storm in the Churches, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969), 59-60. 
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challenged denominational leaders over their failure to address racism within the church itself. 
Accordingly, Black clergy in liberal, predominantly white denominations created their own 
autonomous Black caucuses to better represent their interests. In 1968, Black clergy in the 
Episcopal Church formed the Union of Black Clergy and Laymen. That same year, their 
counterparts in the United Methodist Church formed Black Methodists for Church Renewal. 
These efforts to consolidate Black clergy’s power are best represented by the 1966 formation of 
the National Conference of Black Churchmen (NCBC), an ecumenical organization that brought 
Black clergy from both historically African American and predominantly white denominations 
together.10  
Simultaneously, Black Power activists turned up the heat on the nation’s churches, 
demanding that they render themselves relevant to Black communities by extending resources 
directly to Black Power organizations. On May 4, 1969, in a now iconic series of events, James 
Forman, former Executive Secretary of SNCC, interrupted Sunday morning worship at the 
beacon of liberal Protestant Christianity, Riverside Church in New York and presented a Black 
Manifesto demanding that America’s white religious community give $500 million (later 
increased to $3 billion) in reparations to atone for wrongs committed against African Americans. 
Black Power activists across the country echoed Forman’s demand, calling upon the nation’s 
largest denominations to “put up or shut up.”11 Even the veteran civil rights activist James 
                                                        
10 For more on the growth of Black caucuses during this period, see Shattuck, Episcopalians and Race, 182-183; 
Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 201; Wilmore, Pragmatic Spirituality, 191-192; Sawyer, Black 
Ecumenicism. For more on the formation of the National Committee of Black Churchmen, see Wilmore, Pragmatic 
Spirituality, 57, 187-189, Pinn, The Black Church in the Post-Civil Rights Era, 15; Lecky and Wright, Black 
Manifesto, 7; Hopkins, “A Transatlantic Comparison of a Black Theology of Liberation,” 85-87; Lincoln and 
Mamiya, The Black Church in the African-American Experience, 192-193. 
11 The statement was made by the director of Social Justice for the National Council of Churches Charles Spivey, 
Jr., in response to the James Forman’s Black Manifesto of 1969. Spivey argued that the Manifesto told the nations 
church to “put up or shut up”. For full citation see, Lecky and Wright, Black Manifesto, 6. For a discussion of the 
Black Manifesto see, James Forman, The Making of Black Revolutionaries, 544-5, Gayraud S. Wilmore and James 
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Lawson called white churches to “radical repentance” through the “deliberate act of redirecting 
their financial resources.”12 These dual pressures on the nation’s largest denominations– 
internally from Black clergy and externally from Black Power activists – presented a significant 
challenge to church executives and resulted in a radical reorientation of church priorities and 
resources.  
Church executives were often hesitant to distribute funds directly to Black Power 
organizations. However, mounting pressure resulted in the transfer of substantial resources to 
new caucuses, task forces, and ecumenical bodies run by Black clergy who would, in many 
cases, opt to extend them to local Black Power organizations anyway. Responses to Forman’s 
Black Manifesto are particularly illustrative of this pattern. While Forman had requested that all 
reparations payments be made directly to the newly established Black Economic Development 
Corporation (BEDC), most denominations opted to sidestep Forman’s secular organization in 
favor of funding less controversial church-based initiatives led by Black clergy. The United 
Methodist Church, for example, refused a proposal made by the denomination’s Black caucus, 
Black Methodists for Church Renewal, to transfer $750,000 directly to BEDC, but offered an 
alternative whereby $1.3 million would be allocated for “economic empowerment” to be 
administered by six African American bishops. The United Church of Christ also sidestepped 
BEDC by creating the Commission for Racial Justice that would be staffed primarily by Black 
clergy and maintain a minimum annual budget of $500,000. Other denominations opted to fund 
external Black-led ecumenical organizations. For example, the United Presbyterian Church 
allocated $100,000 to the Interreligious Fund for Community Organization while the Episcopal 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
H. Cone, Black Theology: A Documentary History, 1966-1979, 75, Frazier and Lincoln, The Negro Church in 
America/The Black Church Since Frazier, 131; Lecky and Wright, Black Manifesto, 3. 
12 James Lawson, “A Nonviolent Endorsement,” in Black Manifesto; Religion, Racism, and Reparations, (New 
York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), 87-88. 
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Church and the National Council of Churches made large contributions of $200,000 and 
$500,000 respectively to the National Conference of Black Churchmen (NCBC). In this manner, 
Black clergy expanded their decision-making power within denominations and secured access to 
considerable resources for Black community development programs.13  
This broader transfer of power and resources elevated prominent Black clergy to 
gatekeeper roles within denominational hierarchies and ensured that they would become key 
players in the distribution of church-based resources to local Black Power struggles. During the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, this core group of Black church leaders included amongst others: 
Rev. Lucius Walker, a Baptist minister and the director of the Interreligious Foundation for 
Community Organizations; Rev. Leon Modeste, chair of the Episcopal Church’s General 
Convention Special Program; Rev. St. Paul Epps, director of the United Presbyterian Church’s 
National Committee on the Self-Development of People; Rev. Albert Cleage, Jr., chairman of the 
United Church of Christ’s Commission on Racial Justice; Rev. Gayraud Wilmore, executive 
director of the United Presbyterian Church’s Commission on Religion and Race; and Rev. 
Robert Chapman, executive director of the National Council of Churches Racial Justice Section 
of the Department of Social Justice. Through their labor, these church-based organizations 
became important hubs of support for Black Power organizations across the country, including 
the Cairo United Front.  
While some might have regarded the rise of Black clergy to gatekeeper roles as a tragic 
co-optation of the Black Manifesto, its author, James Forman, saw something more positive. 
Looking back on the Manifesto’s impact in his autobiography, Forman argued that it had been “a                                                         
13 Quote taken from the NCC’s Crisis in the Nation and cited in Schucter, Reparations, 16. “Council of Churches 
Oks Black Development Funds,” Cairo Evening Citizen, September 12, 1969, Lecky and Wright, Black Manifesto, 
23-24; Schucter, Reparations: The Black Manifesto and Its Challenge to White America, 14, 25; “United Church of 
Christ Embarks on Broad New Course of Action,” Cairo Evening Citizen, July 1, 1969, “Episcopal Diocese to Raise 
$25,000 for Black Persons,” Cairo Evening Citizen, October 27, 1969.  
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positive struggle” and suggested that the biggest success was in its ability to forge an “alliance 
between black churchmen and revolutionaries.” For Forman, this was “an important 
development that [helped] to radicalize other church people and offer[ed] bases of material and 
moral support for revolutionaries.” In the case of Cairo, Forman’s analysis proved to be 
particularly astute.14  
 
The Cairo United Front and the Mobilization of Church-Based Resources 
 
Locating and securing external resources was of particular importance to Cairo’s United 
Front. While local activists had shown remarkable skill in mobilizing the indigenous cultural and 
moral resources of Cairo’s African American residents, they were continually faced with the 
harsh reality of organizing in an impoverished Black community that lacked significant material 
and financial assets. Cairo’s declining river economy, limited industrial opportunities, and strict 
adherence to Jim Crow segregation trapped the vast majority of Black Cairoites in a cycle of 
unemployment and underemployment that inhibited the development of a stable Black working-
class and attendant Black professional class. By the late 1960s, these problems had reached a 
crisis point. The official unemployment rate for Black males was 16.2 per cent, as compared to 
6.5 per cent for whites, leaving a large segment of Cairo’s Black working class to rely upon a 
combination of piecemeal work and public assistance. In 1969, almost three quarters of all Black 
families in Cairo earned less than $3,000 in total income. While Cairo’s poverty rates were high 
across the board, statistical data demonstrates that Blacks bore the brunt of the city’s economic 
crisis. The median annual income for Cairo’s Black families in 1969 was $2,809, compared to                                                         
14 Schucter, Reparations: The Black Manifesto and Its Challenge to White America, 19; Forman, The Making of 
Black Revolutionaries, 549-50. 
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$6,428 for whites. This figure compared poorly with the national median average income for 
Black families at $8,074 per annum, almost three-times that of Black Cairoites. The United Front 
pulled heavily from the ranks of the jobless and working poor who lived in the city’s segregated 
public housing projects. This allowed the organization to avoid many of the internal class 
divisions that plagued other Black Power struggles, but it also meant that the United Front would 
face significant financial obstacles to the realization of its goals.15   
During earlier civil rights struggles, these problems had been less apparent due to the 
narrower strategic and tactical focus of the city’s leading social movement organizations. As 
shown in Chapter One, the local branch of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) had 
focused on attacking segregation in public accommodations by filing legal suits and engaging in 
acts of civil disobedience. As a result, these organizations had incurred relatively small costs, 
mainly in the areas of legal defense and bail bond. However, the shift to Black Power brought 
with it a tremendous expansion in the strategies and tactics adopted by Cairo’s social movement 
organizations, including an emphasis on the development of self-determining parallel 
institutions. Establishing and sustaining such institutions would require thousands if not millions 
of dollars in funding. Despite mobilizing a broad-based coalition of the city’s Black residents 
and securing the support of all of the Black community’s civic, religious, and political 
organizations, the United Front was unable to meet these costs without considerable external 
support.  
                                                        
15 See ,“Table 24: Median Family Income by Age of Head: 1964, 1967, 1969 and 1974,” in U.S. Dept. of 
Commerce, The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States: An Historical View, 1790-
1978, (Washington: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1979), 41, United States Commission on Civil 
Rights, Cairo, Illinois: A Symbol of Racial Polarization, (Washington, February, 1973) 6; U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, Census of Population: 1970, vol. 1, Characteristics of the Population, pt. 15 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1973); Freeman, “The United Black Front of Cairo, Illinois a Situational Report.”  
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In other communities, shortages in indigenous resources might be overcome through 
interracial coalition building, particularly with local labor unions and religious organizations that 
had a tradition of civil rights activities. However, the near universal opposition of Cairo’s white 
population to the United Front ensured that this kind of support would be virtually nonexistent. 
In fact, militant white opposition to Black Power exacerbated the United Front’s dependence 
upon external resources by promoting a culture of popular vigilantism and state repression that 
resulted in mass arrests, costly criminal proceedings, and a resistance to the United Front’s 
initiatives. Accordingly, between 1969 and 1974 securing external resources would become one 
of the organizations’ highest priorities. 
 Church-based resources were particularly attractive to the United Front for a combination 
of reasons, both principled and pragmatic. Most importantly, the United Front envisioned 
church-based resources as the natural funding base for its political program. The distinctly 
religious tenor of the United Front’s ideology ensured that the organization was sympathetic to 
Black clergy’s efforts to radicalize the nation’s churches. Many of the United Front’s leaders 
held respected positions within local churches, where they had also fought vigorously for a more 
“authentic” Christian message that emphasized an expanded social ministry to the city’s poor 
and oppressed. Therefore, United Front leaders tended to view the extraction of national church-
based resources as a logical extension of longstanding local practices and part of a broader 
political project to render the church relevant to Black communities.  
Church-based resources also provided the United Front with an important alternative to 
governmental aid, which was consistently obstructed by local officials. While other cities were 
scrambling to secure War on Poverty funds, Cairo’s city leaders refused to comply with federal 
requirements mandating the formation of racially representative committees to oversee the 
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initiation and development of new projects. By refusing to formally involve Black community 
members, city leaders effectively blocked the extension of governmental programs that would 
have improved the city’s economic base and benefited both Black and white Cairoites. 
Furthermore, when Black Power activists endeavored to work around the city in obtaining 
federal and state grants for community programming, they were undercut again and again by the 
city administration. In the absence of state and federal support, the United Front was left with 
relatively few funding options. Thus, the United Front’s solicitation and acceptance of church-
based support was both a pragmatic and principled affair.16  
However, securing church-based resources was far from inevitable. Most of the grant-
awarding programs were based in the New York headquarters of liberal, predominantly white 
denominations that had few ties to Cairo’s Black community.  With the exception of the local 
Black Catholic congregation, Black Cairoites attended churches that were affiliated with 
historically Black denominations that had their own separate institutional structures. Moreover, 
the traditionally liberal United Presbyterian and United Methodist congregations in Cairo were 
widely considered to be bastions of white supremacy. Congregants at Cairo’s First Methodist 
Church, Tigert Memorial, and First Presbyterian Church resisted the integration campaigns of the 
early 1960s, forcing liberal white clergy to transfer out of the city. By the late 1960s, little had 
changed. Longstanding activist Hattie Kendrick underscored these problems in a letter to her 
sister in 1969. “The [United] Methodist Church is trying to work here,” Kendrick wrote, but with 
“no success.” “I went up and had an interview with the Bishop,” Kendrick explained. “He said                                                         
16 “Cairo Mayor Thomas Resigns,” The Tri-State Informer, November 1971, “Fed Agencies Critical Of Mayor’s 
Plan,” The Monitor  (East St. Louis, Ill.) March 3, 1970, “Mayor Angry At Ewing,” The Monitor (East St. Louis, 
Ill.) March 12, 1970, “Mayor Attacks Federal Agencies,” The Monitor (East St. Louis, Ill.) April 16, 1970, “Mayor 
Tells State No On Task Force,” The Monitor (East St. Louis, Ill.) April 23, 1970, “Cairo Mayor A Failure In 
Washington, D.C.,” The Monitor (East St. Louis, Ill.) May 14, 1970, “Federal Agencies Criticize City Council,” The 
Monitor, October 1, 1970. 
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when ever he sends a pastor here to preach love & compassion etc., the peckerwoods quit 
coming to church and won’t let him come back.” William Warner, pastor of both the First 
Methodist Church and Tigert Memorial Church, confirmed Kendrick’s claims, stating that since 
relocating to Cairo in 1968 he had been “hamstrung” by “intercongregational conflict” and 
“racial tones” that had made it virtually impossible for any meaningful ministry to be 
established. Similar problems plagued the First Presbyterian Church and leaders within the 
Presbytery of Southeast Illinois, and the Southern Illinois Synod consistently opposed 
denominational efforts to extend church-based resources to local community development 
initiatives. As a result, Black Power activists would find few local allies in their efforts to secure 
organizational resources from predominantly white denominations.17  
 In the absence of local support, the United Front forged key coalitional relationships with 
clergy working at the state level that would ultimately provide the networks necessary to secure 
church-based resources from national denominational structures. Most important among these 
relationships was the United Front’s ties to the Illinois Council of Churches Special Task Force 
Committee. Mirroring patterns in church organizations across the country, the Illinois Council of 
Churches, the state’s leading ecumenical agency, voted to establish the Special Task Force 
Committee at the organization’s 38th General Assembly in January 1968 in direct response to the 
urban crisis. The Task Force was charged with developing “an ecumenical statewide strategy” to 
address the urban crisis in conjunction with secular organizations. Founded on the scriptural 
mandate “to feed the hungry, to receive the stranger, to clothe the naked, to heal the sick and to 
be present with the imprisoned” (Matthew 25:25-46), the Task Force declared itself to be the 
                                                        
17 Hattie Kendrick to Martha, n.d., Kendrick’s-Brooks Family Papers, Library of Congress, Washington D.C., box 
20, folder 10; William R. Warner to John P. Adams, September 9, 1969, Administrative Records of the DGW, 1477-
3-2-08, United Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., Minutes of the General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church in 
the U.S.A., Part I (Philadelphia, PA: Office of the General Assembly, 1972) 51, 98-100, 865, 1006. 
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“functional arm of the institutional church” coordinating the efforts of religious institutions to 
address “the problems of race and poverty that exist in Illinois.” According to the General 
Assembly, the Task Force would “assist local communities in the establishment of an effective 
emergency program to further the development of adequate housing on a complete 
nondiscriminatory basis; equal justice under the law; the development of equal and excellent 
education for all children and youth; and to make provision for the training of adults for 
employment in work that pays wages sufficient for an adequate standard of human dignity, 
decency, and health.” In this context, the Special Task Force was a logical ally and would come 
to serve as an important locus for church-based resources for the United Front and other Black 
Power organizations across the state.18 
 In the first year of its existence, the Special Task Force struggled to make good on its 
mission to assist the state’s poor and Black communities. Until the late 1960s, the Illinois 
Council of Churches’ work on race and poverty, like that of many church organizations, had 
focused almost exclusively on behind-the-scenes lobbying in support of civil rights legislation. 
As one member put it, the organization had actively participated in the work of “making quiet 
contacts with key people in government to help get good laws into being.” While critical to the 
passage of civil rights legislation, these particular experiences did not prepare the Illinois 
Council of Churches to meet the unique demands of Black Power activists working in some of 
the state’s most impoverished communities.19  
This obstacle was by no means insurmountable. With the creation of the Task Force in 
1968, the Illinois Council of Churches demonstrated at least the intent to translate rhetoric into                                                         
18 “The Inter-Organization Task Force for Community Action,” February 1970, ICC Records, box 11, folder 8; 
“Functional & Structural Analysis of Inter-Organization Task Force for Community Action,” April 11, 1972, ICC 
Records, box 10, folder 30. 
19 “A Progress Report from the Commission on Christian Social Action to the Board of Directors of the ICC,” June 
1, 1966, ICC Records, box 10, folder 24. 
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reality. However, once the Task Force came into being, members were forced to address the 
much more serious obstacle presented by the organization’s failure to place Black clergy into 
leadership positions. Lacking these ties, the Task Force struggled to make meaningful 
connections with local congregations and community organizations working on the ground to 
address the urban crisis. In January 1968, concerns that Black clergy had “written off” the 
Illinois Council of Churches as an “ineffective vehicle for meeting the needs of the black 
community” prompted the organization to perform a formal study of Black clergy’s participation 
in the organization. The study indicated that the Illinois Council of Churches’ efforts to respond 
to the urban crisis had been “curtailed by the lack of meaningful rapport or functional 
relationships with the black sector of the church which largely resided in the midst of the Core 
City which so often is the foundation of the urban crisis.” According to the study, this situation 
fostered considerable cynicism among Black clergy who, in many cases, believed “that the white 
sector of the Church is too deeply enmeshed in the diseased society to extricate itself sufficiently 
to be of any assistance.”20 
 If contacts with Black clergy were weak, relationships with local Black Power 
organizations were virtually nonexistent. The 1968 study indicated that very few local councils 
maintained functional relationships with “black nationalist groups or radical civil rights 
organizations.” In the few cases where such relationships did exist, they tended to be on “a 
personal basis” rather than formalized.21 Task Force members worried that even if they could 
identify and incorporate more Black clergy, this would not inevitably lead to better ties with 
Black Power organizations since, as one member put it, “the average Negro church” was largely 
                                                        
20 William K. Fox, “Black Participation in Council of Churches,” October 21, 1968, ICC Records, box 11, folder 4; 
“Staff Report on Agenda Items to Department for Council of Churches,” 1968, ICC Records, box 11, folder 4. 
21 William K. Fox, “Black Participation in Council of Churches,” October 21, 1968, ICC Records, box 11, folder 4.
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middle-class and was “not reaching the disadvantaged Negro in the ghetto.”22 In the absence of 
Black clergy representation and access to deeper community networks, the Task Force initially 
remained an observer of local struggles and quickly fell back on old practices. Predominantly 
white members exchanged anecdotal information about which communities were most likely to 
succumb to urban rebellions, and the group threw its collective energy into the production of an 
educational pamphlet directed at local churches entitled “What To Do Before, During, and After 
a Civil Disturbance.”23 
 However, the Task Force’s stated mission to work alongside secular organizations in 
addressing the urban crisis provided an important contradiction that the savviest Black Power 
activists would quickly use to their advantage. Within a few months of the Task Force’s 
founding, reports began circulating that Black Power activists in downstate Illinois were tiring of 
what they perceived to be inactivity on the part of the church. At a Task Force meeting in April 
1968, committee members discussed an ultimatum they had received from Koen’s Black 
Economic Union operating out of East St. Louis. The Black Economic Union had already 
requested funding for its programs from church-based organizations, but little had been 
forthcoming. As a result, Koen made “one last appeal” to the churches to extend their 
unconditional support. Over the next few months, pressure on the Special Task Force to extend 
resources directly to local Black Power organizations intensified, prompting Dr. Frederick 
Roblee, executive secretary of the Illinois Council of Churches, to make a clear statement. Dr. 
Roblee informed activists attending the Task Force’s meetings that he “did not want to undersell 
or oversell what the Illinois Council of Churches can do,” emphasizing that “immediate funds” 
were not available. However, referencing the growth in church-based grant-awarding bodies at                                                         
22 Minutes of the Special Task Force Committee, February 23, 1968, ICC Records, box 10, folder 31. 
23 Minutes of the Board of Directors of the Illinois Council of Churches, March 18, 1968, ICC Records, box 11, 
folder 2. 
 225 
the national level, Dr. Roblee stated that “it might be possible to go to certain foundations or 
organizations that are set to channel funds into needed areas.” Local activists affirmed Dr. 
Roblee’s suggestion and directed the Task Force to focus its energies on identifying, soliciting, 
and rechanneling resources to local organizations working in the state’s largest Black 
communities.24 
 Over the next five years, this call to action would become the Special Task Force 
Committee’s mandate as it emerged as a key mediator between Illinois-based Black Power 
organizations and national denominational funding sources. However, as late as the spring of 
1969 the Illinois Council of Churches still lacked the connections to Black Power organizations 
necessary to facilitate this kind of relationship. Accordingly, the Task Force developed a 
proposal to hire a permanent staff member charged with establishing firmer relations with local 
Black Power organizations as well as identifying potential resources and funds for their use. The 
proposal found widespread support at the Illinois Council of Churches 39th General Assembly 
held in Carbondale on January 17, 1969, where delegates determined that the Task Force’s 
efforts should be “continued, strengthened and enlarged” and that participation should be 
broadened to include historically African American denominations.25  
Shortly afterwards, Rev. Blaine Ramsey, Jr., a minister of the African Methodist 
Episcopal (A.M.E.) Church and respected civil rights activist, was appointed as the Task Force’s 
first permanent staffer. Ramsey, a former pastor of Cairo’s Ward Chapel and leader in the 
campaign to integrate the city’s public accommodations, was an obvious choice for the chair of 
the Illinois Council of Churches’ most engaged committee on race and poverty. Since leaving 
Cairo in 1962, Ramsey had remained a staunch advocate of an activist ministry despite finding                                                         
24 Minutes of the Task Force Committee, April 29, 1968, ICC Records, box 10, folder 31. 
25 “The Inter-Organization Task Force for Community Action,” February 1970, ICC Records, box 11, folder 8.  
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himself relocated to several different downstate communities in accordance with the itinerancy 
system of the A.M.E. Church. Although the itinerancy system could hinder some ministers from 
putting down the kinds of roots necessary to build effective local struggles, it also had the 
paradoxical effect of providing activist ministers like Ramsey with extensive statewide networks 
and a concrete understanding of the struggles facing multiple Black communities. After leaving 
Cairo, Ramsey had undertaken several pastorates in quick succession, beginning with 
Champaign’s Bethel A.M.E. Church (1963-1966) followed by Peoria’s Ward Chapel (1966-
1969) before arriving in the state capitol in 1969 to serve as chair of the Special Task Force 
Committee. In each community, Ramsey had refocused the local congregation toward civil rights 
activities, challenging both clergy and laity to reconceptualize the meaning of their faith in the 
context of the struggle for Black freedom. In the shift to Black Power, Ramsey also exhibited a 
flexibility uncharacteristic of many of his peers by taking some of the earliest steps toward 
opening up church spaces to secular Black Power organizations. In 1966, upon relocating to 
Peoria, Ramsey worked closely with local Black Panther Party leader Mark Clark, opening up 
Ward Chapel A.M.E. to the organization’s free breakfast program. In 1969, he brought this 
tactical flexibility as well as his extensive experience of Black community struggles across 
central and southern Illinois to the role of chair of the Illinois Council of Churches’ Special Task 
Force Committee.26 
Under Ramsey’s leadership, the Task Force was transformed. Prior to his appointment as 
chair, participation in the Task Force was largely confined to the executive officers of the ICC 
and a small group of white liberal representatives of mainline denominations. However, by 
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drawing on his own extensive church networks, Ramsey was able to secure the participation of 
Black clergy from historically African American denominations. This new group of participants 
represented longstanding African American congregations in some of the state’s largest urban 
communities. They included, Rev. Newell W. Guy (Springfield A.M.E.), Dr. Carroll McCoy 
Felton (Chicago African Methodist Episcopal Zion), Rev. Negil McPherson (Springfield, 
National Baptist Convention, U.S.A., Inc.), and Rev. Norman Owens (East St. Louis, National 
Baptist Convention, U.S.A., Inc.). Ramsey asked members of the committee to forge 
relationships with civil rights and Black Power organizations in their own communities and to 
encourage them to begin submitting proposals and funding requests to the Task Force for 
consideration. Ramsey recognized that while African American clergy were often best situated to 
develop relationships with local activists, representatives of predominantly white denominations 
could use their own denominational networks to secure the funding and resources that 
community organizations needed. Therefore, once the Task Force received a funding request 
from a community organization, it was circulated to the Illinois Council of Churches constituent 
members as well as to national denominational networks and emergent Black-led church 
organizations. In this manner, Ramsey succeeded in forging important coalitional ties between 
community organizations, Black church leaders, and the progressive wing of the predominantly 
white mainline denominations.27 
By the end of 1969, with Ramsey at the helm, the Task Force had forged working 
relationships with community organizations in cities across the state, including Rockford, 
Kankakee, Rock Island, Peoria, Bloomington, Champaign, Decatur, Springfield, Alton, East St. 
Louis, and Cairo. Representatives of African American community organizations in each of 
these cities regularly attended Task Force meetings and were incorporated at every stage of the                                                         
27 “Officers,” Special Task Force Committee, March 28, 1969, ICC Records, box 10, folder 29. 
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“dialogue, planning, and programming.”28 Through these relationships the Task Force was able 
to contribute to a variety of public and private projects supported by local Black Power 
organizations, including the East St. Louis Model Cities Model Cities Program, the Massac 
County O.E.O. Program, the Peoria Community Action Program, the Champaign Non-Profit 
Housing Corporation, the Rock Island County Model Cities Program, and the Macon County 
Community Action Program. The Task Force’s contributions to these projects included 
providing consultancy services for program development, conducting leadership training, and 
functioning as a liaison between community organizations and denominational and governmental 
agencies. However, the Task Force’s most important and controversial role was in the leveraging 
and brokerage of church funding to local Black Power organizations.29 
As the chair of the Task Force, Ramsey was outspoken in his insistence that  
“denominations at [the] state and national levels… respond above the token level for funding 
community organizations and projects.” Such support, Ramsey argued, was “very necessary” in 
terms of establishing “the kind of base upon which real economic and political power can be 
built.” Ramsey championed a direct, “no-strings” approach to funding community organizations 
and was very critical of what he described as the “pernicious paternalism” of many clergy toward 
self-determining local Black Power groups. Accordingly, he challenged the executive officers of 
the Illinois Council of Churches to “revamp” their funding guidelines “to relate to new situations 
that demand new responses.” To this end, Ramsey was responsible for establishing the Special 
Task Force’s brokerage system through which church-based donations could be channeled 
directly to local Black Power organizations. During his time as chair, Ramsey – like other                                                         
28 “Officers,” Special Task Force Committee, March 28, 1969, ICC Records, box 10, folder 29; Minutes of the 
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progressive Black clergy – oversaw an expansion of the Illinois Council of Churches’ 
involvement in poor and Black communities and played a critical role in leveraging key 
organizational resources for local organizations.30  
Between 1969 and 1974, Cairo was consistently at the top of the Special Task Force’s list 
of priorities for funding and resources. In part, this was a consequence of the national attention 
garnered by events in the embattled community. However, it was also a very tangible product of 
Ramsey’s unique relationship with the city and its leading Black Power activists. His activist 
approach to ministry was cultivated during his itinerancy at Cairo’s Ward Chapel. Outraged by 
the southern manners and practices of life in the border city, Ramsey cut his teeth in civil rights 
struggles against segregation in public accommodations. As I have argued, Ramsey owed older 
Black Cairoites like Hattie Kendrick a particular debt for shaping his outlook as a junior minister 
and ushering him into a lifetime of service and struggle. In turn, he had mentored many of the 
younger activists who came to serve as leaders of the local Black Power Movement. Rev. 
Charles Koen, the United Front’s director, described Ramsey as a spiritual mentor and, in the 
absence of his own father, a surrogate parent who was responsible for bringing him into the 
ministry. Accordingly, when Ramsey became the chair of the Special Task Force it was natural 
that he functioned as what Belinda Robnett has defined as a “professional bridge leader,” 
continually foregrounding the city’s concerns and linking the United Front to grant-awarding 
agencies in state and national denominational structures. Indeed, Ramsey maintained an 
extraordinarily close relationship with events and actors on the ground in Cairo, visiting the 
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community regularly and assisting United Front leaders in the development of their political 
program.31 
The Illinois Council of Churches Special Task Force Committee was the first of the state 
and national church-based organizations to establish a formal working relationship with Cairo’s 
Black Power Movement. In the spring of 1969 Blaine Ramsey began to encourage 
representatives from Cairo’s various community organizations to attend the Task Force’s 
meetings and make their needs known to its members. During these early interactions, a pattern 
was quickly established that solidified the Task Force’s role as a primary vehicle in the 
mobilization of church-based resources. Representatives from the city’s various Black Power 
organizations presented their political programs before the Task Force and submitted formal 
proposals for funds and other resources. The Task Force often extended whatever consultative or 
financial support it could immediately offer before circulating a proposal to various state and 
national denominational bodies. All donations were then transferred directly to the local Black 
Power organizations via the Task Force’s brokerage system. In this manner, the Task Force 
played a dual role in extracting church-based resources for local Black Power organizations and, 
simultaneously, educating church leaders as to the struggles of Black Cairoites.32 
Initial support came primarily from regional and state denominational bodies that were 
constituent members of the Illinois Council of Churches and had direct jurisdictional ties to 
Cairo. By the end of 1969, the Task Force had transferred close to $15,000 in small one-time                                                         
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donations to various community organizations working in the city. These donations were made 
by several Illinois-based church organizations, including: the Illinois Council of Churches South 
Conference, the Southern Illinois Association of Priests, the Illinois Conference Branch 
Missionary Society of the A.M.E. Church, the Southern Illinois Conference of the United 
Methodist Church, the Special General Convention Program of the Illinois Episcopal Church, 
and the Illinois Synod of the Presbyterian Church.33 However, the outbreak of violence in the 
summer of 1969 and subsequent deployment of National Guard and state police units to Cairo 
drew national attention that, over the coming months, would serve to expand and broaden 
church-based support for the city’s Black Power organizations significantly. 
 
The United Methodist Church and the Cairo Legal Aid Office 
 
 The first signs of this expansion in church-based support emerged in June 1969 at the 
annual convention of the Southern Illinois Conference of the United Methodist Church. 
Representatives from over four hundred United Methodist congregations arrived in East St. 
Louis for the opening session of the convention, where a small number of determined African 
American clergy and laypersons ensured that the plight of Black Cairoites would be at the 
forefront of discussions. In light of the summer’s violence, Dr. Ernest Teagle, an African 
American surgeon from Belleville, called upon the conference to “tell us if we have a structured 
ministry for the poor and black immediately in Cairo.” The United Methodist Church, which                                                         
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maintained Cairo’s all-white Tigert Memorial and First Methodist Church, of course did not have 
such a ministry. Therefore, at the recommendation of Rev. Charles Napier, an African American 
minister of a recently integrated parish in East St. Louis, delegates appointed a nine-member ad-
hoc committee charged with developing a proposal that would be delivered to the conference at 
the end of the week. On the final day of the conference the ad-hoc committee returned and 
recommended that the Board of Missions be directed to set up a task force to begin exploring and 
implementing programs in communities, like Cairo, where the conference lacked any ministry to 
“minority groups.”34  
Recognizing the weakness of the proposal and its failure to deal with the immediate 
concerns of Cairo’s Black residents, Ernest Teagle rose again and presented an amendment 
recommending that the conference establish a legal office in Cairo “to offer legal advice and 
representation to the poor and dispossessed of that city.” In the wake of the summer’s violence, 
allegations that Black Cairoites were receiving inadequate and often discriminatory treatment at 
the hands of local law enforcement and the court system had been made by a number of different 
governmental bodies, including a special investigative committee of the Illinois legislature and 
the Illinois Attorney General’s Office. The United Front had spent most of the summer 
petitioning Governor Richard Ogilvie to take immediate steps to remedy these problems and 
restore law and order to the city. With this in mind, Teagle encouraged the conference to make a 
meaningful contribution to Black Cairoites’ struggle to secure justice by establishing a legal 
office that would be staffed by an attorney and legal secretary.35                                                         
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to Black Community in Cairo,” Cairo Evening Citizen, June 3, 1969; “Methodists Establish Task Force to Minister 
to Minority Groups,” Cairo Evening Citizen, June 6, 1969, United Methodist Church (U.S.) Southern Illinois 
Conference, Official Journal and Yearbook of the 118th Session of the Southern Illinois Conference of the United 
Methodist Church (The Conference Committee on Journal Publications, 1969), 64. 77. 214. 
35 “Committee Study Proposal by Methodists,” Cairo Evening Citizen, June 2, 1969; “Methodists Discuss Ministry 
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 Conference delegates were divided over the proposal to provide Black Cairoites with 
legal support, much to the consternation of progressive Black clergy and their allies. In response 
to a plea from one delegate that the conference “slow down” on its Cairo study, Rev. Charles 
Napier warned, “Time is short. Hatred begets hatred… We are a white racist institution. These 
are God’s people and we have an obligation to minister to them.” Dr. Lowell Hazzard, a United 
Methodist theologian from Washington D.C., agreed and called upon delegates to “quicken the 
pace of reconciliation with the black man, not slow it down.”36 Importantly, church leaders, 
including Bishop Lance Webb, supported the proposal. By the conclusion of the conference 
delegates had voted to create a “biracial and ecumenical” task force charged with establishing a 
ministry to Cairo’s Black community and, in accordance with Teagle’s amendment, allocated 
$10,000 for the establishment of a legal office.37   
 The decision of the Southern Illinois Conference reverberated in Cairo where the abuse 
of legal power had functioned as a central tool in the repression of the Black freedom struggle. 
Historically, Cairo had maintained an inequitable system of criminal justice in which African 
Americans were subject to glaring discrimination. Longstanding concerns included a failure to 
enforce and prosecute the law in cases involving Black victims; harsher enforcement, 
prosecution, and sentencing of Black defendants; widespread police brutality; unrepresentative                                                                                                                                                                                   
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jury composition; and discriminatory implementation of court costs. By 1968, these concerns had 
led the U.S. Department of Justice to conclude that one of “the greatest deterrents to racial 
progress was the firm conviction of Negroes and many whites that the administration of justice 
in Cairo was working against the Negro community.” By the summer of 1969, these 
longstanding inequities were exacerbated by the joint efforts of white citizens, law enforcement, 
and city officials to repress the local Black Power Movement through a combination of legal and 
extralegal channels. Spearheaded by the local chapter of the White Citizens Council (a.k.a., 
United Citizens for Community Action), these efforts included the passage of restrictive city 
ordinances criminalizing conventional protest activities, mass arrests and prosecutions of Black 
Power activists, and a pattern of sustained and unbridled terrorism directed against Black 
community members.38  
 The United Front’s ability to counteract these forces as well as to secure progressive 
changes to longstanding patterns of discrimination had been severely limited by the absence of 
indigenous legal resources. Of the approximately ten attorneys working in the city, none would 
handle civil rights cases or even, for the most part, criminal cases involving Black clients. The 
few who did accept Black clients were widely considered to provide inadequate and 
discriminatory services. As a result, the United Front had depended largely on the services of 
African American attorneys from larger Black communities like East St. Louis, resulting in 
additional transportation and lodging costs that were an added burden on the organization’s 
already limited resources. As a result, local Black Power activists were fully aware that legal 
                                                        38 Lawyers’ Committee on Civil Rights Under the Law, “Report Relative to Cairo, Illinois, n.d., Administrative 
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support would have to be obtained from outside the county and were eager to ensure that the 
resources promised by the United Methodist Church would become a reality.39 
 Shortly after receiving word that the Southern Illinois Conference of the United 
Methodist Church had committed to open a legal office in the city, local Black Power activists 
and their allies began exerting pressure on the national denomination to follow through on their 
commitment. On July 3, United Front leaders wrote to Rev. John P. Adams, director of the 
United Methodist Church’s Department of Law, Justice, and Community Relations in regards to 
the opening of a legal office in the city. “We have had many promises made by different state 
agencies,” the letter stated, “but as usual they have been promises… We do not need promises 
because we have a file of them.” Instead, the United Front asked for “help and action from you 
and concerned agencies who are willing to work for Justice.” Specifically, the United Front 
asked that the Methodists secure the services of a lawyer who could work in Cairo “over an 
extended time, not just for one or two cases.” It appears that this subtle prodding was relatively 
successful and prompted further action from the national denomination. Shortly after, leaders 
within the United Methodist Church’s General Board of Christian Social Concerns began 
exploring a variety of potential non-profit legal aid providers that might be willing to open an 
office in Cairo. They eventually settled on the Lawyer’s Committee for Civil Rights Under the 
Law, a non-profit private advocacy group that focused on racial discrimination cases, and began 
working hard to solicit funds for the upkeep of the program.40 
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 After a brief investigative trip to the city, the Lawyers’ Committee concluded that there 
was “a substantial need for legal assistance” and estimated that it would require a budget of 
$14,500 for the establishment and operation of a legal office in Cairo for the first six months. 
Upon receiving assurances from the United Methodist Church that finances would be obtained, 
the Cairo legal aid office officially opened its doors in October 1969. Lawrence Aschenbrenner, 
Chief Counsel of the Lawyers’ Committee in Jackson, Mississippi, was sent to Cairo to set up 
the office and deal with the initial cases. Ashenbrenner departed in December and was replaced 
by a permanent staff, including Martha Jenkins, who had functioned as Mayor Charles Evers’s 
special attorney in Fayette, Mississippi.41 
 With the assistance of the Lawyers’ Committee, the United Front was able to challenge 
longstanding practices of racial discrimination in the city as well as counteract many of the legal 
and extralegal methods utilized by whites to repress the local Black Power Movement. 
Moreover, the Lawyers’ Committee was also able to provide free legal services to low-income 
residents in Alexander, Union, and Pulaski counties for the first time. Thousands of working 
people – Black and white – were able to obtain legal support for civil cases involving divorce, 
adoption, employment discrimination, child support, social security, and public aid.42  
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Within a few weeks of arriving in the city, the Lawyers’ Committee had halted all jury 
trials in the county and forced a series of reforms that eliminated longstanding patterns of 
discrimination in jury selection. With the assistance of local Black Power activists, the Lawyers’ 
Committee was also able to overturn a series of repressive city ordinances that criminalized such 
conventional protest activities as picketing and marching.  On top of counteracting such 
repression, the Lawyers’ Committee also fought and won a series of landmark civil rights suits 
overturning longstanding patterns of discrimination in education, housing, employment, and 
political representation. Long-term practices of segregation in public housing were overturned 
when Black residents won a class action lawsuit against the Alexander County Housing 
Authority. City jobs were opened up after the Lawyers’ Committee filed suit after suit alleging 
racial discrimination in hiring practices. County boards and commissions that had traditionally 
been the preserve of white appointees were eventually forced to include Black representation. 
And, in Kendrick v. Walder (1980), the district court abolished the city’s discriminatory at-large 
voting system and restored the earlier ward-based system, resulting in the election of African 
Americans to the city council for the first time in almost one hundred years.43 
 For many, the United Methodist Church’s establishment of a legal aid office in Cairo 
represented exactly the kind of engaged social ministry that the Black Power Movement 
demanded of predominantly white denominations. A regional conference of the United 
Methodist Church had been challenged to address the very real problems facing Black residents 
in its jurisdiction and had boldly stepped forward and offered a solution. In turn, the national 
denomination had thrown its weight behind the local initiative and offered to assist in securing 
critical resources. In many ways, the United Methodist project might be characterized as a model                                                         
43 Illinois Advisory Committee, A Decade of Waiting in Cairo, 15; Michael P. Seng, “The Cairo Experience: Civil 
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for church-based support for Black Power. However, a closer examination illustrates some of the 
problems that would plague many church-funded initiatives during this period.  
From the outset, the legal aid office lacked fiscal stability and a long-term financial plan. 
Since the United Methodist Church had initiated the project, the United Front could be forgiven 
for expecting that the denomination would provide a stable source of ongoing support for its 
operation. However, such a commitment was never forthcoming for a couple of reasons. On the 
one hand, the Methodists viewed their support for the legal aid office as seed money, believing 
that a more permanent state-supported legal aid service and public defenders office could be 
secured in time. On the other, Methodist leaders hoped that the more immediate financial needs 
of the legal aid office could be met by an ecumenical funding effort that simply never 
materialized.44 
In this context, the legal aid office was forced to operate on a series of short-term funding 
grants as opposed to more institutionalized sources of revenue from within the denomination. 
During its first year, for example, the legal aid office was primarily supported by a combination 
of private donations from Methodist laypersons and small grants from church committees. Dr. 
Ernest Teagle, the Belleville surgeon who had proposed the creation of the legal aid office, 
personally donated $5,000 to the project. Robert C. O’Neil, another layperson who had also 
committed to assist in the legal aid office’s formation, matched this donation. Supplementing 
these individual donations were a number of small grants from the Southern Illinois Conference 
($4,000), the Southern Illinois Bishop’s discretionary fund ($1,000), and the Women’s Division 
of the Board of Missions of the national United Methodist Church ($2,000). These, like the 
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individual donations, were one-time grants with no firm commitment for renewal. Thus, in its 
first year the legal aid office operated on a precarious and unsustainable funding base.45 
On several occasions, a shortage of funds caused the legal aid office to operate at a 
deficit, hindering work and putting considerable pressure on the United Front to lobby 
denominational leaders for additional resources. As the office became more established and its 
achievements more widely known, the United Front was able to better utilize its contacts within 
denominational hierarchies to leverage a number of emergency grants. Many of these grants 
came from within the United Methodist Church. However, significant allocations also came from 
other denominations, including in 1970 an $8,000 donation from the United Presbyterian Church 
and $13,000 from the Illinois Council of Churches Special Task Force Committee. Like other 
donations, however, these emergency grants were one-time, nonrenewable allocations designed 
to sustain the legal aid office in a time of crisis.46 
 Despite periodic requests to other denominations for more sustainable long-term 
allocations, the United Methodist Church remained the primary church-based funding source to 
the legal office, much to the frustration of Methodist leaders. Shortly after the Lawyers’                                                         
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Committee opened the legal office in Cairo, Methodist leaders reached out to Rev. Robert 
Chapman, executive director of the National Council of Churches Committee for Racial Justice, 
to ask for assistance in coordinating ecumenical support for the project. Unfortunately, these 
efforts bore little fruit, prompting John Adams, director of the United Methodist Church’s 
Department of Law, Justice and Community Relations, to write a letter of complaint to 
Chapman. “[W]e have endeavored to search out every possible source of funding,” Adams 
wrote, “and to this date have been able to receive only Methodist money for a project that was 
assumed to be inter-denominational and ecumenical from the beginning.” Adams reminded 
Chapman that the Methodist funding was simply “an initial effort to establish the Project” and 
that it had been believed that “other denominations would come up with support similarly and 
that the Project could be secured.” Instead, Adams feared that “the Methodist sources have been 
explored and exploited to their fullest” and that “unless there are other expressions of support 
soon the Project unfortunately will have to be terminated.”47 
 In reality, the legal aid office was a Methodist-initiated project, and Adams’s expectation 
that other denominations would support the project in a more sustained fashion was probably 
wishful thinking on his part. Moreover, his claim that Methodist sources of funding had been 
“explored and exploited to their fullest” rings hollow considering the size and non-institutional 
character of the denomination’s donations. By the time Adams wrote his letter to Rev. Chapman 
in December 1969, the national United Methodist Church had contributed a grand total of $2,000 
to the legal office from a one-time donation made by the Women’s Division of the Board of 
Missions. Clearly the United Methodist Church, an organization with a total operating budget in 
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the millions, had not exhausted its resources. Rather, the organization had failed to prioritize and 
secure the kind of long-term and institutional funds necessary to sustain the legal office, hoping 
instead that they could persuade other denominations to extend their own resources. While other 
denominational leaders including Rev. Chapman clearly supported the Lawyers’ Committee’s 
work, they were hampered in their ability to secure donations as a result of their own allocation 
of much larger amounts of institutional funding to the United Front for the bail bond and 
economic development programs that I will examine further in this chapter. 
 Unsurprisingly, these funding concerns provoked considerable animosity among local 
Black Power activists, who appreciated the support of the Lawyers’ Committee but fretted that a 
shortage of church funding would cut the organization’s efforts short. In a letter dated January 
31, 1971, the United Front leadership expressed its “deepest appreciation for the funds the 
United Methodists made available so that the Lawyers’ Committee could serve in Cairo.” 
However, they emphasized the importance of locating long-term funding that would allow the 
Lawyers’ Committee to stay in the community, stating that to leave now would be “insane” and 
would turn the committee into “a gigantic farce upon our community.” The United Front 
apologized if the tone of these statements sounded “hostile,” but emphasized that too many “well 
intentioned” people had “set back the day of reconciliation by unwise, premature and what have 
turned out to be the abortive attempts to mediate and reconcile.” In order to preserve the legal aid 
office, the United Front recommended that the Methodists commit further resources immediately 
and cast wide their net to incorporate other denominational support. While tense, these types of 
interactions were one of the key ways in which local Black Power activists held church leaders 
accountable for their commitments and leveraged much needed resources.48 
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 Ultimately, concerns regarding the sustainability of the legal aid office were partially 
addressed by the extension of federal funds from the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). In 
July 1970, the OEO approved an annual budget for the Lawyers’ Committee of $101,500, of 
which $90,000 came directly from an annually renewable OEO grant. This funding allowed for a 
significant expansion in the work of the Lawyer’s Committee and the kind of financial stability 
that had been absent in the past year. With these new resources, the Lawyer’s Committee was 
able to provide free legal services to all poor residents in Alexander, Pulaski, and Union 
counties. However, the remaining $11,500 would still have to be raised by the United Front, 
which would continue to rely heavily on church-based resources.  This pattern was continued in 
July 1971 when the OEO renewed its grant, prompting the United Front to begin lobbying 
denominations to renew their own donations to the sum of $12,000. John Adams of the 
Methodist Church and Robert Chapman of the National Council of Churches’ Racial Justice 
Commission continued to play key roles in leveraging funds that sustained the organization 
throughout the early 1970s. This included securing a significant grant from the Legal Defense 
Fund of the United Presbyterian Church in 1972. However, the need to continually mobilize new 
funding sources placed a considerable burden on the United Front, fueling underlying tensions 
between the organization and its church donors.49 
 A fundamental tension between the United Front and its church-based donors was over 
control of the allocation and distribution of church-based resources. With the Lawyers’ 
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Committee now receiving generous federal grants, Charles Koen demanded that church 
donations be redirected to the United Front to address the organization’s more immediate 
concerns. When this advice was not heeded, Koen wrote to the national director of the Lawyer’s 
Committee, Peter Connell. Koen explained that over the past few months the United Front had 
actively pursued funds for the legal office at the expense of other key programs and services. 
“We did this,” Koen explained, “without any knowledge that the Lawyers’ Committee was 
seeking funds from the Office of Economic Opportunity.” Now the Lawyers’ Committee had 
received the OEO funding and Koen worried that “there are still some church funds being 
siphoned from the United Front to the Lawyers’ Committee on the basis of our pleas and 
requests.” Specifically, Koen informed Connell that it was his understanding that “the United 
Presbyterian Church will give $8,000 to the Committee and that the National Missionary Society 
of the United Methodist Church has earmarked another $2,500.” This frustrated Koen because of 
the desperate need of his own organization for bail bond and economic development funding. 
Koen explained that the high bail bonds had “caused the United Front to be in serious financial 
condition” and that “[t]his happens at the same time our program is rapidly expanding in the 
fields of economic development and housing.” In a desperate last appeal for help, Koen informed 
Connell that the United Front was “not able to adequately finance these and other programs 
because of this tremendous drain-off due to necessary legal expenses.”50 
 At one level, Koen’s concerns were a logical consequence of escalating bail bond and 
legal aid costs incurred by local Black Power activists who were systematically picked up on 
spurious charges and prosecuted under repressive city ordinances. The Lawyers’ Committee did 
not fund bail bond and, as a result, the United Front had to devote considerable energy to 
fundraising just to keep its members out of jail. Rev. Blaine Ramsey of the Illinois Council of                                                         
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Churches’ Special Task Force and Rev. Robert C. Chapman of the National Council of 
Churches’ Racial Justice Committee played key roles in securing allocations for bail bond by 
lobbying their constituent members at the state and national levels.51  
 However, at a more fundamental level, Koen’s letter to Connell indicated the frustrations 
many Black Power activists had with the funding priorities and processes of predominantly white 
churches. “Since much of our funding comes from the white church,” Koen wrote, “we are faced 
with a situation which appears to be that the white church will fund us indirectly and through 
another white person who they feel would safely administer their monies.” For Koen, the 
Lawyer’s Committee was a good example of this pattern because it allowed “white American 
Church officials to escape from dealing directly with real Black citizens.” According to Koen, 
the United Front rejected “this subterfuge which allows some whites for a few moments to 
assuage their guilt, but not remove their prejudices.” Instead, Koen demanded that churches 
adopt a “no strings attached” model by forwarding donations directly to the United Front and 
allowing Black Power activists working at the grassroots level to make decisions about the 
appropriate usage of funds.52 
 In September 1970, the United Front made this request directly to the United Presbyterian 
Church that had extended an emergency grant of $8,000 to the Lawyers’ Committee after the 
OEO funding had been received. When Presbyterian Church executives refused to meet with the 
United Front to discuss the matter further, Koen wrote a letter in which he “strongly urged” that                                                         
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church executives “reconsider your flat refusal to meet with us in Cairo to discuss this grant.” “It 
has always been our feeling,” Koen wrote, “that the white church should always desire to talk 
with Black citizens who are involved in the struggle when grants are being made in a city on the 
assumption these monies would aid Blacks.” Further, Koen reiterated that the Front would “not 
become part of a goodwill program which allows the white church to buy off their guilt by 
giving money, but at the same time permit the church to remain as prejudiced and non-
understanding as before.” According to Koen, this was exactly what the Presbyterian Church had 
done in Cairo by diverting funds needed by Blacks “to an operation adequately funded by a 
$90,000 grant from the Office of Economic Opportunity.” Koen acknowledged that the Lawyers’ 
Committee “needed funds to survive,” but insisted that since they had received the OEO grant, 
“priorities have changed dramatically.” Therefore, Koen informed the Presbyterian leadership 
that they must “be prepared to change as circumstances change” or face the loss of faith of Black 
communities. “We would hope,” Koen stated, “that you will face this issue head on and 
understand that Blacks must determine their own destiny and Blacks must determine the 
priorities, at a given time, as to how and to whom, funds must be spent.” “The white church,” he 
insisted, “cannot and must not pick a white person or a committee with a majority of whites to 
make these determinations for Blacks.” Such an approach, Koen argued, could not be accepted 
by the United Front because it represented a compromise both of the “covenant” they had made 
with God “to fight racism at all levels” and to their “rights for self-determination.” Similar 
demands were sent to John Adams at the United Methodist Church. All future donations, Koen 
demanded, “should come directly to the United Front.”53 
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These initial encounters between the United Front and national church executives 
crystallized both the tremendous potential and unforeseen limitations of church-based resources 
in the minds of Cairo’s Black Power activists. One contemporary of the Black Power Movement 
has described the nation’s churches as “the only major institutions in our society possessing both 
the latent and moral capability and sufficient financial resources to play a catalytic role.” Black 
Cairoites and their allies tested this theory and, in the process, demonstrated the vulnerability of 
church executives to Black Power’s rhetorical appeals. Church-based resources had played a 
critical role in initiating a program to address Black Cairoites’ legal problems when federal and 
state agencies had failed to do so. In turn, the existence of a fully operational legal aid office had 
made obtaining federal support much more achievable.  However, church-based funding had 
been piecemeal and unreliable, forcing the United Front to engage in its own rigorous 
fundraising campaign. This had added to the organization’s workload and “siphoned” funds 
away from other important initiatives. Consequently, United Front leaders began working with 
Rev. Blaine Ramsey and the Illinois Council of Churches Special Task Force Committee to 
identify more stable sources of church support for their survival programs, organizational 
operations, and economic development initiatives that came with fewer “strings attached.” One 
of the places they began to look was toward historically Black denominations in the state of 
Illinois.54  
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Black Denominational Networks and the United Front’s Survival Program 
 
While predominantly white denominations played a key role in addressing the United 
Front’s legal needs, the organization’s survival programs in the areas of food and clothing 
security and medical assistance illustrate the unique and significant contributions of historically 
Black denominations. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Black church networks in Chicago 
played a critical role in facilitating the work of Operation Need, the United Front’s emergency 
food and clothing distribution service. Chicago-based AME congregations donated food, 
clothing, and funds for distribution through Ward Chapel, their sister-church in Cairo. By early 
1970, these donations were consistent and substantial enough to warrant the opening of a 
separate United Front Office in the Hyde Park Bank Building in Chicago. United Front activist 
Edna Williams coordinated the churches’ donations and arranged for regular convoys to 
transport the goods to Cairo. In this manner, Operation Need was able to meet the basic needs of 
Cairo’s poorest community members as well as provide a viable alternative to white merchants.55 
Operation Need typified the unique relationship forged between historically Black 
denominations and the United Front. While the contributions of predominantly white 
denominations were extended from powerful state and national bodies, Black churches tended to 
coordinate their support locally in the form of a continuous stream of clothing, food, and 
monetary donations. Local congregations discussed the plight of Black Cairoites, their 
relationship to the struggle, and the need to extend Christian support and encouragement. Thus, 
                                                        
55 United Front of Cairo, “Progress Report from the United Front,” 1969, ICC Records, box 11, folder 8; United 
Front Inaugurates Operation Need,” Cairo Evening Citizen, October 14, 1969, “Operation Need Continues to Supply 
Food and Clothes,” The Monitor (East St. Louis, Ill.) February 19, 1970, Freeman, “The United Black Front of 
Cairo, Illinois a Situational Report,”; “Visitors Attend Weekly Rally,” The Monitor (East St. Louis, Ill.) March 3, 
1970. 
 248 
the coalitional relationships forged between the United Front and Chicago’s Black congregations 
were often more personal and direct, reflecting stronger grassroots solidarity.  
However, unlike their predominantly white counterparts, historically Black 
denominations did not extend significant financial resources to the United Front from their state 
and national bodies. Of course, it was predominantly white denominations that had been the 
target of both Forman’s reparations demands and Black clergy’s critiques. It was predominantly 
white denominations, Black Power activists contended, that needed to atone for past wrongs 
through the extension of financial contributions to Black communities. However, as my earlier 
examination of Cairo’s Black churches demonstrates, the call for a more relevant ministry clearly 
influenced African American congregations, and although they might not have matched the large 
financial contributions of their predominantly white counterparts, they did use their networks to 
extend critical resources to Black Power initiatives. 
In addition to coordinating food and clothing donations for Operation Need, historically 
Black denominations provided the United Front with the technical expertise of Black 
professionals. This approach is most visible in the efforts of the AME Church’s Health 
Commission to address the desperate medical concerns of Cairo’s poor and Black community 
members. In 1969, the United Front began to develop plans to secure access to medical resources 
from outside the city. The need for medical resources was critical for several reasons. First, 
Cairo’s only medical facility, St. Mary’s Hospital, had a history of discrimination in the 
provision of medical services. The civil rights struggles of the 1960s had successfully challenged 
some of St. Mary’s more overt discriminatory practices. However, by the late 1960s the hospital 
was facing bankruptcy and could only provide what its own administrator, Sister Joan Marie, 
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defined as “grossly inadequate” care for both Black and white low-income residents.56  Reports 
of Black Cairoites being turned away in emergency cases were all too common, forcing African 
Americans to drive almost thirty miles to hospitals in Paducah, Kentucky and Cape Girardeau, 
Missouri for medical assistance.57 
Efforts to provide alternative medical services from within the community were 
hampered by a combination of the city’s intractable white civic leadership and the shortage of 
Black doctors. Cairo’s civic leaders turned a blind eye to the massive health problems. As the 
1972 Hearing of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights would show, local officials had never 
applied for state or federal resources that could have addressed this health crisis.58 In the absence 
of these resources, the Black community and poor whites commonly went untreated. In the late 
1960s, only two African American doctors operated in Cairo and, according to the United Front, 
both failed to contribute to the extension of adequate and accessible medical services to the city’s 
Black population.59  
With the formation of the United Front, Black Power activists determined to address this 
health crisis themselves by securing outside support and resources. Their efforts were spurred on 
in January 1970 when Dr. Leonidas Berry, chairman of the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) 
Church’s Health Commission, came to Cairo to speak at Ward Chapel AME Church. Berry, a 
nationally renowned physician and churchman working at Chicago’s Provident Hospital, had 
been following events in Cairo closely and decided to fill a truck with food and medical supplies 
and drive to the embattled city. After speaking at Ward Chapel AME Church on Sunday, Berry 
stayed in Cairo to participate in the United Front’s protests and discuss the needs of Black                                                         
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community members. When local residents described being denied medical care at St. Mary’s 
and driving across state lines for emergency treatment, Berry felt compelled to take action.60  
On his way home to Chicago, Berry developed the idea for the Flying Black Medics – a 
team of Black physicians and nurses that would make trips to Cairo to provide immediate 
medical assistance and bring media attention to the city’s health crisis. Berry quickly set up a 
meeting with a group of Black doctors in Chicago to begin coordinating the trip. The group 
worked on securing the voluntary participation of Black nurses, technicians, and doctors while 
Berry worked through AME church networks to secure access to medical supplies and other 
resources. Berry met with Bishop H. Thomas Primm of the Fourth Episcopal District of the 
African Methodist Episcopal Church, and he was granted permission to solicit foodstuffs and 
medicine through the health groups and missionary societies of the Woodlawn, Grant, and 
Coppin AME churches in Chicago for distribution through Cairo’s Ward Chapel. More help 
came from the Black-owned Williams Clinic in Chicago, which provided over $10,000 of 
laboratory equipment. Finally, the Black doctors pooled their resources and financed two charter 
planes to transport the staff and supplies to Cairo.61 
 The Flying Black Medics landed in Paducah on a cold February day where they were met 
by Rev. Charles Koen and other leaders of the United Front. The team of thirty-two doctors, 
nurses, technicians, social workers, and dieticians were loaded onto the United Front bus and 
transported across the river into Cairo. Awaiting the group at Ward Chapel AME were hundreds 
of patients who had been organized and registered in advance by the United Front and the                                                         
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church’s own Social Action Committee chaired by Hattie Kendrick. The doctors set up a 
makeshift clinic in the basement of the church and began taking patients one by one.  
As they met with the patients, the doctors were alarmed by the tragic human cost of 
Cairo’s grossly inadequate medical services. Dr. Audley F. Connor of the Chicago Board of 
Health stated that 12 of the first 15 adults he examined had “serious medical problems which 
needed immediate medical treatment.” Men and women suffering from treatable conditions all 
but wiped out elsewhere came to the clinic and received medical attention for the first time all in 
front of the gaze of the national news media. Most notably, NBC’s famed television news show, 
the Huntley-Brinkley Report, had moved into the basement of Ward Chapel and was covering 
the remarkable scene for a national audience. Koen, taking advantage of the opportunity, made a 
statement to press. “Those in our city who have said that local medical facilities and personnel 
are keeping up with the medical needs of our poor will have to do some rethinking and 
evaluating,” Koen stated. “The poor in Cairo and its surrounding communities,” he explained, 
“have been sadly neglected in this important area of their life.”62 
The Black Flying Medics had won a remarkable victory. They had provided immediate 
medical care and attracted the kind of attention necessary to secure a more long-term solution to 
the city’s health crisis. According to Berry, “the medical power structure of the state was greatly 
upset” by what they had seen in Cairo and even more so by the wave of bad publicity that had 
followed. The Black Flying Medics worked with the United Front to lobby state officials to 
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provide funds from the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) for the establishment of a Black-
owned and controlled medical center in the city. However, Berry complained that the project was 
“bogged down by state, medical, and local politics” from the start, and a year after the Black 
Flying Medics had visited the city, state officials extended the OEO grant to St. Mary’s Hospital 
instead. Berry’s efforts to secure the program for the United Front were defeated, and the 
hospital that had been at the center of debates over racial discrimination reaped the harvest of 
others’ seed. In his autobiography, Berry situates his struggles with the OEO as one of the most 
exhausting and demoralizing moments of his career. Shortly after the OEO’s decision, Berry 
announced his “semi-retirement” from the profession and a “drastic reduction” in his private 
practice.63 
  On January 4, 1971, St. Mary’s Hospital opened a walk-in clinic with the support of a  
$100,000 federal OEO grant channeled through the Shawnee Development Council. The 
crusading role of Dr. Leonidas Berry and the AME church in securing these much-needed 
medical resources was quickly forgotten by those outside the Black community, but those within 
continued the fight to ensure that the new clinic was accountable and accessible to them. In 
accordance with the federal OEO grant guidelines, a bi-racial board that included representatives 
from the health care profession and the community administrated the clinic. In the first three 
months of its operation, the community clinic served over 650 patients in a total of 1300 visits. 
The heavy load required the clinic to borrow personnel from St. Mary’s Hospital and begin 
identifying other sources of funding to expand the clinic’s services. An important source of 
support came from the Governor’s Office of Human Resources in the form of a Mobile Health 
Unit that allowed the clinic to extend its services to the areas surrounding Cairo. Shortly after,                                                         
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the clinic also opened three Outreach Program Centers in the city’s public housing projects. The 
mobile units and the outreach centers allowed residents to have continual on-the-spot contact 
with medical practitioners. However, when hospital administrators testified before the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights in 1972, they continued to emphasize the inadequacy of the level of 
care and the need for a more long-term solution to the serious medical problems facing the city’s 
Black and poor residents. “I believe,” Sister Joan Marie stated, “that we are still just putting out 
fires.” While Sister Marie believed the clinic was a good thing, she insisted that “a great deal 
more needs to be done.”64 However, additional assistance was not forthcoming, and by the end of 
the year the OEO explained that it would not be renewing the clinic’s grant due to insufficient 
funds.65 By 1974, with St. Mary’s Hospital facing bankruptcy, the clinic was closed.66  
 The closure of the medical clinic underscored the risks that came with accepting 
governmental funding. The clinic, like the legal aid office, had been initiated with the critical 
support of church-based organizations under the assumption that governmental resources would 
provide a more stable, long-term base. Indeed, implicit in the vision of liberal denominational 
bodies like the United Methodist Church and the National Council of Churches was a 
fundamental belief that poverty would be eradicated by the creation of a guaranteed annual wage 
and the provision of federal and state social welfare programs. Their own grant-awarding 
programs were often envisioned as stop-gaps on the path to longer term government solutions. 
However, by involving state and federal agencies, Black Cairoites had rapidly lost control over 
the clinic and, ultimately, witnessed its closure due to cuts in governmental funding. This pattern                                                         
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would play itself out in a number of the United Front’s projects, undercutting the early 
collaborative efforts of Black Power activists and church-based donors and setting back the 
community’s struggle for equity and empowerment.67  
 
Church-Based Grants for Organizational Operations and Economic Development  
   
Identifying alternative funding sources that would allow the United Front to preserve 
control over local projects as well as secure stable sources of ongoing funding became a central 
priority for the United Front. Blaine Ramsey’s networking on behalf of the United Front had 
brought him into direct contact with leading Black church executives who functioned as 
gatekeepers of much larger sources of denominational funding at the national level. Through 
these networks, the United Front became aware of several new grant-awarding bodies, including 
the Interreligious Foundation for Community Organizations (IFCO), the Episcopal Church’s 
General Convention Special Program, and the United Presbyterian Church’s National Committee 
for the Self-Development of People. These grant programs were particularly attractive to local 
activists because they had large institutional budgets that were controlled by progressive Black 
clergy committed to extending funds directly to Black Power organizations. With significant 
portions of the United Front’s budget being redirected to legal aid and bail bond, its leaders 
began working with Blaine Ramsey to craft funding proposals that would allow them to sustain 
their own organizational operations as well as initiate autonomous parallel institutions, including 
a day care center, a food cooperative, a prefabricated housing factory, and a cooperative 
shopping center.  
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 In the fall of 1969, the United Front began developing a funding proposal for the 
Interreligious Foundation for Community Organizations (IFCO).  IFCO was a not-for-profit 
ecumenical foundation that, under the leadership of Rev. Lucius Walker, funded a wide variety 
of Black Power initiatives during the late 1960s and early 1970s. In September, Rev. Charles 
Koen and Rev. Blaine Ramsey traveled to IFCO headquarters in New York to discuss the 
proposal and, a few weeks later, IFCO leaders converged on the border city to witness for 
themselves the United Front’s work. The United Front’s first proposal was unsuccessful. 
However, after making some suggested modifications their second proposal was accepted in 
September 1970, resulting in the extension of a grant totaling $229,660.68  
 The IFCO grant was the largest single church-based donation to the United Front and was 
responsible for underwriting much of the organization’s work between September 1970 and 
September 1971. Most critically, the grant contained allocations covering the United Front’s day-
to-day operational expenses including staff salaries and office expenses. In accordance with the 
United Front’s proposal, IFCO extended $78,000 for salaries for the United Front’s Executive 
Director ($10,000), Program Coordinator ($9,000), Public Relations Officer ($8,000), Research 
Assistant ($8,000), seven Field Organizers ($35,000), and two secretaries ($8,000). In addition, 
separate allocations were made for the maintenance of the United Front’s offices at St. 
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Columba’s ($15,000) and travel expenditures ($10,000) necessary to ensure that the group 
maintained its coalitional relationships with Black Power organizations across the country.69  
 The IFCO grant also allocated funds for the initiation of the United Front’s economic 
development projects. In their proposal, the United Front explained that they “had become 
increasingly aware of the need to move along the lines of economic development,” and because 
of the distinctive nature of that kind of work, they requested funds for “a separate staff of 
persons” that would work through a new Economic Development Corporation. In accordance 
with this request, IFCO extended a total of $39,500 for salaries for a Program Director 
($12,5000), Economic Developer ($12,000), Deputy Economic Developer ($10,000), and a 
secretary ($5,000). IFCO also provided funds for the maintenance of an economic development 
office at St. Columba’s Church ($8,260) and travel expenses for its director ($4,500). The staff 
of the Economic Development Corporation, headed by Bobby Williams, devoted themselves 
full-time to a series of local projects including the development of a shopping plaza, a pre-
fabricated housing factory, a food cooperative, a clothing store, and cleaners. To help launch 
these programs, IFCO extended $60,000 in seed money to be used at the United Front’s 
discretion.70 
 Over the next two years, the United Front’s organizational operations and economic 
development programs would be supported by a series of similar church-based grants. In 1970, 
the IFCO grant was supplemented by a grant from the Episcopal Church’s General Convention 
Special Program. Established in 1967, the program was designed to address the problems of 
African Americans and other oppressed populations in urban communities by extending grants                                                         
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directly to local community organizations. In February, Leon Modeste and other members of the 
General Convention Special Program approved a $68,000 grant to “sustain [the United Front’s] 
office and staff expenses, develop its economic program further, continue political organizing 
and finance leadership training classes.”71  
At the start of the next funding year, the United Front secured two separate grants totaling  
$127,000 from the National Committee for the Self-Development of People of the Presbyterian 
Church. Established in 1970, the National Committee extended seed money to community 
organizations for the initiation of programs that would allow affected communities to “use their 
own efforts to gain material, social, political and spiritual freedom.” Over the past year, the 
program had funded, among other projects, a wood products company in Lowndes County 
($62,500), the Black People’s Unity Movement in Camden, New Jersey ($150,000), the San 
Diego Welfare Rights Organization ($29,000), and a cooperative feeder pig program run by the 
Southeast Alabama Self-Help Association ($50,000). In 1971, representatives from the National 
Committee visited Cairo to meet the United Front and study their plight. Shortly after, the United 
Front submitted a proposal for funding to the National Committee. The grants from the National 
Committee were extended to the United Front for the purpose of assisting the organization in its 
most “urgent needs of personnel and operating capital to establish a transit system, design a 
welfare program, protect tenants rights, settle union and employment problems, and design and 
implement an education plan for children.” In addition, funds were allocated for the ongoing 
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operation of the United Front’s earlier economic development initiatives, including the food 
cooperative and clothing store.72  
After struggling for almost a year with limited organizational resources, the United Front 
was now able to maintain a full-time professional staff capable of devoting considerable 
attention to the development of the organization’s political program. In most cases the United 
Front hired local Black activists, like Mabel Hollis and “Switch” Wilson, who had demonstrated 
considerable loyalty and commitment. This created jobs for local activists and ensured that 
people familiar with local conditions and networks were at the center of the United Front’s 
operations. With their salaries coming from church-based organizations located outside of the 
city, the United Front’s staff was relatively autonomous and insulated from the economic 
pressure of Cairo’s white elite. Such autonomy was important in Cairo since active participation 
in the United Front’s activities often carried the risk of harassment at the hands of white 
merchants and city officials, not to mention law enforcement.  
Hiring a permanent staff also had important programmatic implications. Without a paid 
staff structure, Black Power organizations could exhaust themselves simply doing, what the 
United Front called, “survival” work. Engaging in self-defense patrols; ensuring that Black 
community members were clothed and fed; keeping activists out of jail; these were the daily 
survival acts that many Black Power organizations performed. However, having a permanent 
staff structure afforded the United Front the stability and resources to develop more long-term 
plans to improve the social, political, and economic position of Black Cairoites. Since 
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governmental and corporate donors were unlikely to extend funds directly to Black Power 
organizations for staff salaries, the United Front’s ability to move beyond “survival” work and 
into long-term political programming was possible, to a large extent, because of their ability to 
secure more flexible church-based grants. 
The development of autonomous parallel institutions was a key component of the United 
Front’s broader political program, a fact that fit well with the funding criteria of many church-
based organizations. Grant-awarding programs like the National Committee for the Self-
Development of People placed primacy on funding self-determining initiatives that would 
eventually operate independent of external support. Accordingly, grants were extended in the 
form of seed money that allowed Black Power organizations to initiate new and innovative 
programs. This type of “start-up” funding allowed the United Front to work on a variety of 
programs, including a shopping plaza, a women’s clothing store, a prefabricated housing plant, a 
cleaners, and a food market, all operated on a cooperative basis. These programs were designed 
to create new jobs for local Black workers, provide Black consumers with an affordable 
alternative to discriminatory white business owners, and redirect accumulated wealth back into 
the Black community. 
However, the extension of seed money assumed that once economic development 
programs were established Black Cairoites would operate on an equal playing field with their 
white counterparts. In reality, the United Front’s Black-owned and -operated institutions faced 
rigorous opposition from white vigilantes and civic leaders willing to utilize a variety of legal 
and extralegal methods to destroy them. City leaders were unified in their opposition to the 
United Front and used their administrative powers to hinder the development of the 
organization’s programs at every turn. The United Front’s efforts to develop a shopping plaza, 
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for example, were halted by the city council, which in a last ditch effort to prevent the project’s 
development, refused to rezone the property the organization intended to build the plaza upon. 
Similarly, the United Front’s housing program stalled when the city council refused to sell city-
owned lots to a non-profit housing development corporation. When such methods failed, white 
vigilantes demonstrated their willingness to engage in violent, terroristic activities. The United 
Front’s clothing store and pre-fabricated housing factory both came under assault by white 
vigilantes. The United Front’s clothing store was subjected to drive-by shootings, almost killing 
a security guard who had been posted outside to protect the building. Meanwhile, arsonists 
torched the housing factory, resulting in extensive damage to the building and lumber supplies.73  
 Even if the United Front’s cooperative programs could survive these immediate threats, 
they faced more long-term structural obstacles to their efforts to achieve self-determination and 
autonomy. In Cairo, the absence of a stable Black working-class and attendant Black middle-
class meant that Black consumer power was remarkably limited. As Chapter One showed, 
Cairo’s underdeveloped Black class structure had contributed to the failure of earlier attempts to 
establish black business enterprises and cooperative institutions. The United Front’s economic 
boycott of white merchants did present the organization with a unique opportunity to capitalize 
on a highly organized and unified Black consumer base. However, once the boycott ended, the 
United Front’s cooperative institutions faced stiff competition from local business owners, not to 
mention the broader challenges presented by a regional marketplace in which industry was 
rapidly declining and large employers were consolidating their control. As political scientist                                                         
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Robert Allen explains, Black Power’s emphasis on the development of autonomous and self-
determining economic programs “assumes that the economy is still open to new enterprises.” 
This assumption, according to Allen, “is unrealistic in an era when small businesses are failing at 
a high rate and large-scale commercial enterprises, because of the virtual monopoly of gigantic 
corporations, are extremely difficult to launch.”74 
In this context, the extension of seed money by church-based organizations resulted in the 
initiation of economic development programs that often appeared destined to fall either to the 
first wave of repression or to a more long-term financial instability. The fact that the United 
Front was able to ensure that some programs survived is testament to the skill and perseverance 
of local activists as well as their ability to mobilize alternative governmental resources that they 
unwittingly believed would be more sustainable. Indeed, despite the best intentions of 
progressive Black clergy, the extension of seed money, far from putting the United Front on a 
track to self-determination and autonomy, actually increased dependence upon governmental 
funding sources that took power out of the hands of Black Cairoites, and with the end of the War 
on Poverty would eventually dry up. 
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CHAPTER 5 
“THE RECESSION OF NATIONAL SPIRIT”: 
THE DECLINE OF THE CAIRO BLACK POWER MOVEMENT 
 
Since its founding in the summer of 1969, the United Front had waged a powerful assault on 
Cairo’s unique system of racial oppression, catapulting the organization into the national 
spotlight. In a period so often characterized by sectarianism and internecine battles, the United 
Front had forged a surprisingly broad-based and inclusive coalition under the banner of a new 
spiritual philosophy and a set of shared cultural practices and discourses rooted in the Black 
church. This unique approach served to promote great solidarity among Black Cairoites and 
opened the door to new and important coalitional relationships, particularly with Black clergy 
operating at the state and national level. Building on these relationships, the United Front 
mounted one of the country’s longest and most effective economic boycotts, overturned 
longstanding practices of discrimination, and established a series of parallel institutions that 
catered to some of the most basic needs of the city’s poor and Black residents. Accordingly, 
many Black Power activists looked to Cairo as a model for organizational unity and a key 
bellwether of national trends. 
However, by January 1972, the East St. Louis Monitor reported that Cairo had “all but 
vanished from the news.” Picketing downtown had ceased a few months prior, the organization’s 
Saturday rallies were sporadic at best, and the economic boycott was, for all intents and 
purposes, broken. Black Cairoites now returned to a downtown business district decimated by 
intractable white merchants who, in many cases, favored bankruptcy over hiring Black workers 
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and extending courtesy titles to all of their customers.  Writing for the Washington Post, 
journalist Andrew Wilson pointed out that despite the failure of local business owners to meet 
the United Front’s demands, the organization had “allowed the boycott to peter out” and local 
activists had seemingly abandoned “the practice of holding weekend rallies and parades.” Mass 
mobilization and direct action, he contended, were no longer the order of the day. However, 
Wilson was quick to note that the United Front was “hardly on its last legs,” arguing that the 
organization had simply “redirected its energy.” Indeed, beginning in the winter of 1971, the 
United Front increasingly shifted organizational focus away from mass mobilization and direct 
action and toward electoral politics, state-sponsored economic development, and the mountain of 
ongoing legal cases still awaiting trial. While this strategic decision was made in earnest by 
United Front leaders determined to both protect and further the Black Freedom Movement, it 
was also a critical signpost that marked the United Front’s final hours as a mass-based 
organization engaged in the “noninstitutionalized discourses and practices of change” that 
sociologist Roberta Garner identifies as the key hallmark of any social movement. Although 
committed men and women continued to work to improve opportunities for African Americans 
in Cairo, by 1974 these efforts no longer constituted a coherent social movement.1 
 This chapter traces the closing stages of the Cairo Black Power Movement, drawing out 
those factors that contributed most significantly to its decline. In contrast to many other Black 
Power organizations, the United Front survived the narrowing structure of opportunities and 
initial wave of state repression that characterized the late 1960s and early 1970s. Moreover, the 
organization’s united front strategy, solidified by its overarching spiritual philosophy and a 
movement culture rooted in the Black church, allowed the United Front to maintain remarkable                                                         
1 “Problem Child Ignored Too Long,” The Monitor, January 20, 1972; “Police Overacts on Picketers,” The Monitor, 
January 27, 1972; Andrew Wilson, “Racially-Tense Cairo, Ill., Quiet but Loathing,” Washington Post, September 
25, 1972; Roberta Garner, Contemporary Movements and Ideologies (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1996) 12.  
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levels of internal unity. Thus, traditional accounts of Black Power’s declension that have focused 
largely on the internal disorganization of Black Power groups or the external pressure of state 
repression are by themselves less persuasive in Cairo’s case.  
Rather, in this chapter I trace the roots of the decline of the Cairo Black Power 
Movement to 1971 and the dynamic interplay of an increasingly obstinate city leadership, an 
escalation in local forms of repression, and, most importantly, the collapse of the church-based 
resources that had facilitated much of the United Front’s political program. Rather than upping 
their support at this critical juncture, the United Front’s primary sponsors - predominantly white 
mainline denominations – pulled back under pressure internally from conservative white 
congregants and externally from federal and state agencies including the FBI and the IRS. This 
so-called “recession of national spirit,” as Rev. Blaine Ramsey so aptly termed it, forced the 
United Front to make some difficult decisions about their political program and in so doing set 
the stage for the movement’s decline.  
 
Historicizing the Decline of the Black Power Movement 
 
 Until recently, interpretations of the Black Power Movement’s decline were hampered by 
a prevailing civil rights story that portrayed Black Power as a chaotic and violent aberration that 
served to undermine earlier civil rights struggles. According to such accounts, Black Power’s 
demise followed shortly after and was the almost inevitable outcome of the movement’s internal 
disorganization, overblown rhetoric, and failure to establish what political scientist Doug 
McAdam termed a “broad-based issue consensus” that could unify participants and mobilize 
coalitional support. Historians Charles Payne and Clayborn Carson also underscored what they 
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perceived as Black Power’s fatal retreat from the community organizing tradition that typified 
earlier civil rights activism, particularly that of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee 
(SNCC). When combined with narrowing political opportunities and rampant state repression, 
scholars contended that Black Power’s obituary was all but written by the end of the Sixties.2  
However, a new generation of Black Power scholarship, to which this dissertation 
contributes, overturns this narrative by tracing the contours of a number of previously 
overlooked local struggles that survived well into the early 1970s. Such studies have transformed 
understandings of Black Power’s character and periodization as well as having taken some 
tentative steps towards a reinterpretation of the movement’s untimely demise. Most obviously, 
by pushing the movement forward into the 1970s these studies demonstrate that the narrowing 
structure of political opportunities ushered in by the rise of the New Right and the wave of state 
repression that followed did not immediately result in Black Power’s decline. In fact, historian 
Peniel Joseph contends that a “second wave” of Black Power organizations came to the fore after 
1970, skillfully adapting their approaches to the harsh political realities of the period. Studies of 
these previously overlooked struggles upend interpretations of Black Power’s declension as a 
logical outcome of activists’ abandonment of the community organizing tradition. Rather, as 
Joseph contends, these studies show that Black Power activists “amplified traditions of 
community organizing” as opposed to weakening them. Nevertheless, the consensus in the 
emergent subfield of Black Power Studies, with few exceptions, is that the national movement 
had ended by 1975, raising new and important questions in regards to causality.3  
                                                        
2 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 186. 
3 Quotes taken from Joseph, Waiting ‘Til the Midnight Hour, 276-8 and “The Black Power Movement: A State of 
the Field,” 1-26. Other works that emphasize Black Power’s continuation and deepening of the community 
organizing tradition include: Countryman, Up South, 7-8; Joseph, ed., The Black Power Movement: Rethinking the 
Civil Rights-Black Power Era. 
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Somewhat surprisingly, recent studies have reached remarkably similar conclusions 
regarding the causes of Black Power’s decline as their predecessors. Despite rejecting the claim 
that Black Power represented a shift away from the community organizing tradition, the more 
general conception of the movement as internally disorganized and divided continues to hold 
sway, particularly at the national level. Scholars have drawn particular attention to the 
ideological diversity of Black Power and the difficulties this presented to a coalitional or united 
front approach. Historian William Van DeBurg contends that the movement was dogged by 
“spirited critiques” from within that made “it appear that none of the activists’ programmatic 
approaches to empowerment were viable.” In contrast, Joseph finds room for hope in the modern 
Black convention movement that reached its zenith at the 1972 Gary Convention, but argues that 
efforts to forge a united front between the movement’s disparate ideological wings were aborted 
shortly after by a resurgent sectarianism. Furthermore, well-known fissures between cultural and 
revolutionary nationalists, not to mention mainstream civil rights organizations and radical Black 
Power groups, often overlapped with other important divisions rooted in class, region, generation 
and gender. Intraracial class divisions, in particular, have emerged as a key factor in narratives of 
movement decline, with historian Clarence Lang persuasively arguing that a truly democratic, 
grassroots approach to Black Power was ultimately undercut by a Black middle-class agenda that 
focused narrowly on the aims of Black capitalists and politicians. Lang builds upon the work of 
sociologist Robert Allen who in his landmark 1969 study, Black Awakening in Capitalist 
America, argued that the Black middle-class captured the Black Power Movement and harnessed 
its energy and ideology of Black Nationalism to expand their own economic and political power 
over Black communities, often producing little in the way of tangible gains for the Black 
working-class.4                                                         
4 Joseph, Waiting ‘Til the Midnight Hour, 263; Van Deburg, A New Day in Babylon, 295, 301; Allen, Black 
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While scholars generally agree that internal divisions contributed to Black Power’s 
decline, most view external factors as equally, if not more, important. Particular emphasis is 
placed on the narrowing structure of political and economic opportunities faced by Black Power 
organizations during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The rise of the New Right and “backlash” 
politics undermined the War on Poverty, slashed domestic spending, and ushered in a “law and 
order” agenda that powerfully shaped the context in which Black Power activists operated. A key 
component of this delimited structure of opportunities was an upsurge in the repressive moves of 
state actors, a factor that scholars have almost universally emphasized as contributing to Black 
Power’s decline. Repression came in many different forms and at the hands of multiple 
individuals and groups, including federal agencies like the FBI and the IRS, as well as state and 
local law enforcement. Studies of specific nationalist and radical organizations show the 
devastating effect these forms of repression had on the movement’s militant wing and their 
corollary role in fostering tensions both within and between Black Power organizations. 
Accordingly, external repression has also been attributed a role in the exacerbation of internal 
disorganization and divisions.5 
However, the salience of such factors in explaining Black Power’s decline comes with 
some important caveats in light of the sustained activity of many Black Power organizations 
throughout the early 1970s. While the periodization of earlier studies implied that the emergence 
of  “law and order” politics after President Nixon’s election in 1968 had an almost immediate 
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effect, more recent accounts reveal that many local organizations were able to adapt and survive 
to their new and hostile surroundings. Which organizations survived and how they were able to 
adapt is an important but understudied question. However, scholars increasingly point toward an 
interpretation of decline that emphasizes the gradual, cumulative, and often, uneven effect of 
repression on the Black Power Movement and the adaptability of many local organizations 
against the odds. Accordingly, historian Matthew Countryman correctly argues that a narrowing 
structure of political and economic opportunities “can provide only a partial explanation for the 
decline in popular response to Black Power appeals during the 1970s.”6  
 Thus, scholars have presented three main causes of Black Power’s decline: internal 
disorganization and division; narrowing political and economic opportunities; and the destructive 
role of state repression. In their accounts, scholars tend to mobilize several of these claims 
simultaneously. For example, the combination of a delimited structure of opportunities and state 
repression is often characterized as having contributed to the destruction of radical Black Power 
groups and the incorporation of their more moderate counterparts. However, scholarly attempts 
to elucidate the causes of decline, whether nationally or locally, tend to be lacking in spatial and 
historical specificity. What is often lost in such accounts is the agency of Black Power activists. 
Decline often becomes the tragic, but inevitable outcome of a catalog of errors and 
insurmountable obstacles.  
By examining Black Power’s decline at the local level in Cairo, Illinois, this chapter 
builds upon and complicates the preceding scholarship. At the grassroots, the story of decline 
was often a gradual one in which small but significant changes in the structure of opportunities, 
the character of repression, and, importantly, the resources of an organization, all contributed to 
the movement’s decline. While studies have tended to emphasize the cumulative pressure that                                                         
6 Countryman, Up South, 329. 
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these factors placed upon the Black Power Movement, as though each added a little more weight 
to an already weak foundation, this chapter argues that it was the interplay between specific and, 
in some cases, innocuous factors that ultimately mattered most.  
Finally, this chapter seeks to restore the agency of Black Power activists to react and 
respond to their changing conditions. Far from being crushed by external factors like state 
repression and narrowing political opportunities, the United Front was able to adapt and survive 
as a result of the skill of their leading activists. Tactical innovation, the skill of adjusting and 
adapting to new conditions and threats, was in abundant supply in Cairo. However, tactical 
innovation also provides a key to understanding the often-overlooked role that Black Power 
activists played themselves in the de-escalation of mass mobilization. In Cairo, the decline of 
Black Power as a social movement is a story of conscious tactical decisions made in the context 
of narrowing opportunities, of repression and of dwindling resources. 
 
Black Power Against All Odds 
 
In October 1971, the St. Louis-based magazine, PROUD, published an article by freelance 
journalist Michael Watson about his recent visit to Cairo, Illinois. Watson cast the significance of 
the Cairo struggle in the highest possible terms, defining the city as “the seat of racism and 
oppression” and the primary “battleground for Black Survival in the country.” “Why such 
importance for Cairo?” Watson asked. “Because leaders in the black struggle view it as a 
microcosm of America – a forecast of what is to become in the not too distant future.” Visions of 
the nation’s future through a Cairo-shaped lens carried foreboding and terror. “Here,” Watson 
declared, “polarization of the races is complete” and “here the white forces of business, 
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government, and the military have joined in their efforts to stamp out black insurrections in a 
raw, overt display of power.” Watson concluded, “There is no hiding behind the facades of 
accommodation and social amenity… The lines are sharply drawn.”7 
Watson’s comments point to the remarkably repressive conditions and narrow structure 
of opportunities faced by Black Power activists in Cairo, Illinois. While political opposition 
handcuffed Black Power organizations across the country, Black Cairoites had to negotiate the 
triple threat of a conservative president, an unsympathetic Republican governor, and an 
intractable white city leadership. Elsewhere Black Power activists might leverage discourses of 
civility to secure incremental changes to public policy and access to anti-poverty funding. In 
Cairo, Black Power activists locked horns with militant white officials who refused to 
compromise, opting to use public policy as a weapon and actively obstructing federal War on 
Poverty funds. In another city, the failure of white officials to compromise might jeopardize their 
electoral chances and would certainly fuel the rise of Black officialdom. However, in Cairo, 
Black candidates ran up against an at-large electoral system that neutralized African American 
voting power and effectively locked Blacks out of the political process.  The city’s business elite, 
as Watson argued, also took a hard line, refusing to bend to the prolonged economic boycott 
opting, in many cases, to close downtown stores rather than hire Black workers. In this manner, 
Cairo’s civic elite stymied even the smallest reforms to the status quo. 
Underpinning the city’s political and economic elite and serving to further cement their 
intransigence was vigilante terror mounted by a highly organized chapter of the White Citizens 
Council, known locally as the United Citizens for Community Action (U.C.C.A.). Founded in 
July 1969 by local businessmen Carl Helt and Bob Cunningham, the U.C.C.A. grew to an 
estimated two thousand members and encompassed a broad cross-section of Cairo’s white                                                         
7 Michael Watson, “CAIRO,” PROUD, October 1971. 
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population. The U.C.C.A. functioned as a vigilante organization and a powerful pressure group 
lobbying city leaders to operate in a manner consistent with their ideals. The most important 
among these ideals was the preservation of white supremacy, a fact made abundantly clear by the 
large sign hanging outside of the organization’s offices on Washington Avenue, which was 
blazoned with a Confederate Flag and the motto “State’s Rights-Racial Integrity”. This ideology 
was further elaborated in the organization’s monthly publication, The Tri-State Informer, of 
which Carl Helt was the editor. By October 1971, the paper boasted a circulation reaching 28 
states with articles written by members of Citizens Council chapters across the country. 
Moreover, the U.C.C.A. maintained close ties with other white supremacist organizations across 
the region. Through these organizational networks, Cairo became a flashpoint for white 
supremacist activity during the late 1960s and early 1970s.8  
The U.C.C.A proved remarkably successful in pressuring Cairo’s white civic leadership 
to adopt a heavy-handed “no compromise” approach. As the previous chapter showed, U.C.C.A. 
members played a key role in securing the passage of a series of local “law and order” policies 
including a civil emergency ordinance and a number of strict picketing and parade laws. 
However, between 1969 and 1971 the U.C.C.A.’s real stronghold was in law enforcement, where 
longstanding segregationist Peyton Berbling served as State’s Attorney and a number of 
U.C.C.A. members worked closely with the police department. After visiting the city in 
December 1970, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist J. Anthony Lukas published an article in the 
New Y ork Times Magazine in which he characterized white vigilantes and local police as being                                                         
8 Kohn, “Civil War in Cairo, Ill.”; “White Citizens Council Founder to Speak in Cairo,” The Monitor (East St. 
Louis, Ill.) May 28, 1970; "Rap Nazis in Cairo Fray," Chicago Daily Defender, August 18, 1970. "Responsibility for 
Riots Place on Mayor, White Hats, and Nazi's," United Front News, August 15, 1970. "Nazis Surface," United Front 
News, August 22, 1970. “American Nazi Party Supports Cairo Whites,” The Monitor (East St. Louis, Ill.) August 
20, 1970; “U.C.C.A. Plays Host to Shannon Meeting,” The Tri-State Informer, January 1972; Editorial, The Tri-
State Informer, October 1971. 
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virtually indistinguishable due to the Sheriff’s continued practice of deputizing local white men. 
During his visit, Lukas was able to obtain a list of the deputies, proving that only a handful were 
professionally trained and that a significant number were known to be either active members or 
sympathizers of the U.C.C.A. One of those men was Bob Hogan, who in 1953 pled guilty to a 
“malicious mischief” charge stemming from the bombing of the home of civil rights activist Dr. 
Urbane Bass. “Today,” Lukas ironically stated, “he [Hogan] is a sheriff’s deputy authorized to 
patrol the streets of Cairo with a rifle or submachine gun and keep racial peace.” Wilbert Beard, 
an African American who had recently resigned from the police force, further corroborated these 
allegations in an interview with Lukas. Beard explained that during his three and a half years 
with the Cairo Police Department, he had been privy to the extraordinarily close ties that existed 
between the U.C.C.A. and white police officers. According to Beard, members of the vigilante 
group were “real chummy with the police” and  “in and out of the police station all the time.” 
Moreover, after being contracted by the city to perform an independent study of these concerns, 
the Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police (ICAP) bluntly concluded that the Cairo Police 
Department was “insensitive to the racial conditions confronting them” and had failed to 
demonstrate “the ability to maintain order with justice or to achieve the traditional objectives of a 
police agency.” Despite these obvious red flags, the Cairo police force continued to operate with 
only cosmetic changes during the late 1960s and early 1970s.9  
On the few occasions that the police department failed to enforce the law in a manner 
deemed appropriate by the organization, U.C.C.A. members took aggressive action, forcing the 
resignation of three police chiefs in less than two years and threatening others unless their 
concerns were addressed. Similar actions were taken against other high-ranking city officials, 
including the mayor. In this context, even those white officials considered to be more moderate                                                         
9 Lukas, “Bad Day at Cairo, Ill.”; “Report Call Cairo Police Incompetent,” The Monitor, December 10, 1970. 
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tended to capitulate to the U.C.C.A.’s demands. As one city official told a reporter from the St. 
Louis Post Dispatch: “We send out the police and let them fire on the [Pyramid Court] project to 
keep the whites satisfied.”10  
The ties between local law enforcement, city officials, and the U.C.C.A. allowed the 
organization to engage in a systematic campaign of terrorism against the city’s Black residents 
without fear of arrest or prosecution. Indeed, United Front leaders contended that many of the 
assaults on Black homes and businesses were conducted with the direct participation and 
sanction of local police officers. The truth of these allegations was exposed to the nation in 
December 1970 when J. Anthony Lukas and other journalists from national publications 
descended on Cairo only to witness the outbreak of a police riot. Lukas depicted peaceful Black 
protesters facing off against law enforcement and deputized white vigilantes “armed with 
automatic carbines, submachine guns, grease guns, shotguns and oversized riot sticks.” Scuffles 
quickly broke out when police threw one local activist, Herman Whitfield, up against an 
unmarked police car and pointed a shotgun at another, James “Switch” Wilson, while officers 
beat him to the ground with billy clubs. Shortly after, shots rang out by the Ohio River levee and 
police ordered everyone, including Lukas, off the streets. Later it was discovered that Lloyd 
Bosecker, a police deputy, had been shot in the melee as the United Front, U.C.C.A., and police 
officers exchanged gunfire. Black witnesses alleged that Bosecker had been caught in police                                                         
10 Quote taken from Kohn, “Civil War in Cairo, Ill.”. Cairo City Council Minutes, September 15, 1969; “Cairo Has 
New Police Chief; Carl Clutts Resigns Post,” Cairo Evening Citizen, May 27, 1969; Cairo City Council Minutes, 
May 26, 1969; “Races War in Little Egypt,” Time Magazine (September 26, 1969); “Stenzel, Peterson Resign as 
Mayor, Police Chief,” Cairo Evening Citizen, September 16, 1969; Gavzer, “Fear and Hate Abound; Gap Is 
Widening,”; Cairo City Council Minutes, December 8, 1969; “Citizens Appear before City Council Meeting; 
Demand Immediate Law and Order in Cairo,” Cairo Evening Citizen, December 9, 1969; “White Hats Force Police 
Chief to Resign,” The Monitor, January 8, 1970; “Mystery Surrounds Shooting At Police Station,” The Monitor, 
January 8, 1970; “Police Chief Attacks Judge, Then Quits,” The Monitor, January 8, 1970; “Can Cairo Hide Its 
Image?” The Monitor, January 8, 1970; Cairo City Council Minutes, September 14, 1970; “No Tears in Cairo as 
Burke Resigns,” United Front News, August 29, 1970; Cairo City Council Minutes, October 12, 1970; “All-White 
Group Picks New Police Chief,” The Monitor (East St. Louis, Ill.) October 22, 1970; U.C.C.A., [untitled pamphlet], 
Alliance to End Repression Records, n.d., Chicago Historical Society, Chicago, Il, box 7, folder 36. 
 274 
crossfire, but five Black men were quickly arrested and charged with attempted murder. Howard 
Kohn of Ramparts magazine was also in Cairo that day and described the scene as a “free-for-
all.”11 
The police riot of December 1970 was not the only instance of open collaboration 
between white vigilantes and local law enforcement, though it was the most publicized. Between 
1969 and 1971, arson and sporadic gunfire were an almost daily experience for Black Cairoites. 
Black businesses were firebombed, homes shot into, and churches burned. According to former 
police officer, Wilbert Beard, white officers often had advance knowledge of such acts. “It was 
uncanny,” he explained, “but they’d already have men on stand-by.” Accordingly, arrests of 
white vigilantes were few and far between. A 1971 report released by the Chicago-based civil 
liberties organization Alliance to End Repression showed that only three white Cairoites were 
arrested between March 3, 1969 and June 1, 1971. None were convicted despite the fact that 
during the same period there were reportedly more than 140 incidents of shooting or firebombing 
directed at the homes and businesses of Black residents. As testament to the sheer absurdity of 
law enforcement in Cairo, one of these three cases involved Black residents performing a 
citizen’s arrest of a white man caught shooting into a Black church and a second was of a white 
man who had fired shots at police officers.12 
Republican Governor Richard Ogilvie’s periodic deployment of state police did little to 
rectify these inequities. Instead, state troopers played a key role in enforcing the city’s repressive 
ordinances arresting Black protesters in droves. Moreover, their presence sparked new                                                         
11 Lukas, “Bad Day at Cairo, Ill.”; Kohn, “Civil War in Cairo, Ill.” 
12 Lukas, “Bad Day at Cairo, Ill.”; The Alliance to End Repression, “Chronology,” 1971, Alliance to End Repression 
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allegations of discriminatory treatment and brutality. United Front activists accused state police 
of failing to investigate the complaints of Black residents and standing by as local law 
enforcement and white vigilantes harassed and shot into their communities. At the same time, 
state police heavily patrolled the Pyramid Courts and secured “blanket” search warrants to raid 
the homes of Black residents in search of weapons. Many local activists believed that this 
harassment was an attempt to bait the Black community into acts of retaliatory violence that 
would serve to justify a full-scale assault on the housing project. While a full-scale assault was 
averted, Black residents living in the Pyramid Courts continued to live in fear, arming 
themselves and sleeping in bathtubs or under beds for protection.13 
Indeed, the laxity with which local and state police enforced the law against white 
vigilantes was matched only by the severe and unjust manner with which the same officers 
handled Black Cairoites and their allies in the United Front. The Alliance to End Repression 
report showed that a total of 266 African Americans, in contrast to 3 whites, were arrested 
between March 3, 1969 and June 1, 1971. While many were smaller ordinance and vehicular 
charges, in the summer of 1970 local and state police also began arresting high profile Black 
Power activists on trumped-up felony charges carrying high bail bonds. In June, several of the 
United Front’s key leaders fell victim to these sweeps including, Rev. Charles Koen and James 
“Switch” Wilson for aggravated battery; Rev. Manker Harris for attempted murder; and Herman 
Whitfield for assault with a deadly weapon – the weapon being a charm bracelet. With the 
support of the Lawyer’s Committee, the United Front was successful in securing acquittals in the                                                         
13 “State Police Plot to Kill Blacks,” The Monitor  (East St. Louis, Ill.) February 12, 1970; “United Front Marches 
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vast majority of these cases at jury trial. In fact, the Alliance to End Repression’s report indicated 
that only 2 of the 266 arrests had resulted in a conviction prior to June 1, 1971. However, the 
arrests and repression continued unabated and towards the end of the year Mayor Pete Thomas 
ratcheted up the tension by issuing a “shoot-to-kill” order if racial disturbances occurred. “And 
when I say we’re gonna kill ‘em,” Mayor Thomas explained, “I mean we’re gonna kill ‘em.”14 
 When vigilante violence and police harassment failed to halt the United Front’s activities, 
city officials and federal agents collaborated in an effort to destroy the organization’s internal 
unity. The FBI had closely monitored Charles Koen’s activities since his time with the Black 
Liberators in St. Louis in 1968. Koen had been placed high on the agency’s Security and 
Agitator Index’s for so-called “Black extremists.” After Koen moved back to Cairo, his 
surveillance continued and was expanded as the FBI opened separate case files on several of the 
United Front’s key leaders. Working in close collaboration with local and state law enforcement, 
federal agents attempted to track the United Front’s activities and develop local informants who 
could provide a continuous stream of information on the Black Power group. However, despite 
their best efforts, the United Front proved to be a remarkably difficult group to infiltrate due to 
the extremely strong social networks that existed in the city. Beginning in November 1970, FBI 
Director J. Edgar Hoover wrote a series of memos to the Springfield FBI criticizing local agents 
for failing to develop contacts within Cairo’s Black community that could provide advance                                                         
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information regarding the United Front’s activities. This failure on the part of Springfield agents 
was not for lack of trying.  In a memo dated November 27, 1970, Springfield agents explained 
the difficulties they faced in their effort to “develop informants who have an inside working 
knowledge of the tightly knit Cairo United Front.” Clearly unimpressed, Hoover informed 
Springfield agents that he was “deeply concerned” by the violence in Cairo and their “failure to 
secure advance, pertinent information.” The FBI director demanded that the agents exert “more 
effort, more imagination and supervisory direction” toward the “development of racial 
informants in Cairo.” However, Hoover appeared much less interested in securing advance 
information on the white vigilantes that had been terrorizing the Black community for more than 
a year.15   
 Spurred by Hoover’s criticism, Springfield FBI agents intensified their efforts to identify 
potential informants in Cairo’s Black community. Agents focused initially on the Pyramid 
Courts, constructing a working profile of the housing project’s residents and performing 
interviews with individuals they hoped would become the agency’s eyes and ears. By the end of 
1970, Springfield agents had developed at least three “confidential sources” who provided 
regular information regarding the United Front’s activities. According to FBI records, all three 
informants were African American and had access to the United Front’s public meetings and 
events. None were part of the organization’s inner core.16  
                                                        
15 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Memorandum from SAC, Springfield to Director, FBI,” 27 November 1970; J. 
Edgar Hoover, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Memorandum from Director, FBI to SAC, Springfield,” 1 
December 1970; Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Memorandum from SAC, Springfield to Director, FBI,” 31 
August, 1970; J. Edgar Hoover, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Memorandum from Director, FBI to SAC, 
Springfield,” 4 December, 1970; Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Memorandum from SAC, Springfield to 
Director, FBI,” 30 November, 1970. 
16 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Memorandum from SAC, Springfield to Director, FBI,” 30 November, 1970; 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Memorandum from SAC, Springfield to Director, FBI, WFO, St. Louis, Chicago, 
and Kansas City,” 19 December, 1970; Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Memorandum from SAC, Springfield to 
Director, FBI,” 21 December, 1970; Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Memorandum from SAC, Springfield to 
Director, FBI,” 15 January, 1971. 
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Information obtained from confidential informants assisted the FBI in its broader effort to 
disrupt the United Front’s operations. In November 1970, FBI agents targeted local Black 
businessman James Avery as a potential informant. A former boxer and state police officer, 
Avery had apparently been on friendly terms with the United Front before he had decided to go 
to police with information regarding a break-in that took place at his tavern. Branded a traitor for 
speaking with police, Avery became the only Black business owner targeted by the boycott and 
his tavern was ultimately forced to close in November 1970. FBI records indicate that 
Springfield agents approached Avery shortly afterwards and “encouraged” him to “attempt to 
discredit the United Front.” Avery allegedly responded with some enthusiasm, explaining to FBI 
agents that he intended to file criminal charges against United Front leaders and “air an appeal to 
the black people in Cairo to no longer follow the dictate of… the United Front.” Springfield 
agents notified their superiors that Avery was “confident that with backing he will be able to 
break the United Front hold on Cairo and gain a peaceful settlement of all difficulties.”17 
 In January 1971, Avery mounted a high profile but ultimately unsuccessful challenge to 
Koen’s leadership. Showing up at a United Front rally at St. Columba’s Church, Avery 
petitioned those present to reconsider their support for Koen and the organization. “The United 
Front ain’t out for you,” he bellowed, “They’re really out for themselves.”  Avery was booed out 
of the hall, gaining virtually no support from those in attendance. However, in the weeks that 
followed he continued his campaign on local television and radio networks, calling upon Black 
Cairoites to participate in a formal election on January 16 to decide once and for all the 
legitimate leadership of the Black community. Rumors abounded as to where Avery was getting 
his support. The Chicago Defender alleged that Avery had received “materials and some money”                                                         
17 Lukas, "Bad Day at Cairo, Ill."; Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Memorandum from SAC, Springfield to 
Director, FBI,” 8 January 1971. 
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from local white officials who had also “arranged for TV appearances and radio spots to 
proclaim his challenge.” Koen agreed, informing a journalist from the Defender that Avery was 
“being supported by the Mayor, and the council and who knows what else.” Indeed, FBI reports 
reveal a chain of evidence that implicates officials at the highest levels. Classified inter-agency 
memos reveal that President Nixon, Vice President Spiro Agnew, Attorney General Robert 
Mitchell, the military, and the Secret Service were all kept abreast as to Avery’s efforts to 
“depose” Koen.18 
 Despite this coordinated effort, the vote was an unmitigated failure for Avery and those 
who had backed him. While Avery continued to work to build popular opposition to the United 
Front in Cairo’s Black community, such attempts struggled in the face of the organization’s 
broad-based consensus and internal unity. In a 1971 report, IFCO’s assistant director Lorenzo 
“Renny” Freeman described Cairo as “the most cohesive Black community I have ever 
experienced. All elements seem to be represented in the [United Front] hierarchy and no 
polarization is evident within the organization. The ranks are well closed.” 19  
Indeed, by the start of 1971 it seemed that the United Front had beaten the odds. Despite 
facing an extraordinarily narrow structure of opportunities and a coordinated pattern of 
repression, the organization did not fragment or collapse but rather made significant strides in 
efforts to address the plight of Cairo’s poor and Black population. The United Front’s 
deployment of armed self-defense, including its adoption of “survival patrols” and a checkpoint 
system at the entrance to the Pyramid Courts, allowed community members to survive this initial                                                         
18 Kohn, “Civil War in Cairo, Ill.”; “Speaking of Condolences,” United Front News, January 16, 1970; “Echoes 
From One of One The Silent Majority,” The Monitor, January 21, 1971; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
“Memorandum from SAC, Springfield to Director, FBI,” 14 January, 1971; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
“Memorandum from SAC, Springfield to Director, FBI,” 13 January, 1971; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
“Memorandum from Domestic Intelligence Division,” 15 January, 1971; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
“Memorandum from SAC, Springfield to Director, FBI,” 15 January, 1971; David Smothers, “Cairo, Ill. – City of 
fear, despair,” Chicago Daily Defender, February 8, 1971. 
19 Freeman, “The United Black Front of Cairo, Illinois a Situational Report.”  
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wave of violence and restrained the potential for retaliation. Moreover, by collaborating with the 
Lawyer’s Committee, the United Front was eventually able to secure some important legal 
victories. However, the United Front was, by no means, in an exclusively defensive posture. As 
the previous chapters showed, Black Power activists advanced a progressive political program 
that included a successful boycott of downtown businesses and the development of a series of 
autonomous parallel institutions designed to build economic power within Cairo’s Black 
community. Furthermore, the United Front was able to mobilize a powerful coalition, planting 
chapters in cities across the region and establishing a national organizational infrastructure with 
Charles Koen at the helm. 
This is not to suggest that the effects of police harassment, vigilante violence, and city 
intransigence were insignificant; quite the opposite. Instead of viewing repression as a simple 
“cost” imposed upon social movement organizations by authorities, scholars increasingly favor 
an interpretation that focuses on the dynamic interaction of repression and mobilization and the 
often unintended consequences that result. While repression did not initially crush movement 
mobilization in Cairo, it powerfully shaped the approaches adopted by Black Power activists, 
prompting a series of, what political scientist Doug McAdam has called, “tactical innovations.” 
Even before returning to Cairo in 1968, Charles Koen’s experience of severe repression at the 
hands of St. Louis police officers and FBI agents prompted him to reevaluate the strategies and 
tactics utilized by the Black Liberators. The Cairo movement’s adoption of a united front 
approach, combined with a spiritual philosophy that emphasized both nonviolent direct-action 
and disciplined armed self-defense, was at least partially motivated by this experience and 
designed to insulate the organization from more extreme forms of repression. This kind of 
tactical innovation continued as activists struggled to respond to the realities of movement 
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mobilization in Cairo. For example, the economic boycott, a tactic wholly consistent with the 
United Front’s broader strategy of nonviolent direct-action, was eventually superseded by the 
creation of parallel institutions when it became apparent that white merchants and city leaders 
were unwilling to compromise. In this manner, even when narrow political opportunities and 
systematic repression failed to destroy local movements outright, they contributed powerfully to 
the transformation of movement strategies and tactics.20 
 
Church-Based Resources and the Seeds of Decline 
 
In January 1971, as the United Front rang in the New Year, many commentators viewed 
the organization as the only bright spot remaining in the struggle for freedom and justice. 
Reviewing the events of the last twelve months, the Chicago Daily Defender characterized 1970 
as having been “a slow year for civil rights.” “Activity on the civil rights front,” according to the 
paper, had “dropped to a murmur” as “more militant organizations either changed their modus 
operandi or went completely underground.” Many Black Power activists had reportedly 
“redirected their energies from the podium to the backroom,” rendering demonstrations and 
direct action “obsolete.” “Nowhere,” the paper concluded, “is anybody doing anything, except in 
Cairo and the political arena.” While somewhat exaggerated, statements like these provide a 
contemporary account of Black Power at a critical juncture. Faced with heightened repression 
and a narrowing structure of political and economic opportunities, many Black Power activists 
had apparently abandoned mass mobilization and direct action in favor of Black officialdom. In 
                                                        
20 See Doug McAdam, “Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency,” American Sociological Review 48, no. 6 
(Dec., 1983), pp. 735-754.  
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this context, the Cairo United Front appeared to be a throwback to the militancy of a prior and 
quickly fading tradition.21  
 However, the United Front had not escaped 1970 unscathed. The organization entered the 
New Year in dire financial straits after being saddled with the burden of skyrocketing bail bonds 
accumulated during the law enforcement sweeps of the preceding months. On a single day in 
December 1970, fifteen United Front members were arrested and jailed, resulting in over 
$100,000 in bail bond costs for the organization. Many of those targeted were United Front 
leaders, a fact that placed added pressure on the activist community. The arrests continued in 
January and February as James Chairs, chief of staff for the United Front, was picked up while 
protesting the discriminatory practices of state and local police at the Governor’s office in 
Springfield. Shortly after, state police raided the Pyramid Courts, arresting Frank Hollis, Debra 
Flowers, and James “Switch” Wilson on federal gun charges. In March, the courts ruled the 
search warrants to be illegal, but the damage had already been done. Large segments of the 
United Front leadership were now awaiting trial and the organization was floundering under a 
mountain of legal bills.22  
 The United Front’s ability to meet bail bond and keep key activists out of jail hinged on 
the organization’s relationship with external donors. The United Front was heavily reliant upon 
funds extended by church-based organizations. Grant awarding bodies including the 
Interreligious Foundation for Community Organizations (IFCO), the Episcopal Church’s General 
Convention Special Program, and the Presbyterian Church’s National Committee on the Self-                                                        
21 "'70 Was a Slow Year for Civil Rights," Chicago Daily Defender, January 2, 1971. 
22  “More Money Needed for Bail Bonds,” United Front News, December 19, 1970; “More Money Needed For 
Bonds; Arrests Continue In Cairo,” United Front News, January 16, 1971; “James Chair, Chief of Staff, First to Be 
Arrested at Governor’s Office,” United Front News, January 16, 1971; “State Police Continues Actions Against 
Blacks,” The Monitor, February 18, 1971; “Court Says Police Raids were Illegal,” The Monitor, March 25, 1971; 
“Police Raid Black Homes,” The Monitor, January 28, 1971; "Trial Dates Set in Alexander County Circuit Court," 
United Front News, January 16, 1971; "Koen: Wihtes Can't Split Cairo Blacks," Chicago Daily Defender, January 
19, 1971. 
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Development of People extended critical resources to the United Front that sustained much of the 
organization’s daily operations and political programming. In addition, predominantly white 
denominations provided emergency legal aid donations that helped the organization counteract 
repression by law enforcement. However, by 1971 United Front activists and their network of 
allies within national denominational structures began to express concern about the reliability of 
church-based funding. An upsurge of opposition to the church’s social justice initiatives among 
white lay people, the emergence of an organized conservative opposition within denominational 
hierarchies, and the growing popularity of evangelical and fundamentalist alternatives all 
contributed to a significant decline in mainline denominational support for the United Front and 
other Black Power organizations during this period. 
 From his position at the Illinois Council of Churches (ICC), Rev. Blaine Ramsey was 
among the first to spot the warning signs. As chair of the ICC’s ecumenical Special Task Force 
Committee, Ramsey was well-situated to observe broader trends within the nation’s largest 
denominations and as early as May 1970 sounded the alarm that funding for local Black Power 
struggles was unstable. In a report written that month, Ramsey informed the leadership of the 
ICC that the “greatest problem” facing his agency was that major denominations would “cop 
out” on funding Black Power organizations. According to Ramsey, this trend was already 
“evidenced by an increased reluctance on the part of some to work ecumenically with programs 
which the Task Force designates as being necessary to accomplish a reconciled community.” 
While Task Force staff were doing their best “to maintain financial and moral support” for such 
programs, Ramsey argued that they were dealing with denominations that were often reluctant to 
extend resources due to their own “polarized constituency,” “dwindling funds,” and “a so-called 
reordering of denominational priorities.” In addition to these internal factors, Ramsey also 
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pointed to the increased burden imposed on church resources by what he perceived to be 
competing struggles. “National events related to pollution, campus unrest and national violence, 
aggravated by the Vietnam War and the Cambodian incursion have not helped,” Ramsey 
explained. “These events have overshadowed the unresolved problems of black people in the 
nation’s ghettos.” When combined with the fact that churches were planning “to cut back in 
areas of social action and ecumenical relations,” Ramsey saw little reason for optimism. “The 
unhappy picture of the ecumenical church in Illinois,” he concluded, “reflects the recession of 
national spirit.” Over the next few months, Ramsey’s immediate fears for the United Front were 
allayed by IFCO’s extension of a substantial grant to the organization. However, his report was 
prescient in that it highlighted major shifts taking place within liberal denominations that in the 
coming years would place extreme pressure upon the United Front. 23 
 During the late 1960s and early 1970s, an abundance of studies pointed to the latent 
conflict burning just beneath the surface of many Protestant and Catholic congregations. In his 
1969 bestseller, The Gathering Storm in the Churches, sociologist Jeffrey Hadden described how 
the “New Breed” of clergy and church executives, radicalized in the crucible of Civil Rights and 
the War on Poverty, were now finding themselves polarized from a more conservative laity. 
According to Hadden, tensions between clergy and laity had deep roots in longstanding 
theological debates over the Social Gospel and Higher Criticism but had been exacerbated by the 
very visible involvement of progressive clergy in the civil rights struggles of the 1960s. A 1967 
national opinion poll showed that while less than 10 per cent of mainline Protestant clergy 
“basically disapproved” of the modern Civil Rights Movement, almost half of all church 
attenders polled were opposed. When the question of clergy involvement in protests was raised,                                                         
23 Blaine Ramsey, “Report of the Inter-Organization Task Force for Community Action,” May 28, 1970, ICC 
Records, box 11, folder 20; Minutes of the Executive Committee of Inter-Organization Task Force Committee on 
Social Action, October 13, 1970, ICC Records, box 12, folder 1. 
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the numbers were even more telling. Half of all Catholic and Protestant church attenders 
indicated that they believed that clergy “should stick to religion and not concern themselves with 
social, economic, and political questions.” When asked specifically about clergy’s participation 
in picketing and demonstration’s almost three-quarters of church attenders indicated that such 
activity did “more harm than good” and that they would be personally “upset” if they were to 
discover their own minister or priest was participating.24 
 Sociologist Yoshio Fukuyama’s 1968 study of the United Church of Christ reinforced 
many of Hadden’s findings but underscored important distinctions in the perspectives of Black 
and white parishioners. While only 20 percent of white respondents felt that their church leaders 
should spend a lot of time “working for social justice,” 77 percent of African American 
respondents indicated that this was a key responsibility of clergy. Moreover, while white 
respondents ranked “working for social justice” tenth in frequency among twelve ministerial 
roles, African Americans respondents ranked it first. Thus, even in the most liberal of Protestant 
denominations, important divisions existed between both laity and clergy and Black and white 
parishioners as to the role and responsibility of clergy in regards to social justice. As Hadden 
explains, these disparities constituted “a very significant source of conflict within the churches” 
and put activist clergy on “a collision course” with a large segment of the laity. 25 
 The growing ties between progressive clergy and the Black Power Movement 
exacerbated these tensions. The use of church revenues by new denominational task forces and 
grant-awarding bodies to bolster local Black Power struggles was for many laypeople in sharp 
conflict with their understanding of the role and responsibility of the church. In his 1971 book, 
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Protestant Power and the Coming Revolution, author Will Oursler documented the rise of an 
increasingly organized conservative response from within mainline denominations. “There is a 
growing fear,” Oursler explained,” that the churches are moving too far into the questionable 
action programs.” While laity would “accept moral and spiritual guidance from their pastor,” 
Oursler argued that most believed that “they should be free to make their own judgments on any 
individual political issue without interference.” Accordingly, many conservative laypersons, 
Oursler explained, recoiled at the idea of being “committed as individuals or a congregation to 
the support of groups and causes with which they may not sympathize – and which they may 
actively oppose.”26 
 The fact that decisions about funding Black Power organizations tended to be made by 
church executives at the highest levels of the denominational structure with little input from local 
laypeople further antagonized conservative laypersons. Despite subscribing to the doctrine of the 
priesthood of all believers, laity in mainline Protestant denominations had long entrusted 
authority to professional clergy. However, support for such a model of decision-making had its 
limits and, according to Hadden, during the late 1960s laity came to have “grave doubts” about 
how that authority had been used. Tension over decision-making power, Hadden argues, was 
compounded by the fact that many activist clergy held key administrative positions within 
denominational structures as opposed to at the parish level. By the end of the decade, Hadden 
explained, the “New Breed” of clergy “saturated virtually every non-parish structure within the 
church” including denominational administrative positions, college and seminary teaching, and 
inner-city experimental ministries. These positions, Hadden explained, allowed radical clergy to 
“maximize their power to bring about innovation and change” and insulated them from “direct 
reprisals from laity.” However, the insulation of activist clergy combined with their failure to                                                         
26 Oursler, Protestant Power and the Coming Revolution,165, 181 
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engage in the systematic political education of laypeople fostered a significant rift between local 
congregations and national church structures.27 
 In an ironic twist, conservative critics from within the church mobilized the grassroots 
participatory democracy discourse of sixties liberal activists to point out what they perceived to 
be the unrepresentative mechanisms by which many denominational policy and funding 
decisions were made. In his 1967 polemic, The Protestant Revolt, fundamentalist clergyman 
James DeForest Murch railed against liberal church executives who, he contended, were trying 
to form a new ecumenical and “socio-politically oriented Super-Church.” Laypeople, Murch 
explained, were “rebelling against a clerical domination which treats them as sheep, demanding 
their complete acquiescence in the distasteful programs of a Super-Church.” According to 
Murch, laity deeply “resented being lumped into a mass of faceless automatons and delivered by 
the Liberal Establishment as in favor or not in favor of this or that social or political position, 
without ever bothering to consult them or to get their approval.” 28 
 Conservative commentators like Murch were not alone in their criticism of the liberal 
church establishment. Laypeople increasingly engaged in organized forms of protest against 
what was widely perceived as the liberal domination of their churches. Protest came in numerous 
forms. Most visibly, conservative laypeople within mainline Protestant denominations formed 
dissident lay committees in an effort, according to Will Oursler, “to thwart the steam-roller 
power of the ecumenical high command.” Organized in 1965, the Presbyterian Lay Committee 
described its work as “a silent revolution” that incorporated “an increasing number of church 
members who are getting tired of paying for all the radicalism and secularism of their church                                                         
27 Hadden, The Gathering Storm in the Churches, 6, 29-37, 185-235. 
28 James DeForest Murch, The Protestant Revolt: The Road to Freedom for American Churches (Crestwood Books, 
1967) 16, 40, 455, 86. For a discussion of how conservative activists mobilized the discourses of Sixties liberal 
social movements to great effect during this period, see: Simon Hall, American Patriotism, American Protest: Social 
Movements Since the Sixties, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011). 
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leaders.” Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, similar groups emerged in the Episcopal 
and Methodist denominations to resist the “rising tide of church pronouncements and 
involvement in social issues.”29   
 Angered by church executives’ support for Black freedom struggles, many local 
congregants also withheld their financial contributions and, in some cases, opted to leave the 
church entirely. In his 1971 study, Will Oursler pointed to a general “retreat in gifts and giving” 
that was particularly targeted at the new task forces and committees developed to address the 
urban crisis. In his 1972 study, Why Conservative Churches Are Growing, Dean Kelley, an 
executive at the National Council of Churches, also pointed to the decline in mainline Protestant 
church membership that was being prompted by the social justice focus of activist clergy. By the 
early 1970s, concerns over what Blaine Ramsey had aptly defined as a “polarized constituency” 
and “dwindling funds” dominated the national conventions of all of the mainline denominations 
forcing church executives to either face down conservative factions or engage in a “reordering of 
denominational priorities.” On the whole, the churches opted for the latter. 30 
The scaling back of church support for ecumenical and social justice ministries was swift 
and devastating in its effects. Task forces and grant-awarding programs designed to address the 
urban crisis were disproportionately affected. The Episcopal Church’s General Convention 
Special Program (GCSP), a program that had extended significant resources to the United Front, 
was one of the first to feel the backlash. Since its founding in 1967, the program had come under 
consistent attack from conservative clergy and laypeople for granting funds to groups whose 
political agendas were considered to be out of sync with that of the church. In particular, 
criticisms honed in on GCSP’s failure to incorporate local diocesan leaders into the decision-                                                        
29 Oursler, Protestant Power and the Coming Revolution, 182-3; Hadden, The Gathering Storm in the Churches, 31 
30 Oursler, Protestant Power and the Coming Revolution, 17, 165; Shattuck, Episcopalians and Race, 206. 
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making process and the program’s alleged sponsorship of programs that advocated violence. One 
controversial case was the GCSP’s extension of a grant to the Jackson Human Rights Project in 
Mississippi. Concerns were raised that the organization, far from advocating racial 
reconciliation, was a Black separatist group that advocated the use of violence against whites. As 
evidence, critics pointed to the organization’s newspaper that had allegedly published an article 
in which staff member Muhammed Kenyatta demonstrated how to construct a “Molotov 
cocktail.” Moreover, conservative clergy claimed that the funding should not be granted because 
the local bishop had objected. The GCSP granted the funding despite local opposition and 
concerns regarding the organization’s goals and tactics. A second high profile case was the 
extension in 1970 of a grant to the Malcolm X Liberation University in Durham, North Carolina. 
When the GCSP awarded a grant over the cries of the local bishop, white conservative 
Episcopalians slashed their financial contributions, costing the North Carolina diocese nearly 
$165,000. As a result, the diocese reduced its donation to the national church by nearly 40 per 
cent that year.  
With tensions over the GCSP increasing, twenty-five diocesan conventions across the 
nation passed resolutions requesting that local bishops be permitted to veto potential grants 
within their diocese. At the 1970 General Convention, these tensions came to a head and the 
conservatives gained the veto power for local bishops that they had been seeking. Bishops were 
now given thirty days in which to object to any proposed grant in their diocese. If the bishop 
objected, only a full majority of the Executive Council could override it. By mobilizing 
discourses rooted in the local, conservative clergy and laity radically undercut the power of the 
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GCSP and its director, Leon Modeste, who had functioned as a key gatekeeper to church 
resources.31  
 By 1973, the GCSP’s very survival was threatened as the Executive Council, according 
to Modeste, increasingly felt that it must respond to the demands of the “folks back home.” 32 On 
October 18, the entire African American staff of the GCSP received notices of termination from 
the Episcopal Church and in December the program was officially closed. Since its creation at 
the height of the urban rebellions, the program had funded projects totaling $7.5 million in urban 
areas across the country. However, heightened hostility toward the program from conservative 
laity and clergy ensured that it had become a liability for liberal church executives. The 
Community Action and Human Development section replaced the program. However, in his 
annual address Bishop Hines conceded that the resources allocated to the group would be 
considerably less than in previous years and its mission broader than originally defined. The 
program would now deal with the plight of all ethnic and racial “minorities” with a small budget 
and no permanent full-time director and only two staff members. Hines gave the project a 
begrudging and defiant farewell, describing it as “a moment in the conscience of men” that had 
served to broaden understandings of the church’s role and responsibility in the world.  
 In contrast, the program’s outgoing director Leon Modeste blamed the program’s closure 
on church executive’s lack of commitment and capitulation to white Episcopal laypeople who, 
when asked in a series of hearings in 1973, insisted that the program was “causing a schism in 
the church, and had to go.” Reflecting on his experiences, Modeste concluded that reliance upon 
the church had been a mistake. “[T]here is no question in my mind,” Modeste stated, “that                                                         
31 Mary Sudman Donovan, “Beyond the Parallel Church: Strategies of Separatism and Integration in the Governing 
Councils of the Episcopal Church,” in Episcopal Women: Gender, Spirituality, and Commitment in an American 
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32 Leon Modeste, “The Church Ends a Good Program,” Amsterdam News, September 22, 1973. 
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Blacks will never be free as long as we are dependent upon white institutions for resources. For 
at the most crucial time for us, the white institution will always withdraw the resources in favor 
of self-interest.” Accordingly, Modeste argued, “Blacks must build and maintain our own 
institutions and control those agencies which provide services in our communities.”33 
 As the Episcopal Church moved to close down its largest grant-awarding body, the 
Presbyterian Church’s National Committee for the Self-Development of People (NCSDP) was 
also struggling to keep afloat. By July 1972, the program was forced to order a moratorium on all 
new funding awards due to declining donations and a backlog of unpaid bills. The committee’s 
director, Rev. St. Paul Epps, bemoaned the fact that donations were dramatically lower than the 
anticipated $10 million a year level required to reach the denominations target of raising “70 
million in the 70s toward overcoming poverty.” According to Epps, donations for the program 
barely reached $2 million, prompting a scaling back of programming and expectations. In 1973, 
these financial realities forced Epps and his staff to reject more than 200 grant applications so 
that the committee could meet more than $1 million in outstanding commitments to programs 
that had been validated the previous year. The moratorium was not lifted until early 1975.34 
 Another key Presbyterian agency charged with addressing issues of race and poverty, the 
Council on Church and Race (CORAR), also came under heavy attack and by 1972 had 
witnessed a dramatic curtailment in its power and autonomy. At the 1972 General Convention, 
widespread opposition to CORAR’s recent extension of a $10,000 grant from the Emergency 
Fund for Legal Aid to the Angela Davis Defense Fund erupted into protests, prompting a series 
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of proposals from local synods demanding that Black-led task forces like CORAR come under 
greater supervision from the General Convention, be governed by stricter guidelines, or be 
stripped of their autonomous funding capacity. These efforts were voted down by the General 
Convention; however, tensions over the dissemination of funds, particularly without the consent 
of local presbyteries, persisted. As a result, many synods, including the Synod of Illinois, began 
to impose stricter measures of their own regarding the dissemination of funds to local programs 
and increasingly granted local presbyteries greater say in the decision-making process.35 
 Ecumenical bodies like IFCO and the National Council of Churches (NCC) were also 
affected by these broader denominational cutbacks. IFCO, an organization heavily dependent 
upon denominational contributions, quickly saw its resources dwindle, and in 1971 was forced to 
declare its own moratorium due to what executives called the “unstable climate within the 
churches.”36 At the NCC, Father Robert C. Chapman, the C.M.E. minister who had worked as 
the organization’s Director for Racial Justice from 1969 to 1971 and had been recently promoted 
to Executive Director of the Social Justice Department, was fired in July 1973, prompting sit-
down protests from supporters at the organization’s headquarters in New York. While the NCC 
claimed that Chapman had been discharged for “lack of concurrence with policy,” his supporters 
alleged that Chapman had fallen out of favor with the organization as its priorities had shifted. 
Close to fifty protestors participated in a sit-in at the NCC’s offices at the Interchurch Center, 
demanding that the organization fire its General Secretary, apologize to Father Chapman, and set 
up a separate and autonomous division on criminal, racial, and social justice that would be 
financed by one-tenth of the organizations overall operating budget. At an earlier moment, this                                                         
35 United Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., Minutes of the General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church in the 
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36 “IFCO reflects mood of churches retreat from ecumenical commitment,” Chicago Daily Defender, January 2, 
1971. 
 293 
proposal might have gained some support from within the denomination. However, by 1973, the 
tide was turning and the plea fell on deaf ears.37 
Back at the ICC, Blaine Ramsey began to observe a similar pattern. What initially had 
been an issue of concern was by 1971 a full-scale crisis that struck at the heart of the 
organization’s ability to meet the needs of the state’s poor and oppressed communities. Blaine 
Ramsey explained to ICC leaders that the Special Task Force’s resources “had dwindled” and in 
certain cases “dried up entirely.” From conversations with church executives, Ramsey deduced 
that the shortage of funds was connected to the fact that “lay giving for benevolent enterprises 
[had] been cut to the bone.” “People have been turned off,” Ramsey explained, “by what they 
call a preoccupation in political affairs.” “This situation,” Ramsey informed the ICC executive 
board, “has greatly jeopardized the morale of staff and hindered the development and execution 
of programs designed to meet the needs of people in areas where poverty and racism are acute.” 
Ramsey, like Modeste, argued that the fundamental cause of this decline in resources was a lack 
of commitment to racial justice and anti-poverty initiatives by church leaders and members. 
“Benign neglect,” Ramsey argued, “seems to be the posture now taken by funding groups.” In 
the face of dwindling funds, Ramsey increasingly believed, like Modeste, that the nation’s 
churches could “no longer be depended upon to adequately fund Community Action Programs.” 
The fragile coalition between liberal white church executives, progressive Black clergy, and 
Black Power activists forged in the wake of the urban rebellions was rapidly disintegrating.38  
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 The effect of this fragmentation was felt most powerfully at the local level, where 
many Black Power organizations had relied heavily on church resources to build effective 
movements and institutions. Between 1971 and 1974, the United Front witnessed a precipitous 
decline in funding from church-based organizations at both the state and national level. While 
comprehensive financial records for the United Front are unavailable, an examination of 
donations made to the United Front by the three largest funding bodies – IFCO, the Episcopal 
Church’s GCSP, and the Presbyterian’s NCSDP – indicates the scope of this decline. As Figure 1 
shows, donations from these bodies peaked at $297,660 in 1970, were slashed by more than half 
the following year, and dried up completely in 1973. 
 
Figure 6: Annual Donations made to the Cairo United Front from Three Major Church-Based 
Organizations, 1968 through 1974 
Source: See appendix 1. 
 
 These fiscal woes were compounded by the inability of some national church bodies to 
meet even their existing commitments. In the fall of 1971, for example, the Presbyterian 
Church’s NCSDP found itself unable to transfer the second half of an $112,000 grant to the 
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United Front due to a shortage of funds. While the grant was eventually received, its delay 
created a crisis of liquidity that hampered the United Front’s ability to cover immediate 
expenses. Efforts to secure the money from alternative sources within the denomination ran up 
against fierce resistance. Although the Presbyterian Church set aside several million dollars for 
social, educational, and economic programs each year, fifty percent of that money was 
designated for distribution by local presbyteries and, for its part, the Southern Illinois Presbytery 
refused to transfer any funds to the United Front. The funding scene outside the Presbyterian 
Church was not much brighter as denominational programs targeting the urban crisis had their 
budgets slashed and IFCO, the United Front’s largest donor, was forced to announce a 
moratorium due to declining donations. Moreover, the United Methodist Church’s ongoing 
support for the Lawyer’s Committee galvanized a backlash from local congregations who, 
according to United Front member Hattie Kendrick, were threatening to cut off support if church 
executives persisted in “taking their money…to help the niggers fight them.”39 
 Heavily reliant upon church-based resources, the United Front began to experience 
serious financial difficulties almost immediately. As the previous chapter showed, the “no 
strings” model of funding championed by many Black clergy made church funds indispensable 
in meeting expenses that corporate and governmental grants prohibited, including the United 
Front’s legal bills and daily operational costs. Unsurprisingly, these two areas were the most 
immediately affected by the scaling back of church support and the concomitant collapse in the 
United Front’s liquidity. The fact that the United Front faced a rapid decline in church resources 
at the exact moment its key activists were facing criminal prosecution only served to exacerbate 
the emerging crisis.                                                           
39 Minutes of JSAC Police Power Work Group, October 11-12, 1972, Administrative Records of the DGW, 1477-3-
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Kendrick-Brooks Family Papers, Library of Congress, box 22, folder 1. 
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 Pushed back on their heels, Black Power activists responded to the lethal combination of 
legal repression and declining resources by engaging in a vigorous fundraising campaign and 
redirecting all available funds to legal aid. At this early stage, it was far from clear that the 
decline in church funding was going to be a permanent feature of the landscape. Therefore, the 
United Front predictably threw its energy behind a series of fundraising events in an effort to 
reenergize the organization’s base and mobilize support from allies in both the Black Church and 
Black Power organizations across the country. In the Spring of 1971, a host of the nation’s 
leading Black activists, performers, and clergymen descended on the city, including poet and 
activist Amiri Baraka, clergyman Albert Cleage, singer Nina Simone, jazz musician Max Roach, 
and SCLC president Rev. Ralph Abernathy. In April, these efforts culminated in the United 
Front’s hosting of the spring convocation of the National Committee of Black Churchmen 
(NCBC). Black church executives from across the country pledged their ongoing support for the 
United Front and their commitment to seek further resources from the nation’s largest 
denominations. Shortly after, smaller donations did begin to trickle in through the ICC’s Special 
Task Force Committee’s brokerage system and from various denominational emergency legal 
aid funds. However, donations would never reach 1970 levels again, despite the best efforts of 
Black church executives. Increasingly, NCBC’s leadership – many of whom worked within 
predominantly white denominations – found themselves fighting to prevent the total dismantling 
of the church infrastructure they had helped build to address the urban crisis.40  
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 Tensions over the church’s support for Black Power were not confined to Protestant 
denominations. In fact, for Black Cairoites one of the year’s most visible signs of broader 
retrenchment in church support came from the Belleville diocese of the Roman Catholic Church. 
Progressive forces within the Belleville diocese had leveraged the urban rebellions to open up St. 
Columba’s Parish, Cairo’s formerly segregated mission, to Black parishioners and social service 
organizations. These social services – in many cases advanced by Black Power organizations 
would, according to radical priests, assist the needy and dispossessed and thus establish the 
foundation upon which true reconciliation might be achieved. It was on this basis that the United 
Front – along with the Illinois Migrant Council, the Alexander County NAACP, and several 
other community organizations – established offices at St. Columba’s, using the parish’s main 
hall for its weekly meetings. However, by 1971 St. Columba’s had become a controversial 
symbol of the Roman Catholic Church support for Black Power as well as the target of frequent 
gunfire by white supremacists and law enforcement. Allegations ran rampant that Black Power 
activists were using the building as a staging ground for sniper fire and arson. Local officials 
exerted tremendous pressure on the diocese to evict the United Front. 
 The coalition between diocesan leaders, radical priests, and local Black Power activists 
was a fragile one to say the least, and in the winter of 1970 it quickly fragmented as leaders 
within the Belleville diocese succumbed to some of the same pressures affecting their Protestant                                                                                                                                                                                   
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counterparts. In December, Bishop Albert Zuroweste ordered the United Front, the Alexander 
County NAACP, the Illinois Migrant Council, and several other community organizations to 
vacate their offices at St. Columba’s parish by February 1, 1971. Furthermore, the Bishop made 
clear that St. Columba’s religious ministries would be terminated and Black parishioners 
transferred to nearby St. Patrick’s Church. According to the Bishop, these changes were 
necessary to make room for the Cairo Recreational Committee, an interracial program initiated 
by Flora Chambliss, a middle-class Black woman and vocal opponent of the United Front. 
Chambliss’s committee, the Bishop argued, better reflected the church’s reconciliation mission 
and represented a positive step toward healing the embattled community. Father Kasper Deis, a 
priest brought in the previous summer to oversee the integration of Cairo’s all-white St. Patrick’s 
Church, supported what he called the Bishop’s “Gospel-spirited decision” and pointed to the bad 
reputation that was being brought upon the parish as a result of the United Front’s use of St. 
Columba’s. “Our concern,” Fr. Deis informed reporters, “must be that the Catholic Church 
disassociate itself from even the appearance of violence.” Fr. Deis agreed that the Cairo 
Recreational Committee was more consistent with the church’s reconciliationist goals, arguing 
that the program was better situated than the United Front to promote programs that afforded 
“opportunities for blacks and whites to develop understanding for each other”.41  
 The United Front and its supporters vehemently disagreed with such claims, insisting that 
true reconciliation could not be achieved without first addressing the fundamental economic, 
political, and social problems facing Black Cairoites. Blaine Ramsey raised this point at a 
meeting with Bishop Zuroweste at the end of January. In a letter following the meeting, Ramsey 
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expressed disappointment that they had been unable to reach a common understanding of the 
“critical urgency” facing Black Cairoites. “At times,” Ramsey wrote, “I got the impression that 
we weren’t communicating.” In a statement that powerfully illustrated the distinctions between 
many white and Black liberal clergy, Ramsey alluded to the “false sense of optimism” he had 
noticed that “kept coming through as we talked about the changed attitudes of the white people 
in Cairo, especially those who make up the Catholic constituency.” While Ramsey stated self-
deprecatingly that he might have been “too pessimistic,” his point was clear. The Bishop’s goal 
of integrating the two parishes was unrealistic and reflected a willful ignorance of the deep-
seated racism prevalent among white Cairoites.42  
 Ramsey also challenged the assumption that the Cairo Recreation Committee offered a 
pathway to reconciliation for Black and white residents. In his letter, Ramsey informed the 
Bishop that he had recently visited Cairo to look further into the work of the recreation 
committee. “To my chagrin,” he wrote, “I found that the Committee membership, made up of 
whites and blacks, is not solid.” In fact, the Committee was highly “fragmented,” raising serious 
questions about the integrity of the group as a potential “Catholic alternative to the racial 
problems in Cairo.” Ultimately, Ramsey argued that while removing the United Front would 
“ameliorate the anxiety of the white people in Cairo,” it would exacerbate tensions in the Black 
community, leading to violence. Ramsey concluded by reminding the Bishop that the Catholic 
Church had historically been “part of the segregated posture in Cairo” and that if he was sincere 
in his desire to correct this situation a “moribund recreational program is not the answer.”43   
 The Bishop also received correspondence from United Front member and former 
Alexander County NAACP president Hattie Kendrick. A devout churchwoman and lay leader at                                                         
42 Blaine Ramsey Jr., to Rev. Albert R. Zuroweste, January 26, 1971, ICC Records, box 19, folder 26. 
43 Ibid. 
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Ward Chapel AME, Kendrick was particularly disheartened by the Bishop’s eviction order not 
just because it represented a potential loss of valuable space and resources for the United Front 
but also because it contradicted her personal understanding of the mission of the church. 
According to Kendrick, “one of the greatest contributions that the Black Catholic Church has 
made to this community has been its demonstration in acts of brotherly love.” “For years,” 
Kendrick wrote, “the six o’clock mass was celebrated at St. Columba by black and white 
praising God and praying together.” “The celebration of His birth and His resurrection,” she 
continued, “knew no color line.” By contrast, St. Patrick’s had treated Black congregants poorly 
and Kendrick had little hope that this renewed attempt at integration would be successful. In 
respect to the United Front, Kendrick argued that the organization “only wants of you a place to 
have their meetings, keep their records and assist the needy.” “Do you knowingly deprive them 
of this opportunity,” Kendrick asked, “or are you like Pilot listening at the angry mob outside as 
they scream ‘crucify them’?” 44  
In a final appeal to the Bishop’s conscience and past commitment to racial justice, 
Kendrick wrote: “If Christ be the head of the Church, then why can it not be steadfast, 
unmovable abounding in the work of God and his cause?” Kendrick’s words were directed at 
Bishop Zuroweste, but her plea for the Church to be “steadfast” and “unmovable” can also be 
interpreted as a broader critique of liberal, predominantly white religious institutions now 
backtracking on earlier commitments to racial justice and support of the poor. For a 
churchwoman like Kendrick, who had devoted her life to that cause, the Church’s recent actions 
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were not just detrimental to the movement; they were antithetical to her faith. Kendrick signed 
the letter, “a discouraged Christian.”45 
 The Bishop’s order of eviction divided Catholic leaders. While Fr. Deis of St. 
Patrick’s Church was encouraged by the eviction order, past and present priests who had served 
at St. Columba’s were outraged, viewing the Bishop’s decision as a betrayal of the Black 
community and the church’s own obligations. Fr. Benjamin Bodewes objected to what he 
described as the Bishop’s “unilateral decision” to evict the United Front, insisting that the 
church’s Black parishioners should have been consulted. For all intents and purposes, Fr. 
Bodewes, had functioned as St. Columba’s parish priest since the outbreak of violence in the fall 
of 1969. Now faced with the prospect of losing his ministry, Bodewes was defiant. “Since many 
black people have asked me to stay,” he declared, “I will stay in St. Columba and the United 
Front and the other six organizations, the food distribution and clothing distribution [services] 
will remain and continue to use the building and facilities… I shall not be moved.” Fr. 
Bodewes’s predecessor, Fr. Gerald Montroy, was also outraged, calling Bishop Zuroweste a 
“white racist” for his actions in an interview with reporters.46  
 As news of the eviction order spread, Fr. Bodewes and the United Front gained further 
support from progressive nuns and priests across the country. The Southern Illinois Association 
of Priests released a statement condemning the Bishop’s decision as an “unequivocal vote for the 
continuance of power and bigotry” and offered to join local parishioners in resisting eviction 
through nonviolent direct action if necessary. The National Coalition of American Nuns also 
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petitioned Bishop Zuroweste to halt the eviction proceedings and, rather, assist the United Front 
“financially and morally.” When these petitions fell on deaf ears, a coalition of Catholic 
organizations, including representatives from the National Coalition of American Nuns, the 
National Conference of Interracial Justice, the National Federation of Priests Councils, and the 
Catholic Interracial Council of Chicago, converged on Cairo in a last-ditch attempt to halt the 
eviction and if necessary purchase the parish property on behalf of the United Front.  Facing 
widespread opposition, Bishop Zuroweste offered a compromise in which the NAACP and the 
Illinois Migrant Council would be permitted to stay if the United Front agreed to leave. The 
leaders of the two organizations, Preston Ewing, Jr., and Ripley Young, rejected the offer and 
when February 1 arrived no eviction took place.47 
 However, the struggle over access to St. Columba’s parish continued, fueling 
considerable tension between the Black community and the Belleville diocese and hindering the 
daily operations of the community organizations that occupied the building. For instance, in 
early September all utilities to St. Columba’s was shut off. According to the public utility 
company, a member of Bishop Zuroweste’s staff had informed them that the building was church 
property and that as landlord the Bishop did not want electric service to be restored to the 
building. As winter approached, the men and women who worked and worshipped at St. 
Columba’s prepared themselves for the cold winter nights without lights, hot water, or heat.48  
 When this tactic failed, Bishop Zuroweste, in a move that appalled many Black 
parishioners, passed ownership of the property onto St. Patrick’s Church. Shortly after, Father                                                         
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Deis announced that St. Columba’s would be demolished and the land given to two “poor 
Catholic families” who allegedly wanted to build homes on the property. The United Front 
received a letter from Deis’s attorney demanding that they immediately vacate the parish in 
preparation for the demolition. When United Front coordinator Leon Page and NAACP president 
Preston Ewing met with Fr. Deis in May 1971, they challenged both his legal right to evict the 
tenants and his claim that two Catholic families wanted to build homes on the parish lot.  
Pointing to the fact that St. Columba’s was located in a predominantly poor and Black area that 
had witnessed considerable violence over the past three years, Ewing argued that this was not the 
real motive and offered to extend the couple a site in a better neighborhood. However, Fr. Deis 
rejected the offer, insisting again that the organizations vacate the premises immediately. These 
struggles continued for several months before a coalition of Catholic leaders finally purchased 
the building on behalf of the United Front.49 
 The United Front’s struggle to secure ongoing access to church resources took a 
significant toll on the organization, diverting activists’ energy away from the larger campaign to 
end the city’s history of racial discrimination and exploitation. Moreover, the United Front 
became increasingly vulnerable to new forms of economic repression. Ironically, the support of 
predominantly white religious institutions had provided United Front activists with a modicum of 
independence from local whites. The organization’s paid staff structure, funded almost 
exclusively by church grants, allowed leading activists protection from economic discrimination 
at the hands of local employers and welfare officers. Bail bond donations and the opening of the 
Lawyer’s Committee provided important legal protections to activists who were picked up and 
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pushed through the criminal justice system. Moreover, the Catholic Church had provided the 
organization with office and meeting space beyond the control of local landlords. For this reason, 
resisting eviction from St. Columba’s was essential since the United Front would almost 
certainly have found itself unable to purchase or rent another building in the city. Even those few 
landlords who might otherwise have been willing to lease property to the United Front faced the 
possibility of harassment by white vigilantes and almost inevitable property damage. Thus, by 
retracting their support, church leaders, as Southern Illinois Priest Father James Genisio put it, 
removed an important “umbrella of protection,” leaving local activists to face a new set of 
obstacles to the realization of their goals.50   
 Making sense of the rationales that underpinned this retraction of support was something 
that frustrated many Black Power activists and radical clergy. Most viewed liberal church 
executives as having succumbed to internal opposition from conservative white laity and a few 
firebrand clergymen. Some, like Leon Modeste, began to interpret white church executives’ 
failure to take a principled stance as an almost inevitable consequence of their positionality as 
leaders of white racist institutions. Future programs, he argued, would have to be developed 
independent of their support or risk a similar outcome. For others, like Fr. Genisio, “money was 
the prime motive” and church executives had opted to prioritize tithes and offerings over their 
commitment to the poor and oppressed. However, the United Front case is particularly 
instructive because it reveals both the internal and external opposition that church executives 
faced to their support of Black Power organizations. While the precipitous decline in church 
support was clearly sparked by broader struggles over the appropriate role of the church in social 
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and political affairs, these tensions were clearly exacerbated by external pressure from state 
actors including, most significantly, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the FBI.51 
  During the early 1970s, Black Power activists and their church-based funders came 
under fire as the IRS began to demonstrate what one contemporary described as “an 
unprecedented interest in the civil rights, anti-poverty, and anti-war activities of certain religious 
organizations.” Investigations were launched into the activities of several national denominations 
and ecumenical bodies concerning allegations that they had violated the provisions of their tax-
exempt status by “carrying on propaganda or attempting to influence legislation.” So-called 
“routine audits” were performed of the financial records of both the NCC and IFCO in response 
to allegations that the organizations were funneling church funds to subversive groups. In 
IFCO’s case, the IRS quickly expanded the audit to include approximately half of the 
approximately 100 community groups that had been sponsored by the organization as well as the 
personal returns of the foundation’s board members. Between 1970 and 1973, the IRS performed 
similar investigations of the accounts of more than a dozen church organizations. Writing for the 
Nation, attorney Joseph Ruskay described the IRS investigations as “the covert weapon” 
employed by the Nixon Administration to “discourage its critics within the churches.” According 
to Ruskay, “The legal basis for this alarming intrusion of the government in church affairs is 
dubious at best” and at worst “a clear abridgment of First Amendment guarantees.” Dean Kelley, 
Director of Religious and Civil Liberties at the NCC agreed, stating that the Nixon 
Administration had used the IRS as “[t]he chief but not only means” to threaten “religious 
groups which engage in dissident secular activities outside their own walls.”52 
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Declining resources certainly made the United Front vulnerable to this kind of 
harassment, and for several years the local chapter of the White Citizen’s Council, angered by 
church donations to the United Front, petitioned state officials to investigate the organization’s 
finances. Indeed, a central tool in the arsenal of the United Front’s opponents was spreading 
rumors of financial impropriety. Local officials mocked the so-called “bleeding hearts” who had 
“poured tons of money” into the United Front for failing to recognize that they “were being 
used” by Black Power activists.  In the winter of 1971, the Illinois Attorney General’s office 
demanded that the United Front file an audit. With external funds dwindling and previous 
donations tied up in bail bond, the United Front was in no position to advance the six to ten 
thousand dollars required to perform an audit. Consequently, the United Front lost its charitable 
status, preventing activists from soliciting donations until the fall of 1972.53 
That same year, the IRS’s Intelligence Division began a major investigation into Charles 
Koen’s personal finances. Alleging that Koen had diverted thousands of dollars in funds from the 
United Front for his own personal use without declaring them as income, the IRS honed its 
investigation on the United Front’s church donors, filing summons in person at the national 
headquarters of the United Methodist Church, the Episcopal Church, the United Church of 
Christ, the United Presbyterian Church, the Christian Church, and the NCC. The summons 
demanded copies of “[c]ancelled checks, money orders or other means to payment” to Charles 
Koen; any “[c]orrespondence, notes or memoranda” related to those contributions; and, more 
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broadly, “[a]ny other records relating to the activities of Charles Koen [or] the United Front, 
Inc.” Church executives immediately met to discuss the investigation and coordinate a strategy. 
None of the groups had given money directly to Koen. However, the final component of the 
summons cast a broader net to include information related to funds that had been extended to the 
United Front. Deeming this beyond the scope of the investigation, church executives decided to 
comply with the first two parts of the summons but not the final one.54  
 Local Black Power activists and their allies in the Black Church viewed the IRS inquiry 
with skepticism and tried their best to persuade other church executives it was part and parcel of 
a broader pattern of state repression. Presbyterian leader Gayraud Wilmore reminded church 
executives that many other African American activists had been “the objects of inquiry by IRS 
and other governmental agencies in recent years.” Fr. Robert Chapman echoed Wilmore’s 
claims, calling the IRS inquiry “just another in a long series of efforts to crush the United Front.” 
Chapman also suggested that local whites might have “sparked” the IRS investigation since on 
his many trips to Cairo Chapman had observed that “rumors circulate freely that large sums of 
money have been pouring into the Front” from church-based organizations.55 Blaine Ramsey 
agreed with Chapman’s assessment, stating that the investigations were “the result of strong 
pressure brought to bear on the United Front by the local power structure to short circuit funding 
channels.” Like Chapman, Ramsey had observed “[a]ll sorts of rumors… swirling in the Cairo 
community about the financial accountability of the United Front” and while he conceded that                                                         
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General Secretary for Administration of the National Council of Churches, July 31, 1972, Administrative Records of 
the DGW, 1477-3-2-10; Minutes of meeting on Internal Revenue Service Summonses, August 2, 1972, ICC 
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11, 1973) 55-59. 
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the organization may have not “employed the best bookkeeping procedures,” the accusation that 
Koen was siphoning large sums for his personal use was patently false. The United Front 
leadership agreed with Ramsey’s interpretation, characterizing the tax investigations as a new 
spin on older forms of harassment.56 
While many church executives took a principled stance in relation to the IRS’s 
harassment of the United Front, the general effect was to further dampen church-based funding 
for Black Power. Dean Kelley argued that the IRS investigations had “a chilling effect” upon the 
churches’ social justice activities: “[E]ven if the investigated organizations get a clean bill of 
health, it will often have spent several thousand dollars in legal and other fees to defend itself 
and will be a little less eager to do anything which might precipitate another complaint and 
investigation.” According to Kelley, these investigations only served to exacerbate the “growing 
mood of quiescence, consolidation, disenchantment and loss-of-nerve” taking place in churches 
throughout the country. This quiescence, Kelley argued, “is a sign that the government’s efforts 
to discourage boat-rocking and trouble-making were not altogether failures.”57 
 The IRS was not the only federal agency devoting considerable energy and resources to 
breaking the ties between the United Front and their church donors. FBI records show that agents 
were particularly concerned with the United Front’s ability to leverage church resources and kept 
close tabs on those denominations that extended grants. When it was discovered that the United 
Front was receiving significant donations from the Episcopal Church, FBI agents in Springfield 
and the Washington Field Office collaborated on a counterintelligence initiative aimed at 
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“having these funds cut off.” Agents crafted a letter to an unidentified leader in the Episcopal 
Church posing as “a Vestreyman of one of the largest downtown Episcopal Churches in 
Chicago.” In the letter, the supposed “Vestreyman” informed the reader that he was “aware that 
the Episcopal Church funded the United Front of Cairo in amount of $50,000.00 for the year 
1970” and that one of the organization’s leaders had been “given an opportunity to speak” before 
the church’s general convention. The author warned that the church’s funding of the United 
Front had prompted “many members” to “cut their pledges, thus forcing a cut of funds for local 
parish programs as well as funds for National Church programs.” “I ask you,” the author pleaded 
“for the good of our church, to withhold funds from the United Front of Cairo.” “I want to assure 
you that I agree with most of the Church’s program and am convinced much good can and will 
come of such a program if it is well directed and run on a sound basis.” “I disagree,” the letter 
concluded, “only with funding groups which advocate violence.” Agents also circulated an 
anonymous flyer among Black and white Cairoites highlighting “the expensive taste of [Koen] 
and possibly some of his other opportunistic traits.” According to field agents, it was hoped that 
“circulation of this would further latent resentment against [Koen] in the black community and 
assist in neutralizing him.”58 
 These examples of IRS and FBI repression demonstrate the concern that church support 
for the United Front generated and the lengths that state actors would go to cut it off. For a brief 
period, church support had brought valuable resources and legitimacy to the local struggle. Each 
new contribution broadened the United Front’s coalition and expanded knowledge of the 
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challenges facing Black residents in a small, embattled town. The fragile coalitional bond 
between Black Power activists and national denominational bodies had also challenged the 
church to examine its own mission and make good on rhetorical commitments to the 
marginalized and dispossessed. However, as pressures mounted church executives began to 
retreat, fostering disillusionment and division within the ranks and creating new obstacles for the 
United Front that would prove very difficult to navigate. 
 
Tactical Innovation and the End of a Mass Movement 
 
As the full extent of this bleak financial picture set in, the United Front faced some difficult 
decisions. Churches had not only underwritten the organization’s legal aid and daily operational 
expenses but had also extended the crucial seed money that made the United Front’s progressive 
political programs possible. In 1971, however, the combination of mounting legal bills and 
declining resources had forced the United Front to dig into church grants that had been provided 
for long-term community development initiatives. Therefore, while the organization had 
witnessed some important gains, particularly in the areas of housing and health, the reality was 
that funds for the initiation of new programs and the continuation of existing ones were rapidly 
diminishing, casting the organization’s long-term political program into jeopardy. These unique 
circumstances necessitated a fundamental reevaluation of the United Front’s strategy and tactics. 
Should Black Power activists continue to focus their efforts on mobilizing coalitional support 
from the nation’s churches? If not, could they identify new coalitional allies or revenue streams 
to support their long-term political program? Alternatively, would the United Front opt to 
abandon the costly strategy of developing parallel institutions and embrace a new approach due 
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to financial constraints? As the year progressed, answering these questions became the 
organization’s central focus.  
 As they discussed their options, United Front activists not only had to consider the 
precipitous decline in church resources but also the further narrowing of political opportunities 
that had begun in Cairo during the spring of 1971. Prior to that spring, the U.C.C.A. had not 
exerted formal control over city government, opting instead to use threats and intimidation to 
secure favorable policies. The organization’s real power had been its domination of local law 
enforcement. However, unhappiness with the city’s failure to eliminate the United Front 
prompted the U.C.C.A. to run a number of candidates for public office in 1971. As in previous 
elections, a number of African Americans also announced their candidacy despite the obstacles 
posed by the city’s at-large commission form of governance. Al Farmer became the first African 
American candidate for mayor, running against U.C.C.A. candidate E. J. Walter. Black 
candidates from Mt. Moriah and First Missionary Baptist Churches also ran for the four city 
commissioner positions, including Rev. Sherman Jones, Ed Wade, and Preston Ewing, Sr. 
Fearing that Black and white “extremists” might seize political office, incumbent mayor Pete 
Thomas declared that he would run for reelection. With that, the election of 1971 became a 
referendum of sorts on the different factions working within the city.59  
 When the ballots were counted, the results marked a resounding victory for the White 
Citizens Council. Three U.C.C.A. candidates – Allen Moss, James Walder, and James Dale – 
were elected to the city council, securing the organization’s control over city governance. Dale, a 
well-known local business owner and sheriff’s deputy, was also appointed Police Commissioner 
to serve alongside fellow U.C.C.A. member and Alexander County Sheriff Donald Turner. The                                                         
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election of the militants stunned Black Power activists. “These men,” Charles Koen declared, 
“are the most extreme of the extremists” and “have vowed to keep blacks in their place.” Even 
mayor Pete Thomas was appalled, describing the election results as a loss for the city and his 
own “moderate” approach. “I am going to see what can be accomplished,” Thomas stated. But, 
he warned the new commissioners that if they refused to “go along” with his plans he would 
“check it to them.” Bob Cunningham, president of the U.C.C.A., assured Thomas that the new 
commissioners shared his concern for the city but warned that they would “not back him in 
anything that is good for just the United Front.” Shortly after, Mayor Pete Thomas was forced to 
resign and was quickly replaced by Walder, treasurer of the U.C.C.A. All three commissioners 
secured reelection in 1975, marking a fundamental realignment in political power.60 
 This realignment had significant implications for the United Front, ending any hopes of 
dialogue or compromise. Prior to the election, the United Front and Mayor Pete Thomas’s 
administration had been engaged in discussions regarding the potential for a cease-fire 
agreement. While the terms of such an agreement were a source of contention, the lines of 
communication were open. However, with U.C.C.A. leaders controlling city government, the 
possibility of any agreement was foreclosed. In a more stringent sense than their predecessors, 
Mayor Walder and the U.C.C.A. commissioners demonstrated a principled opposition to 
negotiating with the United Front. As storeowners, Walder and Dale had cultivated this no-
compromise approach through their experience in combatting the boycott of downtown 
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businesses. By the time they secured political office, at least twelve downtown businesses had 
closed and the U.C.C.A.-led city council was determined to remain firm in its opposition to any 
actions that might appear to legitimize the United Front’s tactics. Faced with a mountain of civil 
suits challenging the city’s longstanding practice of discrimination, the city council dug in its 
heels and pursued the cases at tremendous expense even when it was clear that the courts would 
rule in the United Front’s favor. Moreover, with the city facing financial catastrophe, U.C.C.A. 
city council members approved significant increases in the police department’s budget, believing 
that “law and order” was the only way to end the boycott and protests. Increasingly, it appeared 
that the city council was willing to bankrupt the city rather than negotiate. As one U.C.C.A. 
member stated to a journalist from Ramparts magazine, “We would rather see the town wiped off 
the map than turn it over to those revolutionaries from the United Front.”61   
 Nowhere was the intransigence of the U.C.C.A. city council more apparent than in its 
refusal to accept any federal or state funds that might benefit working-class African Americans. 
If Mayor Thomas and the United Front had agreed on anything, it was that improving economic 
conditions in the city was critical to resolving the current crisis. As the previous chapter showed, 
Mayor Thomas made a determined effort to secure federal and state programs, but faltered when 
officials mandated that he construct representative task forces to oversee their initiation. In 
contrast, the U.C.C.A. was opposed on principle to what it described as “hand-out programs” run 
by “fat necked Negro administrators” designed to “bribe-off” so-called troublemakers. 
Accordingly, the city council obstructed the extension of a number of social and economic 
programs that would have improved the city’s economic base and benefited both Black and 
white Cairoites. Furthermore, when Black Cairoites endeavored to work around the city in                                                         
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obtaining federal and state grants for community programming, they were repeatedly undercut 
by the city administration.62  
A particularly egregious example of this obstructionism was the city’s refusal to sell lots 
to the United Cairo Housing Corporation for use in new home developments. Now a state 
sponsored agency, the United Cairo Housing Corporation wished to obtain city lots for the 
development of new homes that were projected to bring a total of $1.9 million to the local 
economy, increase the tax base, and create a number of new jobs. However, the fact that the 
Housing Corporation had ties to the United Front and was led by Van Ewing, Preston Ewing Jr.’s 
brother, ensured the opposition of the U.C.C.A. Members of the U.C.C.A. showed up in force at 
a city council meeting in May when the housing program was slated for discussion. The 
organization’s president, Robert Cunningham, declared that members of the U.C.C.A. were “not 
opposed to new housing” but were rather “against any housing… controlled by the United 
Front.” Commissioner Dale also released a written statement explaining that he was also 
“opposed to having control of any housing development in the hands of the United Front, under 
its own or any other name.” After the meeting, the new commissioners closed ranks in 
opposition to the sale of the lots, forcing the Housing Corporation to reevaluate a proposal that 
had secured considerable support from state and federal agencies. This obstructionism on the part 
of the city council infuriated members of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, who addressed 
the issue directly at a hearing held in Cairo the following spring. “I’m trying to understand,” one 
member of the commission remarked to city council member Allen Moss, “the logic of refusing 
to sell vacant land owned by the city which receives nothing to a group that wants to build 
housing which you say is needed.” In response, Moss claimed that the aforementioned lots were 
listed for a broader urban renewal project that would result in the development of town homes on                                                         
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that site. However, after further questioning, the city’s legal counsel admitted that the urban 
renewal program to which Moss referred had been cancelled several years earlier. The real 
motivation, the Commission concluded, was that the city opposed the plan because of the 
Housing Corporation’s ties to the United Front, a fact that commissioners had quite openly 
conceded only a year before.63 
 The rise of the U.C.C.A. to political power played an important role in the United Front’s 
discussions of the need for tactical innovation. Black Power activists in Cairo had always 
adopted a multi-pronged approach to addressing the longstanding practice of discrimination in 
the city: filing legal suits, engaging in nonviolent direct-action, running Black candidates for 
political office, and developing autonomous parallel institutions. For some, however, these new 
political realities appeared to render many of the older tactics obsolete.  
Most obviously, the election of 1971 demonstrated the limitations of electoral strategies 
to achieving Black Power in Cairo. Until the discriminatory at-large commission system could be 
dismantled, Black Cairoites would find themselves locked out of city government and unable to 
capitalize on their latent voting power. Of course, this exclusion of Black Cairoites from formal 
avenues of power wasn’t new, and between 1969 and 1971 local activists had become 
particularly adept at operating through non-institutionalized channels, mounting boycotts and 
protests in an effort to extract concessions from local officials. However, with U.C.C.A. 
members now in full control of city government, the business district and law enforcement, 
serious questions were raised about the viability of nonviolent direct action in achieving the 
United Front’s goals. Black Power activists had never subscribed to the concept of moral suasion 
that had underpinned SNCC’s earlier campaigns. However, Black Power activists maintained                                                         
63 “City Council Rejects New Housing,” The Monitor, May 13, 1971; “Housing Program to Be Explained to City 
Council,” The Monitor, May 20, 1971; Hearing before the United States Commission on Civil Rights, 184-6, 192; 
“Housing Program to Be Explained to City Council,” The Monitor, May 20, 1971; 
 316 
that nonviolent direct-action could be powerful when the power of the Black dollar was 
deployed. Economic pressure, local activists contended, would force local merchants and city 
leaders to meet their demands. Two years into one of the nation’s best organized boycotts, 
however, the United Front was forced to question this assumption as local business owners 
continued to act against their own economic self-interest in order to preserve the status quo. In 
many ways, the election of 1971 represented the final repudiation of this logic as city leaders 
drove Cairo to the brink of financial collapse in order to hinder the United Front’s efforts.  
 It is also important to recognize that the costs associated with nonviolent protest did not 
only affect those against whom the actions were directed. Indeed, as this chapter has shown, 
Black Cairoites faced severe economic and legal penalties for their participation in nonviolent 
direct-action campaigns, particularly picketing connected to the boycott of downtown businesses. 
After the 1971 election, the United Front expected these repressive acts to intensify. With church 
funds dwindling and key leaders facing jail time, it is unsurprising that Black Power activists 
began to question whether the picketing and protests associated with the boycott in particular 
were still worth the cost. Upon reflection, most of the victories secured by the United Front had 
taken place outside of the city’s existing economic and political institutions through the creation 
of autonomous parallel institutions. In contrast, the organization’s use of direct action tactics to 
counteract discrimination in local government and business, while well coordinated, had been 
largely unsuccessful due to white opposition. With the U.C.C.A. now controlling city 
government, the odds of future concessions were negligible. Increasingly, the United Front’s best 
chance of eradicating longstanding practices of discrimination seemed to lie in the hands of the 
organization’s lawyers who were busy fighting it out in the courts.64                                                           
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The debate over whether to pursue costly forms of nonviolent direct action continued 
during the summer of 1971, as police resumed their assaults on the United Front with the 
sanction of city administrators. Heavy police patrols returned to Cairo’s streets. An armored 
truck was deployed. Conflict seemed imminent. In June, violence erupted when police fired shots 
and tear gas into St. Columba’s Church as three unarmed people– two priests and a lawyer – 
worked quietly inside. The order to fire on the church had been given by Commissioner Dale, 
who alleged that four “black militants” had been seen shooting out of the rectory and into the 
police station. The chaos that followed required state police to risk their lives to rescue the men 
and women trapped in the church from being shot by local law enforcement. As the smoke 
dissipated, Governor Ogilvie would be forced once again to send his top aide Paul Wisner to 
investigate allegations of police misconduct.65 
The United Front had survived police repression in the past, but this time they would 
have to cope without the assistance of several key leaders. Over the course of the summer, a 
number of United Front activists faced trial dates, some lost appeals, and others were sentenced 
to jail. The organization’s economic development coordinator, Bobby Williams, was trapped in 
the middle of a protracted legal battle stemming from his arrest on weapons charges in Cape 
Girardeau in 1969. Although Williams was exonerated on appeal, he was picked up again in June 
1971 for violating the Federal Gun Control Act. Living and working in the Pyramid Courts, 
Williams approached a licensed gun dealer in Cape Girardeau to purchase two rifles to protect 
his family. When asked by the salesman if he had any felony convictions, Williams explained 
that he had one but that it was currently under appeal. The salesman allegedly made a phone call 
and subsequently informed Williams that it was okay for him to purchase a firearm. Shortly                                                         
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afterwards, however, Williams was arrested. Two convictions and two successful appeals later, 
representatives from the Internal Security Division of the U.S. Justice Department were brought 
in to prosecute the case against Williams one more time. Williams was found guilty in 1974 and 
surrendered to the federal marshal in St. Louis to begin serving a five-year prison sentence in 
federal prison in Terre Haute, Indiana.66 
 While the United Front’s economic development coordinator struggled through an 
exhausting number of trials and appeals, its director, Rev. Charles Koen, was also facing 
sentencing for charges dating back to his 1968 beating at the hands of St. Louis police officers. 
In July, Koen surrendered to officers and began serving a six-month sentence at the St. Louis 
County Jail for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest. Koen’s incarceration was greeted by 
outrage from the United Front’s allies across the country. In September, supporters staged 
protests in twelve different cities, calling upon President Nixon to pardon Koen immediately. 
During his incarceration, Koen began a water fast to protest his unjust imprisonment and those of 
other Black Power activists across the country. By the time he was paroled in September, Koen 
had lost almost sixty pounds, his body wracked by the effects of malnutrition. It took months for 
Koen to gain the strength to even leave his home, and when he did he was unable to walk 
without the assistance of a cane. Koen would never recover the physical and verbal dexterity that 
had characterized his youth, a powerful illustration of the tremendous personal cost borne by so 
many Black Power activists during this period.67  
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Koen’s absence in particular had a visible effect on the United Front. Despite preparing 
for such an eventuality for several months by training a second tier of leadership, the 
combination of dwindling resources, narrow political opportunities, and the loss of Koen’s 
charismatic and energizing leadership style left the organization reeling without clear direction. 
Although the NAACP and the Lawyer’s Committee continued their legal battles, the direct-
action arm of the United Front was stagnating. Picketing ground to a halt and Black shoppers 
trickled back to some of the stores. In October, The Tri-State Informer bragged that all was quiet 
in the embattled city. “Downtown,” the paper alleged, “more and more Negroes are seen among 
the whites, going about their business of shopping in the stores.”  “Yes,” the author concluded, 
“Cairo in the Autumn of 1971 is peaceful and serene and has been for some months now – and 
the answer to it all is very simple – Rev. Koen is still in St. Louis.”68  
United Front leaders contested the U.C.C.A.’s characterization of the city as peaceful, 
arguing that tensions lay just beneath the surface. According to the organization’s public 
relations officer, Rev. Manker Harris, conditions in the city were still “potentially explosive” but 
after being released from jail Koen had “asked the black community to keep calm” and “not 
respond to these intimidations and provocations.” Rather, he encouraged local activists to 
abandon confrontational tactics and continue the pursuit of justice through the legal system. 
While not openly stated, the implications of Koen’s new strategy quickly became apparent. The 
boycott would continue in spirit but the picketing and protests that had sustained it would be 
deemphasized in order to protect local activists and allow the organization’s legal counsel to 
focus their energies on the growing number of civil rights cases. As a skilled organizer, Koen 
characterized this tactical shift as a sign of victory, not accommodation. “We feel the social                                                                                                                                                                                   
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aspect of the struggle has been won,” Koen explained. “Our economic boycott has been so 
successful that not only are the merchants going broke but the whole city and county are both 
about bankrupt.” Situated now as an example of Black power and unity in the face of 
discrimination, the boycott was characterized as a complete success. But, what was also 
tragically apparent was that city officials had refused to meet any of the United Front’s demands, 
a fact that made sustaining a boycott interminably very difficult.69 
The end of picketing and protesting in Cairo could have easily demoralized local activists 
and resulted in a complete dissipation of the United Front’s activities. However, United Front 
leaders took the opportunity presented by the de-escalation to initiate what they described as “a 
new stage” in the Black Power struggle. According to the United Front’s coordinator, Leon Page,  
the organization had held a series of meetings with local community members to assess how the 
they should proceed after three years of struggle. While the NAACP and the Lawyer’s 
Committee were engaged in what promised to be a very slow and arduous legal struggle, United 
Front leaders redirected their energy to the organization’s more immediate solutions to the crisis 
facing Black Cairoites – namely the organization’s parallel institutions. The United Front’s 
housing and medical initiatives had met with some limited success and with white militants in 
control of the city independent Black-run programs appeared to be the only way to address the 
needs of the city’s poor and Black residents. However, the reinvigoration and expansion of these 
programs faced one obvious problem – funding. With church funds declining to record lows in 
1972, the United Front would have to identify new sources of revenue immediately.70                                                         
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In their efforts to locate more stable sources of revenue, the United Front turned its 
attention increasingly to state government. For the past three years the United Front had 
struggled to make headway with Republican Governor Richard Ogilvie. However, in 1972, 
Ogilvie faced an uphill battle to reelection against his Democratic opponent, Daniel Walker. 
Seeing the potential for a shift in power, Rev. Koen stepped out in early support for Walker, 
denouncing Ogilvie’s record and describing the sitting governor’s administration as “the most 
repressive in Illinois’ history.” “Blacks cannot survive another four years of Ogilvie’s 
repression,” Koen declared in a press conference in November. “We must get ourselves 
together… At the ballot box we’re not going to be turned around.”71 
Using the United Front’s existing infrastructure, Koen brought together a powerful 
coalition of Black leaders behind Walker’s campaign. “We activated the Coalition downstate to 
work for the election of Gov. Walker,” Koen explained, “based on offsetting the ills of the 
Ogilvie administration.” The coalition included representation from 24 downstate communities 
and focused its energy on getting out Black voters in their districts for Walker. When the election 
results came, the coalition claimed success as Ogilvie was ousted from the governor’s office with 
Black voters playing an important role in several Illinois communities.72  
 United Front leaders anticipated that their support for Walker would afford them political 
patronage and influence over the new governor. With Walker in office the lines of 
communication were certainly more open than they had been under the Ogilvie Administration. 
Moreover, some tangible gains for Black Cairoites were secured, including a commitment to 
prevent the closure of St. Mary’s Hospital, which had been facing serious financial difficulties, 
and the extension of $50,000 in economic development grants to a new United Front initiative                                                         
71 “Koen backs Walker,” Chicago Daily Defender, November 7, 1972. 
72 “United Front maps strategy,” Chicago Defender, September 15, 1972; “Koen lauds state’s black voters,” 
Chicago Daily Defender, November 9, 1972. 
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focused on assisting in the development of small business enterprises. Indeed, by the fall of 
1973, United Front leaders expressed some optimism about their community development 
initiatives seeing some small but significant progress.73 
Building upon these initial successes, the United Front’s coalition organized a series of 
local forums aimed at highlighting the concerns facing the state’s poorest communities. Talk of a 
comprehensive state project that would bring significant economic development and social 
service programming to Southern Illinois was discussed, including expanded funding for the 
OEO agencies to allow for job training. “We went to Springfield with a master plan,” United 
Front chief of staff James Chairs explained. “And they listened.” However, over the next year 
very little progress was made and the relationship between the United Front’s coalition and the 
Walker administration ultimately broke down when the governor supported a series of regressive 
welfare policies. United Front activist Geneva Whitfield had actively campaigned for Walker but 
now lamented her decision. “I could claw my eyes out now,” she declared. “Walker brainwashed 
us, I figured if a man wore out his shoes going around talking to people and if he didn’t drive a 
limousine, I figured we had a chance with that man. But now, I don’t see nothing that he has 
done to help the poor people. People are suffering under the administration of Walker.”74 In 
March 1974, members of the United Front electoral coalition showed up at a joint session of the 
legislature to protest the fact that the governor had turned a “deaf ear” toward the plight of the 
poor. As the coalition broke down, so did hopes that electoral politics was a solution to the plight 
                                                        73 “3 County medics to Cairo,” Chicago Defender, March 14, 1973; Joy Darrow, “Cairo has changed-for the better?” 
Chicago Defender, November 10, 1973; “United Front maps strategy,” Chicago Defender, September 15, 1972. 
74 Bud Farrar, “Walker’s charisma has faded away,” Southern Illinoisan, May 19, 1974. 
 323 
of Black Cairotes. “They kept telling us to try the political process,” one United Front activist 
declared, “and we tried the political process only to get cheated again.”75 
The Cairo United Front’s attempts at tactical innovation between 1971 and 1974 had 
produced a mixed bag for local Black Power activists. Prompted by what Rev. Blaine Ramsey 
called a “recession of national spirit,” the United Front had been forced to make some difficult 
decisions after their primary source of funding dwindled. This decline in church resources was 
compounded in the summer of 1971 by a further narrowing of political opportunities when 
members of the White Citizen’s Council rose to political power and several of the United Front’s 
leadership faced incarceration. It was in this context that United Front leaders decided to 
deemphasize the high profile mass mobilizations and direct action campaigns that had 
characterized the organization’s first three years. Instead, local activists opted to shift their focus 
to the organization’s ongoing legal battles and the leveraging of political patronage through 
involvement in electoral politics at the state level. The latter proved largely ineffective as a tool 
to expand the United Front’s fledgling economic programs, though some limited progress was 
made. On the other hand, legal strategies, as the concluding chapter shows, were remarkably 
successful in transforming the city’s longstanding patterns of racial discrimination in politics, 
hiring, and law enforcement. However, the onset of a primarily legal and electoral battle over the 
rights and opportunities of Black Cairoites also marked the end of mass mobilization and social 
movement activity in Cairo, Illinois. While key leaders like Rev. Charles Koen, James Chairs, 
and Preston Ewing, Jr., continued to devote considerable energy to the struggle for Black Power, 
the days of rallies, picketing, and protest had drawn to a close. In December 1985, the St. Louis                                                         
75 Vernon Jarrett, “Battling for voters’ rights,” Chicago Tribune, September 27, 1981; Betsy Chan and Esters Greer, 
Jr., “Say Walker has deaf ear,” Chicago Defender, March 16, 1974; “United Front maps strategy,” Chicago 
Defender, September 15, 1972; Joy Darrow, “Cairo has changed-for the better?” Chicago Defender, November 10, 
1973; “United Front of Cairo calls meet,” September 27, 1973; “Walker to aid Cairo,” Chicago Daily Defender, 
September 20, 1973. 
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Post Dispatch poignantly characterized the impact of these tactical innovations. While the United 
Front had survived, the paper reported that “in a touch of irony” the organization was now “part 
of the establishment,” functioning as a “clearinghouse for federal and state social services 
grants.”76
                                                        
76 Patrick E. Gauen, “Civil Rights Activist Seeks Role in Illinois Governor’s Race,” St. Louis Post Dispatch, 
December 26, 1985. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In the spring of 1972, the United States Commission on Civil Rights held a three-day public 
hearing in Cairo to examine the “underlying causes of racial strife” in this now infamous city. 
For almost five years, events in Cairo had dominated national headlines, prompting 
commentators to ask whether the city was a “bizarre anomaly,” or if its story offered “an 
ominous portent of the future.” Commissioner Frankie Freeman explained that information 
gathered during the hearing would be used “to examine and evaluate not only the problems of 
Cairo, but… of cities throughout the Nation that are also troubled by poverty [and] racial strife.” 
After hearing from representatives from city government, state and federal agencies, private 
business, and the Black community, the Commission made nineteen recommendations. Among 
them were a proposal to overhaul the policies and practices of the Cairo Police Department, 
which the Commission condemned as having been “both unprofessional and biased;” the 
appointment of Black residents to serve on all county and city boards and commissions; the 
immediate integration of public housing; and the initiation of investigations into discriminatory 
practices in public and private employment. Governmental agencies at the local, state, and 
federal level were tasked with ensuring that these recommendations were carried out.1  
 Two years later, staff members from the Commission’s Illinois Advisory Committee 
returned to Cairo to evaluate what progress had been made. Despite the cessation of open 
hostilities, committee members quickly discerned that the relative calm did not stem from 
meaningful changes in the city’s racial practices. Under Mayor Walder’s U.C.C.A.-dominated                                                         
1 Kohn, “Civil War in Cairo, Ill.”; Lukas, “Bad Day At Cairo, Ill.”; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Cairo, 
Illinois: A Symbol of Racial Polarization,12; Hearing Before the United States Commission on Civil Rights, 325. 
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city council, local government remained a bastion of white power. Black Cairoites held only 5 of 
the 126 positions available on city and county boards and commissions and continued to 
experience chronic underrepresentation in municipal employment. The city still had no Black 
firemen and only two Black police officers charged with patrolling the still rigidly segregated 
Pyramid Courts. Investigations performed by the Illinois Fair Employment Practices 
Commission (FEPC) and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) 
confirmed widespread discriminatory practices in public and private employment, but both 
agencies reported that statutory and budgetary constraints had prevented effective action. 
Perhaps most disconcertingly, the Committee found that “no action” had been taken “to prevent 
a recurrence of the breakdown of law and justice which occurred in Cairo during the late 1960s 
and early 1970s.” The policies and practices of the Cairo Police Department remained wholly 
unchanged. Almost a decade after the Committee’s first visit to the city in 1966, members 
concluded that the “impact of civil rights legislation has still not reached Cairo.”2  
The findings of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in 1972 and the Illinois Advisory 
Committee in 1974 revealed the extent and resiliency of Cairo’s racial and economic problems. 
Despite mounting one of the longest and best-organized struggles of the Black Power era, the 
United Front had struggled to pierce a solid wall of white intransigence and naked terror. In turn, 
these local challenges had been exacerbated by the refusal of public officials at all levels of 
government to use their authority to force compliance with civil rights legislation, opting instead 
to use the punitive arm of the state to quash protests. However, despite the bleak picture rendered 
by the hearings, the United Front’s efforts had not been in vain. As protests waned, legal suits 
filed at the height of the struggle continued to make their way through the courts, culminating, by 
                                                        
2 Illinois Advisory Committee, A Decade of Waiting in Cairo, 29, 32. 
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the decade’s end, in a series of landmark victories that would irrevocably transform racial 
practices in the city.   
A key turning point in the legal battle took place in October 1974 when a resolution was 
finally reached in Y oung v. A lexander County Housing Authority, a suit filed five years earlier 
addressing segregation in public housing. The consent decree that followed resulted in the 
integration of public housing and the allocation of federal funds for renovations necessary to 
bring accommodations up to equal standards. Importantly, the consent decree also stipulated that 
members of the Alexander County Board should retain two Black representatives to serve on the 
Housing Authority establishing a precedent for affirmative action appointments to other boards 
and commissions. The following year, a settlement was reached in Ewing v. Walder, resulting in 
a consent decree mandating Black representation on the boards of a number of municipal 
agencies including the county Welfare Commission, Land Commission, Building Commission, 
and Health Department, as well as the city Board of Zoning Appeals, Library Board, Police 
Pension Board, and Board of Fire and Police Commissioners. In February 1976, a resolution was 
also reached in the seven-year-old Hollis v. Emerson case, resulting in the appointment of a 
Black representative to the four-member Public Utilities Commission. Collectively, these legal 
rulings contributed to a significant expansion of formal Black political power in the city, 
affording African Americans a greater role in the administration of governmental programs and 
agencies.3  
 However, the biggest political victory would not come until March 1980 when the district 
court ruled on Kendrick v. Walder, a suit filed by Hattie Kendrick in 1973 charging that Cairo’s 
at-large city council system violated the 14th and 15th Amendments as well as the Voting Rights                                                         
3 Seng, “The Cairo Experience: Civil Rights Litigation in a Racial Powder Keg,” 305-310; Illinois Advisory 
Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights, A Decade of Waiting in Cairo, 16-17; Cairo City 
Council Minutes, September 24, 1974; Cairo City Council Minutes, June 24, 1975.  
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Act of 1965 by “canceling, minimizing, and diluting” the votes of Black citizens. After seven 
years of legal wrangling, a consent decree was imposed abolishing the at-large city council 
system of governance and replacing it with an aldermanic system in which the city was divided 
into five wards, two of which were predominantly African American. In November 1980, two 
Black Cairoites – Bobbie Whitaker (Second Ward) and Earl Wade (Third Ward) – were elected 
to the city council, becoming the first African American councilmembers in almost seventy 
years. In the next election, the United Front’s chairman, Charles Koen, would join them, 
symbolizing a transition of movement leadership from protest to Black officialdom.4 
 Beyond the political sphere, Black Cairoites also made some significant strides in the 
battle against employment discrimination, increasing the number of municipal jobs held by 
Black workers. In February 1976, under pressure from the EEOC, the city agreed to maintain a 
17 percent Black workforce as well as employ two African Americans on the fire department and 
three on the police department. That same year, Charles Bridges became the city’s first African 
American firefighter. “Back then you had some bad bigots in this department,” Bridges recalled. 
“But I knew I had to fight it. Either blacks were going to be here or I was going to go down 
swinging.” Legal action also prompted a number of county agencies including the Department of 
Corrections, the Housing Authority, the Highway Department, and the public aid office to begin 
hiring Black workers in skilled and semi-skilled positions. Former United Front activist Clarence 
Dossie pointed to the significance of these gains for Black workers. “If it wasn’t for the 
                                                        
4 Seng, “The Cairo Experience: Civil Rights Litigation in a Racial Powder Keg,” 308-11; Eastman, “Speaking Truth 
to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators,”; “Rule at-large voting hits blacks in Cairo,” Chicago Defender, 
December 17, 1975; “Court overturn bias ruling,” Chicago Defender, December 18, 1975; “Downstate Primary: 2 
Black Aldermen for Cairo,” Chicago Sun-Times, August 25, 1980; “Charles Koen to Seek Spot on Cairo City 
Council,” Milwaukee Courier, June 28, 1980; Cairo City Council Minutes, May 27, 1980; Cairo City Council 
Minutes, June 10, 1980; Cairo City Council Minutes, August 28, 1980; Cairo City Council Minutes, January 13, 
1981. 
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movement… a lot of brothers that were around here they wouldn’t have gotten jobs… because 
we were instrumental in helping them get jobs on the highway department and the prison jobs.”5  
The Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law played a critical role in securing 
these victories and continued to provide the only free legal services available to poor Black and 
white citizens in the county. In 1972, the Lawyers’ Committee played a prominent role in the 
formation of the Land of Lincoln Legal Assistance Foundation which took over operations in the 
city and went on to provide free legal services in sixty-five counties across central and southern 
Illinois. Among the organization’s founders were local attorney Robert Lansden and NAACP 
president Preston Ewing, Jr. In this manner, Black Power struggles in Cairo directly contributed 
to the development of what Ewing describes as a vast “network of legal services” across the state 
of Illinois.6 
 In tandem with these important legal gains, the United Front and its many organizational 
offshoots were responsible for the only substantive economic development efforts of the 1970s. 
In addition to their earlier cooperative ventures, United Front activists worked with the Pulaski-
Alexander Development Corporation (PADCO) to attract a small number of new industries to 
the city and provide technical assistance to individuals seeking to start businesses of their own. 
In conjunction with the latter, United Front members also formed Help Your Brother, Inc., a 
non-profit organization that leveraged state and federal grants to assist in small business 
development. The United Front’s housing initiative, the Egyptian Housing Development 
Corporation, was particularly effective, resulting in the construction of over 160 homes for low-
                                                        
5 “Cairo: The Legacy of Racism,” The Washington Post, March 22, 1987; Seng, “The Cairo Experience: Civil 
Rights Litigation in a Racial Powder Keg,” 301-304; Illinois Advisory Committee to the United States Commission 
on Civil Rights, A Decade of Waiting in Cairo, 16-17. 
6 Hattie Kendrick to John Phipps, Esq., February 9, 1984, Kendrick-Brooks Family Papers, LOC, box 20, folder 12; 
Land of Lincoln Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc., “Handbook for Advisory Councilmembers,” (1977), Kendrick-
Brooks Family Papers, LOC, box 21, folder 8; Preston Ewing interview, Cairo, Illinois, October 29, 2011. 
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income residents as well as creating jobs for local carpenters and laborers. While modest, these 
programs represented the only meaningful local efforts to counteract capital flight, job losses, 
and growing poverty.7  
  Beyond these tangible gains, Black Power had also facilitated a potent transformation in 
the consciousness and identity of Black Cairoites, particularly the working class activists who 
had been at the forefront of local struggles. In oral interviews and biographies, United Front 
members stress the role that the movement played in fostering a powerful sense of racial 
solidarity or, in their own words, “oneness” and “togetherness.” The organization’s democratic 
organizing model allowed people who had been marginalized from formal political power for 
generations to articulate their shared experience of racial oppression and cultivate a sense of 
agency necessary for collective action. Parallel institutions afforded the unschooled and 
unemployed new knowledge and skills instilling pride and a belief in the capacity for self-
determination. For a working class activist like Clarence Dossie, the movement offered an 
opportunity to obtain a formal education as well as visit other parts of the country forging 
connections with leaders in a broader movement for racial justice and social change. “I would 
never have gone anywhere if it hadn’t been for the [movement],” Dossie states. “I never would 
have traveled the highways… I would never have had a chance to meet Cesar Chavez… Dick 
Gregory… Louis Farrakhan.” Emboldened and inspired by these types of experiences, United 
Front activists would continue to organize around the plight of Black workers in Cairo even after 
the broader movement had dissipated. Dossie eventually became a master craftsman and turned 
                                                        7 Illinois Advisory Committee, A Decade of Waiting in Cairo, 13, 33-34; Minutes of the Illinois Consortium for 
Community Action, October 11, 1973, ICC Records, box 10, folder 31; Minutes of the Illinois Consortium for 
Community Action, November 15, 1973, ICC Records, box 10, folder 31; Seng, “The Cairo Experience: Civil 
Rights Litigation in a Racial Powder Keg,” 305; Preston Ewing Interview, Cairo, Illinois, October 29, 2011. 
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his attention to addressing discrimination in local craft unions. Others entered local politics, 
organized around welfare and tenants rights, and championed equitable taxation policy.8 
 Importantly, Soul Power has shown that these cultural, political, and economic 
transformations were possible in large measure due to the United Front’s ability to mobilize the 
organizational and ideational resources of the Black church. Challenging accounts of Black 
Power’s de-Christianization, this dissertation has shown that activists in Cairo successfully 
counteracted the narrowing political opportunities and sectarianism of the late 1960s and early 
1970s by forging a surprisingly broad-based and inclusive coalition under the banner of a new 
spiritual philosophy and a set of shared cultural practices rooted in the Black church. Building on 
the unrivaled social and cultural power of Cairo’s Black churches, local activists mobilized 
religious discourses and cultures to bridge potent intraracial divisions rooted in class, generation, 
and ideology. In the hands of grassroots activists, Black religious traditions operated as a kind of 
glue, binding together disparate peoples in a common struggle for social justice and racial 
change. It was primarily because of this broad-based and cohesive foundation that the United 
Front was able to survive state repression and vigilante violence mounting one of the longest and 
most successful Black Power campaigns of the era.  
This vision of a religiously grounded Black united front was Reverend Charles Koen’s 
most important contribution to the national Black Power Movement. A little examined and 
undervalued movement theorist, Koen skillfully navigated the organizational rifts and thorny 
political debates of Black Power’s “second wave” building an effective local united front 
                                                        
8 Koen, The Cairo Story, 25; Preston Ewing interview, Cairo, Illinois, October 29, 2011; Clarence Dossie interview, 
Cairo, Illinois, February 5, 2010; “Tenant Orgn. To Be Formed,” The Monitor, May 13, 1971; Cairo City Council 
Minutes, May 14, 1974; Cairo City Council Minutes, May 28, 1974; Cairo City Council Minutes, November 26, 
1974; “Blacks Want In On Housing Changes,” The Monitor, Mary 11, 1972; Cairo City Council Minutes, January 
13, 1976; Cairo City Council Minutes, January 27, 1976; Cairo City Council Minutes, February 10, 1976; Cairo City 
Council Minutes, July 25, 1978. 
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organization and solidifying ties with offshoots in communities across Illinois and Missouri. By 
1971, Koen – with the aid of his extensive political allies – had succeeded in developing a 
national political structure foreshadowing the emergence of the National Black United Front at 
the decades end.  
Central to all of Koen’s political projects was a belief in the unifying power of a religious 
tradition that placed emphasis on the poor and oppressed. Soul Power has shown that Koen and 
other United Front activists, far from being disconnected from the emergent Black Theology, 
were key agents in its production, consumption, and transmission. Engaging the latest religious 
literature, inviting theologians to speak at weekly rallies, and obtaining training at seminaries and 
universities across the country, Cairo’s Black Power activists were significant participants in a 
broader dialogue about Black Theology’s character and role in protest and community building 
traditions. In many ways, grassroots activists anticipated many of the more recent turns in Black 
Theology, though the rise of Womanist Theology was an important exception to this rule. As 
community organizers, United Front leaders intuitively fused formal academic theologies with 
deeper African American folk traditions, presaging the important work of theologians such as 
Dwight Hopkins. In turn, Koen’s blending of grassroots revivalism and radical politics produced 
a strong emphasis on social class as well as a critique of U.S. capitalism neglected by many early 
works in Black Theology. Accordingly, I argue that Koen and other grassroots movement 
theorists should be understood as pioneers and co-contributors in the effort to develop a 
systematic Black Theology during the late 1960s and 1970s.  
If grassroots activists were formative to the development of Black Liberation Theology, 
Soul Power also shows that Black theologians and church executives made vital contributions to 
local Black Power struggles. Emboldened by the New Nationalism of the post-rebellion era, 
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Black clergy developed their own caucuses and ecumenical bodies, exerting pressure on 
predominantly white denominations to extend resources directly to Black Power organizations. 
As a result of these efforts, the United Front was able to secure more than half a million dollars 
in grants from church-based sponsors between 1969 and 1974, as well as vital technical and legal 
support. The “no-strings” funding model adopted by denominational authorities ensured that 
church funding would play an important role in sustaining those aspects of the United Front’s 
work that corporate and state donors refused to sponsor such as legal expenses, rent, and staff 
salaries. This funding insulated Black working class activists from economic harassment and 
allowed the United Front to move beyond “survival work” to the development of a constructive 
program for economic and community development. In turn, seed-money grants provided by 
churches played an important role in initiating programs like the Lawyers’ Committee and the 
Egyptian Housing Development Corporation, increasing the likelihood that more stable sources 
of governmental funding would eventually be secured. Accordingly, I argue that the nation’s 
churches were an important and overlooked source of coalitional support for Black Power and 
challenge traditional periodizations of the liberal civil rights coalition’s decline.   
 However, in an era of conservative ascendancy the United Front’s reliance upon such 
funds proved to be a double-edged sword and by the mid-1970s churches retreated under 
mounting opposition from state agencies and white congregants. When combined with ongoing 
repression at the local level, the collapse in church funding compelled United Front leaders to 
redirect energy away from mass direct action strategies and toward legal gradualism and state 
sponsored economic development projects, resulting in the decline of the Cairo movement. 
Accordingly, Soul Power also contributes to broader debates about Black Power’s decline as 
well as the rise of modern conservatism, situating the nation’s churches at the center.  
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While the shift away from mass direct action signaled the end of the Black Power 
Movement in Cairo, the aforementioned legal and political victories were secured in the quieter 
years that followed, serving to expand Black political power and access to municipal 
employment. However, victories in the battle against economic decline, capital flight, and Black 
deproletarianization were harder to come by, indicative of a broader national problem. In the 
forty years following the Black Power struggle, Cairo has continued to decline, its population 
plummeting from just over six thousand in 1970 to less than three thousand in 2010. Downtown 
stores are closed, industry has relocated, and the city itself is in dire financial straits. “Cairo has 
been raped and everything else as far as the economics,” former United Front activist Clarence 
Dossie stated in 2010. “The people that was controlling Cairo they done taken everything out of 
Cairo and Cairo is indebted like I don’t know what… They ain’t got no base as far as a tax 
base… and no businesses.” Reflecting back on his years in the struggle, Dossie surmised that the 
United Front had “won the battle but we lost the war.” Despite the severity of the city’s 
economic problems, the impact of the Cairo Black Power Movement has continued to resonate 
across the nation, giving rise to new political alliances such as the National Black United Front 
and theologies that offer an important alternative to prevailing conservative doctrines such as the 
prosperity gospel.9    
 
                                                        
9 Clarence Dossie interview, Cairo, Illinois, February 5, 2010. 
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APPENDIX: ANNUAL DONATIONS MADE TO THE CAIRO UNITED FRONT BY THREE 
MAJOR CHURCH-BASED AGENCIES, 1968-1971 
 
Year Church-Based Agency Amount 
1968 Episcopal General Convention 
Special Program 
1,100 
1969 Episcopal General Convention 
Special Program 
10,000 
1970 Episcopal Church General 
Convention Special Program 
68,000 
1970 Interreligious Foundation for 
Community Organizations (IFCO) 
229,660 
1971 Presbyterian Church National 
Committee on the Self-Development 
of People 
112,000 
1971 Presbyterian National Committee on 
the Self-Development of People 
15,000 
Total  435,760 
 
Source: Bishop Albert A. Chambers to Charles McClellan, November 5, 1968, ICC Records, box 19, 
folder 4; “Twelve Grants Approved for Community Action Projects,” Episcopal Church Diocesan Press 
Service, February 19, 1970; United Front of Cairo, “IFCO Grant Proposal Records,” August 27, 1970, 
IFCO Papers, Schomburg Center of Research in Black Culture, New York Public Library, box 35, folder 
78; United Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., Minutes of the General Assembly of the United Presbyterian 
Church in the U.S.A., Part 1 (Philadelphia, PA: Office of The General Assembly, 1972), 98, 836, 840-2; 
Bryant George to Blaine Ramsey, August 10, 1972, ICC Records, box 19, folder 14; “UPUSA Announces 
Grant for ‘Self Development,” Presbyterian Journal (December 8, 1971). 
